Not buyers remorse guys. Just trying to get some clarity regarding the Board¹s position vis a vis the last tussle over recall of the Board with 3 rather than 4. The thresholds should be adjusted if there are only 4 members of the Empowered Community. Don¹t over-react, I think this is good from the perspective of a restrained ICANN. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel & Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington D.C. 20006 Office: +1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / neustar.biz <http://www.neustar.biz> On 2/28/16, 4:09 AM, "Nigel Roberts" <nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:
Fellow councillors,
Not only do I agree with this, I am concerned about legitimacy and process.
Even if we assume that the final Draft Report is as was published, it is extremely complicated, and (as can been seen from the archive of the CCWG list) many of the Members of the CCWG, let alone Participants, really do not understand it.
Whilst it MIGHT be a work product that the ccNSO can, at least, register a non-objection, there are serious risks here that in approving the transition, we undo the hard work that led to the founding of the ccNSO.
Let's not forget that the ccTLD community, in 2001/2 REJECTED ICANN and walked away, due to the behaviour of the then ICANN staff (Louis Touton in particular) and of the ICANN Board, in acting like they had been appointed a super-regulator over ccTLDs, when the truth is, ICANN has no legal power, or legitimacy over ccTLDs except what we voluntarily permit.
The conclusion I have reached is that ONCE the CCWG proposal is stable, we must consult ccTLDs inside and outside the ccNSO. We have a moral duty to look after the ccTLD community, not just a majority of the 2/3s of ccTLDS who are in the ccNSO.
We should encourage the CCWG to provide a Final Draft without delay.
Furthermore, I am concerned in respect of the role of Council, as defined in the existing By-laws, and may have further input on this subject later this coming week.
On 28/02/16 08:34, Stephen Deerhake wrote:
FYI, it seems our colleagues in the gNSO are having a bit of buyer's remorse with respect to a particular aspect of the CCWG "final" report, and are requesting further work be undertaken, as indicated in the attached letter to the CCWG co-chairs from Keith Drazek.
I really don't see how we can commit the ccNSO to such a moving targetŠ
Best,
/Stephen
PS: FYI, subsequent to the publication of this correspondence, additional CCWG participants have signed onto it.
*From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Drazek, Keith *Sent:* Saturday, February 27, 2016 3:04 PM *To:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue
Hi Thomas, Mathieu and Leon. I¹m submitting the following on behalf of the undersigned members/participants from the GNSO:
---------------------------------------------
Dear CCWG-Accountability Chairs,
We are very concerned with the response of the Board to the request for clarification regarding the need to adjust the thresholds for the Empowered Community to exercise its powers if the number of decisional participants is less than 5 SOACs. Currently the text in Annex 1 and 2 regarding this possibility is ambiguous:
³The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN¹s SOs and ACs agree to be decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be adjusted. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs.²
In our view, there is no question that the thresholds /must/ be adjusted if there are fewer than five decisional participants. We have acknowledged repeatedly and operated under the assumption that there should not be a requirement of unanimous support for the Empowered Community to exercise its powers. Yet, if there are less than five decisional participants, unless the thresholds are adjusted it would require unanimous support for the Empowered Community to:
·Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget;
·Recall the entire Board of Directors; and
·Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process.
These powers are central to ensuring that ICANN remains accountable to the Empowered Community. This matter is too critical to the primary purpose of the CCWG-Accountability proposal to remain unclear. As the Board has noted in its own formal comments, ³Leaving this issue for future consideration raises the potential for renegotiation of the community thresholds. This potential for renegotiation adds a level of instability and a lack of predictability.²
Although it has a superficial resemblance to the recent debate over thresholds in the GAC carve-out, we believe it is fundamentally different. There is a great distinction between an SO or AC */choosing/* to not participate, and an SO or AC being */blocked/* from participation in a specific instance, as was the case in the case of the GAC carve-out. We were willing to accept a unanimous threshold for Board recall in the unique circumstances of the GAC carve-out, where the GAC was blocked from participation, but we believe firmly that if any SO or AC */elects/*, whether through a conscious decision or an inability to decide, to not participate, then the non-unanimity principle must be upheld.
However, as we saw with the debate over the thresholds in the GAC carve-out, this could be a contentious issue. It is far better to resolve this matter now (and during the drafting of bylaws), prior to the official transfer of the proposal to NTIA, than to delay it when it could have significant negative ramifications on the transition through a failure to resolve it during the implementation phase.
Therefore, we respectfully request that the current text in Annex 1 and Annex 2 be edited to replace ³may² with ³shall² and add an additional explanatory clause:
³The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN¹s SOs and ACs agree to be decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support */shall/*be adjusted */to prevent the need for unanimous support among the decisional Participants to exercise any of the seven Community powers/*. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to have more SOs or ACs.²
Signed,
Phil Corwin
Steve DelBianco
Keith Drazek
James Gannon
Robin Gross
Ed Morris
Brett Schaefer
Greg Shatan
Matthew Shears