- Ccwg-accountability1 - lists.icann.org

Re: [Area 1] [Internal-cg] ICANN52
by Kavouss Arasteh Feb. 13, 2015

Feb. 13, 2015

Dear Patrik Let us not play with words Someone in ICG clearly told that ICG does not expect any input from CCGG work stream 1 I did not agree to that statement now Milton very rightly remind all of us that there is a direct link between ICG and CCWG work stream 1 . Tks Kavouss Sent from my iPhone > On 13 Feb 2015, at 10:38, Patrik Fältström <paf(a)frobbit.se> wrote: > > >> On 13 feb 2015, at 09:15, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> >> 'ICG does not expect any input from CCWG .I did severely disagree with that statement but since no one else than me raised that issue I did not raise it again but in CCWG I mentioned that the sole purpose of Work Steam 1 was exactly to provide the accountability required to be in place or committed before transition is take place. > > My view: > > There is no contradiction between the two statements. It is all a question on what you mean by "input from". > > The ICG and CCWG are parallell, so none of the two groups report to each other. > > There is though [of course] a requirement that there is no contradiction between the two outputs. > > Because of that, coordination is needed. > > But for me, that does not imply one group give input to the other, because to me "input to" implies one group report to the other, which I do not think we do. > > Patrik >

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Re: [Area 1] [Internal-cg] ICANN52
by Kavouss Arasteh Feb. 13, 2015

Feb. 13, 2015

Dear Milton, Thank you very much for your thoughtful and wise advice. I have raixsed this issue many times and every time I was told by somebody in ICG that for the sake of solidarity I do not name( please refer to my comments at several call and the corresponding transcript) but the answer that was given was. 'ICG does not expect any input from CCWG .I did severely disagree with that statement but since no one else than me raised that issue I did not raise it again but in CCWG I mentioned that the sole purpose of Work Steam 1 was exactly to provide the accountability required to be in place or committed before transition is take place. See CCWG CHARTER, Once again sincere thanks to you in razing such a vital question Kavouss 2015-02-12 22:00 GMT+01:00 Milton L Mueller <mueller(a)syr.edu>: > The term “ready for implementation” needs to be subject to a lot of > critical scrutiny. > > On my way to an airport now but will give it more scrutiny soon. > > > > --MM > > > > *From:* internal-cg-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto: > internal-cg-bounces(a)icann.org] *On Behalf Of *WUKnoben > *Sent:* Thursday, February 12, 2015 11:10 AM > *To:* internal-cg(a)icann.org > *Subject:* [Internal-cg] ICANN52 > > > > Dear colleagues, > > > > my take from the ICANN52 meeting in Singapore re the IANA Stewardship > Transition and the future ICG related work: > > - see *statement from Steve Crocker*, ICANN Board Chair: > > << > > *We have received several questions requesting clarification as to how > ICANN will handle receipt of the proposal from the ICG and the Work Stream > 1 proposal from the CCWG. We hope the following will be helpful.* > > *NTIA is expecting coordinated proposals from both groups. They cannot > act on just one. Further, they expect the ICG proposal will take into > account the accountability mechanisms proposed by the CCWG. We are > heartened by the close coordination between the groups, including liaisons > from the ICG to the CCWG. ICANN is expecting to receive both proposals at > roughly the same time. When ICANN receives these proposals, we will > forward them promptly and without modification to NTIA. As we have > previously stated, if we do submit the proposals with an accompanying > communication of comments, they will be on points we had already shared > with the community during the development of the proposals.* > > *We therefore encourage the groups to continue coordinating closely to > ensure ICANN receives the proposals together and is able to provide them to > NTIA in a coordinated manner.* > > *With respect to improvements in our accountability, we are definitely > open to improvements*. > > >> > > > > He’s referring to the Names Community Proposal as an output from the > CWG-stewardship and the CCWG-accountability. > > Consequently the ICG would have to accomodate the overall timeline > accordingly. > > - *Larry Strickling, NTIA* Assistant Secretary, in a session on > Sunday, 09 Feb., pointed out that NTIA is expecting a common proposal from > the three communities (protocols, numbers, names). The proposal as a whole > should be ready for implementation. > > From this point of view I wonder whether the names and protocol > proposals delivered in the present version reach this level of readiness. > I’d like to suggest beginning a related ICG discussion about. this item and > the potential consequences. > > Best regards > > Wolf-Ulrich > > _______________________________________________ > Internal-cg mailing list > Internal-cg(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/internal-cg > >

