January 2015 - Ccwg-accountability1

Fwd: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 28, 2015

Jan. 28, 2015

Dear All, This is one option . We need to llok at other options At anyrate, the apportionment of representation is an important issue. There is no equal footing between SO ,AC as some wouls have more qwider representation which should be respected. Regards Kavouss ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Drazek, Keith <kdrazek(a)verisign.com> Date: 2015-01-28 20:58 GMT+01:00 Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure To: "accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org" < accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> Eric, To be clear, no one has ever said that, “…only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management.” Where did you get that? In order for any accountability structure to be meaningful and acceptable, it should represent all members of the community and there should be appropriate balance among all community participants and interests. As an employee of a gTLD Registry and Chair of the GNSO Registries Stakeholder Group, I can state definitively that we have a strong interest in ICANN’s accountability to us and to the rest of the community. I find your suggestion that registries might not have a place in a possible cross-community membership model odd, to say the least. Regards, Keith *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Eric Brunner-Williams *Sent:* Wednesday, January 28, 2015 12:51 PM *To:* accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure On 1/28/15 8:50 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote: If a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me understand how they are impacted and why they would care about the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community. I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently being addressed via the CWG Transition. It is not so very long ago that a (previous) Executive and (previous) Board made changes requested by delegees of iso3166 code points conditional upon a form of agreement. The policy pursued by that Executive and that Board were not subject to substantive community review (notice and comment) prior to being implemented, with the accountability issue I hope many, not just the directly concerned, still recall. Additionally, the interests of parties (of any type) need not encompass the union of all interests of all parties in the mechanisms and policies relating to accountability. The pursuit of the narrow self-interest of a hypothetical ccTLD, or gTLD, delegee or contractual party, through its operator, should not, by itself, remove a party pursuing its narrow self-interest from what ever may eventually be a body of "members". Were it so, the removed would be at least some of those the USG observed in the AOC which constitute " a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally." However, given the general awareness that the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners is of fundamental importance, and the limited interest _as_delegees_or_contractees_ in issues other than the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, it seems unnecessary to encumber the problem of accountability-via-membership (already quite difficult if not intractable, in my opinion) with notions that delegees and contractees, as delegees or contractees, contribute an interest absent but for their status as "members", whether represented en toto, or as self-organized aggregates, or by lottery. In simple terms, why registries-as-members at all? Does anyone believe only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management? I think that the function of the Board is general oversight of the registries, arising from its technical coordination of unique endpoint identifiers delegated authority, and contractual oversight arising from its delegated contracting authority, so the assumption that registries have a necessary place in a hypothetical membership model is one that should be examined carefully for self-interest and self-dealing, as well as for necessity and utility. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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Current requirements for independent panels in the bylaws
by Bruce Tonkin Jan. 19, 2015

Jan. 19, 2015

From: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#IV There shall be an omnibus standing panel of between six and nine members with a variety of expertise, including jurisprudence, judicial experience, alternative dispute resolution and knowledge of ICANN's mission and work from which each specific IRP Panel shall be selected. The panelists shall serve for terms that are staggered to allow for continued review of the size of the panel and the range of expertise. A Chair of the standing panel shall be appointed for a term not to exceed three years. Individuals holding an official position or office within the ICANN structure are not eligible to serve on the standing panel. In the event that an omnibus standing panel: (i) is not in place when an IRP Panel must be convened for a given proceeding, the IRP proceeding will be considered by a one- or three-member panel comprised in accordance with the rules of the IRP Provider; or (ii) is in place but does not have the requisite diversity of skill and experience needed for a particular proceeding, the IRP Provider shall identify one or more panelists, as required, from outside the omnibus standing panel to augment the panel members for that proceeding.

