As discussed in the BC meeting on Tuesday, I was invited to a panel on Enhancing ICANN Accountability, Thursday 8:30 - 9:45 in Los Angeles Room. ICANN staff want us to describe the 'Stress tests' proposed in the BC comments (link<http://www.bizconst.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/BC-reply-comment-on-Enhan...>, starting bottom of page 8 and at http://BizConst.org/StressTests ). I will show just 2 slides in the 5 minutes allotted us: Slide1 : What are Stress Tests, and why use them? Definition: A plausible and challenging scenario that helps us design and test a new mechanism or process. Plausible -- not Probable. A stress test is something we believe could happen. Why do Stress Tests? * Lets us be creative about future scenarios (instead of defensive about past problems) * Gives critics a productive way to express their concerns, so we can develop responses. * Helps us design an ICANN for the future Slide: Here are 10 Stress Tests the BC proposed in June. noting: All these affect overall ICANN accountability - once USG relinquishes the contract. 1. ICANN cancels the Affirmation of Commitments 2. Corporation changes its legal presence 3. ICANN becomes financially insolvent 4. ICANN greatly expands scope 5. ICANN adds a new TLD despite security concerns 6. GAC changes to majority voting 7. Governments move censorship to the core 8. Court bars re-delegation based on contract breach 9. Court bocks a delegation 10. ccTLD re-delegation dispute The light blue Stress Tests are those that involve IANA directly. Let's focus on just two of them: numbers 1 and 10. #1. Let's say that ICANN unilaterally cancels the Affirmation of Commitments, which it may do with just 120 days notice. Presently, the discipline imposed by needing to win the IANA contract forces ICANN to adhere to the only external accountability it has today: the Affirmation of Commitments. If Affirmation reviews are to remain part of the new ICANN accountability framework, we need to address this stress test in the IANA transition and Enhanced Accountability WGs. How? Guess we could amend the AoC without an option for ICANN to quit. But still a bilateral. Guess we could try getting +100 governments and others to sign along with USG. 'web of Affirmations'. But that's not going to be easy. The BC recommended we bring the AoC reviews into the ICANN Bylaws. #10. Let's say a government telecom minister instructs ICANN to re-delegate a country-code top-level domain (ccTLD), but there are vocal objections from most registrants and user communities in the country concerned. Faced with this re-delegation request, what response options and measures could be available to the entity charged with maintenance of the root zone - presumably ICANN? That's one for the Naming Functions group of the IANA Transition WG.