- Ccwg-accountability1 - lists.icann.org

Re: [Area 1] [Internal-cg] RFP, CCWG-Accountability, and timeline
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

Alissa Thankj you very much for that explanation However, I draw your attention to the part of the CCWG Charter as ststed below: Quote “In the discussions around the accountability process, the CCWG-Accountabili ty will proceed with two Work Streams: · *Work Stream 1: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition*; Whereas · *Work Stream 2: focused on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition* *In that sense , ICG is expected to receive the results of activities of Work Stream 1 .No doubt the activities of that Work Stream should include but not limited to cover the outcome of the CWG accountability part on naming . * *Moreover, Work Stream 1 shall also receive the inputs from **for **CRISP( for numbers ) **; and from **IANAPLAN.( foir protocol and parameters ) .* *In other words all accountabilities relating to Naming, Numbers , and proptocol including parapametrs ,irrespective their transmission to ICG as You have mentioned , must be seen together in a pachkage by CCWG under Work Stream 1. .Without that information from CCWG the accountability actions referred to in WS1 IANA TRANSITION WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE.* *This is an issue that must be discussed in CCWG thoroughly.* *Moreover, I do not understand the term “ CONDITIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY” the accountability is not coherenet and understandable with such qualification.* *In addition the results of CWG ,efven if it come to ICG at the end of Januar , it must have the consensus of community . I have doubt that community would have sufficient time to comment on the output of CWG.* *I therefroe see a major difficulty here that such a proposal may come from CWG at the end of Jan. 2015 without being sufficiently discussed by the community and not reached consensus.* *We are rushing to do something which may have serious inconsistencies . * *Regards* *Kavouss * 2015-01-15 7:49 GMT+01:00 Joseph Alhadeff <joseph.alhadeff(a)oracle.com>: > Agreed. > > Sent from my iPad > > On Jan 14, 2015, at 6:22 PM, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek(a)verisign.com> wrote: > > Thanks Alissa, > > > > I think this is spot on. > > > > Best, > > Keith Drazek > > > > *From:* internal-cg-bounces(a)icann.org [ > mailto:internal-cg-bounces@icann.org <internal-cg-bounces(a)icann.org>] *On > Behalf Of *Alissa Cooper > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 14, 2015 6:05 PM > *To:* ICG > *Subject:* [Internal-cg] RFP, CCWG-Accountability, and timeline > > > > Kavouss started a discussion on our call earlier today concerning the > relationship between the CCWG-Accountability and the ICG, and since we ran > the call right down to the end, I wanted to reiterate some points here and > make sure we are all on the same page. > > > > In our RFP < > https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/rfp-iana-stewardship-08sep14-en…> > we asked for a complete formal response from each of the operational > communities: names, numbers, and protocol parameters. Each community was > convened in its own way and chartered its own group to develop an RFP > response. The group that was created for names was the CWG; for numbers it > was CRISP; and for protocol parameters it was IANAPLAN. > > > > RFP Section III asks the communities to detail the changes they propose to > the existing IANA oversight and accountability mechanisms. If any proposal > that gets sent to us does not include these details, we will have to send > it back to the community to be completed. We cannot proceed with proposals > that are missing the oversight and accountability component. > > > > We set January 15 as a target for receiving responses from the > communities. For the ICG, this is the first step in the process — not the > last. We have explained the full process that will take place over the rest > of the year to get from individual community proposals to a final proposal > for submission to NTIA < > https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-transition-assembly-finali…>. > As such, while the responses we receive from the communities need to be > complete in detailing their proposed transition plans, those plans need not > be actually implemented before the responses are submitted to the ICG. > > > > Indeed, one feature that all of the proposals may end up having in common > is that they create expectations or conditions that must be met or steps > that must be carried out before the transition itself may take place (but > not before the proposal is submitted to the ICG), and that various other > bodies may need to act to meet those conditions or take those steps. For > example, the CWG proposal might outline accountability measures that it > expects the CCWG-Accountability to take up. The CRISP proposal might > outline steps it expects the RIR legal teams to take on. The IANAPLAN > proposal lists a couple of expectations about acknowledgements it expects > other parties to make. > > > > I think it’s perfectly fine — and expected — for the proposals to have > this feature when they come to us. We didn’t ask the communities to finish > the implementation of the transition. We asked them to propose plans. We > have many months of further review and public comment in front of us, and > we have established that if issues arise further down the line, we will > send the proposals back to the communities to work those issues out. Thus > if we receive a proposal that puts a condition on another body and it turns > out that that body cannot or will not fulfill the condition, we have both > the time and the process in place to work through it. I hope we won’t have > to do that, but we’ve built our process to accommodate it. > > > > Alissa > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Internal-cg mailing list > Internal-cg(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/internal-cg > > > _______________________________________________ > Internal-cg mailing list > Internal-cg(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/internal-cg > >

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Re: [Area 1] Sub Group 1 - Preliminary Draft
by Samantha Eisner Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

