Dear Parminder, I see that your interactions in other threads of the same topic have all run out of steam, ending up in circular arguments. Let me also try to explain things in a simple manner to try and get you to understand *why* your argument does not hold. On 09/04/2016 06:54, parminder wrote:
You are describing a case where a private party sought seizure of a ccTLD (Iranian) on quite dubious grounds....
That is correct. This was a concrete case.
You are not willing to discuss all the cases in which domain names were seized through orders to the registries.....
Because that has *nothing* to do with ICANN! I am surprised that you would not know the difference between the Root & the Registries, but let me try and explain it in a clear a way I can try. The Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical decentralized naming system for computers, services, or any resource connected to the Internet or a private network. Note the words: "hierarchical" and "decentralized". At the top of the hierarchy, there is the ROOT. That database contains a list of all of the top level domains, including generic top level domains, country code top level domains, internationalised top level domains etc. That database points to the nameservers which contain the next level domain of each top level domain. These databases are run by each top level domain Registries running that particular top level domain. The databases run by the Registries then point to the nameservers for a sub-domain, often run by the internet service provider or other provider that's agreed to run the DNS for a particular domain. Let me take an example for my company's domain name gih.com - and I am simplifying the interactions between nameservers queries etc. but roughly this is what happens: When you send me an email, your mail exchanger checks the domain gih.com The Root server (or one of its copies) returns information that the .COM Top Level Domain is run by the Verisign Registry so the query is forwarded to the nameserver for .COM. at the Verisign Registry. That nameserver returns the IP address of the nameserver for GIH.COM - that's auth1.ns.gin.ntt.net and the query is forwarded there. That nameserver is the only one that has all of the details for domain name GIH.COM and what actual computer to send the email to. You are complaining that domain name take-downs have been sent to the Registry. Well, it's a fat of life that .COM is run by Verisign and that Verisign is a US company, so it is subjected to US law. I find this quite normal. If someone want to have a domain name that's registered with a non-US company, that's perfectly possible too. You can register domains under Country Code Top Level domains that are run by companies which are not based in the United States. In fact there are now a lot of Generic Top Level Domains that are not run by US companies. So the choice is there for end users to register domains under a variety of jurisdictions.
You are not ready to respond to the question on what would happen if a closed business gTLD is similarly brought to a US court, in which case ICANN ittself is the registry, as Verisign etc were registries for .com, etc, and thus the party to which earlier orders were directed. Any order for gTLD seizures would clearly be directed at ICANN. And the latter has no protection against it.
No. Not at all. ICANN is not a Registry. It is currently running .INT and a couple of other technical gTLDs, but its work is not to run Registries. What I think you are arguing is that ICANN could receive an order to have gih.com seized. It would be able to do nothing about it. It would forward this request to Verisign, who would take the action it deems necessary. But let's say GIH was under top level domain "example" and this was run by a Registry based in India. If ICANN received a request to seize gih.example, it would forward this request to the Registry in India and it is the Registry in India that would decide what they want to do. Nothing to do with ICANN. Is this clearer now? Kind regards, Olivier