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Nolan principles
by Bruce Tonkin Jan. 19, 2015

Jan. 19, 2015

Hello All, I saw mention of these principles in the newspaper yesterday. They might be useful when thinking about members of independent review panels. From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Committee_on_Standards_in_Public_Life The Committee's First Report established The Seven Principles of Public Life, also known as the "Nolan principles".[4] They are included in the Ministerial Code. They are: Selflessness - Holders of public office should act solely in terms of the public interest. They should not do so in order to gain financial or other benefits for themselves, their family or their friends. Integrity - Holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might seek to influence them in the performance of their official duties. Objectivity - In carrying out public business, including making public appointments, awarding contracts, or recommending individuals for rewards and benefits, holders of public office should make choices on merit. Accountability - Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions and actions to the public and must submit themselves to whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their office. Openness - Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all the decisions and actions they take. They should give reasons for their decisions and restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly demands. Honesty - Holders of public office have a duty to declare any private interests relating to their public duties and to take steps to resolve any conflicts arising in a way that protects the public interest. Leadership - Holders of public office should promote and support these principles by leadership and example. Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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Re: [Area 1] Regarding review and redress
by Roelof Meijer Jan. 16, 2015

Jan. 16, 2015

Thanks for that, Bruce. And so, a review can lead to a redress, but does not necessarily do so. If a review concludes a „a wrong or grievance” (Bruce’s wording) and the advice is binding, redress will follow. If it does not conclude that, there will be no redress. If the advice is a recommendation, redress might follow. Or not. So, @Mathieu re the preliminary draft: I would not consider a review mechanism to be an example of a redress mechanism. A mechanism whereby the outcome of (a) review(s) are worked into binding measures, is. Cheers, Roelof On 15-01-15 09:18, "Bruce Tonkin" <Bruce.Tonkin(a)melbourneit.com.au> wrote: >Hello Robin, > > >>> 1. I think some of the mechanisms that are labeled "redress" are >>>actually "review". See the definitions below, but basically, since >>>mechanisms like ReconRequest and IRP and the Ombudsman are only making >>>recommendations to the board to change its mind on a decision, and have >>>no authority to set aside a decision on their own, they more >>>appropriately categorized as "review" mechanisms (and not redress). > > >Although in terms of an end-to-end process, once the Board approves a >recommendation from mechanisms like ReconRequest and IRP and the >Ombudsman it is possible to provide redress where a review has found that >a decision has violated the bylaws etc. and where the review has >recommended that ICANN provide redress. In general when one of the >existing accountability mechanisms finds fault in a decision by the >Board, the Board would be seeking to provide some form of redress to the >complainant. > >This is separate of course from the discussion about whether the outcome >of an independent review is binding. > >Just wanted to note that the existing process "can" provide redress, just >that currently the Board still does have discretion to approve or not >approve any specific recommendation for redress. If the Ombudsman >recommended that as a result of a bad decision that the Board provide a >payment of a Billion dollars to the complaint as a redress mechanism then >that may be rejected, but if the redress was to allow an applicant to >proceed to the next stage of say a new gTLD evaluation process - then I >would expect the Board to provide such redress. > >I am using "redress" to mean a remedy or compensation for a wrong or >grievance. > > >Regards, >Bruce Tonkin > >_______________________________________________ >Ccwg-accountability1 mailing list >Ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ccwg-accountability1

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Re: [Area 1] [CCWG-Accountability] [Area 2] Work Streams definition
by Robin Gross Jan. 16, 2015