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Fwd: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 28, 2015

Jan. 28, 2015

Dear All, This is one option . We need to llok at other options At anyrate, the apportionment of representation is an important issue. There is no equal footing between SO ,AC as some wouls have more qwider representation which should be respected. Regards Kavouss ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Drazek, Keith <kdrazek(a)verisign.com> Date: 2015-01-28 20:58 GMT+01:00 Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure To: "accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org" < accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> Eric, To be clear, no one has ever said that, “…only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management.” Where did you get that? In order for any accountability structure to be meaningful and acceptable, it should represent all members of the community and there should be appropriate balance among all community participants and interests. As an employee of a gTLD Registry and Chair of the GNSO Registries Stakeholder Group, I can state definitively that we have a strong interest in ICANN’s accountability to us and to the rest of the community. I find your suggestion that registries might not have a place in a possible cross-community membership model odd, to say the least. Regards, Keith *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Eric Brunner-Williams *Sent:* Wednesday, January 28, 2015 12:51 PM *To:* accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure On 1/28/15 8:50 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote: If a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me understand how they are impacted and why they would care about the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community. I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently being addressed via the CWG Transition. It is not so very long ago that a (previous) Executive and (previous) Board made changes requested by delegees of iso3166 code points conditional upon a form of agreement. The policy pursued by that Executive and that Board were not subject to substantive community review (notice and comment) prior to being implemented, with the accountability issue I hope many, not just the directly concerned, still recall. Additionally, the interests of parties (of any type) need not encompass the union of all interests of all parties in the mechanisms and policies relating to accountability. The pursuit of the narrow self-interest of a hypothetical ccTLD, or gTLD, delegee or contractual party, through its operator, should not, by itself, remove a party pursuing its narrow self-interest from what ever may eventually be a body of "members". Were it so, the removed would be at least some of those the USG observed in the AOC which constitute " a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally." However, given the general awareness that the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners is of fundamental importance, and the limited interest _as_delegees_or_contractees_ in issues other than the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, it seems unnecessary to encumber the problem of accountability-via-membership (already quite difficult if not intractable, in my opinion) with notions that delegees and contractees, as delegees or contractees, contribute an interest absent but for their status as "members", whether represented en toto, or as self-organized aggregates, or by lottery. In simple terms, why registries-as-members at all? Does anyone believe only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management? I think that the function of the Board is general oversight of the registries, arising from its technical coordination of unique endpoint identifiers delegated authority, and contractual oversight arising from its delegated contracting authority, so the assumption that registries have a necessary place in a hypothetical membership model is one that should be examined carefully for self-interest and self-dealing, as well as for necessity and utility. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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Current requirements for independent panels in the bylaws
by Bruce Tonkin Jan. 19, 2015

Jan. 19, 2015

From: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2012-02-25-en#IV There shall be an omnibus standing panel of between six and nine members with a variety of expertise, including jurisprudence, judicial experience, alternative dispute resolution and knowledge of ICANN's mission and work from which each specific IRP Panel shall be selected. The panelists shall serve for terms that are staggered to allow for continued review of the size of the panel and the range of expertise. A Chair of the standing panel shall be appointed for a term not to exceed three years. Individuals holding an official position or office within the ICANN structure are not eligible to serve on the standing panel. In the event that an omnibus standing panel: (i) is not in place when an IRP Panel must be convened for a given proceeding, the IRP proceeding will be considered by a one- or three-member panel comprised in accordance with the rules of the IRP Provider; or (ii) is in place but does not have the requisite diversity of skill and experience needed for a particular proceeding, the IRP Provider shall identify one or more panelists, as required, from outside the omnibus standing panel to augment the panel members for that proceeding.

