Draft ISPCP Comments on the Mid-point consultation report on ALAC Review
The BGC ALAC Review WG has offered discussion points regarding their initial thinking on the ALAC. This is a response to those points. First, Terminology: “ALAC” is a 15-person advisory committee to the Board. 2 people from each RALO plus 5 NCAs “At-Large” consists of 110 bodies organized into RALOs; these bodies are termed ALSs (At-Large Structures) “at-large” (lower case) refers to the universe of Internet users. Points for discussion: 1. The ALAC has a continuing purpose in the ICANN structure. This continuing purpose has three key elements: o providing advice on policy; o providing input into ICANN operations and structure; o part of ICANN’s accountability mechanisms ISPCP Response: The At-Large AC can play a useful role in ICANN as an advisory committee to the Board, just as the other ACs. Organisation 2. At Large should in principle be given two voting seats on the ICANN Board ISPCP Response: This is totally inappropriate. None of the other advisory committees have voting seats on the Board. Advisor committees advise, they do not vote on Board business. 3. The ALAC‐RALO‐ALS structure should remain in place for now ISPCP Response: Not unless it can become useful; otherwise it is a waste of money. ICANN pours a huge amount of funds into the building and maintenance of the ALAC-RALO-ALS structure and gets very little from it. At-Large prefers to retain its advisory status. If At-Large is not going to be involved in making policy, what is its function and why is it in ICANN? ICANN’s sole purpose is to make and enforce Internet policy, manage TLDs and support the root servers. At-Large participates in none of these activities. Policy is made by the SOs, not by the Board. Currently the At-Large has only non-voting liaisons to the SOs. Effectiveness and participation 4. Educating and engaging the ALSs should be an immediate priority; compliance should be a longer term goal ISPCP Response: Engaging the ALSs is a worthwhile goal if ICANN is will derive some benefit in policy making. Otherwise, this is merely replicating the activity of ISOC (indeed, many of the ALSs are simply ISOC chapters). 5. ALAC should develop strategic and operational plans (including performance criteria and cost information) as part of ICANN’s planning process ISPCP Response: Yes, plans based on measurable objectives. These objectives should include direct participation in the policy making process through SOs. 6. More effort needs to be put into developing accurate cost models for At Large activity ISPCP Response: Surely. Again, budget should be tied to useful accomplishments. Right now the At-Large is a total waste of money because it achieves nothing. 7. ALAC should be encouraged to make its own choice of tools for collaborative work ISPCP Response: Certainly they should have this freedom as long as the collaborative work process is public and transparent. 8. The public comment period should be kept at 30 days except in special circumstances, in which case ALAC may request an extension to 45 days ISPCP Response: Retaining the current 30 comment period is preferable as long as necessary language translation can be done speedily. 9. ICANN should strengthen its translation processes ISPCP Response: Agreed, within reasonable budget constraints. Relationship with other ICANN entities 10. The ALAC is the appropriate organizational channel for the voice and concerns of the individual Internet user in ICANN processes ISPCP Response: It (the At-Large structure, not the advisory committee) could be if it would deign to actually participate in the ICANN process instead of just offering advice. 11. Since ALAC is the appropriate channel for the voice and concerns of the individual Internet user, it is inappropriate for other ICANN entities to attempt to claim to represent that individual user voice ISPCP Response: In fact the At-Large structure (not the advisory committee) is currently ineffective in representing the individual user voice. We recommend that At-Large be reconstituted as a constituency for the individual user. In particular, with regard to the GNSO, we advise that ALAC have voting representation within the non-commercial users stakeholder group. 12. Processes for providing advice on policy should be strengthened both within ALAC for the development of policy advice and within SOs for requesting input from ALAC on policy issues ISPCP Response: It is inappropriate (not to mention ineffectual) for the At-Large to try to function outside of the SOs by providing advice. They should function within the SOs as recommended above as a contributing constituency. Summary ICANN needs to redirect its resources to forming an organization that will actively represent the at-large community in the Internet policy-making process. As presently constituted, At-Large does not serve that purpose. The ALAC (the advisory committee) should continue to be represented on the Board by an non-voting liaison, just as the RSSAC and SSAC are represented. It should not have a voting seat (much less two!) because it should not be involved in the business conducted by the Board (which is, primarily, the running of the Corporation). The At-Large should not have liaisons to SOs. Rather it should take an active part, as appropriate, in the policy making activities of the SOs. http://gnso.icann.org/mailing-lists/archives/ispcp/msg00462.html