Jan. 16, 2015

I support Matthew's points and amendments. Thanks, Robin On Jan 16, 2015, at 12:07 AM, Fares, David wrote: > I support Matthew’s comments and amendments as well. > > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith > Sent: 15 January 2015 16:27 > To: Burr, Becky; Matthew Shears; Jordan Carter; Kavouss Arasteh > Cc: ccwg-accountability3; ianatransition(a)icann.org; ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org; ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] [Area 2] Work Streams definition > > +1 from me too. I support Matthew’s points…it’s both. > > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky > Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2015 11:19 AM > To: Matthew Shears; Jordan Carter; Kavouss Arasteh > Cc: ccwg-accountability3; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org; ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org; ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org; ianatransition(a)icann.org > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] [Area 2] Work Streams definition > > +1 > > J. Beckwith Burr > Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer > 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 > Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr(a)neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz > > From: Matthew Shears <mshears(a)cdt.org> > Date: Thursday, January 15, 2015 at 11:16 AM > To: Jordan Carter <jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz>, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> > Cc: ccwg-accountability3 <ccwg-accountability3(a)icann.org>, "ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org" <ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org>, "ianatransition(a)icann.org" <ianatransition(a)icann.org>, "ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org" <ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org>, Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > Subject: Re: [Area 2] [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition > > Not to belabor this much more, and I may be being pedantic... > > It appears to read as if WS1 is about putting in place mechanisms that "provide the community with confidence" but not specifically about putting in place accountability mechanisms or measures. There is a big difference between putting in in place process mechanisms to provide confidence (as it now seems to imply) and putting in place actual accountability mechanisms which is what the original definition suggested. The second definition is fine for so long as it explicitly includes the first as well. > > It might be better if it read something like: > > Work Stream 1: is focused on mechanisms that 1) enhance ICANN's accountability and must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition, and 2) that provide the community with confidence that any accountability measures that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter ICANN management resistance or if it were against the interest of ICANN as a corporate entity. > > Matthew > > > > On 1/15/2015 10:40 AM, Jordan Carter wrote: > I agree with Paul, Mathieu etc - the Charter language is the skeleton. The language proposed sets out to characterise why we would select items - i.e. why they have to be done before the transition. > > We have to set out transparently the criteria we are using to decide what has to be in place. This language helps do that. > > best > Jordan > > On 16 January 2015 at 04:17, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Dear All, > I do not understand who agreed with whom > What has been changed from the Charter. > I personally fully agree with the following > Quote > " in the absence “mechanisms [that] would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability ( in relation with work stream 1 of CCWG ,for three distinct areas , Naming, Numbers and Protocols, including parameter ) could be implemented if it had consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should not occur." > Unquote > > Kavouss > > 2015-01-15 16:06 GMT+01:00 Edward Morris <emorris(a)milk.toast.net>: > +1 > > Paul has eloquently expressed my views in a manner far superior to anything I could write. Thanks. > > One could argue that our current system of accountability and transparency (reconsideration, Appeal, CEP, IR, DIDP), with some tweaks, should actually be sufficient going forward. It looks great: on paper. The problem is that a system designed for redress (per Bruce) actually functions as a system of review (per Robin), and a rather cursory review system at that. We simply must have mechanisms designed to ensure that we have real systems of accountability, ones that does not rely on the good faith and open-mindedness of any particular Board or staff member or group, in place before the transition can be allowed to occur. > -----Original Message----- > From: "Paul Rosenzweig" <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com> > To: "'Tijani BEN JEMAA'" <tijani.benjemaa(a)fmai.org.tn>, <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2015 09:22:26 -0500 > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition > > Respetful disagreement. I think the way it describes types of mechanisms in the “new” definition is exactly what needs to be in place before the Stewardship transition takes place. Put another way, I think that the exposition in WS1 precisely describes the commitments that MUST be made before a transition is allowed to occur. More importantly, I think there is growing consensus across the community that this is so. To state it affirmatively – in the absence “mechanisms [that] would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should not occur. > > Paul > > **NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 *** > 509 C St. NE > Washington, DC 20002 > > Paul Rosenzweig > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 > Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 > Link to my PGP Key > > From: Tijani BEN JEMAA [mailto:tijani.benjemaa@fmai.org.tn] > Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2015 4:53 AM > To: accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition > > Dear all, > > I read again the new proposed definition of the Work Streams, and I found it too different from the one in our charter: > > In the charter: > · Work Stream 1: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition; > · Work Stream 2: focused on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition > > The new proposal: > · Work Stream 1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter ICANN management resistance or if it were against the interest of ICANN as a corporate entity. > · All other consensus items could be in Work Stream 2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from ICANN management and board. > > I don’t believe that we are allowed to change any part of the charter without going back to the chartering organizations and ask for their approval. > > On the other hand, the separation of WS 1 and WS 2 was for the purpose of having the accountability mechanisms necessary before the transition done in time, and the new definition doesn’t satisfy this requirement > > I would prefer stay with the charter definition for all those reasons > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Tijani BEN JEMAA > Executive Director > Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) > Phone: + 216 41 649 605 > Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 > Fax: + 216 70 853 376 > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > Ce courrier électronique ne contient aucun virus ou logiciel malveillant parce que la protection Antivirus avast! est active. > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > > _______________________________________________ > Ccwg-accountability2 mailing list > Ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ccwg-accountability2 > > > > > -- > Jordan Carter > > Chief Executive > InternetNZ > > 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) > jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz > Skype: jordancarter > > To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential. > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > > -- > Matthew Shears > Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights > Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) > mshears(a)cdt.org > + 44 771 247 2987 > This message and its attachments may contain legally privileged or confidential information. It is intended solely for the named addressee. If you are not the addressee indicated in this message (or responsible for delivery of the message to the addressee), you may not copy or deliver this message or its attachments to anyone. Rather, you should permanently delete this message and its attachments and kindly notify the sender by reply e-mail. Any content of this message and its attachments that does not relate to the official business of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. or its subsidiaries must be taken not to have been sent or endorsed by any of them. No representation is made that this email or its attachments are without defect. _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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Regarding review and redress
by Bruce Tonkin Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