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Nolan principles
by Bruce Tonkin Jan. 19, 2015

Jan. 19, 2015

Hello All, I saw mention of these principles in the newspaper yesterday. They might be useful when thinking about members of independent review panels. From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Committee_on_Standards_in_Public_Life The Committee's First Report established The Seven Principles of Public Life, also known as the "Nolan principles".[4] They are included in the Ministerial Code. They are: Selflessness - Holders of public office should act solely in terms of the public interest. They should not do so in order to gain financial or other benefits for themselves, their family or their friends. Integrity - Holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might seek to influence them in the performance of their official duties. Objectivity - In carrying out public business, including making public appointments, awarding contracts, or recommending individuals for rewards and benefits, holders of public office should make choices on merit. Accountability - Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions and actions to the public and must submit themselves to whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their office. Openness - Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all the decisions and actions they take. They should give reasons for their decisions and restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly demands. Honesty - Holders of public office have a duty to declare any private interests relating to their public duties and to take steps to resolve any conflicts arising in a way that protects the public interest. Leadership - Holders of public office should promote and support these principles by leadership and example. Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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Re: [Area 1] Regarding review and redress
by Roelof Meijer Jan. 16, 2015

Jan. 16, 2015

Thanks for that, Bruce. And so, a review can lead to a redress, but does not necessarily do so. If a review concludes a „a wrong or grievance” (Bruce’s wording) and the advice is binding, redress will follow. If it does not conclude that, there will be no redress. If the advice is a recommendation, redress might follow. Or not. So, @Mathieu re the preliminary draft: I would not consider a review mechanism to be an example of a redress mechanism. A mechanism whereby the outcome of (a) review(s) are worked into binding measures, is. Cheers, Roelof On 15-01-15 09:18, "Bruce Tonkin" <Bruce.Tonkin(a)melbourneit.com.au> wrote: >Hello Robin, > > >>> 1. I think some of the mechanisms that are labeled "redress" are >>>actually "review". See the definitions below, but basically, since >>>mechanisms like ReconRequest and IRP and the Ombudsman are only making >>>recommendations to the board to change its mind on a decision, and have >>>no authority to set aside a decision on their own, they more >>>appropriately categorized as "review" mechanisms (and not redress). > > >Although in terms of an end-to-end process, once the Board approves a >recommendation from mechanisms like ReconRequest and IRP and the >Ombudsman it is possible to provide redress where a review has found that >a decision has violated the bylaws etc. and where the review has >recommended that ICANN provide redress. In general when one of the >existing accountability mechanisms finds fault in a decision by the >Board, the Board would be seeking to provide some form of redress to the >complainant. > >This is separate of course from the discussion about whether the outcome >of an independent review is binding. > >Just wanted to note that the existing process "can" provide redress, just >that currently the Board still does have discretion to approve or not >approve any specific recommendation for redress. If the Ombudsman >recommended that as a result of a bad decision that the Board provide a >payment of a Billion dollars to the complaint as a redress mechanism then >that may be rejected, but if the redress was to allow an applicant to >proceed to the next stage of say a new gTLD evaluation process - then I >would expect the Board to provide such redress. > >I am using "redress" to mean a remedy or compensation for a wrong or >grievance. > > >Regards, >Bruce Tonkin > >_______________________________________________ >Ccwg-accountability1 mailing list >Ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ccwg-accountability1

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Re: [Area 1] [CCWG-Accountability] [Area 2] Work Streams definition
by Robin Gross Jan. 16, 2015