My strongest advice to the At-large is to not take this bait and resist all encroachments to its independence from the SOs. The At- large has a very important role in ICANN's structure, a role that must be filled lest we lose balance in the structure. It might be worth pointing out that the ISPC speaks of "equality" amongst ICANN's stakeholders, whereas I am referring to "balance" between ICANN's stakeholders. Contracted parties and business users carry a lot of weight in the ICANN process - it is imperative that user voices (direct and indirect) counterbalance that weight. Once absorbed into the GNSO, that balance is irretrievably lost. Here is an excerpt from a document that I collaborated on related to the earlier Lynn reforms - There will be some form of membership which will be represent the interest of domain name registrants, who will also be entitled to seats on the Board of ICANN; - These representatives will in time be directly elected in ways that we have not yet devised; We saw this as a key check on the interests of the contracted parties. Please fight to preserve and enhance this balance. The rest of the document and background can be found here: http://www.byte.org/heathrow/ Here are the key principles from the document: Principles that will guide ICANN reform 1. The governance of the DNS should be appropriate and proportionate to the nature and needs of the DNS. Accordingly, the governance of the DNS should not outlast the useful life of the DNS. This result is more likely to be achieved if governance of the DNS is more responsive to popular demand for domain names and a coherent working DNS than to formal arrangements among states. 2. Owing to the role of states in the management of country codes, the role of a central manager of the DNS, such as ICANN, is naturally larger in relation to generic TLDs than it is in relation to country codes. 3. Those who wish to participate in the management of the DNS should contribute to the funding of it, possibly with some exception for non- profit entities. 4. Businesses need a structure that resolves issues quickly. The future structure of ICANN or its successor should be tested against this criterion. This means that rules must specify voters, election procedures, and what constitutes a majority suitable to decide an issue. Consensus is not a sufficiently precise basis for action. The decisions of stakeholders should be capable of being enforced or supported by ICANN’s Board. 5. Registrants of domain names have a greater claim on the attention of ICANN than end users who do not own domain names. The interests of domain name registrants and users are broad and varied. ICANN must provide a mechanism by which the interests of Registrants are actively taken into account. 6. Internet Users who are not registrants, being without a contractual link to ICANN, have interests that are distinct from those of governments. Internet users are affected by whether the symbols they type resolve to websites they seek. Some avenue of participation in DNS management, apart from registrars themselves, is desirable, and it is appropriate that they pay for this input in some measure. On Dec 16, 2008, at 11:41 AM, Danny Younger wrote:
The BGC ALAC Review WG has offered discussion points regarding their initial thinking on the ALAC. This is a response to those points. First, Terminology: “ALAC” is a 15-person advisory committee to the Board. 2 people from each RALO plus 5 NCAs “At-Large” consists of 110 bodies organized into RALOs; these bodies are termed ALSs (At-Large Structures) “at-large” (lower case) refers to the universe of Internet users.
Points for discussion:
1. The ALAC has a continuing purpose in the ICANN structure. This continuing purpose has three key elements: o providing advice on policy; o providing input into ICANN operations and structure; o part of ICANN’s accountability mechanisms ISPCP Response: The At-Large AC can play a useful role in ICANN as an advisory committee to the Board, just as the other ACs.
Organisation
2. At Large should in principle be given two voting seats on the ICANN Board
ISPCP Response: This is totally inappropriate. None of the other advisory committees have voting seats on the Board. Advisor committees advise, they do not vote on Board business.
3. The ALAC‐RALO‐ALS structure should remain in place for now
ISPCP Response: Not unless it can become useful; otherwise it is a waste of money. ICANN pours a huge amount of funds into the building and maintenance of the ALAC-RALO-ALS structure and gets very little from it. At-Large prefers to retain its advisory status. If At-Large is not going to be involved in making policy, what is its function and why is it in ICANN? ICANN’s sole purpose is to make and enforce Internet policy, manage TLDs and support the root servers. At-Large participates in none of these activities. Policy is made by the SOs, not by the Board. Currently the At-Large has only non-voting liaisons to the SOs.
Effectiveness and participation
4. Educating and engaging the ALSs should be an immediate priority; compliance should be a longer term goal
ISPCP Response: Engaging the ALSs is a worthwhile goal if ICANN is will derive some benefit in policy making. Otherwise, this is merely replicating the activity of ISOC (indeed, many of the ALSs are simply ISOC chapters).
