Por favor me urde tener el documento disponible en español de El Grupo de Trabajo de Revisión ALAC - proyecto de Informe Final [PDF, 309K] sobre las mejoras ALAC. Más detalles de la revisión puede ALAC ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jacqueline A. Morris" <jam@jacquelinemorris.com> To: "At-Large Worldwide" <at-large@atlarge-lists.icann.org> Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2009 7:16 PM Subject: Re: [At-Large] Auerbach: "It is my view that ICANN ought to scrapthe ALAC in its entirety"

Clarification - not at the same time - all At Large members and non-members can be proposed for the ALAC and be voted or appointed one of the 15 Jacqueline A. Morris wrote:

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As far as I know the At Large list (this list on which we are currently posting) is open to all who are willing to join. The ALAC is a committee that consists of 15 members, some chosen by the NomCom and some chosen by the regions. So most people who are in the At Large will not be able to be members of the ALAC (restricted to 15 persons) Jacqueline Elisabeth Porteneuve wrote:

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I concur wholeheartedly with Karl's notes. I have been here for ICANN and DNSO creation, five long years, and should not have much difficulty to follow or catch up with its organizations or committees. Still, I cannot comprehend ALAC. Sometimes I wonder if ALAC, or At Large, or whatever acronym used here and designating something in a dark forest of its labyrinthine form, have been formed to prevent good people to discuss Internet matters together, learn, share and rise important issues.

"The current ALAC was a step backwards from the system that it replaced. That prior system self-organized and self-funded itself into a vibrant system of debate and information exchange. ICANN merely ran the election machinery. In that system the public itself nominated and elected people onto the ICANN Board of Directors, a far cry from the thickly insulating committee upon committee upon committee intricacy of the present ALAC."

In early ICANN's days we had the GA "ga" list, open to anyone willing to join. I still do not know if I am legitimate person on this ALAC, At Large or whatever acronym list. And yes, I am that pesky individual, only individual, not accepting to be segregated into geographic boxes.

Thanks Karl, thanks Danny.

Elisabeth Porteneuve

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Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2009 12:30:46 -0800 (PST)

My thanks to Karl for his honest assessment of what ought to be done with the ALAC. You may read the ALAC Review WG Draft Final Report (along with Karl's comments) here: http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-11feb09-en.htm

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I've kind of refrained from commenting on things whilst the review was going on... (yes, I know that what was released was a "draft" of the final report, so further changes are possible.) Anyway... Joe Baptista wrote:

Yes - it does. Is that not what I've been saying for years - the whole purpose behind ICANN bureaucracy is to ensure no one has a voice and good people are expendable.

One of my all time favorite bits of literature is Chapter 10 of Dicken's 1857 book Little Dorrit - http://www.cavebear.com/archive/cavebear/containing_the_whole_science_of_gov... That chapter describes The Circumlocution Office - a body of the government having the job of assuring that nothing can be done by any other body, or in Dicken's words (and capitalization): "Whatever was required to be done, the Circumlocution Office was beforehand with all the public departments in the art of perceiving--HOW NOT TO DO IT." I leave it is an exercise for the reader to draw comparisons, if any, between ICANN and The Circumlocution Office. Moving on to Evan's comment about direct elections for board seats. Yes, it may be a romantic notion (and I certainly don't mind being called a romantic), but it does not seem to me to be all that far fetched. Our year 2000 experience was quite positive once one removes the negative gloss that has been painted over it by those who found the process of debate and elections, and perhaps some of the people elected, to be less dignified and more rough-edged than they felt proper for their image of what ICANN ought to be. But let's say that I'm wrong, as I often am, and let's say "let's not do direct elections". That does not rule out a representational system that interposes but one layer of indirection between internet users and seats on ICANN's board of directors. I'd be happy with that kind of system as long as that intermediary layer of representatives are all seated by the action of internet users and that the choices they may make are not excessively constrained. You can see from this logic why I find the layer upon layer of the current ALAC to be an undesirable trait - it puts users too far from the seat of authority. The issue in my mind is the exercise of accountability - how do internet users make sure that ICANN serves to promote their interests. It would be nice if we could somehow brew up an ICANN that could be accountable unto itself with only a limited amount of corrective external pressure from the community of internet users. Unfortunately history hasn't given us many examples of such systems. Instead history is filled with good ideas that wobbled and went astray once the original people tired or left. To my mind some of the best thoughts on the construction of accountable systems came out of the 18th century work of people like Voltaire, Montesquieu, Jefferson, Madison, etc. They would have understood that ICANN is a political body that can exert authority within its realm that is not readily reviewed or constrained by any higher body. And as such ICANN needs structural mechanisms to impede misuse of that authority including mechanisms that allow those for whose benefit the body was created to reach out and change that body so that it better serves their needs. That's why I focused on accountability and the power to affect ICANN structurally as the key elements of authority that the ALAC ought to have. (One thing people should note about the report is that it contains a very broad definition of who is an internet user. I consider a broad definition to be a good thing.) As you can tell, I'm one who believes that structure and procedure is very important, indeed that it is usually more important in the long term than choices made on particular substantive issues. In other words I might be said to turn the famous phrase "form follows function" upside-down onto its head so that it evolves into "better substantive choices tend to flow from better formed institutions." --karl--

