Dear Michele, On 23/09/2015 15:36, Michele Neylon - Blacknight wrote:

Speaking in my purely personal capacity … Just to clarify - not ALL contracted parties are going to be pushing as hard for a next round as others ..

I’m not saying that we are opposed to a new round - a lot of registrars obviously aren’t - but not all of us are going to be as motivated for a new round as others

I’m on the record as saying that quite a few things from the current round need to be reviewed.

Thanks for your follow-up. I am sure that not all contracted parties might wish another round. In fact, there are surely some Registries that are starting business from the current round and are no looking forward to having another round tailing behind them. Ditto for Registrars that have to sign more and more agreements with more Registries. But what I have noticed so far on the GNSO council is that the representatives from Contracted Parties have a unified concern that the process might be delayed - thus reticence to having an initial extended commenting period, concerns that the PDP might take several years. Eagerness to start now. Has a frank discussion taken place in Contracted parties House? Kindest regards, Olivier

Olivier, I read carefully your statement, and I’m really satisfied. I found it exhaustive, well documented, and addressing all the points that I fought for in the discussion group that prepared for the issue report. I fully agree with you that we need to avoid rushing towards a next round, but not block the system endlessly. We need to be present and strongly defend our positions in the WG. I will be there. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- Tijani BEN JEMAA Executive Director Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) Phone: + 216 41 649 605 Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 Fax: + 216 70 853 376 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- De : at-large-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org [mailto:at-large-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org] De la part de Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond Envoyé : mercredi 23 septembre 2015 15:24 À : at-large@atlarge-lists.icann.org; ICANN GTLD WG list Objet : Re: [At-Large] [ALAC-Announce] CALL FOR COMMENTS: ALAC Statement on the Preliminary Issue Report on New gTLD Subsequent Procedures [ I've modified the distribution & added both new gTLD WG list & ALAC list - when you reply, you might get a bounce from the new gTLD list if you're not in the WG but staff will do the magic to unlock you message ] Just a few notes: - the Preliminary Issues Report is long (147 pages) but needs to be read thoroughly. - the draft ALAC Statement addresses only those points which Carlton and I felt were important to address. If you see anything else in the Preliminary Issues Report that requires our attention, please flag it as soon as possible so we can add it. - I know that some in our community are saying: "no more new gTLDs / ban on new gTLD rounds", or "no more new gTLDs until we see a demonstration that the first round has served the public interest". Please note that the current issues report says that the default is that the program *will continue with a next round*. Having spent time on the gNSO council participating in the discussions, it is clear that there is a very strong pressure from Contracted Parties and some parts of the Non-Contracted parties (some of whom might be interested in being part of the next application round) that *want* a next round to take place *as soon as possible*. Unless you are ready to enter a trench war with the GNSO, I would not recommend that we ask for an outright indefinite ban on new gTLDs -- because since the working group will be a GNSO working group, we'll all end up being completely ignored from day 1. Carlton and I have therefore taken the stance that if there is going to be another round, *all* the issues identified in the issues report, and other issues we have pointed out, need to be both studied and resolved. Even that is going to be a very hard point to defend, but it is absolutely worth defending - if/when the working group gets under way, please take part in the WG. - If the At-Large Community would like next round of new gTLDs promoting applicants from developing economies, the ALAC might need to support a next round sooner rather than later. Kind regards, Olivier On 23/09/2015 14:07, ICANN At-Large Staff wrote: Dear All, On behalf of the ALAC, Olivier Crepin-Leblond and Carlton Samuels have developed the first draft ALAC Statement in response to the Public Comment on the Preliminary Issue Report on New <https://community.icann.org/x/zIdYAw> gTLD Subsequent Procedures. The draft, as well as pertinent resources for the Public Comment, can be found in its wiki workspace here: https://community.icann.org/x/zIdYAw. All At-Large members are welcome to comment on this draft. Please take a moment to review this draft and if you have input, please submit it in the wiki workspace using the comment function by 30 September 2015. You will need to log in to the wiki to use the comment function. If you don’t have a login or have other issue using the wiki, kindly contact staff@atlarge.icann.org. Inputs submitted in this mailing list will be transferred to the wiki workspace for the penholder(s) to keep track of the community comments and take them into consideration when finalizing the draft. Regards, Heidi Ullrich, Silvia Vivanco, Ariel Liang, Gisella Gruber, Nathalie Peregrine and Terri Agnew ICANN Policy Staff in support of ALAC E-mail: staff@atlarge.icann.org Facebook: www.facebook.com/icannatlarge <https://www.facebook.com/icannatlarge> Twitter: @ <https://twitter.com/ICANNAtLarge> ICANNAtLarge <https://twitter.com/ICANNAtLarge> --- L'absence de virus dans ce courrier électronique a été vérifiée par le logiciel antivirus Avast. https://www.avast.com/antivirus

Dear Christopher, my comments inline: On 02/10/2015 13:02, Christopher Wilkinson wrote:

Olivier, Carlton, All:

Thankyou. Noted.

1.The next round should wait for the outcome of the IAG-CCT studies.

That's included in the ALAC Draft Statement.

2.The next round should prioritise the under provided groups from the last round: IDN, Social and Community, non-NA/EU etc.

That is included in the Staff Issues report and I expect that it will be a significant discussion point in the PDP, if there is one.

3.The vertical integration decision should be revoked and ICANN should be taking its competition and user-protection responsibilities seriously.

I think that at this point in time, it is too early to voice this point. But it might be discussed in the potential PDP. That said, expect strong opposition. Kindest regards, Olivier

I cannot but note with considerable surprise and disappoinment that when everyone with any thing ever to do with ICANN is currently hotly debating the issue of the stand off between the ICANN board and CCWG on ICANN accountability, ALAC remains so aloof from the issue.... When this should prima facie be the one part of the ICANN structure, as representing the peripheries, that should be most bothered by efforts at concentration of power, or of holding on it, vis a vis the rights of the public. I have not been able to follow the process closely, but if I am right -and please correct me if I am not - even in the earlier discussions ALAC has been most lukewarm to any kind of structural changes that could indeed place an effective oversight of the 'community' over the ICANN board, when as said ALAC is the one group that should be most keen on institutionalising such checks over centralisation of power with the ICANN board. Can anyone explain me why it is so. It really intrigues me, and I am sure I am missing something here. Thanks, parminder