5. ALAC should develop strategic and operational plans (including performance criteria and cost information) as part of ICANN’s planning process
ISPCP Response: Yes, plans based on measurable objectives. These objectives should include direct participation in the policy making process through SOs.
6. More effort needs to be put into developing accurate cost models for At Large activity
ISPCP Response: Surely. Again, budget should be tied to useful accomplishments. Right now the At-Large is a total waste of money because it achieves nothing.
7. ALAC should be encouraged to make its own choice of tools for collaborative work
ISPCP Response: Certainly they should have this freedom as long as the collaborative work process is public and transparent.
8. The public comment period should be kept at 30 days except in special circumstances, in which case ALAC may request an extension to 45 days
ISPCP Response: Retaining the current 30 comment period is preferable as long as necessary language translation can be done speedily.
9. ICANN should strengthen its translation processes
ISPCP Response: Agreed, within reasonable budget constraints.
Relationship with other ICANN entities
10. The ALAC is the appropriate organizational channel for the voice and concerns of the individual Internet user in ICANN processes
ISPCP Response: It (the At-Large structure, not the advisory committee) could be if it would deign to actually participate in the ICANN process instead of just offering advice.
11. Since ALAC is the appropriate channel for the voice and concerns of the individual Internet user, it is inappropriate for other ICANN entities to attempt to claim to represent that individual user voice
ISPCP Response: In fact the At-Large structure (not the advisory committee) is currently ineffective in representing the individual user voice. We recommend that At-Large be reconstituted as a constituency for the individual user. In particular, with regard to the GNSO, we advise that ALAC have voting representation within the non-commercial users stakeholder group.
12. Processes for providing advice on policy should be strengthened both within ALAC for the development of policy advice and within SOs for requesting input from ALAC on policy issues
ISPCP Response: It is inappropriate (not to mention ineffectual) for the At-Large to try to function outside of the SOs by providing advice. They should function within the SOs as recommended above as a contributing constituency.
Summary ICANN needs to redirect its resources to forming an organization that will actively represent the at-large community in the Internet policy-making process. As presently constituted, At-Large does not serve that purpose. The ALAC (the advisory committee) should continue to be represented on the Board by an non-voting liaison, just as the RSSAC and SSAC are represented. It should not have a voting seat (much less two!) because it should not be involved in the business conducted by the Board (which is, primarily, the running of the Corporation). The At-Large should not have liaisons to SOs. Rather it should take an active part, as appropriate, in the policy making activities of the SOs.
http://gnso.icann.org/mailing-lists/archives/ispcp/msg00462.html
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best, Ross Rader General Manager, Hover t. 416.538.5492 The Easiest Way To Buy and Use Your Domain Names http://www.hover.com Check out our blog at: http://stuff.hover.com Hover on Twitter: http://about.hover.com/twitter
Ross, I afraid that DNS is a very small part of what @large Internet lead users are interested in. They are mainly interested in the Internet "at large" engineering, development and deployment they can each and individually benefit from. jfc At 17:58 16/12/2008, Ross Rader wrote:
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64My strongest advice to the At-large is to not take this bait and resist all encroachments to its independence from the SOs. The At- large has a very important role in ICANN's structure, a role that must be filled lest we lose balance in the structure.
It might be worth pointing out that the ISPC speaks of "equality" amongst ICANN's stakeholders, whereas I am referring to "balance" between ICANN's stakeholders. Contracted parties and business users carry a lot of weight in the ICANN process - it is imperative that user voices (direct and indirect) counterbalance that weight.
Once absorbed into the GNSO, that balance is irretrievably lost.
Here is an excerpt from a document that I collaborated on related to the earlier Lynn reforms -
There will be some form of membership which will be represent the interest of domain name registrants, who will also be entitled to seats on the Board of ICANN; - These representatives will in time be directly elected in ways that we have not yet devised;
We saw this as a key check on the interests of the contracted parties.
Please fight to preserve and enhance this balance.
The rest of the document and background can be found here: http://www.byte.org/heathrow/
Here are the key principles from the document:
Principles that will guide ICANN reform
1. The governance of the DNS should be appropriate and proportionate to the nature and needs of the DNS. Accordingly, the governance of the DNS should not outlast the useful life of the DNS. This result is more likely to be achieved if governance of the DNS is more responsive to popular demand for domain names and a coherent working DNS than to formal arrangements among states.
2. Owing to the role of states in the management of country codes, the role of a central manager of the DNS, such as ICANN, is naturally larger in relation to generic TLDs than it is in relation to country codes.