Jan. 16, 2015

I support Matthew's points and amendments. Thanks, Robin On Jan 16, 2015, at 12:07 AM, Fares, David wrote: > I support Matthew’s comments and amendments as well. > > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith > Sent: 15 January 2015 16:27 > To: Burr, Becky; Matthew Shears; Jordan Carter; Kavouss Arasteh > Cc: ccwg-accountability3; ianatransition(a)icann.org; ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org; ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] [Area 2] Work Streams definition > > +1 from me too. I support Matthew’s points…it’s both. > > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky > Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2015 11:19 AM > To: Matthew Shears; Jordan Carter; Kavouss Arasteh > Cc: ccwg-accountability3; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org; ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org; ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org; ianatransition(a)icann.org > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] [Area 2] Work Streams definition > > +1 > > J. Beckwith Burr > Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer > 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 > Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr(a)neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz > > From: Matthew Shears <mshears(a)cdt.org> > Date: Thursday, January 15, 2015 at 11:16 AM > To: Jordan Carter <jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz>, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> > Cc: ccwg-accountability3 <ccwg-accountability3(a)icann.org>, "ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org" <ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org>, "ianatransition(a)icann.org" <ianatransition(a)icann.org>, "ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org" <ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org>, Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > Subject: Re: [Area 2] [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition > > Not to belabor this much more, and I may be being pedantic... > > It appears to read as if WS1 is about putting in place mechanisms that "provide the community with confidence" but not specifically about putting in place accountability mechanisms or measures. There is a big difference between putting in in place process mechanisms to provide confidence (as it now seems to imply) and putting in place actual accountability mechanisms which is what the original definition suggested. The second definition is fine for so long as it explicitly includes the first as well. > > It might be better if it read something like: > > Work Stream 1: is focused on mechanisms that 1) enhance ICANN's accountability and must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition, and 2) that provide the community with confidence that any accountability measures that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter ICANN management resistance or if it were against the interest of ICANN as a corporate entity. > > Matthew > > > > On 1/15/2015 10:40 AM, Jordan Carter wrote: > I agree with Paul, Mathieu etc - the Charter language is the skeleton. The language proposed sets out to characterise why we would select items - i.e. why they have to be done before the transition. > > We have to set out transparently the criteria we are using to decide what has to be in place. This language helps do that. > > best > Jordan > > On 16 January 2015 at 04:17, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Dear All, > I do not understand who agreed with whom > What has been changed from the Charter. > I personally fully agree with the following > Quote > " in the absence “mechanisms [that] would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability ( in relation with work stream 1 of CCWG ,for three distinct areas , Naming, Numbers and Protocols, including parameter ) could be implemented if it had consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should not occur." > Unquote > > Kavouss > > 2015-01-15 16:06 GMT+01:00 Edward Morris <emorris(a)milk.toast.net>: > +1 > > Paul has eloquently expressed my views in a manner far superior to anything I could write. Thanks. > > One could argue that our current system of accountability and transparency (reconsideration, Appeal, CEP, IR, DIDP), with some tweaks, should actually be sufficient going forward. It looks great: on paper. The problem is that a system designed for redress (per Bruce) actually functions as a system of review (per Robin), and a rather cursory review system at that. We simply must have mechanisms designed to ensure that we have real systems of accountability, ones that does not rely on the good faith and open-mindedness of any particular Board or staff member or group, in place before the transition can be allowed to occur. > -----Original Message----- > From: "Paul Rosenzweig" <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com> > To: "'Tijani BEN JEMAA'" <tijani.benjemaa(a)fmai.org.tn>, <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2015 09:22:26 -0500 > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition > > Respetful disagreement. I think the way it describes types of mechanisms in the “new” definition is exactly what needs to be in place before the Stewardship transition takes place. Put another way, I think that the exposition in WS1 precisely describes the commitments that MUST be made before a transition is allowed to occur. More importantly, I think there is growing consensus across the community that this is so. To state it affirmatively – in the absence “mechanisms [that] would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should not occur. > > Paul > > **NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 *** > 509 C St. NE > Washington, DC 20002 > > Paul Rosenzweig > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 > Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 > Link to my PGP Key > > From: Tijani BEN JEMAA [mailto:tijani.benjemaa@fmai.org.tn] > Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2015 4:53 AM > To: accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition > > Dear all, > > I read again the new proposed definition of the Work Streams, and I found it too different from the one in our charter: > > In the charter: > · Work Stream 1: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition; > · Work Stream 2: focused on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition > > The new proposal: > · Work Stream 1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter ICANN management resistance or if it were against the interest of ICANN as a corporate entity. > · All other consensus items could be in Work Stream 2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from ICANN management and board. > > I don’t believe that we are allowed to change any part of the charter without going back to the chartering organizations and ask for their approval. > > On the other hand, the separation of WS 1 and WS 2 was for the purpose of having the accountability mechanisms necessary before the transition done in time, and the new definition doesn’t satisfy this requirement > > I would prefer stay with the charter definition for all those reasons > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Tijani BEN JEMAA > Executive Director > Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) > Phone: + 216 41 649 605 > Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 > Fax: + 216 70 853 376 > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > Ce courrier électronique ne contient aucun virus ou logiciel malveillant parce que la protection Antivirus avast! est active. > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > > _______________________________________________ > Ccwg-accountability2 mailing list > Ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ccwg-accountability2 > > > > > -- > Jordan Carter > > Chief Executive > InternetNZ > > 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) > jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz > Skype: jordancarter > > To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential. > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > > -- > Matthew Shears > Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights > Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) > mshears(a)cdt.org > + 44 771 247 2987 > This message and its attachments may contain legally privileged or confidential information. It is intended solely for the named addressee. If you are not the addressee indicated in this message (or responsible for delivery of the message to the addressee), you may not copy or deliver this message or its attachments to anyone. Rather, you should permanently delete this message and its attachments and kindly notify the sender by reply e-mail. Any content of this message and its attachments that does not relate to the official business of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. or its subsidiaries must be taken not to have been sent or endorsed by any of them. No representation is made that this email or its attachments are without defect. _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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Regarding review and redress
by Bruce Tonkin Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