Well said Evan. Many of us have been anything but aloof. Befuddled, frustrated, exhausted... We've been pushing for real changes and disclosures without much support. Icann is adept at denial and self-preservation. This has little to do with accountability and transparency but it works well for what has become an inside circle pushing money around the table. We're dealing with a new monolithic sovereign entity, a virtual royal nation. Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry -----Original Message----- From: Evan Leibovitch <evan@telly.org> Sender: at-large-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2015 16:38:37 To: parminder<parminder@itforchange.net> Cc: ICANN At-Large list<at-large@atlarge-lists.icann.org> Subject: Re: [At-Large] ICANN oversight _______________________________________________ At-Large mailing list At-Large@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/at-large At-Large Official Site: http://atlarge.icann.org

Evan I am even more surprised by your email - although there is completely honestly written all over it, and that from gbruen@knujon.com that followed yours. I am not sure what and whim exactly you are so completely disgruntled with . I am sure you are aware ofthis statement from ALAC <https://community.icann.org/display/alacpolicydev/At-Large+Cross+Community+W...> on the ICANN oversight issue which says "The ALAC is generally supportive of the overall proposal. Although the ALAC preference was to have less “enforceability” and a lighter-weight proposal than preferred by some other groups in ICANN,......" which represents a position whose status quo-ism is beaten only by the Board's own position. So, when you criticise the Board for not listening to you/ ALAC I am not how to square that with this status quoist statement of ALAC, which refuses to make any structural changes to the current power configuration. I am really even more puzzled. Will the real ALAC stand up! More later, but the above has further confused me. parminder On Saturday 10 October 2015 08:08 PM, Evan Leibovitch wrote:

Speaking for myself only...

The ALAC has a number of people on the CCWG itself, so in that that sense At-Large has been central to that very confrontation with the Board which you note.

But beyond that, what are your expectations? Fiery protest? An avalanche of advice statements? Caustic op-ed pieces in DomainIncite?

Speaking for nobody but myself ... an example of the complacency that bothers you ... I think there's some war-weariness settling in.

On the ground, very little that ALAC does seems to policy-wise have much real consequence. On an issue that (by name!) impacted our community the most in the TLD expansion -- Public Interest Commitments -- we were ignored before it was invented, and rebuffed after we complained that it did not serve its claimed purpose. This was serious enough that we called for a freeze of new gTLD deliveries, which led to a series of high-level discussions that .... burned a lot of volunteer time before being shut down with no change.

In essence we were powerless to affect even the facet of ICANN that most directly impacted end-users. What chance does it have elsewhere?

(In other words, from the PoV of end-user influence in ICANN policy, you can't get worse than powerless and we're already there.)

Compound this with the time demanded to understand the complex CCWG issues. But At-Large, almost by definition, is not comprised of policy wonks, but rather of casual participants to whom ICANN is just one small corridor inside the Internet Governance labyrinth. Very few At-Largers would call Internet Governance a profession, and have the time to completely follow a really archaic process such as the IANA handoff.

Meanwhile, there are other components of the labyrinth -- traffic blocking, site takedowns, zero-rating, RTBF -- that can make the fussing over domain names look trivial by comparison. ICANN attracts its level of attention because of the money floating around, not because its issues are the most critical to Internet users.

So... combine a sense that the public interest will continue to be ignored regardless of who oversees ICANN, together with these other factors, and perhaps the result is the seeming complacency that appears to irritate.

- Evan

On 10 October 2015 at 13:13, parminder <parminder@itforchange.net <mailto:parminder@itforchange.net>> wrote:

I cannot but note with considerable surprise and disappoinment that when everyone with any thing ever to do with ICANN is currently hotly debating the issue of the stand off between the ICANN board and CCWG on ICANN accountability, ALAC remains so aloof from the issue.... When this should prima facie be the one part of the ICANN structure, as representing the peripheries, that should be most bothered by efforts at concentration of power, or of holding on it, vis a vis the rights of the public.

I have not been able to follow the process closely, but if I am right -and please correct me if I am not - even in the earlier discussions ALAC has been most lukewarm to any kind of structural changes that could indeed place an effective oversight of the 'community' over the ICANN board, when as said ALAC is the one group that should be most keen on institutionalising such checks over centralisation of power with the ICANN board. Can anyone explain me why it is so. It really intrigues me, and I am sure I am missing something here.

Thanks, parminder

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-- Evan Leibovitch Geneva, CH

Em: evan at telly dot org Sk: evanleibovitch Tw: el56

Hi, I disgree that the At-Large has no effect. I think the fact that we have PICs at all is largely due to At-Large. But for things to have community level pressure it takes getting alliances and perseverance. And yeah there is compromise. But at-large when it focuses on a goal and carries through. On 10-Oct-15 10:38, Evan Leibovitch wrote:

Speaking for myself only...

...

On the ground, very little that ALAC does seems to policy-wise have much real consequence. On an issue that (by name!) impacted our community the most in the TLD expansion -- Public Interest Commitments -- we were ignored before it was invented, and rebuffed after we complained that it did not serve its claimed purpose. This was serious enough that we called for a freeze of new gTLD deliveries, which led to a series of high-level discussions that .... burned a lot of volunteer time before being shut down with no change.

Keep pushing for PIC compliance, you will succeed in the end. Use the User Pulpit. avri --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus

""I'll repeat Larry Strickling's words, which I agree with 100%: "Why is it that so many in the ICANN community feel that a Board member which they have appointed THEMSELVES turns into a pariah the moment he/she is appointed? "" Personally, I believe they turn into auto-pariah's unless there is an efficient and independent external whistleblower process to prevent and discourage bad actor government involvement and other forms of intimidation. No internal process is sufficient in my opinion. Ron

Olivier, Spot on. And so does unnecessary complexity. When "ownership" displaces stewardship all will be lost. Accountability that does not cut bidirectionally is exactly that. Alejandro Pisanty Enviado desde/Sent from BlackBerry® ! !! !!! !!!! Dr. Alejandro Pisanty UNAM, Av. Universidad 3000, 04510 Mexico DF Mexico Blog: http://pisanty.blogspot.com LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/pisanty Unete al grupo UNAM en LinkedIn, http://www.linkedin.com/e/gis/22285/4A106C0C8614 Twitter: http://twitter.com/apisanty ---->> Unete a ISOC Mexico, http://www.isoc.org . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -----Original Message----- From: Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> Sender: <at-large-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org> Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2015 17:49:14 To: Ron Baione<ron.baione@yahoo.com>; <parminder@itforchange.net>; <at-large@atlarge-lists.icann.org> Subject: Re: [At-Large] ICANN oversight _______________________________________________ At-Large mailing list At-Large@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/at-large At-Large Official Site: http://atlarge.icann.org

Hi, Community accountability is the reason I have been recommending that the Single member (SM) also be subject to the IRP on a basis similar to the Board. And why I now support very high thresholds for the community powers - which should prevail in my opinion, when there is community consensus (defined similar to GAC consensus). avri On 10-Oct-15 11:38, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:

Dear Parminder,

my personal point of view is that whilst I am comfortable with some additional accountability measures to be ingrained in ICANN's DNA in order to prevent the Board from going rogue, I am very uncomfortable with giving all of the power to the Community to overrule the Board *without additional checks and balances imposed on the community too*.

