All, Over the next couple of days auDA will be finalising its comments on the CWG proposal. As part of those we will be putting forward an alternative proposal. That proposal is below and also attached as a word document. I would welcome and very much appreciate input and feedback from ccTLD colleagues on our draft alternative. Like the CWG one, there is more work to do on it and detail to be filled in but I think it stands as a viable way forward that might, as a whole, be more palatable to some ccTLDs than the CWG proposal. Of course I could be wrong. I’ve been wrong before, once or twice. IMPORTANT - As you know, I’m on the ICANN Board. The below proposal and the comments auDA will make on the CWG proposal come from auDA. The proposal has nothing to do with the ICANN Board and has not been discussed with the ICANN Board. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112 E: ceo@auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator auDA’s Alternative Proposal to CWG Transition Plan Assumptions: 1. In a limited number of circumstances (such as 'gross incompetence' or ‘material breach’) there should be an option for the IANA function to be transferred from ICANN to another operator - The Nuclear Option. 2. There should be an enhancing of the current functional separation of the IANA function from the rest of ICANN - Functional Separation. 3. There should be a TLD registry operator centric standing committee to liaise with and oversee the IANA functions operator on administrative and service level functions - The Customer Standing Committee. 4. There should be an independent, binding arbitration mechanism to handle certain disputes - Appeals. 5. There should be a separate review body to review any ccTLD revocation and delegation (formally referred to as re-delegation) - The ccTLD Review Body Note - there is a further assumption that the ICANN Accountability working group will deal with ICANN wide accountability recommendations (for example a Board spill mechanism) and that such matters are best dealt with there. It is clear that any fully formed transition proposal from the CWG has to be inextricably linked to the work of that Accountability WG and therefore the timing of the work of the groups needs to become aligned. Proposal: 1. The Nuclear Option - Where the IANA functions operator is grossly negligent or incompetent or in material breach of its obligations under agreed service level commitments or performance indicators, it needs to be possible for the IANA function to be moved to a new operator. This could be achieved by the creation of a ‘Golden Bylaw’, similar to the corporate concept of a golden share (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_share). The Golden Bylaw would give the TLD registry operators the right, in certain circumstances, to require ICANN to put the IANA function out to re-bid. The Golden Bylaw would set out at least: a) the requirements to trigger the re-bid process - FOR EXAMPLE a vote of over 75% of ccTLD registry operators and 75% of gTLD registry operators b) what would need to happen to trigger the TLD registry operator’s vote - FOR EXAMPLE a petition by more than 15% of TLD registry operators c) the composition of a Re-Bid Committee that would oversee the vote and the subsequent re-bid and decide who the successful bidder was. The Re-Bid Committee could, FOR EXAMPLE, comprise of 20 registry operators (split between ccTLDs and gTLDS) plus a representative from each of the GAC, ALAC, SSAC and RSSAC d) the basis upon which the Golden Bylaw itself could be changed - FOR EXAMPLE only by a vote of over 75% of ccTLD registry operators and 75% of gTLD registry operators e) the other aspects of this proposal set out below. 2. Functional Separation - The current levels of functional separation of the IANA function from the rest of ICANN can be enhanced as part of the transition in a number of ways including: a) the IANA department having its own discrete budget b) the IANA department having its own legal advisors and independent legal advice. 3. Customer Standing Committee - This committee would provide the day-to-day liaison between the IANA functions operator and the TLD registry operators. It could be made up of an equal number of ccTLD and gTLD registry operators plus a representative from each of the GAC, ALAC, SSAC and RSSAC. It would perform, at least, the following tasks: a) work with the IANA functions operator to agree service levels and performance indicators b) review and re-negotiate the service levels and performance indicators at agreed intervals c) receive reports on and monitor the IANA functions operator’s performance with respect to the service levels and the performance indicators d) conduct a regular IANA functions operator budget review. 4. Appeals - To deal with disputes that arise in respect to matters covered by 3 above there should be a binding arbitration mechanism utilising the services of an independent arbitration organisation. 5. The ccTLD Review Body - The ccTLD community needs to work to come to consensus on the review body contemplated by the Framework of Interpretation WG. Whilst it may not be essential that this work is done by the time of the transition, it is essential that the appeals mechanism set out in 4 above is clearly understood to not be that ccTLD Review Body.