Hello Robin, >> 1. I think some of the mechanisms that are labeled "redress" are actually "review". See the definitions below, but basically, since mechanisms like ReconRequest and IRP and the Ombudsman are only making recommendations to the board to change its mind on a decision, and have no authority to set aside a decision on their own, they more appropriately categorized as "review" mechanisms (and not redress). Although in terms of an end-to-end process, once the Board approves a recommendation from mechanisms like ReconRequest and IRP and the Ombudsman it is possible to provide redress where a review has found that a decision has violated the bylaws etc. and where the review has recommended that ICANN provide redress. In general when one of the existing accountability mechanisms finds fault in a decision by the Board, the Board would be seeking to provide some form of redress to the complainant. This is separate of course from the discussion about whether the outcome of an independent review is binding. Just wanted to note that the existing process "can" provide redress, just that currently the Board still does have discretion to approve or not approve any specific recommendation for redress. If the Ombudsman recommended that as a result of a bad decision that the Board provide a payment of a Billion dollars to the complaint as a redress mechanism then that may be rejected, but if the redress was to allow an applicant to proceed to the next stage of say a new gTLD evaluation process - then I would expect the Board to provide such redress. I am using "redress" to mean a remedy or compensation for a wrong or grievance. Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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Re: [Area 1] [Area 2] [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition
by Burr, Becky Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