In response to Evan Leibovitch: I hadn't considered the possibility of excising the ALS layer and keeping the RALO layer. Since my sense is that we need to remove a layer or two, I guess that way would serve my goal. I do see your point about the desirability of one big regional group as opposed to lots of small ones in a region - what I mean by this is that I consider it desirable that people be able to form and reform coalitions based on their perceived common interests at any particular point in time. And I see that a big organization, one that is mainly a nose counter (my word to avoid saying the ticklish words "elections" or "consensus"), could be a reasonable way to go. Regarding ICANN backing of participation - I realize that most people weren't as lucky as I was to have been a principal in a startup that got sold to Cisco. I know firsthand that being involved in ICANN can cost tremendous amount of money in direct and indirect costs. But I worry very much about what happens when an organization (in our case that would be ICANN) pays a person's expenses rather than those expenses coming from his/her supporters. The former method risks, if not coercion, then at least a sense that one ought not to bite the hand that feeds. The latter method creates a kind of ongoing vote of confidence by the public. I do want, and perhaps our report did not express the idea as forcefully as some of us on the working group felt, that ICANN should make resources available to the ALAC and its components so that those resources would be available for use according to the discretion of the people out there at the edges. I personally would have felt comfortable with a mechanism that created funds of money that would be available to be spent, even to hire people, by at-large groups right there at the very edges. Of course, having caused at least one business to fail because I did not have adequate cost tracking and cost control procedures, I do have an elevated concern that such a mechanism be well protected against errors or, worse, abuse. (I must also say that I was very concerned with the legal issues that could come about when employer-employee relationships are created in jurisdictions around the world.) As for an executive committee - I haven't been watching that debate. However, I agree with your concern that this creates yet another layer of insulation. I saw this happening on ICANN's board of directors and felt that we unprivileged board members were often left in the dark by the executive committee. At least at the ICANN board level I got a commitment that all committee processes would be open to be observed by those members of the board who weren't on the committee. But because of my fight over access to ICANN's financial records I never really had an opportunity to walk that path. Committees can be good tools when used as institutional eyes and ears to watch for events or to do first-cut analysis of issues - but when they have their own powers to act without the informed consent of the full body then my neurons start to tingle with concern. Perhaps this is reaching to the emotional core of my concern - that the ALAC of today acts more as a body that tries to give wisdom to ICANN rather than one that drives ICANN to act in the public benefit with that benefit being defined and measured by the community of internet users. Wisdom is good. But the power to control and require ICANN to serve the public interest is better. Regarding cultural differences about the desirability and undesirability of confrontational tactics - I'm not sure what to do about that. But I would suggest that moving to the level that is least offensive is an invitation to be run over by the industrial interests within ICANN. But we do need to find a solution to the e-rage that happens when we communicate by email. Even the best of us tend to lapse into non-respectful dialog. And the fact that no one, even if we are skilled in the chosen language (usually English), is able to communicate without ambiguity leads us to misinterpret one another's words, often to impute disagreement or hostility when none was meant. My own sense is that we need to find a way to interact face to face, early on, so that we can put faces and voices to our electronic exchanges. And finally, when I used the phrase "accountable unto itself" I was thinking of the near impossibility of that happening at a practical level - that we humans rarely create institutions that can be launched and that will remain on track, doing their job and only their job, for an indefinite time. To my mind, "accountable unto itself" is a chimera. And instead of presuming that we can create a perfect organization, we should strive to construct means for the public at large to exert corrective pressure. Are you going to be in Mexico City? --karl--

Evan I agree with you re the elections. I've written a lot about it already, so won't review it all here. Just to say - elections worked well for some people - but not for MOST people who did not participate, know about it, know why it was important, get involved. Having the outreach programme was great and important and one of the main things I got involved in ICANN for. I am quite disappointed about the effective ending of it. I also agree with you about the ExCom - so you are not alone! To me, the solution to ALAC's organisational problems is not to form a small elite group to get things done but rather to look at ways to involve all members and RALOs. Of course time is an issue - if ALAC finds out about something with a very short timeframe, it is impossible to get full participation, but that's better solved by information - finding out what is likely to come up in the future and start working on it before the 45 or 30 or 21 day comment period begins! With regard to the lack of individual user participation in other RALOs - in LAC it was put to a vote of all the people who were invited to the formation meetings and those of us espousing the individual user participation lost. That's democracy at work. I still disagree and think that individual user participation would be great in LACRALO, but that is not the majority view. Evan Leibovitch wrote:

Karl Auerbach wrote:

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Yes, it may be a romantic notion (and I certainly don't mind being called a romantic), but it does not seem to me to be all that far fetched. My main objection to direct elections is that it misrepresents the public interest through over-representation by "squeaky wheels", both candidates and voters, who exploit the general-public's boredom and lack of comprehension in ICANN functions almost as much as the vested interests do.