Hi - I uploaded a background document that I was developing to give a high level overview of how we've gotten to where we are on the Reconsideration and Independent Review processes. I already had it in progress, so I did not attempt to insert the information into David's document, so that we could keep background separate from present state. It would be helpful to understand the level of detail that you would hope to see regarding the SSR Review and ATRT reviews as part of this document - are we envisioning that we'll have high level summaries of recommendations, or references to external documents? I will build out some of the other sections tomorrow. I'd also like to get your opinions on how much we should be identifying other items that have an impact on ICANN's accountability outside of the redress mechanisms. I'm attaching the presentation that was given at ICANN 50 during the accountability session as a conversation starter for us about what else we think we should include here so that the CCWG can make assessments as to which areas are to be prioritized for attention. Best, Sam From: "David W. Maher" <dmaher(a)pir.org<mailto:dmaher@pir.org>> Date: Thursday, December 11, 2014 at 2:03 PM To: "ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability1@icann.org>" <ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability1@icann.org>> Cc: Accountability Staff <accountability-staff(a)icann.org<mailto:accountability-staff@icann.org>> Subject: [Area 1] Sub Group 1 - Preliminary Draft Welcome to SubGroup 1, working on Establishing an inventory of existing accountability mechanisms / ATRT recommendations. A preliminary draft inventory is available at our Wiki page: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=51413856 It needs work; comments, edits, rewrites are welcome. We should have a full draft available by Monday for the entire group. David David W. Maher Senior Vice President - Law & Policy Public Interest Registry 312 375 4849

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Comments on accountabilty
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 12, 2015

Jan. 12, 2015

Dear Mathieu Dear All Please find attached my comments on the document provided by mathieu on accountabilty Regards Kavouss

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Re: [Area 1] [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding role of Board directors
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 12, 2015