+1 J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Matthew Shears <mshears(a)cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org>> Date: Thursday, January 15, 2015 at 11:16 AM To: Jordan Carter <jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>>, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> Cc: ccwg-accountability3 <ccwg-accountability3(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability3@icann.org>>, "ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability2@icann.org>" <ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability2@icann.org>>, "ianatransition(a)icann.org<mailto:ianatransition@icann.org>" <ianatransition(a)icann.org<mailto:ianatransition@icann.org>>, "ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability1@icann.org>" <ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability1@icann.org>>, Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [Area 2] [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition Not to belabor this much more, and I may be being pedantic... It appears to read as if WS1 is about putting in place mechanisms that "provide the community with confidence" but not specifically about putting in place accountability mechanisms or measures. There is a big difference between putting in in place process mechanisms to provide confidence (as it now seems to imply) and putting in place actual accountability mechanisms which is what the original definition suggested. The second definition is fine for so long as it explicitly includes the first as well. It might be better if it read something like: Work Stream 1: is focused on mechanisms that 1) enhance ICANN's accountability and must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition, and 2) that provide the community with confidence that any accountability measures that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter ICANN management resistance or if it were against the interest of ICANN as a corporate entity. Matthew On 1/15/2015 10:40 AM, Jordan Carter wrote: I agree with Paul, Mathieu etc - the Charter language is the skeleton. The language proposed sets out to characterise why we would select items - i.e. why they have to be done before the transition. We have to set out transparently the criteria we are using to decide what has to be in place. This language helps do that. best Jordan On 16 January 2015 at 04:17, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote: Dear All, I do not understand who agreed with whom What has been changed from the Charter. I personally fully agree with the following Quote " in the absence “mechanisms [that] would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability ( in relation with work stream 1 of CCWG ,for three distinct areas , Naming, Numbers and Protocols, including parameter ) could be implemented if it had consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should not occur." Unquote Kavouss 2015-01-15 16:06 GMT+01:00 Edward Morris <emorris(a)milk.toast.net<mailto:emorris@milk.toast.net>>: +1 Paul has eloquently expressed my views in a manner far superior to anything I could write. Thanks. One could argue that our current system of accountability and transparency (reconsideration, Appeal, CEP, IR, DIDP), with some tweaks, should actually be sufficient going forward. It looks great: on paper. The problem is that a system designed for redress (per Bruce) actually functions as a system of review (per Robin), and a rather cursory review system at that. We simply must have mechanisms designed to ensure that we have real systems of accountability, ones that does not rely on the good faith and open-mindedness of any particular Board or staff member or group, in place before the transition can be allowed to occur. -----Original Message----- From: "Paul Rosenzweig" <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>> To: "'Tijani BEN JEMAA'" <tijani.benjemaa(a)fmai.org.tn<mailto:tijani.benjemaa@fmai.org.tn>>, <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2015 09:22:26 -0500 Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition Respetful disagreement. I think the way it describes types of mechanisms in the “new” definition is exactly what needs to be in place before the Stewardship transition takes place. Put another way, I think that the exposition in WS1 precisely describes the commitments that MUST be made before a transition is allowed to occur. More importantly, I think there is growing consensus across the community that this is so. To state it affirmatively – in the absence “mechanisms [that] would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should not occur. Paul **NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 *** 509 C St. NE Washington, DC 20002 Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> O: +1 (202) 547-0660<tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20547-0660> M: +1 (202) 329-9650<tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20329-9650> Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739<tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20738-1739> or paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.redbranchconsulting…> From: Tijani BEN JEMAA [mailto:tijani.benjemaa@fmai.org.tn<mailto:tijani.benjemaa@fmai.org.tn>] Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2015 4:53 AM To: accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition Dear all, I read again the new proposed definition of the Work Streams, and I found it too different from the one in our charter: In the charter: · Work Stream 1: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition; · Work Stream 2: focused on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition The new proposal: · Work Stream 1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter ICANN management resistance or if it were against the interest of ICANN as a corporate entity. · All other consensus items could be in Work Stream 2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from ICANN management and board. I don’t believe that we are allowed to change any part of the charter without going back to the chartering organizations and ask for their approval. On the other hand, the separation of WS 1 and WS 2 was for the purpose of having the accountability mechanisms necessary before the transition done in time, and the new definition doesn’t satisfy this requirement I would prefer stay with the charter definition for all those reasons -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tijani BEN JEMAA Executive Director Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) Phone: + 216 41 649 605 Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 Fax: + 216 70 853 376<tel:%2B%20216%2070%20853%C2%A0376> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ________________________________ [http://static.avast.com/emails/avast-mail-stamp.png]<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avast.com_&d=AwMD-g…> Ce courrier électronique ne contient aucun virus ou logiciel malveillant parce que la protection Antivirus avast!<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avast.com_&d=AwMD-g…> est active. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> _______________________________________________ Ccwg-accountability2 mailing list Ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org<mailto:Ccwg-accountability2@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ccwg-accountability2<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> -- Matthew Shears Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) mshears(a)cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org> + 44 771 247 2987

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Re: [Area 1] [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