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Speak the truth consistently and clearly. Like you I decided from the start to watch and be entertained, with an anticipation of the change remaining the same. Have to say this whole thing provides quite an enjoyable spectator position on power and its struggles. Simply delicious it is! -Carlton On Sat, Oct 10, 2015, 9:20 PM Carlton Samuels <carlton.samuels@gmail.com> wrote:

+1. Couldn't say better.

I say this further. What is being proposed only marginalize further those of us already at the edge.

-Carlton

On Sat, Oct 10, 2015, 10:40 AM Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> wrote:

...

Dear Parminder,

my personal point of view is that whilst I am comfortable with some additional accountability measures to be ingrained in ICANN's DNA in order to prevent the Board from going rogue, I am very uncomfortable with giving all of the power to the Community to overrule the Board *without additional checks and balances imposed on the community too*.

Some aspects of the community proposal would effectively create a shadow Board that would overrule the ICANN Board and this shadow Board would have no accountability mechanisms whatsoever. It would not be bound to all of the reviews which the ICANN Board is bound to. It would not have any appeal mechanism. It would not have any fiduciary responsibility and liability. Nothing. The shadow Board would be the most direct way to capture and to use as a tool to blackmail ICANN into doing things that it should not do.

I'll repeat Larry Strickling's words, which I agree with 100%: "Why is it that so many in the ICANN community feel that a Board member which they have appointed THEMSELVES turns into a pariah the moment he/she is appointed? " And do not tell me that SOs & ACs have no say in the appointment of NomCom appointed Board members: the NomCom is made up of people from the community appointed by their SOs and ACs. NomCom members work together to find the best people for ICANN.

On the topic of needing to have a set of accountability mechanisms that create a legal entity so that the mechanisms can be enforced in a court, I am even more unhappy. "Enforced in a court" means "enforced in a US Court" - have you ever checked the cost of US lawyers? Only the rich will be able to do that. The ALAC has no chance whatsoever to use that mechanism. Then I am told, "no, ICANN will fund both parties in the lawsuit" - WOW, what a great tool to destroy the organisation by suing itself and depleting itself of all resources it has by paying lawyers ad-infinitum to inflict itself wounds. Really?

A shadow Board, self appointed, with no checks and balances, would only serve those with the money and time to spend 24/7 on ICANN issues. Pure volunteers like the ALAC would not have the time to spend on this, leaving only those with a direct vested interest (and being paid for it) being able to spend the time on this. If you want to hand over ICANN control to corporate interests and the domain name industry (in its widest sense) from rich English-speaking countries then agree to the current proposals as they stand. I do not want to see that.

The Board has a duty to balance the points of view in the community and make sure the weaker parts of the community are also supported. A shadow board will just be the perfect environment for loud mouths, bullies and deep pockets.

Kindest regards,

Olivier (as I said, just my personal views)

On 10/10/2015 12:13, parminder wrote:

...

I cannot but note with considerable surprise and disappoinment that when everyone with any thing ever to do with ICANN is currently hotly debating the issue of the stand off between the ICANN board and CCWG on ICANN accountability, ALAC remains so aloof from the issue.... When this should prima facie be the one part of the ICANN structure, as representing the peripheries, that should be most bothered by efforts at concentration of power, or of holding on it, vis a vis the rights of the public.

I have not been able to follow the process closely, but if I am right -and please correct me if I am not - even in the earlier discussions ALAC has been most lukewarm to any kind of structural changes that could indeed place an effective oversight of the 'community' over the ICANN board, when as said ALAC is the one group that should be most keen on institutionalising such checks over centralisation of power with the ICANN board. Can anyone explain me why it is so. It really intrigues me, and I am sure I am missing something here.

Thanks, parminder

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On 10/10/2015 18:17, Bill Silverstein wrote:

ICANN needs to have people that will oversee its actions, or lack of.

And you are saying that the best people to perform this oversight will be the industry which you ask ICANN to regulate? Kindest regards, Olivier

Dear Bill, comments in the text below: On 10/10/2015 19:58, Bill Silverstein wrote:

On Sat, October 10, 2015 10:51 am, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:

...

On 10/10/2015 18:17, Bill Silverstein wrote:

...

ICANN needs to have people that will oversee its actions, or lack of. And you are saying that the best people to perform this oversight will be the industry which you ask ICANN to regulate? Kindest regards,

Olivier

No. That is how the problems occurred in the first place, or at least in public.

Maybe one or two people from the industry that ICANN is supposed to regulate but some from the general registration public and the general internet using public (who understand the internet.)

Well -- IMHO, the current CCWG Accountability Proposal proposes that the Board could be over-ruled, or dismissed, or individual Board members could be kicked out by a Committee whose composition is such that the GNSO & CCNSO, both composed primarily of people who are in the business of domain names, could have a majority irrespective of the Advisory Committees like the ALAC. The ALAC might have only 1 person on the ICANN Board, at least the NomCom selected Board members are somehow independent of the Domain Name Industry. That's what bothers me deeply in a membership model that allocates votes to SOs/ACs instead of working on Consensus. Kind regards, Olivier

On 10-Oct-15 15:35, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:

That's what bothers me deeply in a membership model that allocates votes to SOs/ACs instead of working on Consensus.