Jan. 12, 2015

Dear Malcolm, Dear Keith Dear All Thank you very much for your contributions. First I will comment on Malcolm,s position He indicated Quote *"I would say that it is the responsibility of the Board to find ways to reconcile the community consensus with their legal obligations. Normally this is done through a combination of engagement with the community (so as to relieve unrealistic or unachievable expectations) and creative approaches to implementation (so that the objectives of the community are met in a manner compatible other obligations, which may not be the implementation originally envisaged)."* Unquote Kavouss Comment 1.Since currently ICANN functions , amongs others, Under the Incorporation Articles and Californian Laws and Rules ,it is incumbent to it to respect those Laws and Rules, thus the pressure or the burden would be shifted to the community. Consequently ,the argument is not a balanced approach. This inconsistency between the communit6y consensus outcome and those Laws and Rules was raised before and is not yet resolved 2. Malcolm also said Quote *"These twin duties are, in my view, *both* fundamental. The latter should not be allowed to become an excuse for the Board to go its own way, in defiance of the community"* Unqupote Comment from Kavouss I fully agree with your analysis 3. Malcolm also POINTED OUT Quote "Ultimately, if a Board member believes they are incapable of satisfying all their duties, then their responsibility is to resign their office" Unquote Comment from Kavouss Here also I fully agree with the analysis . 4. The last part of Malcolms opinion is Quote *"The radical idea would be to propose that directors are entitled, in the final analysis, to advance their own preferences in defiance of the community they are appointed to serve"* Unquote Comment from Kavouss *Here I disagree with the analysis* Now on the Keith's position Quote "The radical idea would be to propose that directors > are entitled, in the final analysis, to advance their own preferences, OR THE PREFERENCES OF ICANN'S LEGAL COUNSEL, in" Unquote Comment from Kavouss *Here also I disagree with the amendment made by Keith* Now on the Alan's position Quote *"But I "hope" that the answer is "it depends". I would like to think that the risk of being sued and the potential liabilities (and the chances of losing!) would be weighed against the ICANN Mission, Core Values and its Articles of Incorporation which includes the phrase "The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole".* Unquote Comment from Kavouss It is not clear whether Alan in favour of Malcolm's views or against it The argument he made is a double face argument.,on the one hand he expressed worries about being sued and ,on the other hand, he refers to *A**rticles of *incorporation which includes the phrase "the corporation shall operate for the benefit of the internet community as a whole" There seems to be a need to clarify his position i.e in favour or anaist Malcolm’s views Tks Kavouss 2015-01-12 9:24 GMT+01:00 Edward Morris <emorris(a)milk.toast.net>: > I would like to strongly support Keith's proposal that we 1) request the > ability to consult legal expert in California corporate law (as opposed to > strictly nonprofit corporate law, as the new Benefits Corporation is a > vehicle we may want to consider) and 2) we ensure the expert is not > affiliated in any way with ICANN legal or any legal contractor, such as > Jones Day, which has a a historical relationship with ICANN. To the extent > any participant can or would be allowed to be involved in the process by > which such an expert is selected, I certainly would like to be part of any > such effort. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Drazek, Keith" <kdrazek(a)verisign.com> > To: Adebunmi AKINBO <akinbo.adebunmi(a)gmail.com> > Cc: "accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org" < > accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2015 04:57:27 +0000 > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding role of Board directors > > In response to Akinbo's question below, I would like to ask the Co-Chairs > to add a discussion of expert legal advice to Tuesday's agenda. > > I believe the CCWG will likely need our own subject matter expert in > California not-for-profit corporate law. > > It's probably time we discuss how best to secure these services and to > ensure that individual is in the service of the CCWG and the community, so > we are not relying only on ICANN's interpretations. > > Thanks, > Keith > > On Jan 11, 2015, at 3:32 AM, "Adebunmi AKINBO" <akinbo.adebunmi(a)gmail.com> > wrote: > > > +1 DelBianco = So, when the Board is confronting a community consensus > to take an action that could put the corporation at risk of a lawsuit … how > do you believe a board member is obliged to react? > > On the above, can we seek a legal opinion? > Its important to address this scenario. > > This can happen at anytime in the lifetime of ICANN. > -Akinbo. > > > > On Sun, Jan 11, 2015 at 4:33 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg(a)mcgill.ca> > wrote: >> >> I am not an ICANN Board Member. I am not a lawyer. I am not a California >> law expert. >> >> But I "hope" that the answer is "it depends". I would like to think that >> the risk of being sued and the potential liabilities (and the chances of >> losing!) would be weighed against the ICANN Mission, Core Values and its >> Articles of Incorporation which includes the phrase "The Corporation shall >> operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole". >> >> Alan >> >> At 10/01/2015 08:40 PM, Steve DelBianco wrote: >> >> >> Thanks for the larger context around that bylaws provision, Bruce. But >> if we are considering whether the bylaws refer to â€˜ICANNâ€™ as the >> corporation or the *community*, see ICANNâ€™s own Management Operating >> Principles (2008 link >> <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/acct-trans-frameworks-principle…>, >> p. 5): >> "The third and perhaps most critical point of tension is between the >> accountability to the participating community to perform functions in >> keeping with the expectations of the community and the corporate and legal >> responsibilities of the Board to meet its fiduciary obligations. The >> ultimate legal accountability of the organization lies with the Board, not >> with the individuals and entities that make up the ICANN community.