Dear All, I do not understand who agreed with whom What has been changed from the Charter. I personally fully agree with the following Quote "* in the absence “**mechanisms [that] would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability ( in relation with work stream 1 of CCWG ,for three distinct areas , Naming, Numbers and Protocols, including parameter ) could be implemented if it had consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should not occur." * *Unquote* *Kavouss * 2015-01-15 16:06 GMT+01:00 Edward Morris <emorris(a)milk.toast.net>: > +1 > > Paul has eloquently expressed my views in a manner far superior to > anything I could write. Thanks. > > One could argue that our current system of accountability and transparency > (reconsideration, Appeal, CEP, IR, DIDP), with some tweaks, should > actually be sufficient going forward. It looks great: on paper. The problem > is that a system designed for redress (per Bruce) actually functions as a > system of review (per Robin), and a rather cursory review system at that. > We simply must have mechanisms designed to ensure that we have real systems > of accountability, ones that does not rely on the good faith and > open-mindedness of any particular Board or staff member or group, in place > before the transition can be allowed to occur. > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Paul Rosenzweig" <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com> > To: "'Tijani BEN JEMAA'" <tijani.benjemaa(a)fmai.org.tn>, < > accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2015 09:22:26 -0500 > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition > > Respetful disagreement. I think the way it describes types of mechanisms > in the “new” definition is exactly what needs to be in place before the > Stewardship transition takes place. Put another way, I think that the > exposition in WS1 precisely describes the commitments that MUST be made > before a transition is allowed to occur. More importantly, I think there > is growing consensus across the community that this is so. To state it > affirmatively – in the absence “mechanisms [that] would provide the > community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would > further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had > consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should > not occur. > > Paul > > ***NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 **** > 509 C St. NE > Washington, DC 20002 > > Paul Rosenzweig > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com > <paul.rosenzweigesq(a)redbranchconsulting.com> > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 > Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 > Link to my PGP Key > <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl…> > > *From:* Tijani BEN JEMAA [mailto:tijani.benjemaa@fmai.org.tn] > *Sent:* Thursday, January 15, 2015 4:53 AM > *To:* accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > *Subject:* [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition > > Dear all, > > I read again the new proposed definition of the Work Streams, and I found > it too different from the one in our charter: > > In the charter: > · *Work Stream 1*: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN > accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame > of the IANA Stewardship Transition; > · *Work Stream 2*: focused on addressing accountability topics > for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may > extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition > > The new proposal: > · *Work Stream 1* mechanisms are those that, when in place or > committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any > accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability > would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even > if it were to encounter ICANN management resistance or if it were against > the interest of ICANN as a corporate entity. > · All other consensus items could be in *Work Stream 2*, provided > there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items > despite resistance from ICANN management and board. > > I don’t believe that we are allowed to change any part of the charter > without going back to the chartering organizations and ask for their > approval. > > On the other hand, the separation of WS 1 and WS 2 was for the purpose of > having the accountability mechanisms necessary before the transition done > in time, and the new definition doesn’t satisfy this requirement > > I would prefer stay with the charter definition for all those reasons > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > *Tijani BEN JEMAA * > Executive Director > Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (*FMAI*) > Phone: + 216 41 649 605 > Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 > Fax: + 216 70 853 376 > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > ------------------------------ > <http://www.avast.com/> > Ce courrier électronique ne contient aucun virus ou logiciel malveillant > parce que la protection Antivirus avast! <http://www.avast.com/> est > active. > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > >

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Re: [Area 1] [Internal-cg] RFP, CCWG-Accountability, and timeline
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