A good reason for changing the Community Mechanism to work on consensus. I think there is a degree growing support for a consensus based Single Member. To Karl, I agree with you and others that going back to striving for an individual membership model is an inviting proposition. But after all these years, I would be happy to see us at least accept the notion of a membership model that has some recourse when there is consensus in the broader community. avri --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus

Thanks to all who have engaged with this discussion. I will try and pull together my response in a single email. I see two kinds of responses. One, from what I understand are people who seem to be close to leadership positions in ALAC, which centre on the argument that a membership model as currently proposed by the CCWG is likely to (further?) put ICANN processes in control of powerful commercial interests, especially of the DN industry. The second set of responses are from those who are relatively on the periphery of the ALAC power structure, or at least seem to like to identify themselves as so. The main proposition here is: they are outraged but feel helpless, and have sort of given up. In any case, for them, the matter may not be of that great an importance. Before I respond to these two kinds of responses, which appear rather opposed to one another and strange to be coming from the same group which fact itself suggests some level of dysfunctionality of the group, I may summarily observe that one thing that is common to the two is that they both represent a rather problematic abdication of responsibility by a group that is officially the representative of the users and the 'real Internet community' in the ICANN system. If one is abdicating, one should do it properly by declaring so and vacating the space. This abdication however proceeds without vacating the space. And for people and groups to both keep occupying the 'representative spaces' and abdicating responsibility at the same time is a double whammy that I find very worrisome. More about that later, but let me first respond separately to the two kinds of arguments. First about the argument that a membership based model as currently proposed is such that it will lead to capture of ICANN processes by DN industry related commercial interests. Very interesting! And I wholly agree with the spirit behind it.... But my question to Olivier and Alan, and others who support thier contention, is simple and straightforward; how do you then accept the fact that the most important policy work - as the most political pubic function - that ICANN does, which is GTLD related policy development, is done by the same group which you now say is captured by commercial interests. I havent ever heard you opposing that fundamental pillar of ICANN - but please do correct me if I am wrong. (In fact, the biggest screw up under the influence of commercial interests that the GNSO ever did which was about allowing 'closed generics' which was never appropriately opposed by ALAC.) Can you please explain how are you fine with the same group (commercial interests captured, as per you, and I agree) can undertake domain name policy development, but it is not ok for that group, in association with ALAC and GAC (two groups which, whatever their other faults, certainly serve to balance against commercial interests), to undertake oversight over the board, which is supposed to be a role that gets activated only in exceptional circumstances, and by design is supposed to just keep people with executive power on their toes rather than be acting often. Preferably, they never need to act, as US did not, I mean mostly, which does not mean that the oversight hang was not there, and not doing its work. Making the question shorter to be clear: How are you ok with commercial capture of a/the policy making function in iCANN, but not of the same groups (esp GNSO) associating with others in an oversight role? In any case, if indeed you do think the Board needs oversight, and it should be by a group that is as closely representative as possible of the global public or the Internet community, rather than commercial interest dominated, lets first agree on these principles. Do we agree? And then from there arrive at what we want, and what the ALAC should seek. Since a membership based model is so much more public (and thus closer to ownership by the internet community - I mean the real one) than a board-centric corporate model, we should certainly be asking for a membership based structure, but seek a different way of populating that membership. Let ALAC develop a position on that, and it is indeed the responsibility of the people in ALAC's leadership positions to guide ALAC towards such a position. Representing those who are outside the relevant power configuration, in this case ordinary Internet users, is almost a sacred responsibility, and it does not get fulfilled by opposing proposals that cause at least some dispersal of power citing obscure, unsubstantiated, reasons, which simply do not square. I myself want a membership structure for ICANN oversight that goes towards new innovations that can include ordinary Internet users in some way, as much as practically possible. The ALAC structure if properly developed seem the best candidate for it. Lets be bold and propose what we want to propose, rather than getting caught in power shenanigans. I am ready to work with you on this. Let the ALAC community assert itself. It may look powerless but that is because it has made itself so... It is in my view the most powerful part of ICANN if we really look towards and connect to where its power and legitimacy comes from - the people, rather than getting bogging down in high power games, and manipulative handling of those who exercise power, and repeatedly keep expressing powerlessness... And if not upto this challenge, vacate the space, say ALAC is structurally not working - ALAC cannot keep giving the ICANN system the legitimacy that it professes vis a vis the global Internet community. This already brings me to my reply to the other kind of responses that my provocation evoked - of helplessness, desperation and dis-interest. But dear sirs, you are ocuppying the ALAC space and providing the ICANN system its most important source of legitimacy. You have the power, you just do not exercise it. Do you think civil society groups fighting climate injustice, trade and intellectual property injustice, disability and gender injustice, and so on, have a less challanging job than yours. But I never hear them say things that I hear from you - we have given up, and even, now mostly see it all as a some kind of entertainment. This last is almost blasphemous to say - you are in this on the behalf of the most powerless in the world, and the work that you are abdicating involves power dis-balances and the opportunity to correct them. Lastly, those who most surprisingly claim that these issues are simply not important enough should then tell others why do they spend time on this area at all... By default they are legitimising a system, why then they are doing it. Let people do work they think is important, and they can usefully contribute to, and leave the space of representation of the interests of ordinary Internet users in global Internet governance regimes to those who consider work in this area as important from a public interest point of view, and are ready to take up the needed struggle. No personal offence to anyone please, I am making an entirely general political argument, for reasons that I consider important enough to devote some of my time to pursing them. parminder On Sunday 11 October 2015 04:17 AM, Alan Greenberg wrote:

Parminder,

I have been otherwise occupied most of today, and so others have already replied and given a number of perspectives.

Although I am the ALAC Chair, what follows is being said purely on my own behalf.

At-Large has been far from aloof in this debate. You are correct that we have not contributed hundreds of posts to the mailing list over the last few days, but I think that speaks more to our self-control than anything else. We have been very clear in our formal comments, and we have been very active in the sub-groups refining the CCWG proposal.

You are also correct that we have not been among the "firebrands" who have been advocating more radical community control over the ICANN Board. This is not accidental, and there are several reasons for this.

1. The position we have taken is not that of a single person. There has been a large and active At-Large community involved. The positions we have arrived at have been hotly debated and refined over the months. This does not necessarily make them better than some other position, but I feel strongly that they do represent the vast majority of those in our community who have chosen to be involved in this process.

2. It is easy to identify specific cases where ICANN Boards have made what I believe to be poor decisions. In at lease some cases, they have later agreed that perhaps some other path should have been followed, so this is clearly a learning process. The Board can also be cited for being less diverse and representative of the entire world or Internet users than it might be. But from my perspective, thanks partly to the good work of recent Nominating Committees, it is far more diverse that some of the constituent bodies of ICANN. And it is the ONLY body in ICANN that is charged with protecting the core mission and values of ICANN as documented in its Bylaws. As such many of us in At-Large feel that it SHOULD have the ultimate decision on many issues, weighing the perspectives of the various other stakeholders within ICANN. It is an essential component that adds balance to the multistakeholder model.