3. Those who wish to participate in the management of the DNS should contribute to the funding of it, possibly with some exception for non- profit entities.
4. Businesses need a structure that resolves issues quickly. The future structure of ICANN or its successor should be tested against this criterion. This means that rules must specify voters, election procedures, and what constitutes a majority suitable to decide an issue. Consensus is not a sufficiently precise basis for action. The decisions of stakeholders should be capable of being enforced or supported by ICANN's Board.
5. Registrants of domain names have a greater claim on the attention of ICANN than end users who do not own domain names. The interests of domain name registrants and users are broad and varied. ICANN must provide a mechanism by which the interests of Registrants are actively taken into account.
6. Internet Users who are not registrants, being without a contractual link to ICANN, have interests that are distinct from those of governments. Internet users are affected by whether the symbols they type resolve to websites they seek. Some avenue of participation in DNS management, apart from registrars themselves, is desirable, and it is appropriate that they pay for this input in some measure.
On Dec 16, 2008, at 11:41 AM, Danny Younger wrote:
The BGC ALAC Review WG has offered discussion points regarding their []@al thinking on the ALAC. This is a response to those points. \Ý\Z[ÛÙÞN8 'SPø 'H\ÈHMK\\ÛÛYvisory committee to the Board. 2 people from each RALO plus 5 NCAs "At-Large" consists of 110 bodies organized into RALOs; these bodies are termed ALSs (At-Large Structures) "at-large" (lower case) refers to the universe of Internet users. Ú[ÈÜ\ØÝ\ÜÚ[Àn: KHSPÈ\ÈHÛÛ[Z[È\ÜÙH[HPÐS"structure. This continuing purpose has three key elements: o providing advice on policy; ÈÝY[È[] into ICANN operations and structure; È\ÙPÐS"¸ s accountability mechanisms TÔÔ\ÜÛÙNH]S@rge AC can play a useful role in ICANN as [Y\ÛÜ@ committee to the Board, just as the other ACs. ÜØ[isation ]\ÙHÚÝ[[[Ú\HHÚ][ÛÈvoting seats on the ICANN Board TÔÔ\ÜÛÙNThis is totally inappropriate. None of the other advisory committees have voting seats on the Board. Advisor committees advise, they do not vote on Board business. ËHSPø $S( Å27G'V7GW&R6÷VÆB&VÖân place for now
ISPCP Response: Not unless it can become useful; otherwise it is a waste of money. ICANN pours a huge amount of funds into the Z[[È[@aintenance of the ALAC-RALO-ALS structure and gets @ry little from it. At-Large prefers to retain its advisory Ý]\ËY]S\ÙH\ÈÝÛÚ[ÈÈH[ÛY@n making policy, what is its function and why is it in ICANN? ICANN's sole purpose \ÈÈXZÙH[[Üce Internet policy, manage TLDs and support the ÛÝservers. At-Large participates in none of these activities. Policy is made by the SOs, not by the Board. Currently the At-Large \ÈÛHÛ]Ý[ÈXZ\ÛÛÈÈthe SOs. YXÝ][\ÜÈ[\XÚ\][ÛBâVGV6ting and engaging the ALSs should be an immediate priority; ÛÛ\X[ÙHÚÝ[HHÛÙ\\HÛØ[£â55Response: Engaging the ALSs is a worthwhile goal if ICANN is will derive some benefit in policy making. Otherwise, this is Y\[H\XØ][ÈHXÝ]]HÙTÓÀC (indeed, many of the ALSs are simply ISOC chapters). KSPÈÚÝ[][ÜÝ]YÚXÈ[Ü\][Û[ans (including \ÜX[ÙHÜ]\XH[ÛÜÝ[ÜX]ion) as part of ICANN's planning process TÔÔResponse: Yes, plans based on measurable objectives. These objectives should include direct participation in the policy making process through SOs. [ÜH@ffort needs to be put into developing accurate cost models for At Large activity
ISPCP Response: Surely. Again, budget should be tied to useful accomplishments. Right now the At-Large is a total waste of money because it achieves nothing.
ËSPÈÚÝ[H[ÛÝ@raged to make its own choice of tools for ÛÛXÜ]@ve work TÔÔ\ÜÛÙNÙ\Z[H^HÚÝ[]Hhis freedom as long as
the collaborative work process is public and transparent.