I -- and many other people who I believe to be useful, active participants in today's At-Large -- are only here because we were actively recruited by ICANN. Once upon a time there were excellent outreach programs -- the "on the edges" resources I believe Karl spoke of -- that sought points of view outside of the usual circle of self-selected activitists and ISOC chapters. They looked for a diverse range of people who did not have ICANN policy as a primary focus, yet still understood what it means to the well-being of Internet users. This seems especially of value outside North America and Europe and native English speakers -- ICANN does have a global mandate, yet it's nowhere near that. Even now At-Large has nobody involved from Russia; does that mean that Russians aren't interested in ICANN issues?

People like me are not fulltime ICANN policy wonks, and we could never afford to participate if not for the money ICANN spends on At-Large. In aggregate the ALS policy has partially worked, though it has certainly not realized its potential. It has done a far better job -- so far as I can see -- in energizing the otherwise-disinterested corners of the end-user community in a manner that direct elections did not -- and IMO cannot -- do.

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Our year 2000 experience was quite positive once one removes the negative gloss that has been painted over it by those who found the process of debate and elections, and perhaps some of the people elected, to be less dignified and more rough-edged than they felt proper for their image of what ICANN ought to be. Rough edges I can deal with, that is not my objection to direct election. Indeed, sometimes I wish the edges were rougher. In its zeal to be polite and diplomatic, sometimes ALAC stifles itself better than ICANN staff ever could. Of course, some cultures in the world don't work well with hard confrontation -- and while I can accept that fact, I also have the realization that ICANN's vested interests will never be constrained by being asked politely to do the right thing. I'm not sure how to deal with this but I'm not sure that a pure abandonment of ALAC's vision is the answer.

Maybe even more than Karl, I would argue that the presence of the (opaque, unaccountable, unrecallable) NomComm in the selection of ALAC members is a virus designed to keep At-Large civil and tame -- to maintain the "company union" mentality of which you spoke. The continuing role of the NomCom in ALAC is a subtle but real reminder that ICANN does not sufficiently trust At-Large to pick all of its own leaders -- no wonder its policy advice carries so little weight. The NomComm -- with its representation from ICANN's vested-interest constituencies -- is trusted by ICANN to assert the public interest as well as At-Large itself. Imagine my amazement at Westlake's proposal to expand ALAC purely through more NomComm seats...

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But let's say that I'm wrong, as I often am, and let's say "let's not do direct elections". That does not rule out a representational system that interposes but one layer of indirection between internet users and seats on ICANN's board of directors. I'd be happy with that kind of system as long as that intermediary layer of representatives are all seated by the action of internet users and that the choices they may make are not excessively constrained. You can see from this logic why I find the layer upon layer of the current ALAC to be an undesirable trait - it puts users too far from the seat of authority.

Well, I can't speak for other RALOs, but the North American one agreed from the outset that individual users must not be penalized for wanting to participate without an ALS to channel through. So people may choose at least one less level removed. It is notable that the current ALAC representative to the Board is a member of NARALO but not through an ALS.

I can defend the presence of the RALO level at least to the extent that the policy development process is so unwieldy, that breaking At-Large up into regions at least allows more personal involvement. This is especially true when English isn't the main local language.

Having said that, my agreement with your desire to keep layers as few as possible has been the prime motivation behind my (seemingly solitary) campaign against ALAC's forming an Executive Committee.

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The issue in my mind is the exercise of accountability - how do internet users make sure that ICANN serves to promote their interests. It would be nice if we could somehow brew up an ICANN that could be accountable unto itself with only a limited amount of corrective external pressure from the community of internet users.

"Accountable unto itself" seems the very definition of the NomComm and look what it has given us: a Board that lets the staff run the show and an ALAC with neither the stamina nor respect to fulfil its mandate. Given the pretence that its members are already placed by the NomComm to serve the "public interest", the Board can easily marginalize the "advice" of its own at-large community as being redundant.

How is this "nice"?

- Evan

PS: I want to make clear that my problem with the NomComm participation in ALAC does not extend to my opinion of all the individuals actually placed that way. Some, including the NomComm appointee from my own region, have clearly distinguished themselves. However, I would still prefer that these same individuals would have attained their position through an accountable, recallable, transparent process rather than the one we got.

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