3. If you look at the people and groups that have been advocating for complete community control over the Board, it is illuminating. The vast majority of those voices are from the US and, in one form or another, represent powerful commercial stakeholders who have much at stake related in the Internet Domain Name System. Is it any surprise that they want power and control. That does not make them evil, and many of these people are colleagues and friends. But it is natural that they will strive to do what is best for their own communities. Within At-Large, we have regularly taken the position that, to paraphrase an old (mis)quote, what is best for General Motors is not necessarily best for Internet users.

Alan

At 10/10/2015 07:13 AM, parminder wrote:

...

I cannot but note with considerable surprise and disappoinment that when everyone with any thing ever to do with ICANN is currently hotly debating the issue of the stand off between the ICANN board and CCWG on ICANN accountability, ALAC remains so aloof from the issue.... When this should prima facie be the one part of the ICANN structure, as representing the peripheries, that should be most bothered by efforts at concentration of power, or of holding on it, vis a vis the rights of the public.

I have not been able to follow the process closely, but if I am right -and please correct me if I am not - even in the earlier discussions ALAC has been most lukewarm to any kind of structural changes that could indeed place an effective oversight of the 'community' over the ICANN board, when as said ALAC is the one group that should be most keen on institutionalising such checks over centralisation of power with the ICANN board. Can anyone explain me why it is so. It really intrigues me, and I am sure I am missing something here.

Thanks, parminder

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Hi Parminder, I would disagree that the GNSO is captured by the Domain Services entities. here is the makeup of the GNSO Council; https://gnso.icann.org/en/about/gnso-council.htm While there are equal numbers of councilors from Contracted parties and non-commercial parties (and more biz/IP/ISP folks as well), this does not mean "capture". In my experience as a member of a Contracted Parties House, these folks are interested in the public interest as well as their own groups interests. In short, i don't see "capture" as being applicable. On Sun, Oct 11, 2015 at 3:57 AM, parminder <parminder@itforchange.net> wrote:

Thanks to all who have engaged with this discussion.

I will try and pull together my response in a single email.

I see two kinds of responses. One, from what I understand are people who seem to be close to leadership positions in ALAC, which centre on the argument that a membership model as currently proposed by the CCWG is likely to (further?) put ICANN processes in control of powerful commercial interests, especially of the DN industry. The second set of responses are from those who are relatively on the periphery of the ALAC power structure, or at least seem to like to identify themselves as so. The main proposition here is: they are outraged but feel helpless, and have sort of given up. In any case, for them, the matter may not be of that great an importance.

Before I respond to these two kinds of responses, which appear rather opposed to one another and strange to be coming from the same group which fact itself suggests some level of dysfunctionality of the group, I may summarily observe that one thing that is common to the two is that they both represent a rather problematic abdication of responsibility by a group that is officially the representative of the users and the 'real Internet community' in the ICANN system. If one is abdicating, one should do it properly by declaring so and vacating the space. This abdication however proceeds without vacating the space. And for people and groups to both keep occupying the 'representative spaces' and abdicating responsibility at the same time is a double whammy that I find very worrisome. More about that later, but let me first respond separately to the two kinds of arguments.

First about the argument that a membership based model as currently proposed is such that it will lead to capture of ICANN processes by DN industry related commercial interests. Very interesting! And I wholly agree with the spirit behind it.... But my question to Olivier and Alan, and others who support thier contention, is simple and straightforward; how do you then accept the fact that the most important policy work - as the most political pubic function - that ICANN does, which is GTLD related policy development, is done by the same group which you now say is captured by commercial interests. I havent ever heard you opposing that fundamental pillar of ICANN - but please do correct me if I am wrong. (In fact, the biggest screw up under the influence of commercial interests that the GNSO ever did which was about allowing 'closed generics' which was never appropriately opposed by ALAC.)

Can you please explain how are you fine with the same group (commercial interests captured, as per you, and I agree) can undertake domain name policy development, but it is not ok for that group, in association with ALAC and GAC (two groups which, whatever their other faults, certainly serve to balance against commercial interests), to undertake oversight over the board, which is supposed to be a role that gets activated only in exceptional circumstances, and by design is supposed to just keep people with executive power on their toes rather than be acting often. Preferably, they never need to act, as US did not, I mean mostly, which does not mean that the oversight hang was not there, and not doing its work.

Making the question shorter to be clear: How are you ok with commercial capture of a/the policy making function in iCANN, but not of the same groups (esp GNSO) associating with others in an oversight role?

In any case, if indeed you do think the Board needs oversight, and it should be by a group that is as closely representative as possible of the global public or the Internet community, rather than commercial interest dominated, lets first agree on these principles. Do we agree? And then from there arrive at what we want, and what the ALAC should seek. Since a membership based model is so much more public (and thus closer to ownership by the internet community - I mean the real one) than a board-centric corporate model, we should certainly be asking for a membership based structure, but seek a different way of populating that membership. Let ALAC develop a position on that, and it is indeed the responsibility of the people in ALAC's leadership positions to guide ALAC towards such a position. Representing those who are outside the relevant power configuration, in this case ordinary Internet users, is almost a sacred responsibility, and it does not get fulfilled by opposing proposals that cause at least some dispersal of power citing obscure, unsubstantiated, reasons, which simply do not square.

I myself want a membership structure for ICANN oversight that goes towards new innovations that can include ordinary Internet users in some way, as much as practically possible. The ALAC structure if properly developed seem the best candidate for it. Lets be bold and propose what we want to propose, rather than getting caught in power shenanigans. I am ready to work with you on this. Let the ALAC community assert itself. It may look powerless but that is because it has made itself so... It is in my view the most powerful part of ICANN if we really look towards and connect to where its power and legitimacy comes from - the people, rather than getting bogging down in high power games, and manipulative handling of those who exercise power, and repeatedly keep expressing powerlessness... And if not upto this challenge, vacate the space, say ALAC is structurally not working - ALAC cannot keep giving the ICANN system the legitimacy that it professes vis a vis the global Internet community.

This already brings me to my reply to the other kind of responses that my provocation evoked - of helplessness, desperation and dis-interest. But dear sirs, you are ocuppying the ALAC space and providing the ICANN system its most important source of legitimacy. You have the power, you just do not exercise it. Do you think civil society groups fighting climate injustice, trade and intellectual property injustice, disability and gender injustice, and so on, have a less challanging job than yours. But I never hear them say things that I hear from you - we have given up, and even, now mostly see it all as a some kind of entertainment. This last is almost blasphemous to say - you are in this on the behalf of the most powerless in the world, and the work that you are abdicating involves power dis-balances and the opportunity to correct them.