8. The public comment period should be kept at 30 days except in special circumstances, in which case ALAC may request an extension to 45 days TÔÔ\ÜÛÙN]Z[[ÈHÝ\[Ì comment period is preferable as long as necessary language translation can be done speedily. KPÐS" should strengthen its translation processes TÔÔ@sponse: Agreed, within reasonable budget constraints.
Relationship with other ICANN entities LHSPÀ is the appropriate organizational channel for the voice [ÛÛÙ\ÈÙH[]YX[[\]\Ù\[PÐS" processes TÔÔ\ÜÛÙN] H]S\ÙHÝXÝ\e, not the advisory committee) could be if it would deign to actually participate in the PÐS"ØÙ\ÜÈ[Àtead of just offering advice. LKÚ[ÙHSPÈ\ÈH@ppropriate channel for the voice and concerns of the individual Internet user, it is inappropriate for other ICANN entities to attempt to claim to represent that individual user voice TÔÔ\ÜÛÙN[XÝH]@Large structure (not the advisory committee) is currently ineffective in representing the individual \Ù\voice. We recommend that At-Large be reconstituted as a ÛÛÝ]Y[ÞHÜH[]YX[\Ù\[\XÝ[\ with regard to the GNSO, we advise that ALAC have voting representation within the non-commercial users stakeholder group. LØÙ\ÜÙ\ÈÜÝY[ÈYXÙHon policy should be strengthened ÝÚ][SPÈÜ the development of policy advice and within SOs for requesting input from ALAC on policy issues TÔÔ\Àponse: It is inappropriate (not to mention ineffectual) ÜH]S\ÙHÈHÈ[Ý[ÛÝ]ÚYHÙHÓÀs by providing YXÙK^HÚÝ[[Ý[ÛÚ][he SOs as recommended above as a contributing constituency.
Summary ICANN needs to redirect its resources to forming an organization that will actively represent the at-large community in the Internet policy-making process. As presently constituted, At-Large does not serve that purpose. The ALAC (the advisory committee) should continue to be represented on the Board by an non-voting liaison, just as the RSSAC and SSAC \e represented. It should not have a voting seat (much less two!) XØ]\ÙH]ÚÝ[ÝH[ÛY[H\Àiness conducted by the Board (which is, primarily, the running of the Corporation). The At-Large should not have liaisons to SOs. Rather it should take [XÝ]e part, as appropriate, in the policy making activities of the SOs. ËÙÛÛËXØ[ÜËÛXZ[[Ë[\ÝËØ\chives/ispcp/msg00462.html £âÒÒÒÒÒУâäÔF67W0s mailing list NA-Discuss@atlarge-lists.icann.org http://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/na-discuss_atlarge-lists.ica... \Ú]HTSÈÛ[H]p://www.naralo.org ------
best,
Ross Rader General Manager, Hover t. 416.538.5492
The Easiest Way To Buy and Use Your Domain Names http://www.hover.com
Check out our blog at: http://stuff.hover.com Hover on Twitter: http://about.hover.com/twitter
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On Dec 16, 2008, at 1:15 PM, JFC Morfin wrote:
I afraid that DNS is a very small part of what @large Internet lead users are interested in
That's reasonable, but ICANN isn't the place to bring those issues forward. best, Ross Rader General Manager, Hover t. 416.538.5492 The Easiest Way To Buy and Use Your Domain Names http://www.hover.com Check out our blog at: http://stuff.hover.com Hover on Twitter: http://about.hover.com/twitter
At 19:19 16/12/2008, Ross Rader wrote:
On Dec 16, 2008, at 1:15 PM, JFC Morfin wrote:
I afraid that DNS is a very small part of what @large Internet lead users are interested in
That's reasonable, but ICANN isn't the place to bring those issues forward.
ICANN is supposedly in charge of IPv6 management and DNSSEC for the Legcacy Internet, which at the present time are the true key issues of the world digital ecosystem. Also, per se ICANN is _the_ Internet Governance at large problem, because of its ill positionning (what it wants to unilaterally do, the way it behaves IRT users, its relations with the US Government, the GAC international oddity) that has to be addressed. The status if ICANN and its staff hi-jacking we suffer for years should be the main issue for ALAC. If we really want to consider the DNS, then the DNS at large problem is to be considered and the TBT (technical barriers to trade), HR and WSIS violations that IDNA and Fast Crack represent. The problem is not to manage the ICANN DNS, but to try to preserve the world from the ICANN insolent and polluting behavior in the domain name space. jfc
participants (3)
-
Danny Younger -
JFC Morfin -
Ross Rader