Hello Robin, >> 1. I think some of the mechanisms that are labeled "redress" are actually "review". See the definitions below, but basically, since mechanisms like ReconRequest and IRP and the Ombudsman are only making recommendations to the board to change its mind on a decision, and have no authority to set aside a decision on their own, they more appropriately categorized as "review" mechanisms (and not redress). Although in terms of an end-to-end process, once the Board approves a recommendation from mechanisms like ReconRequest and IRP and the Ombudsman it is possible to provide redress where a review has found that a decision has violated the bylaws etc. and where the review has recommended that ICANN provide redress. In general when one of the existing accountability mechanisms finds fault in a decision by the Board, the Board would be seeking to provide some form of redress to the complainant. This is separate of course from the discussion about whether the outcome of an independent review is binding. Just wanted to note that the existing process "can" provide redress, just that currently the Board still does have discretion to approve or not approve any specific recommendation for redress. If the Ombudsman recommended that as a result of a bad decision that the Board provide a payment of a Billion dollars to the complaint as a redress mechanism then that may be rejected, but if the redress was to allow an applicant to proceed to the next stage of say a new gTLD evaluation process - then I would expect the Board to provide such redress. I am using "redress" to mean a remedy or compensation for a wrong or grievance. Regards, Bruce Tonkin

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Re: [Area 1] [Area 2] [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition
by Burr, Becky Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