Lastly, those who most surprisingly claim that these issues are simply not important enough should then tell others why do they spend time on this area at all... By default they are legitimising a system, why then they are doing it. Let people do work they think is important, and they can usefully contribute to, and leave the space of representation of the interests of ordinary Internet users in global Internet governance regimes to those who consider work in this area as important from a public interest point of view, and are ready to take up the needed struggle.

No personal offence to anyone please, I am making an entirely general political argument, for reasons that I consider important enough to devote some of my time to pursing them.

parminder

On Sunday 11 October 2015 04:17 AM, Alan Greenberg wrote:

Parminder,

I have been otherwise occupied most of today, and so others have already replied and given a number of perspectives.

Although I am the ALAC Chair, what follows is being said purely on my own behalf.

At-Large has been far from aloof in this debate. You are correct that we have not contributed hundreds of posts to the mailing list over the last few days, but I think that speaks more to our self-control than anything else. We have been very clear in our formal comments, and we have been very active in the sub-groups refining the CCWG proposal.

You are also correct that we have not been among the "firebrands" who have been advocating more radical community control over the ICANN Board. This is not accidental, and there are several reasons for this.

1. The position we have taken is not that of a single person. There has been a large and active At-Large community involved. The positions we have arrived at have been hotly debated and refined over the months. This does not necessarily make them better than some other position, but I feel strongly that they do represent the vast majority of those in our community who have chosen to be involved in this process.

2. It is easy to identify specific cases where ICANN Boards have made what I believe to be poor decisions. In at lease some cases, they have later agreed that perhaps some other path should have been followed, so this is clearly a learning process. The Board can also be cited for being less diverse and representative of the entire world or Internet users than it might be. But from my perspective, thanks partly to the good work of recent Nominating Committees, it is far more diverse that some of the constituent bodies of ICANN. And it is the ONLY body in ICANN that is charged with protecting the core mission and values of ICANN as documented in its Bylaws. As such many of us in At-Large feel that it SHOULD have the ultimate decision on many issues, weighing the perspectives of the various other stakeholders within ICANN. It is an essential component that adds balance to the multistakeholder model.

3. If you look at the people and groups that have been advocating for complete community control over the Board, it is illuminating. The vast majority of those voices are from the US and, in one form or another, represent powerful commercial stakeholders who have much at stake related in the Internet Domain Name System. Is it any surprise that they want power and control. That does not make them evil, and many of these people are colleagues and friends. But it is natural that they will strive to do what is best for their own communities. Within At-Large, we have regularly taken the position that, to paraphrase an old (mis)quote, what is best for General Motors is not necessarily best for Internet users.

Alan

At 10/10/2015 07:13 AM, parminder wrote:

I cannot but note with considerable surprise and disappoinment that when everyone with any thing ever to do with ICANN is currently hotly debating the issue of the stand off between the ICANN board and CCWG on ICANN accountability, ALAC remains so aloof from the issue.... When this should prima facie be the one part of the ICANN structure, as representing the peripheries, that should be most bothered by efforts at concentration of power, or of holding on it, vis a vis the rights of the public.

I have not been able to follow the process closely, but if I am right -and please correct me if I am not - even in the earlier discussions ALAC has been most lukewarm to any kind of structural changes that could indeed place an effective oversight of the 'community' over the ICANN board, when as said ALAC is the one group that should be most keen on institutionalising such checks over centralisation of power with the ICANN board. Can anyone explain me why it is so. It really intrigues me, and I am sure I am missing something here.

Thanks, parminder

_______________________________________________ At-Large mailing list At-Large@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/at-large

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-- Cheers, McTim "A name indicates what we seek. An address indicates where it is. A route indicates how we get there." Jon Postel

Parminder, I have only limited time and this will be brief, focussing on just a few of your points. At 11/10/2015 03:57 AM, parminder wrote:

Before I respond to these two kinds of responses, which appear rather opposed to one another and strange to be coming from the same group which fact itself suggests some level of dysfunctionality of the group,

I find nothing wrong with multiple points of view within a group. In fact, it is rather healthy. If opposing views within a group were to be taken as dysfunctionality, then based on the mailing lists that I read, Civil Society is terminally dysfunctional and should be abandoned.

First about the argument that a membership based model as currently proposed is such that it will lead to capture of ICANN processes by DN industry related commercial interests. Very interesting! And I wholly agree with the spirit behind it.... But my question to Olivier and Alan, and others who support thier contention, is simple and straightforward; how do you then accept the fact that the most important policy work - as the most political pubic function - that ICANN does, which is GTLD related policy development, is done by the same group which you now say is captured by commercial interests. I havent ever heard you opposing that fundamental pillar of ICANN - but please do correct me if I am wrong.

You are wrong on several counts. I did not claim that the GNSO or ICANN was captured. I said that ICANN (and by implication the GNSO) is subject to capture if care is not taken to have balancing processes and powers. - The GNSO does not set policy. It recommends policy and the Board under the current Bylaws, is free to reject those recommendations, or to ask that the GNSO revise them. It has done so in the past. - Certain groups do have a large say in GNSO recommendations, but it is also up to the other groups to balance them. Often, there is actually agreement that something is "broken" and needs to be fixed. Most GNSO PDPs actually have all parties working together to achieve a better environment (as hard as that may be for some to believe). At times, there are differences, and in those cases care needs to be taken. If in any given case, the policy process does not properly address the public interest, the Board is there as a backstop. - The ALAC has regularly made statements that in cases where the public interest (in our view, since the term is VERY subjective) is at odds with the interests of the contracted parties, there is the POTENTIAL for skewed results. Our advice has been that we need to take action to increase active participation of those parties that are less well funded, to have the Board monitor policy outcomes to ensure that the results are balanced, and possibly one day, to re-organize the GNSO or ICANN to better ensure that we can balance all needs.

Making the question shorter to be clear: How are you ok with commercial capture of a/the policy making function in iCANN, but not of the same groups (esp GNSO) associating with others in an oversight role?

To repeat, you are saying that it is captures. I did not. And the GNSO has no power other than to recommend. Our position on accountability that maintaining this role is essential.

I myself want a membership structure for ICANN oversight that goes towards new innovations that can include ordinary Internet users in some way, as much as practically possible. The ALAC structure if properly developed seem the best candidate for it. Lets be bold and propose what we want to propose, rather than getting caught in power shenanigans. I am ready to work with you on this. Let the ALAC community assert itself. It may look powerless but that is because it has made itself so... It is in my view the most powerful part of ICANN if we really look towards and connect to where its power and legitimacy comes from - the people, rather than getting bogging down in high power games, and manipulative handling of those who exercise power, and repeatedly keep expressing powerlessness... And if not upto this challenge, vacate the space, say ALAC is structurally not working - ALAC cannot keep giving the ICANN system the legitimacy that it professes vis a vis the global Internet community.

