Hi again, By the way, as a practical matter going forward, I think the BC officers should in a timely manner raise at GNSO council the issue of eliminating double-weighted voting for the registrars and registries based on the language in paragraph 4 of the AOC, namely: "4. ...... ICANN and DOC recognize that there is a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally." I'm sure everyone can read that as a clear reference to the registrars and registries. The elimination of that double-weighted voting by the contracted parties would be an important step forward, to ensure that policy outcomes truly reflect the public interest, and in particular small and large businesses around the world who are neither registrars nor registries (no wanna-be registries). Sincerely, George Kirikos 416-588-0269 http://www.leap.com/ On Wed, Sep 30, 2009 at 12:37 PM, George Kirikos <icann@leap.com> wrote:
Hello,
On Wed, Sep 30, 2009 at 11:31 AM, Marilyn Cade wrote:
I wouldn't get irrationally enthusiastic about the agreement. The proposed accountability mechanisms that were posted, even though delayed in comment deadline, were not by any measure meeting the Comments from the community. There is much yet to understand.
As Marilyn suggests, one should temper any enthusiasm until one sees how ICANN operates in practice under the new document.
For example, language like.
4. ....." To ensure that its decisions are in the public interest, and not just the interests of a particular set of stakeholders, ICANN commits to perform and publish analyses of the positive and negative effects of its decisions on the public, including any financial impact on the public, and the positive or negative impact (if any) on the systemic security, stability and resiliency of the DNS."
appears very positive to those like myself who believe in cost-benefit analysis of various decisions. However, the ICANN staff have taken the position routinely that the promised "economic studies" for new TLDs have been accomplished, even though most observers would find that they do not come close to satisfying the concerns of the public. Obviously better and more responsive staff are needed, and the existing organizational culture needs to change considerably.
The DOC in some weighs tipped their hand in point #5 that they don't expressly support the current ICANN plan for new gTLDs, in much the same way they (with the DOJ) expressly failed to give immunity protection to VeriSign when the .com settlement was approved in 2006:
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/agreements/amend30_11292006.pdf
"5. .... This approval is not intended to confer federal antitrust immunity on VeriSign with respect to the Registry Agreement."
leaving the door wide open for the CFIT lawsuit to let a court determine whether the contract was anti-competitive.
I was encouraged to see the language in 9.3.1 in regards to WHOIS.
Ultimately, the DOC can terminate the agreement by providing 120 days notice. Given the IANA Function contract is more important, ICANN will hopefully be compelled to meet its promises. The IANA contract can be seen at:
http://www.icann.org/en/general/iana-contract-14aug06.pdf http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/iana.htm
and, if all options are exercised, comes up to be re-awarded in 2011. That's the critical contract that exercises control over the root zone file. So, one should not expect the political positioning and posturing to cease in the coming years. I expect the US government will never relinquish the IANA function permanently to ICANN, and I would support that continued control by the US as an important "check" to foil ICANN's tendency to "go rogue."
Sincerely,
George Kirikos 416-588-0269 http://www.leap.com/