+1 J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr(a)neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: Matthew Shears <mshears(a)cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org>> Date: Thursday, January 15, 2015 at 11:16 AM To: Jordan Carter <jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>>, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> Cc: ccwg-accountability3 <ccwg-accountability3(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability3@icann.org>>, "ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability2@icann.org>" <ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability2@icann.org>>, "ianatransition(a)icann.org<mailto:ianatransition@icann.org>" <ianatransition(a)icann.org<mailto:ianatransition@icann.org>>, "ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability1@icann.org>" <ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability1@icann.org>>, Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [Area 2] [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition Not to belabor this much more, and I may be being pedantic... It appears to read as if WS1 is about putting in place mechanisms that "provide the community with confidence" but not specifically about putting in place accountability mechanisms or measures. There is a big difference between putting in in place process mechanisms to provide confidence (as it now seems to imply) and putting in place actual accountability mechanisms which is what the original definition suggested. The second definition is fine for so long as it explicitly includes the first as well. It might be better if it read something like: Work Stream 1: is focused on mechanisms that 1) enhance ICANN's accountability and must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition, and 2) that provide the community with confidence that any accountability measures that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter ICANN management resistance or if it were against the interest of ICANN as a corporate entity. Matthew On 1/15/2015 10:40 AM, Jordan Carter wrote: I agree with Paul, Mathieu etc - the Charter language is the skeleton. The language proposed sets out to characterise why we would select items - i.e. why they have to be done before the transition. We have to set out transparently the criteria we are using to decide what has to be in place. This language helps do that. best Jordan On 16 January 2015 at 04:17, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote: Dear All, I do not understand who agreed with whom What has been changed from the Charter. I personally fully agree with the following Quote " in the absence “mechanisms [that] would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability ( in relation with work stream 1 of CCWG ,for three distinct areas , Naming, Numbers and Protocols, including parameter ) could be implemented if it had consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should not occur." Unquote Kavouss 2015-01-15 16:06 GMT+01:00 Edward Morris <emorris(a)milk.toast.net<mailto:emorris@milk.toast.net>>: +1 Paul has eloquently expressed my views in a manner far superior to anything I could write. Thanks. One could argue that our current system of accountability and transparency (reconsideration, Appeal, CEP, IR, DIDP), with some tweaks, should actually be sufficient going forward. It looks great: on paper. The problem is that a system designed for redress (per Bruce) actually functions as a system of review (per Robin), and a rather cursory review system at that. We simply must have mechanisms designed to ensure that we have real systems of accountability, ones that does not rely on the good faith and open-mindedness of any particular Board or staff member or group, in place before the transition can be allowed to occur. -----Original Message----- From: "Paul Rosenzweig" <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>> To: "'Tijani BEN JEMAA'" <tijani.benjemaa(a)fmai.org.tn<mailto:tijani.benjemaa@fmai.org.tn>>, <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2015 09:22:26 -0500 Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition Respetful disagreement. I think the way it describes types of mechanisms in the “new” definition is exactly what needs to be in place before the Stewardship transition takes place. Put another way, I think that the exposition in WS1 precisely describes the commitments that MUST be made before a transition is allowed to occur. More importantly, I think there is growing consensus across the community that this is so. To state it affirmatively – in the absence “mechanisms [that] would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should not occur. Paul **NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 *** 509 C St. NE Washington, DC 20002 Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> O: +1 (202) 547-0660<tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20547-0660> M: +1 (202) 329-9650<tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20329-9650> Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739<tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20738-1739> or paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.redbranchconsulting…> From: Tijani BEN JEMAA [mailto:tijani.benjemaa@fmai.org.tn<mailto:tijani.benjemaa@fmai.org.tn>] Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2015 4:53 AM To: accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition Dear all, I read again the new proposed definition of the Work Streams, and I found it too different from the one in our charter: In the charter: · Work Stream 1: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition; · Work Stream 2: focused on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition The new proposal: · Work Stream 1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter ICANN management resistance or if it were against the interest of ICANN as a corporate entity. · All other consensus items could be in Work Stream 2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from ICANN management and board. I don’t believe that we are allowed to change any part of the charter without going back to the chartering organizations and ask for their approval. On the other hand, the separation of WS 1 and WS 2 was for the purpose of having the accountability mechanisms necessary before the transition done in time, and the new definition doesn’t satisfy this requirement I would prefer stay with the charter definition for all those reasons -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tijani BEN JEMAA Executive Director Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) Phone: + 216 41 649 605 Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 Fax: + 216 70 853 376<tel:%2B%20216%2070%20853%C2%A0376> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ________________________________ [http://static.avast.com/emails/avast-mail-stamp.png]<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avast.com_&d=AwMD-g…> Ce courrier électronique ne contient aucun virus ou logiciel malveillant parce que la protection Antivirus avast!<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.avast.com_&d=AwMD-g…> est active. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> _______________________________________________ Ccwg-accountability2 mailing list Ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org<mailto:Ccwg-accountability2@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ccwg-accountability2<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential. _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_l…> -- Matthew Shears Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) mshears(a)cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org> + 44 771 247 2987