In my mind, the ALAC and At-Large is not powerless. I would not be investing so much of my time in it if I thought it was. Nor would I be putting in the effort if I thought no improvement was possible. It continues to evolve and a large part of my efforts as Chair is to increase both its effectiveness and credibility. Alan

Parminder: See my reponses inline. ​​ ============================== Carlton A Samuels Mobile: 876-818-1799 *Strategy, Planning, Governance, Assessment & Turnaround* ============================= On Sun, Oct 11, 2015 at 2:57 AM, parminder <parminder@itforchange.net> wrote:

Thanks to all who have engaged with this discussion.

I will try and pull together my response in a single email.

I see two kinds of responses. One, from what I understand are people who seem to be close to leadership positions in ALAC, which centre on the argument that a membership model as currently proposed by the CCWG is likely to (further?) put ICANN processes in control of powerful commercial interests, especially of the DN industry. The second set of responses are from those who are relatively on the periphery of the ALAC power structure, or at least seem to like to identify themselves as so. The main proposition here is: they are outraged but feel helpless, and have sort of given up. In any case, for them, the matter may not be of that great an importance.

Before I respond to these two kinds of responses, which appear rather opposed to one another and strange to be coming from the same group which fact itself suggests some level of dysfunctionality of the group,

​The At-Large has never been a single position community and as long as I have caucused here, plurality has always been encouraged. The idea that the ALAC - as the representative body of the At-Large to the ICANN community - should always be in lockstep is even for me, way too bolshevik a contemplation.​

I may summarily observe that one thing that is common to the two is that they both represent a rather problematic abdication of responsibility by a group that is officially the representative of the users and the 'real Internet community' in the ICANN system.

​I think this mischaracterises the situation. I think it is barely fair to say the At-Large represents the interest of 'ordinary internet users' the 1.563B <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm> in Asia, for example. I say this to say none of the mechanisms developed over time to take the temperature of the internet user community works all that well. There is very little real participation by the mass of users so we tend to follow our instincts on what matters. The IANA transition is one issue that has VERY little traction in the internet user community. I hesitate to accept the mantle of designated martyr; way too religion-tinged. And I personally do not believe in fighting unwinnable wars. In the end, most users want to get to the Internet for a small fee...or free of charge. And, for each of us to use it to connect and reach all of us. If one is abdicating, one should do it properly by declaring so and

vacating the space. This abdication however proceeds without vacating the space. And for people and groups to both keep occupying the 'representative spaces' and abdicating responsibility at the same time is a double whammy that I find very worrisome.

​Yessir. So, step up and represent. And by represent I mean study the issues, develop a position and advocate that position to others in At-Large and the wider ICANN community for adoption. Even better, get a few more like you to engage. I can say the ALAC and those near to it - have tried with decidedly mixed success to date.​ ​ Any additional firepower you can bring would be enormously helpful.​

More about that later, but let me first respond separately to the two kinds of arguments.

First about the argument that a membership based model as currently proposed is such that it will lead to capture of ICANN processes by DN industry related commercial interests. Very interesting! And I wholly agree with the spirit behind it.... But my question to Olivier and Alan, and others who support thier contention, is simple and straightforward; how do you then accept the fact that the most important policy work - as the most political pubic function - that ICANN does, which is GTLD related policy development, is done by the same group which you now say is captured by commercial interests.

​The policy development process is mischaracterised here. The support organisations - xxNSO - advance policy strictures to the Board that the Board can accept wholly or in part. They may also choose to ask for advice from the advisory organisations like the ALAC or SSAC. It is more the case that the advisory organisations provide unsolicited advice to the Board. Here's the principle that is usually missing. The Board is not obliged to implement every advice or policy stricture proposed. By law, regulation and practice they have an obligation to make up their own minds in furtherance of the corporation. And so long as ICANN remain a California corporation that is the way it will be. The fundamental issue to understand is that domicile and the legal environment in which ICANN exist imposes certain fealties.​ ​ That is the big change that will not likely happen.​

I havent ever heard you opposing that fundamental pillar of ICANN - but please do correct me if I am wrong. (In fact, the biggest screw up under the influence of commercial interests that the GNSO ever did which was about allowing 'closed generics' which was never appropriately opposed by ALAC.)

​It is easy to support generics and I do. I am yet to hear a compelling contra argument for closed generics, especially as they are configured within the current domain name ecosystem. Matter of fact I thought it would have been a great opportunity to disrupt the registry/registrar/ICANN tandem​...and perhaps drive some unforeseen market innovations.

Can you please explain how are you fine with the same group (commercial interests captured, as per you, and I agree) can undertake domain name policy development, but it is not ok for that group, in association with ALAC and GAC (two groups which, whatever their other faults, certainly serve to balance against commercial interests), to undertake oversight over the board, which is supposed to be a role that gets activated only in exceptional circumstances, and by design is supposed to just keep people with executive power on their toes rather than be acting often. Preferably, they never need to act, as US did not, I mean mostly, which does not mean that the oversight hang was not there, and not doing its work.

Making the question shorter to be clear: How are you ok with commercial capture of a/the policy making function in iCANN, but not of the same groups (esp GNSO) associating with others in an oversight role?

​See above. The policy-making ecosystem is a little more complex than that. And if you've ever worked a chartered working group where the policies are defined, you would see significant opportunities to influence. ​ ​In fact, as far as I'm concerned, the working group is the place to put limited At-Large resources if this community truly want to influence policy. This is where the voluntary At-Large is disadvantaged. Because we are working generally with folks who are paid to be there.​ And, too few of us are there at the ground floor working hard while others hardly work. We could use a man versed in argument and bringing the perspectives that you could to the chartered working groups.

In any case, if indeed you do think the Board needs oversight, and it should be by a group that is as closely representative as possible of the global public or the Internet community, rather than commercial interest dominated, lets first agree on these principles. Do we agree? And then from there arrive at what we want, and what the ALAC should seek. Since a membership based model is so much more public (and thus closer to ownership by the internet community - I mean the real one)

​I actually believe that the membership model as proposed will marginalize those of us already at the edge of empire even more so.​

than a board-centric corporate model, we should certainly be asking for a membership based structure, but seek a different way of populating that membership. Let ALAC develop a position on that, and it is indeed the responsibility of the people in ALAC's leadership positions to guide ALAC towards such a position. Representing those who are outside the relevant power configuration, in this case ordinary Internet users, is almost a sacred responsibility, and it does not get fulfilled by opposing proposals that cause at least some dispersal of power citing obscure, unsubstantiated, reasons, which simply do not square.