Alissa Thankj you very much for that explanation However, I draw your attention to the part of the CCWG Charter as ststed below: Quote “In the discussions around the accountability process, the CCWG-Accountabili ty will proceed with two Work Streams: · *Work Stream 1: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition*; Whereas · *Work Stream 2: focused on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition* *In that sense , ICG is expected to receive the results of activities of Work Stream 1 .No doubt the activities of that Work Stream should include but not limited to cover the outcome of the CWG accountability part on naming . * *Moreover, Work Stream 1 shall also receive the inputs from **for **CRISP( for numbers ) **; and from **IANAPLAN.( foir protocol and parameters ) .* *In other words all accountabilities relating to Naming, Numbers , and proptocol including parapametrs ,irrespective their transmission to ICG as You have mentioned , must be seen together in a pachkage by CCWG under Work Stream 1. .Without that information from CCWG the accountability actions referred to in WS1 IANA TRANSITION WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE.* *This is an issue that must be discussed in CCWG thoroughly.* *Moreover, I do not understand the term “ CONDITIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY” the accountability is not coherenet and understandable with such qualification.* *In addition the results of CWG ,efven if it come to ICG at the end of Januar , it must have the consensus of community . I have doubt that community would have sufficient time to comment on the output of CWG.* *I therefroe see a major difficulty here that such a proposal may come from CWG at the end of Jan. 2015 without being sufficiently discussed by the community and not reached consensus.* *We are rushing to do something which may have serious inconsistencies . * *Regards* *Kavouss * 2015-01-15 7:49 GMT+01:00 Joseph Alhadeff <joseph.alhadeff(a)oracle.com>: > Agreed. > > Sent from my iPad > > On Jan 14, 2015, at 6:22 PM, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek(a)verisign.com> wrote: > > Thanks Alissa, > > > > I think this is spot on. > > > > Best, > > Keith Drazek > > > > *From:* internal-cg-bounces(a)icann.org [ > mailto:internal-cg-bounces@icann.org <internal-cg-bounces(a)icann.org>] *On > Behalf Of *Alissa Cooper > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 14, 2015 6:05 PM > *To:* ICG > *Subject:* [Internal-cg] RFP, CCWG-Accountability, and timeline > > > > Kavouss started a discussion on our call earlier today concerning the > relationship between the CCWG-Accountability and the ICG, and since we ran > the call right down to the end, I wanted to reiterate some points here and > make sure we are all on the same page. > > > > In our RFP < > https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/rfp-iana-stewardship-08sep14-en…> > we asked for a complete formal response from each of the operational > communities: names, numbers, and protocol parameters. Each community was > convened in its own way and chartered its own group to develop an RFP > response. The group that was created for names was the CWG; for numbers it > was CRISP; and for protocol parameters it was IANAPLAN. > > > > RFP Section III asks the communities to detail the changes they propose to > the existing IANA oversight and accountability mechanisms. If any proposal > that gets sent to us does not include these details, we will have to send > it back to the community to be completed. We cannot proceed with proposals > that are missing the oversight and accountability component. > > > > We set January 15 as a target for receiving responses from the > communities. For the ICG, this is the first step in the process — not the > last. We have explained the full process that will take place over the rest > of the year to get from individual community proposals to a final proposal > for submission to NTIA < > https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-transition-assembly-finali…>. > As such, while the responses we receive from the communities need to be > complete in detailing their proposed transition plans, those plans need not > be actually implemented before the responses are submitted to the ICG. > > > > Indeed, one feature that all of the proposals may end up having in common > is that they create expectations or conditions that must be met or steps > that must be carried out before the transition itself may take place (but > not before the proposal is submitted to the ICG), and that various other > bodies may need to act to meet those conditions or take those steps. For > example, the CWG proposal might outline accountability measures that it > expects the CCWG-Accountability to take up. The CRISP proposal might > outline steps it expects the RIR legal teams to take on. The IANAPLAN > proposal lists a couple of expectations about acknowledgements it expects > other parties to make. > > > > I think it’s perfectly fine — and expected — for the proposals to have > this feature when they come to us. We didn’t ask the communities to finish > the implementation of the transition. We asked them to propose plans. We > have many months of further review and public comment in front of us, and > we have established that if issues arise further down the line, we will > send the proposals back to the communities to work those issues out. Thus > if we receive a proposal that puts a condition on another body and it turns > out that that body cannot or will not fulfill the condition, we have both > the time and the process in place to work through it. I hope we won’t have > to do that, but we’ve built our process to accommodate it. > > > > Alissa > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Internal-cg mailing list > Internal-cg(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/internal-cg > > > _______________________________________________ > Internal-cg mailing list > Internal-cg(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/internal-cg > >

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Re: [Area 1] Sub Group 1 - Preliminary Draft
by Samantha Eisner Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

Hi - I uploaded a background document that I was developing to give a high level overview of how we've gotten to where we are on the Reconsideration and Independent Review processes. I already had it in progress, so I did not attempt to insert the information into David's document, so that we could keep background separate from present state. It would be helpful to understand the level of detail that you would hope to see regarding the SSR Review and ATRT reviews as part of this document - are we envisioning that we'll have high level summaries of recommendations, or references to external documents? I will build out some of the other sections tomorrow. I'd also like to get your opinions on how much we should be identifying other items that have an impact on ICANN's accountability outside of the redress mechanisms. I'm attaching the presentation that was given at ICANN 50 during the accountability session as a conversation starter for us about what else we think we should include here so that the CCWG can make assessments as to which areas are to be prioritized for attention. Best, Sam From: "David W. Maher" <dmaher(a)pir.org<mailto:dmaher@pir.org>> Date: Thursday, December 11, 2014 at 2:03 PM To: "ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability1@icann.org>" <ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability1@icann.org>> Cc: Accountability Staff <accountability-staff(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-staff@icann.org>> Subject: [Area 1] Sub Group 1 - Preliminary Draft Welcome to SubGroup 1, working on Establishing an inventory of existing accountability mechanisms / ATRT recommendations. A preliminary draft inventory is available at our Wiki page: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=51413856 It needs work; comments, edits, rewrites are welcome. We should have a full draft available by Monday for the entire group. David David W. Maher Senior Vice President - Law & Policy Public Interest Registry 312 375 4849

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