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Re: [Area 1] [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

Dear All, I do not understand who agreed with whom What has been changed from the Charter. I personally fully agree with the following Quote "* in the absence “**mechanisms [that] would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability ( in relation with work stream 1 of CCWG ,for three distinct areas , Naming, Numbers and Protocols, including parameter ) could be implemented if it had consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should not occur." * *Unquote* *Kavouss * 2015-01-15 16:06 GMT+01:00 Edward Morris <emorris(a)milk.toast.net>: > +1 > > Paul has eloquently expressed my views in a manner far superior to > anything I could write. Thanks. > > One could argue that our current system of accountability and transparency > (reconsideration, Appeal, CEP, IR, DIDP), with some tweaks, should > actually be sufficient going forward. It looks great: on paper. The problem > is that a system designed for redress (per Bruce) actually functions as a > system of review (per Robin), and a rather cursory review system at that. > We simply must have mechanisms designed to ensure that we have real systems > of accountability, ones that does not rely on the good faith and > open-mindedness of any particular Board or staff member or group, in place > before the transition can be allowed to occur. > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Paul Rosenzweig" <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com> > To: "'Tijani BEN JEMAA'" <tijani.benjemaa(a)fmai.org.tn>, < > accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2015 09:22:26 -0500 > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition > > Respetful disagreement. I think the way it describes types of mechanisms > in the “new” definition is exactly what needs to be in place before the > Stewardship transition takes place. Put another way, I think that the > exposition in WS1 precisely describes the commitments that MUST be made > before a transition is allowed to occur. More importantly, I think there > is growing consensus across the community that this is so. To state it > affirmatively – in the absence “mechanisms [that] would provide the > community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would > further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had > consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should > not occur. > > Paul > > ***NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 **** > 509 C St. NE > Washington, DC 20002 > > Paul Rosenzweig > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com > <paul.rosenzweigesq(a)redbranchconsulting.com> > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 > Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 > Link to my PGP Key > <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl…> > > *From:* Tijani BEN JEMAA [mailto:tijani.benjemaa@fmai.org.tn] > *Sent:* Thursday, January 15, 2015 4:53 AM > *To:* accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > *Subject:* [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition > > Dear all, > > I read again the new proposed definition of the Work Streams, and I found > it too different from the one in our charter: > > In the charter: > · *Work Stream 1*: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN > accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame > of the IANA Stewardship Transition; > · *Work Stream 2*: focused on addressing accountability topics > for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may > extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition > > The new proposal: > · *Work Stream 1* mechanisms are those that, when in place or > committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any > accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability > would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even > if it were to encounter ICANN management resistance or if it were against > the interest of ICANN as a corporate entity. > · All other consensus items could be in *Work Stream 2*, provided > there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items > despite resistance from ICANN management and board. > > I don’t believe that we are allowed to change any part of the charter > without going back to the chartering organizations and ask for their > approval. > > On the other hand, the separation of WS 1 and WS 2 was for the purpose of > having the accountability mechanisms necessary before the transition done > in time, and the new definition doesn’t satisfy this requirement > > I would prefer stay with the charter definition for all those reasons > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > *Tijani BEN JEMAA * > Executive Director > Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (*FMAI*) > Phone: + 216 41 649 605 > Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 > Fax: + 216 70 853 376 > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > ------------------------------ > <http://www.avast.com/> > Ce courrier électronique ne contient aucun virus ou logiciel malveillant > parce que la protection Antivirus avast! <http://www.avast.com/> est > active. > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > >

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