​Yeah. But reality check. The United States government says we want to transition. And they gave a red-lined pre-requisite as the only acceptable endgame​. Surely you're politically astute enough to understand how that works!

I myself want a membership structure for ICANN oversight that goes towards new innovations that can include ordinary Internet users in some way, as much as practically possible.

​Oh yes, what is 'practically possible' is indeed the thing. See above.​

The ALAC structure if properly developed seem the best candidate for it. Lets be bold and propose what we want to propose, rather than getting caught in power shenanigans.

​I should be obliged to know how the ALAC could accrete some powere while escaping the existing 'power shenanigans', even while standing aloof above them.​

I am ready to work with you on this. Let the ALAC community assert itself. It may look powerless but that is because it has made itself so... It is in my view the most powerful part of ICANN if we really look towards and connect to where its power and legitimacy comes from - the people, rather than getting bogging down in high power games, and manipulative handling of those who exercise power, and repeatedly keep expressing powerlessness

​Without the leverage recognized by Chairman Mao, I would be obliged to know how you would approach the entities now with power to cede power to a relatively powerless ALAC​ ​.​

... And if not upto this challenge, vacate the space, say ALAC is structurally not working - ALAC cannot keep giving the ICANN system the legitimacy that it professes vis a vis the global Internet community.

This already brings me to my reply to the other kind of responses that my provocation evoked - of helplessness, desperation and dis-interest. But dear sirs, you are ocuppying the ALAC space and providing the ICANN system its most important source of legitimacy.

​I agree somewhat with you here. The fig leaf of the global public interest could always be removed but that has a very short halflife. So expect a little short-lived impact. I have always thought one reason the ICANN community comes built with the tension of who are the representatives - the ALAC or GAC? - of the 'global public interest' is to make this outcome so much less likely.​

You have the power, you just do not exercise it. Do you think civil society groups fighting climate injustice, trade and intellectual property injustice, disability and gender injustice, and so on, have a less challanging job than yours. But I never hear them say things that I hear from you - we have given up, and even, now mostly see it all as a some kind of entertainment. This last is almost blasphemous to say - you are in this on the behalf of the most powerless in the world, and the work that you are abdicating involves power dis-balances and the opportunity to correct them.

​To be entertained even as you go to the gallows is not an unknown response to adversity. Especially if you know what the end game is.​

Lastly, those who most surprisingly claim that these issues are simply not important enough should then tell others why do they spend time on this area at all... By default they are legitimising a system, why then they are doing it. Let people do work they think is important, and they can usefully contribute to, and leave the space of representation of the interests of ordinary Internet users in global Internet governance regimes to those who consider work in this area as important from a public interest point of view, and are ready to take up the needed struggle.

No personal offence to anyone please, I am making an entirely general political argument, for reasons that I consider important enough to devote some of my time to pursing them.

​None taken, my friend. Hope you reciprocate in good humor.​

parminder

On Sunday 11 October 2015 04:17 AM, Alan Greenberg wrote:

Parminder,

I have been otherwise occupied most of today, and so others have already replied and given a number of perspectives.

Although I am the ALAC Chair, what follows is being said purely on my own behalf.

At-Large has been far from aloof in this debate. You are correct that we have not contributed hundreds of posts to the mailing list over the last few days, but I think that speaks more to our self-control than anything else. We have been very clear in our formal comments, and we have been very active in the sub-groups refining the CCWG proposal.

You are also correct that we have not been among the "firebrands" who have been advocating more radical community control over the ICANN Board. This is not accidental, and there are several reasons for this.

1. The position we have taken is not that of a single person. There has been a large and active At-Large community involved. The positions we have arrived at have been hotly debated and refined over the months. This does not necessarily make them better than some other position, but I feel strongly that they do represent the vast majority of those in our community who have chosen to be involved in this process.

2. It is easy to identify specific cases where ICANN Boards have made what I believe to be poor decisions. In at lease some cases, they have later agreed that perhaps some other path should have been followed, so this is clearly a learning process. The Board can also be cited for being less diverse and representative of the entire world or Internet users than it might be. But from my perspective, thanks partly to the good work of recent Nominating Committees, it is far more diverse that some of the constituent bodies of ICANN. And it is the ONLY body in ICANN that is charged with protecting the core mission and values of ICANN as documented in its Bylaws. As such many of us in At-Large feel that it SHOULD have the ultimate decision on many issues, weighing the perspectives of the various other stakeholders within ICANN. It is an essential component that adds balance to the multistakeholder model.

3. If you look at the people and groups that have been advocating for complete community control over the Board, it is illuminating. The vast majority of those voices are from the US and, in one form or another, represent powerful commercial stakeholders who have much at stake related in the Internet Domain Name System. Is it any surprise that they want power and control. That does not make them evil, and many of these people are colleagues and friends. But it is natural that they will strive to do what is best for their own communities. Within At-Large, we have regularly taken the position that, to paraphrase an old (mis)quote, what is best for General Motors is not necessarily best for Internet users.

Alan

At 10/10/2015 07:13 AM, parminder wrote:

I cannot but note with considerable surprise and disappoinment that when everyone with any thing ever to do with ICANN is currently hotly debating the issue of the stand off between the ICANN board and CCWG on ICANN accountability, ALAC remains so aloof from the issue.... When this should prima facie be the one part of the ICANN structure, as representing the peripheries, that should be most bothered by efforts at concentration of power, or of holding on it, vis a vis the rights of the public.

I have not been able to follow the process closely, but if I am right -and please correct me if I am not - even in the earlier discussions ALAC has been most lukewarm to any kind of structural changes that could indeed place an effective oversight of the 'community' over the ICANN board, when as said ALAC is the one group that should be most keen on institutionalising such checks over centralisation of power with the ICANN board. Can anyone explain me why it is so. It really intrigues me, and I am sure I am missing something here.

Thanks, parminder

_______________________________________________ At-Large mailing list At-Large@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/at-large

At-Large Official Site: http://atlarge.icann.org

_______________________________________________ At-Large mailing list At-Large@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/at-large

At-Large Official Site: http://atlarge.icann.org