This information clearly sets the goal posts for the match, but it also points out where fresh staff work will be focused - should the Board agree to these terms, and it is pretty clear to me that the right action of the Board will be to capitulate to most of what the GAC wants. Regarding staff work, for example, VI, as per the GAC, will need a lot of thought to sort the methodology on this out: 5: Restrict cross-ownership between registrars and registries where ICANN determines that the TLD is likely to obtain market power. What is the threshold of 'likelihood'? In any case, I agree with Steve's analysis that we have a GAC that wants to play nice with the ICANN Community so I do hope that this golden opportunity does not get trashed due to competing egos or ideology. Kind regards, RA Ronald N. Andruff RNA Partners, Inc. _____ From: owner-bc-gnso@icann.org [mailto:owner-bc-gnso@icann.org] On Behalf Of Steve DelBianco Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 11:24 PM To: bc-GNSO@icann.org Subject: [bc-gnso] GAC scorecard and quick summary In preparation for their meeting with the ICANN Board on Monday, the GAC just published their 'scorecard' on ICANN's new gTLD plans. http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/gac-scorecard-23feb11-en.pdf Below I provide some summary points about this GAC 'Advice'. But first, read the GAC's intro for their scorecard: The scorecard below represents the considered efforts of the GAC to distil the key elements of consensus advice regarding the introduction of new gTLDs it has been providing the ICANN Board since March, 2007. As the GAC noted in its Cartagena Communique, the GAC's initial advice, presented in the form of Principles, pre-dated both the completion of the GNSO's Recommendations on new gTLDs and the ICANN Board's subsequent adoption of those Recommendations in June, 2008. The GAC has sought from the outset of its deliberations regarding the public policy aspects related to the introduction of new gTLDs to contribute to the bottom-up, consensus-based policy development process within ICANN. As per the ICANN Bylaws, the GAC provides advice directly to the ICANN Board. Once the GAC forwards its advice to the ICANN Board, the GAC understands that it is within the ICANN Board's remit to instruct ICANN staff to take the GAC's advice into account in the development of the implementation plan for the introduction of new gTLDs. The GAC therefore welcomes the opportunity presented by the ICANN Board's agreement to hold a meeting with the GAC to review its longstanding and outstanding concerns regarding ICANN's proposed implementation plan for the introduction of new gTLDs. From the GAC's perspective, the Brussels meetings are not only an appropriate but a critical next step in ensuring the perspectives of governments are fully taken into account in the ICANN private sector-led, multi-stakeholder model that ICANN represents. I believe the government reps in the GAC really do appreciate private sector role in building internet infrastructure and creating nearly all compelling content and commerce. And I think they are gradually warming to the mulit-stakeholeder model. But it takes two to Tango, so ICANN needs to get up and dance, too. And if you dislike the idea of showing respect for the GAC, you will positively hate the idea of letting the UN-ITU run things. That is a very real threat - especially if the new gTLD round lets governments say, "I told you this was going to happen". Just ask Marilyn and others who are 'observing' the UN debating the future of internet governance. GAC Advice: 1.1: GAC may object to a string during initial evaluation. ICANN board can disregard GAC advice, but they must provide an explanation. 1.2: Individual governments (not the entire GAC) may object to Community-based applications and they don't want to pay a fee to file an objection. Makes it that much harder to get a community-based TLD. 3: GAC is concerned about ICANN capacity and root zone stability with 200-300 simultaneous applications. Makes case for a limited first batch of 300. 4: gTLD applicants must describe benefits of their TLD and explain how they will mitigate costs to registrants and consumers. 5: Restrict cross-ownership between registrars and registries where ICANN determines that the TLD is likely to obtain market power. 6.1: TM Clearinghouse should accept any TM recognized in country where registry is based. Both Sunrise and TM Claims should be mandatory, and include variations on the TM term. And. the TM clearinghouse [and services?] should continue after launch. 6.2 URS should be faster, simpler, and be based on lower standard of proof. 6.3: post-delegation dispute resolution should require a lower standard of proof, and be simpler to pursue. 6.4: national consumer protection authorities want ICANN to provide adequate compliance resources. 7: TLD contracts must require registry operator to comply with any legally binding decisions of governments. 8: For community-based applications, Allow governments to protect their legal interest in geographical names. 9: ICANN should seek legal advice where national competition authorities might object to a TLD. 10: Make it cheaper and easier for new gTLD applicants from developing countries. (and for Applications in languages whose presence on the web is limited ) 11: Law enforcement wants publicly available and accurate WHOIS, deeper vetting of applicants, and higher weight to applicants offering highest level of security. 12: ICANN should give 'early warning' to applicants if governments object to the string.