â€ >> >> So, when the Board is confronting a community consensus to take an action >> that could put the corporation at risk of a lawsuit … how do you bellieve a >> board member is obliged to react? >> >> >> From: Robin Gross < robin(a)ipjustice.org> >> Date: Saturday, January 10, 2015 at 8:10 PM >> To: Bruce Tonkin < Bruce.Tonkin(a)melbourneit.com.au> >> Cc: " accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org" < >> accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> >> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding role of Board directors >> >> Thanks for the info, Bruce. It is worth pointing out that regardless of >> how those bylaws are interpreted, under California law, nonprofit board >> members owe a legal duty of loyalty to the corporation and there isn't >> anything that this working group can do change California corporations law >> and the legal duty of loyalty each board member owes to the corporation (as >> a corporation, yes, not staff). This is where a tension comes in for >> trying to do public governance via a private corporation - the two concepts >> weren't "built" for the other, so there are gaps and some issues as a >> result. I think this is an issue our group should explore. >> >> Best, >> Robin >> >> >> On Jan 10, 2015, at 4:43 PM, Bruce Tonkin wrote: >> Hello Steve, ICANN Bylaws Article 6 Section 7 defines the duty of >> directors to ICANN the Corporation: >> Directors shall serve as individuals who have the duty to act in what >> they reasonably believe are the best interests of ICANN and not as >> representatives of the entity that selected them, their employers, or any >> other organizations or constituencies. >> I have often heard you refer to that specific clause in the bylaws >> over the past year. I think it is worth understanding it a little >> more. I personally believe that the intent of putting this clause in the >> bylaws is that several Board members are appointed to the Board from a >> specific stakeholder group, and this makes it clear that Board members need >> to act on behalf of all stakeholders not just the stakeholder group that >> appointed them. So from my perspective it is a higher level of >> accountability than simply being accountable to the group that appointed >> them. We certainly make that clear as new directors join the Board. The >> clause does not mean that somehow a Board director is now accountable to >> the staff in the organization rather than the "ICANN community". For >> those appointed to the Board by the nominating committee - I think it is >> already clear to them that they represent stakeholders as a whole, as they >> go through a rigorous interview process in front of the whole nominating >> committee. In my experience as Board director, Boards in general operate >> on behalf of their stakeholders - these stakeholders could be the general >> public, shareholders, or members. Under its articles of incorporation, >> ICANN is structured to act on behalf of the global public interest - i.e. >> the general public. In addition to acting on behalf of stakeholders, a >> board is also accountable to govern an organization in accordance with the >> law. This to me is the "corporate" obligation that you often refer. >> This includes ensuring that the organization can meet its financial >> commitments, ensure the staff have a safe workplace, ensure there are >> financial controls to stop fraud, ensure the organization complies with any >> contracts it has entered into etc. Directors of ICANN can be held >> personally liable under law if they are negligent. After the ATRT1 >> review, a set of governance guidelines were established to make this >> clearer: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/guidelines-2012-05-15-en From >> the section on the role of directors: "The fundamental responsibility of >> Directors (as defined below) is to exercise their business judgment to act >> in what they reasonably believe to be the best interests of ICANN and in >> the global public interest, taking account of the interests of the Internet >> community as a whole rather than any individual group or interest" "It >> is the duty of the Board to oversee management's performance to ensure that >> ICANN operates in an effective, efficient and ethical manner. The Board >> will also be responsible for overseeing the development of ICANN's short, >> medium and long-term strategic plans, ensuring that they will result in >> sustainable outcomes, and taking account of the critical interdependencies >> of financial, human, natural, manufactured, social and intellectual >> capitals." "Some of the Board's key responsibilities are to ensure that >> ICANN's ethics are managed effectively, that ICANN as a whole (as well as >> individual Board and staff members) operates pursuant to the highest >> ethical standards, that ICANN complies with applicable laws, and that ICANN >> considers adherence to best practices in all areas of operation." The >> bylaws could certainly be enhanced to incorporate the notion in the >> Governance Guidelines that Board directors are accountable to the Internet >> community as a whole. Regards, Bruce Tonkin >> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community >> mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> > > > > -- > *Evang. Akinbo A. A. Cornerstone, Nigeria.* > +2348064464545, +2348089118151 | 2BAC511D. > www.akinbo.ng > > *Member, Executive Board of Directors*, > Nigeria Internet Registration Association (NiRA) > www.nira.org.ng | akinbo(a)nira.org.ng <akinbo(a)yips.org.ng> > @niraworks > > *Acting Chief Operating Officer,* > DNS Africa Magazine > www.dnsafrica.org | akinbo(a)dnsafrica.org > @dnsafrica > > *National Convener,* > Nigerian Youth Coalition on Internet Governance (NG-YCIG) > www.ycig.org.ng <http://www.nira.org.ng/> > > *President,* > Young Internet Professionals (YiPS) > www.yips.gnbo.com.ng <http://wwwyips.org.ng/> | akinbo(a)yips.org.ng > > *The RedHub.* > 12, Afonka Odebunmi Street, Lagos State. > http://www.theredhub.org/ > > *National Focal Point ( Nigeria ) 2009-2011.* > Global Youth Coalition on HIV/AIDS (a program of TakingITGlobal) > www.youthaidscoalition.org www.takingitglobal.com > www.iaids.org > About me: http://profiles.tigweb.org/pscornerstone > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > >

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Re: [Area 1] [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding how bylaw changes are made
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 2, 2015

Jan. 2, 2015

Dear Avri, Dear All. Thank you very much for your comments I have one question which continued to bother me as everyone refers to «community" What is that magic term "community» covers? Does it includes or embrace the entire multistakeholders? As it was discussed at several occasion, there is a defacto agreement that ,generally speaking multistakeholder composed of Civil Society Private Sector, Technical Community including academics Governments In your views and the views other those who repeatedly refer to "Community" do they mean; Global Multistakeholer" as described above. If that is the case how the " community" fits in that overall description. When there are comments received from «community" have we checked whether all four categories of multistakeholder have commented? Do we treat the comments with equal footing. I know that your are defending the equal rights of the constituency In CSTD you defended that equality of rights for more than 2 hours and finally succeeded to win How we decide whether comments from a limited number of people ( mostly those who comments on everything are representing which of those four categories of community How we have taken into account whether the number of comments is representative of the entire multistakeholder . I give you an example, for the issue of ICANN accountability at one point of time ICANN mentioned based on 17 comments it modified the approach previously submitted. Did we checked whether all four categories of Multistakeholder commented ? Have we checked whether any Government commented or as they are frustrated they did not? What footing criteria were used to conclude on the representativeness of the comments? Did we consider comment made on behalf on a big community with equal footing with comments received from an individual who spoke on behalf of herself or himself? We need to be careful when we refer to the term “ community” Until the time that the constituents of Global Multistakeholder Community is not clearly specified and their footing are not agreed ,it is difficult to associate any serious value to the comment received from a limited number of permanent commenting people which may not representing the community as such. Best Regards Your friend Kavouss 2015-01-02 16:42 GMT+01:00 Paul Rosenzweig < paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com>: > Dear Kavouss > > > > I reply to you privately simply because I think we have pretty much > exhausted our friends on the listserve. I found your answer fascinating. > And I think, in the end, the difference lies in the perspectives of our > different worlds. Where I work (here in Washington DC) if I am going to > have a fight with someone, it is often beneficial to create a public > perception that I am being reasonable and the other fellow is the one who > is being unreasonable – and having the Board say “no” to my question would > help me in that regard. > > > > Best wishes > > Paul > > > > > > ***NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 **** > > 509 C St. NE > > Washington, DC 20002 > > > > Paul Rosenzweig > > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com > <paul.rosenzweigesq(a)redbranchconsulting.com> > > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 > > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 > > Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 > > Link to my PGP Key > <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl…> > > > > *From:* Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Friday, January 2, 2015 9:10 AM > > *To:* Paul Rosenzweig > *Cc:* Seun Ojedeji; <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding how bylaw changes are made > > > > Dear Paul, > > Dear All > > I am coming back to reply to your kind responses on which we have major > agreement on the substance but different views on the approaches. > > Let me just clarify my points that I raised many times and no answer was > give. > > Currently, there is constitutional and legal mechanism for ICANN > accountability > > On the other hand, there are some sort of optional accountability ( in > form of ATRT Recommendations and comments received from a limited number of > people ( Public Comments ) > > However, there is no mechanism at all to verify whether the > responsibilities entrusted to the Board have been properly held or > implemented. > > Moreover, there are not any constitutional (legally adopted) by > stakeholder accountability terms and conditions. > > We have bylaws crafted by board and under the Board authority to modify > and or update > > In my view having more than 40 years of constitutional experience the > Board is no more than an executive entity > > What they execute is AoC and Bylaws .The first one is designed to meet the > NTIA requirement .The second one is a quasi-unilateral provisions crafted > by Board and commented by a limited number of people ( public ) without > knowing that whether or not that limited number of people commented > represents the entire multistakeholders ( Civil Society, Private Sector, > Technical Community including Academics and last but not leased Governments > ) > > There is no separation of authority between those who establish policy/ > Multistakeholders or their legally designated or elected representatives > with appropriate footing and those who implement policies ( ICANN) and in > particular the policy itself ( modified version of AoC plus modified Bylaws > ) Every thing is mixed. > > Currently ICANN is at least is responsible to NTIA for certain actions and > responsible to UNKNOWN Public for certain other actions .Once the > transition is done the entire responsibilities goes to that UNKNOWN Public > without having any authority to scrutinize actions implemented and no > authority to sanction those who did not implement the established policy > > Now CCWG is making every effort to clarify the situation .We are at the > beginning of the process. In my view, that takes many months if not many > years to do so . > > Now you and those supporting your approach consider that we need to ask > the Board in an upfront approach what they believe implementable and what > believe Un/ Non implementable > > Allow me dear Paul to describe the scenarios. > > We would wish to ask an entity whether or not that entity agrees that we > a) limit its authority) designating or establishing a mechanism for > overnighting their action and c) implement sanctions if they have not or > will not perform their duties as prescribed by the Policy Terms and > condition > > Now I am asking this simple question > > Do you know any one or any entity wants that a) ,b) and C) individually > and or/ collectively be implemented in her or his regard? > > In this world that we are living no one wants to be limited in authority > nor being held more responsible than she or he is currently responsible > and more importantly no one which is not under any sanctioning rules to be > under that rules > > If the answer is yes, then we should not raise any question to them at all. > > Moreover, does the legislating authority ask the executing authority which > kind of authority sphere or responsibility domain it wishes to perform its > function? > > The answer is no > > The legislator establishes the laws and rules and the executing entity > MUST implement that Law or Rule. > > However, in devising those laws and Rules there is continuing dialogues > between the two CCWG and ICANN Board. > > In summary, in view of the above, we should not raise any such questions > to the Board but continue to exchange views between the Board and CCWG ,as > appropriate > > Kavouss > > > > > > 2015-01-02 9:52 GMT+01:00 Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>: > > Dear Paul, > > Thank you very much in deed to kindly answering my question. > > Yes it helps ( your clarification) . > > I will revert to you in few hours > > Thanks again for your kind answer and analysis > > Kavouss > > > > Sent from my iPhone > > > On 2 Jan 2015, at 00:08, Paul Rosenzweig < > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com> wrote: > > Dear Kavouss > > > > Thank you for this question which is a very sensible one. Let me try to > clarify what I am trying to accomplish by my proposal. > > > > I am a complete and firm support of Board accountability to the > Community. That is 100% clear and I think you and I are in firm agreement > on that. > > > > I may, however, not be clear about my method and process. From my > perspective the strongest accountability would be with a clear Bylaw > limitation on ICANN functionality and a provision for an outside arbiter. > Both of those changes would require Board approval. I am not trying to > subordinate the CCWG to the Board. Far from it – what I am trying to do > is find out as early in the process whether the Board is going to be > willing to agree to subordinate itself to the Community through those > mechanisms. > > > > So, I think the place where you may misunderstand me is at the very end of > your note – where you say “why you want to limit CCWG to just follow those > areas of accountability that Board wishes?” I think you are assuming that > if the Board said “no” to the questions I was asking that my reaction would > be to say “oh … oh well. That is OK. If the Board won’t agree, we can’t > do it.” > > > > My real reaction, in practice, would be exactly the opposite – I would > urge the Community to dig in for an extended discussion with the Board and > use my limited powers of persuasion to rally the community to demand that > the Board changed its mind. J And I would probably urge CCWG to > recommend those same things anyway – but at least we would do that knowing > what was going to happen. > > > > Does that help? > > Regards > > Paul > > > > ***NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 **** > > 509 C St. NE > > Washington, DC 20002 > > > > Paul Rosenzweig > > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com > <paul.rosenzweigesq(a)redbranchconsulting.com> > > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 > > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 > > Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 > > Link to my PGP Key > <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl…> > > > > *From:* Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com > <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com>] > *Sent:* Thursday, January 1, 2015 4:39 PM > *To:* Paul Rosenzweig > *Cc:* Seun Ojedeji; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding how bylaw changes are made > > > > Dear Paul, > > The way you commenting on the matter could have two different > interprétations or leave two different impressions: > > A) You are a firm supporter of accountabilty process when we note your > comments about Mathieu > > B) You wish to raise the question Under discussion to the Board asking > what they wish to see from CCWG and what they do not see from CCWG .The > latter interpretation ,in my view, seems to be subordinating CCWG to the > Board in the sense that we just study, elaborate and recoomend those area > of accountability that Board is comfortable with but not CCWG address the > full picture, objectives, requiremnets of accountability. > > Pls find a coherence between interpretation A) and interpretation B) .In > order words if you are really in favour of addressing the accountability in > a fullflege scope why you want to limit CCWG to just follow those areas of > accountability that Board wishes? > Thank you very much to clarify your position. > > Best Regards > > Kavouss > > > > 2015-01-01 21:35 GMT+01:00 Paul Rosenzweig < > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com>: > > Bruce is a wonderful man. But we don’t need his opinion, we need a formal > commitment from the Board. That’s why we need to ask the question in an > official manner. > > > > Indeed, I would posit that if the accountability working group tasked with > ensuring accountability by ICANN is reluctant to even ask the Board a > question then the communities capacity to actually reign in Board excess > when/if it perceives such would be very limited. If we are so unwilling to > even ask a question, will we be willing to tell the Board “no.” > > > > In any event, if we choose not to ask this question, then the scope of WS1 > has just expanded to essentially include almost all oversight mechanisms we > might conceivably want – which would, I think, be the wrong result. > > > > Warm regards > > Paul > > > > ***NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 **** > > 509 C St. NE > > Washington, DC 20002 > > > > Paul Rosenzweig > > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com > <paul.rosenzweigesq(a)redbranchconsulting.com> > > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 > > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 > > Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 > > Link to my PGP Key > <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl…> > > > > *From:* Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Thursday, January 1, 2015 10:09 AM > *To:* Seun Ojedeji > *Cc:* accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding how bylaw changes are made > > > > Dear All > > I agree to the term that no one should dictate the CCWG. > > Still why there is a need that we raise any such question to the Board, > > Bruce is quite active and requested to continue the Liaison > > Kavouss > > > > > > Sent from my iPhone > > > On 1 Jan 2015, at 15:28, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > Hi Bruce, > > Thanks for this information, I will then suggest that this WG determine if > those steps will indeed be appropriate for us especially since WS1 is more > of a perquisite to transition. One would expect some adjustments on timing > and wording rights to be made in the process, also board voting rights in > this particular process may need to be agreed upon. It will not be > encouraging to have implementation stopped on the basis of no 2/3 board > majority....time utilization is an important factor in all these. So the > earlier we involve board (without having them dictate for us) the better. > > Regards > sent from Google nexus 4 > kindly excuse brevity and typos. > > On 1 Jan 2015 04:55, "Bruce Tonkin" <Bruce.Tonkin(a)melbourneit.com.au> > wrote: > > Hello Seun, > > >> I think writing to board to know how it will treat the WG outcome > especially when some of it's implementations will require by-law > modifications that further involve the ICANN community in decision making > process may be useful. > > In terms of the process for making bylaws changes, changes have previously > been made to accommodate recommendations from the review teams associated > with the work of the Accountability and Transparency Review Teams (ATRT) > https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/atrt-2012-02-25-en . > > Any archive of all previous versions of the bylaws is available here: > https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/archive-bc-2012-02-25-en > > Based on our current practice I would expect the process to be as follows: > > - Board accepts recommendations from the CCWG > > - General Counsel's office prepares specific text to change in the bylaws > > - proposed bylaws changes are put out for public comment (45 days) > > - Board then votes on the bylaws amendments - a 2/3 majority of the Board > is required to make a bylaw change > > If there is significant community comments against the proposed bylaws > language - then a new draft of the bylaws would be put out for public > comment that is consistent with the recommendations from the CCWG. > > Regards, > Bruce Tonkin > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > > >

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Happy New Year
by Kavouss Arasteh Dec. 31, 2014

Dec. 31, 2014

Dear Thomas Dear Mathieu Deal all distinguished colleagues of CCWG, HAPPY NEW YEAR TO ALL OF YOU, May 2015 be a year of prosperity, success, healthy for you and your family May 2015 be also a year of revolution in ICANN process after almost 16 years of existence. We all have a difficult year before us with challenging tasks to address one of the most complex issue before us .If we succeed, the whole mankind would benefit of that, if we do not succeed, we should yet continue the battle until we succeed. Never be discouraged or be disappointed at all. I am confident in putting off our efforts and experience together in a friendly, constructive and healthy environment we will achieve what we expected and should achieve Good Luck BEST WISHES KAVOUSS

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Fwd: Sub Group 1 - Preliminary Draft
by Kavouss Arasteh Dec. 30, 2014

Dec. 30, 2014

Dear All Dear Bruce I think one of the steps to be taken is that the entire Board,s meeting be webcasted and on line captioned and fully recorded and transcript to be nade available within 24 hours ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> Date: 2014-12-30 15:12 GMT+01:00 Subject: Re: [Area 1] Sub Group 1 - Preliminary Draft To: Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin(a)melbourneit.com.au> Bruce Pls then forward it to every one on my behalf Kavouss 2014-12-30 2:27 GMT+01:00 Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin(a)melbourneit.com.au>: > Hello Kavouss, > > Thanks for your suggestion. > > Note I think you post just went to me rather than the full mailing list. > > Regards, > Bruce Tonkin > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] > Sent: Tuesday, 30 December 2014 2:29 AM > To: Bruce Tonkin > Subject: Re: [Area 1] Sub Group 1 - Preliminary Draft > > Dear All > Dear Bruce > I think one of the steps to be taken is that the entire Board,s meeting be > webcasted and on line captioned and fully recorded and transcript to be > nade available within 24 hours > Kavouss > > Sent from my iPhone > > > On 26 Dec 2014, at 10:00, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin(a)melbourneit.com.au> > wrote: > > > > Hello Phil, > > > >>> hopefully the final recommendations will be so broadly supported > within the community that Board cherry-picking will be limited or > nonexistent. > > > > Yes - that is the Board's hope also. > > > > > >>> What is most concerning is that the community has little or any > information by which to judge how the Board has reached difficult decisions > on public interest matters in the past. As you note in regard to the .XXX > decision, "Several directors spent considerable time preparing their own > personal statements on that matter that were delivered in the public > forum." Similarly, I remember a vigorous public debate and statements when > the Board voted to let the new gTLD program proceed and accept > applications. But we no longer have public Board meetings, and the > materials released pertaining to Board meetings are quite opaque regarding > how decisions are reached or whether dissents took place, and of course we > have no transcripts of Board meetings or access to other relevant > communications related to Board decision-making. I do note that the October > 16th resolution further states that a rationale will be provided for any > Board rejection of CCWG recommendations, and a further dialo > > gue initiated, but that is still inferior to being able to witness or at > least read the full Board debate on such matters. > > > >>> It has been widely recognized that transparency is a fundamental > requirement for accountability, yet the transparency of the Board's > decision-making process is greatly lacking at present. I know that view > prevails within the Commercial Stakeholders Group, and my perception is > that other parts of the community share it as well. It is my hope that this > CCWG process will lead to much greater transparency in that area and that > the Board will recognize that such transparency is very much in the global > public interest. > > > > That is good feedback. I was at one time the Chair of the DNSO and > then later chair of the GNSO. Over the time I was chair we put in place > transparency steps including making recordings of the meetings available > publicly and also transcripts. In my time there was only about two people > in the community that ever listed to the audio recordings - but in > principle they were available to everyone. I personally support that > approach in principle, but it is not yet a Board view. > > > > I just reviewed the minutes of the Board meeting of 28 Oct 2014: > > https://www.icann.org/resources/board-material/minutes-2014-10-28-en > > > > The minutes state with respect to moving the meeting location in Feb > 2015: > > > > " The Board engaged in an intense conversation on the topic, with some > Board members noting their personal preference that the meeting proceed in > Marrakech as scheduled, given that it is difficult to know what the > situation will be in Marrakech in February. However, even with a personal > preference to keep the meeting location, there are risks to proceeding with > that decision that may require the meeting to be postponed." > > > > The minutes also note that the decision was not unanimous: > > > > " Twelve Board members voted in favor of Resolutions 2014.10.28.02, > 2014.10.28.03, 2014.10.28.04, 2014.10.28.05, 2014.10.28.06 and > 2014.10.28.07. Gonzalo Navarro and Mike Silber were opposed to the > Resolutions. Markus Kummer abstained from voting on the resolutions. > Kuo-Wei Wu was unavailable to vote. The Resolutions carried." > > > > In that meeting I recall that nearly every Board member spoke on the > topic - some in favour of moving the location, and some in favour of > keeping it in the original location. There were well articulated views > that could have been made public in my own personal view. > > > > It would certainly be helpful if the CCWG on accountability did > articulate what they would like to see in terms of transparency from Board > meetings. Note however - that in many cases significant discussion on a > controversial topic occurs over several months - with much of the dialogue > occurring in Board workshops (for example the Board holds at least two > face-to-face workshops during the year, and also meets on the weekend prior > to the ICNAN public meeting week, as well as during the week in workshop > format). In many ways the Board functions like a GNSO or IETF working > group - with numerous discussions, before a topic reaches decision. The > current chair - Steve Crocker - tries as much as possible to ensure that a > Board resolution has matured to the point where it can be approved > unanimously. I agree however that the community sees the end product, > and not the intermediate steps. > > > > Regards, > > Bruce Tonkin > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Ccwg-accountability1 mailing list > > Ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org > > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ccwg-accountability1 >

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Comments from Mr. Kavouss Arasteh (GAC, ICG)
by Grace Abuhamad Dec. 17, 2014

Dec. 17, 2014

Dear all, Here attached is Mr. Arasteh's first contribution to the work of the CCWG-Accountability as he shared on the main mailing list on 15 December. Below I've copied an excerpt of his document that relates to WA1. 2.1 Working Group 1 collects and compile all existing information mostly from ATRT past works The past works done ATRT were based on the initial AoC and the amendments thereto. Moreover, that works were resulted from consultancy agreement between ATRT and some private sources .Consequently,that output must be adjusted to post transition environment in which the duty of the NTIA is expected to be performed by another entity. This requires a thorough review of the terms, conditions and scope of works as contained in AoC and its required adjustment to post transition environment Best, Grace

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Work Area 1 - Preliminary Drafts - Workspace
by Berry Cobb Dec. 15, 2014

Dec. 15, 2014

Hi All, Drafts for Work Area 1 will be posted in this collaborative workspace: https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Work+Area+1+-+Draft+Docume nts Thank you. B Berry A. Cobb Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers 720.839.5735 mail(a)berrycobb.com @berrycobb

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Sub Group 1 - Preliminary Draft
by Malcolm Hutty Dec. 12, 2014

Dec. 12, 2014

Dear all, I would like to point to a 'root source' for accountability mechanisms that underpins those identified in the first draft. These are clauses C.2.9.2c and C.2.9.2.d of the IANA Functions contract. See below for [1] A link to the contract [2] quote of C.2.9.2.c [3] quote of C.2.9.2.d. These are core provisions of the contract that ensure ICANN's accountability to the ccTLD and gTLD communities, respectively. The effect of C.2.9.2c is to protect the independence and authority of ccTLDs to make policy for their domain, and to prevent ICANN encroaching on that by seeking to make policy for ccTLDs in the way it does for gTLDs. The effect of C.2.9.2.d is to create a binding commitment that gTLD changes shall be based on existing policy procedures (i.e. the GNSO PDP), to require that these procedures continue, and that they be open and transparent. Because they are in a contract to which NTIA is a counter-party, they make ICANN accountable to NTIA for ensuring that it honours these requirements. They also form the base of ICANN's understanding of its accountability to the community for ccTLDs and gTLDs respectively. To put it bluntly, C2.9.2.d is the binding mechanism that prevents the ICANN Board deciding to abolish the GNSO, or to look to somewhere else (e.g. GAC) for the source of gTLD policy. There is more detail set out in the Bylaws as to how this is to operate, but C.2.9.2.d elevates this above a mere Bylaws requirement (which is subject to change by the Board) into a binding, externally enforceable commitment. Please note that CCWG-Stewardship, which is dealing with IANA transition, has decided that the effect of C.2.9.2.d is a matter for CCWG-Accountability and not for itself. I attach a proposed modification to the current draft that would recognise these clauses as an accountability mechanism. Kind Regards, Malcolm. [1] http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/sf_26_pg_1-2-final_award_an… [2] Regarding ccTLDs, the IANA functions contract [1] says at C.2.9.2.c: "C2.9.2.c -The Contractor shall apply existing policy frameworks in processing requests related to the delegation and redelegation of a ccTLD, such as RFC 1591 Domain Name System Structure and Delegation, the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) Principles And Guidelines For The Delegation And Administration Of Country Code Top Level Domains, and any further clarification of these policies by interested and affected parties as enumerated in Section C.1.3. If a policy framework does not exist to cover a specific instance, the Contractor will consult with the interested and affected parties, as enumerated in Section C.1.3; relevant public authorities and governments on any recommendation that is not within or consistent with an existing policy framework. In making its recommendations, the Contractor shall also take into account the relevant national frameworks and applicable laws of the jurisdiction that the TLD registry serves. The Contractor shall submit its recommendations to the COR via a Delegation and Redelegation Report." [3] Regarding gTLDs, the IANA functions contract says at C.2.9.2.d: "C.2.9.2.d Delegation and Redelegation of a Generic Top Level Domain (gTLD) -- The Contractor shall verify that all requests related to the delegation and redelegation of gTLDs are consistent with the procedures developed by ICANN. In making a delegation or redelegation recommendation, the Contractor must provide documentation verifying that ICANN followed its own policy framework including specific documentation demonstrating how the process provided the opportunity for input from relevant stakeholders and was supportive of the global public interest. The Contractor shall submit its recommendations to the COR via a Delegation and Redelegation Report" -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA

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