Dear all, As discussed, I suggest the table to be expanded with at least one column „final say” or „stops the buck” or something, that states where the final decision lies. I bet that in most cases we will find that this is the ICANN Board. Which is not a flaw in the system, but -as I am sure you are all aware- just the logic result of the present (common) governance structure of the corporation, whereby board members have a fiduciary duty and ultimately (only) serve the best interests of the corporation. As long as the best interests of ICANN the corporation and the „public interest” are aligned (or are so in the opinion of the board) all is probably well. If they are not, if the are not in the opinion of the board, or if the board misinterprets the public interests and/or the corporations interests, problems arise. It surely has not always been the case, but in my opinion the board and CEO have done pretty well over the last years in finding the right balance (or alignment) between corporate and public/community interests. No guarantee that that will remain the case indefinitely however, especially if there’s no longer the NTIA/USG to subtly threaten with corrective measures... As far as I understand it, we mean by „enhanced accountability” that ultimately, when the *stuff* hits the fan, the public interest will be the decisive interest and NOT the corporation's. I do not think that can be demanded from the board. I agree that we should consider multiple solutions to this challenge. One of which might be assigning the task and the authority required for it, to an external or semi-external structure, through the bylaws of that corporation. In such a situation, the members of that structure should obviously not be appointed by (the board of) the corporation. But by those representing the public interest. Cheers, Roelof Meijer SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05 roelof.meijer@sidn.nl | www.sidn.nl <http://www.sidn.nl/> On 23-12-14 06:18, "Mathieu Weill" <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> wrote:
Thanks Samantha,
Just adding a link to the resource for everyone to access easily : DOC version : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414329/WS1%20-%20Accoun tability%20Inventory%20with%20Questions.doc?version=1&modificationDate=141 9299658000&api=v2
PDF version : https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414329/WS1%20-%20Accoun tability%20Inventory%20with%20Questions.doc?version=1&modificationDate=141 9299658000&api=v2
Mathieu
Le 23/12/2014 02:57, Samantha Eisner a écrit :
Hi -
I’ve done a first attempt (which is by no means comprehensive) of our assigned task and uploaded to the wiki. I think we’d benefit from seeing what other detail we’d like in there, so I put this out to start the conversation.
Best,
Sam
On 12/16/14, 1:43 PM, "David W. Maher" <dmaher@pir.org> wrote:
I agree David David W. Maher Senior Vice President – Law & Policy Public Interest Registry 312 375 4849
On 12/16/14 2:04 PM, "Mathieu Weill" <mathieu.weill@afnic.fr> wrote:
Samantha, Colleagues,
That is indeed what I understand from the discussion. You could also add a 3) is it review, redress or check & balance (see Netmundial definition of Accountability).
Best Mathieu
Le 16/12/2014 13:04, Samantha Eisner a écrit :
Colleagues,
Listening to the discussion, I propose think that one of the new refined tasks that we could undertake would be, for each mechanism that we’ve identified on the inventory, first try to answer the questions of:
1) To whom does this mechanism seek to make ICANN accountable; and 2) For what
This could be a starting point for parsing through the next wave of issues that we are agreeing to take on.
Best,
Sam
On 12/15/14, 9:23 AM, "David W. Maher" <dmaher@pir.org> wrote:
Thanks, Samantha. On the subject of contractual sources of accountability, it should be noted that the proposed withdrawal of NTIA from IANA functions will remove NTIA as a source of accountability enforcement. I propose that the Sub Group look for other contractual sources and at the same time explore the possibility of broadening the scope of accountability enforceable by contract. For example, the registries and registrars could enter into contracts with ICANN covering the IANA functions in addition to the following: 1. ICANN could agree by binding contract not to impose rules on third parties (by means of policies, accreditation standards, or required contract terms) that are not supported by a demonstrated consensus among affected parties. 2. ICANN could agree by binding contract not to impose rules on third parties (by means of policies, accreditation standards, or required contract terms) that do not relate to issues the uniform resolution of which is necessary to assure sound operation of the domain name system. 3. ICANN could agree by binding contract not to impose rules on third parties (by means of policies, accreditation standards, or required contract terms) that relate to online content or to online behavior that does not threaten the sound operation of the domain name system? 4. ICANN could agree that any claim that it has not complied with the previous three obligations may be brought by any adversely affected party before an independent review panel that can issue decisions that are binding on ICANN.
David
David W. Maher Senior Vice President Law & Policy Public Interest Registry 312 375 4849
On 12/15/14 9:30 AM, "Samantha Eisner" <Samantha.Eisner@icann.org> wrote:
> Hi all - > > I posted a new version of the document on the wiki page in clean >and > redline form. The proposed changes include: > 1. To address Malcolm Hutty¹s edit regarding contractual sources of > accountability, I made a ³contract² heading and also listed >Registry > and > Registrar Contracts under there. > 2. To address David¹s inclusion of SSAC recommendations as a source > of > accountability, I incorporated a heading under Bylaws that >accounted > for > Advisory Committee inputs. (Note that action is pending on ATRT2 > recommendations regarding ICANN¹s obligations on considerate of > advice >from ACs other than the GAC). Because identifying accountability in > terms > of advice did not then seem complete without reference to the >policy > recommendations upon which that advice is often given, I referenced > the > policy development/Board consideration of policy recommendations >for > each > of the SOs. > 3. Inserted summary listings of all ATRT recommendations (1 and 2) > > In terms of background documentation, I modified the page to make a > clear > delineation between the background info and the drafting work > ongoing. > In > line with David¹s concern and Bruce¹s suggestion, I excerpted the > presentation I previously circulated, and posted only the part that > deals > with the inventory effort, so as not to bring all the questions in >at > this > stage. > > I also included an excerpt to the inventory effort undertaken by > ICANN in > advance of the first postings on Enhancing ICANN Accountability. > > Please let me know if you have any questions. > > Sam > > > > On 12/13/14, 4:01 PM, "Bruce Tonkin" > <Bruce.Tonkin@melbourneit.com.au> > wrote: > >> Hello Samantha, >> >> Is it possible to split this presentation from London into its two >> components? >> >> The first few slides list some of the accountability mechanisms >> available >> within the ICANN structure. The ATRT2 review identified some >> improvements to make to these mechanisms. >> >> The slides from 11-28 are a general presentation about >> accountability > >from Professor Jan Aart Scholte, School of Global Studies, > .University >> of >> Gothenburg. >> >> He lists 9 framing questions to consider when looking at >> accountability >> mechanisms: >> >> (1) What is accountability? >> >> - processes whereby an actor answers to other actors for the >> impacts on >> them of its actions and omissions >> >> (2) with what components? >> >> - transparency >> >> - consultation >> >> - monitoring and evaluation >> >> - correction and redress >> >> >> (3) for what purpose? >> >> - financial review; 'the accounts' >> >> - performance measurement >> >> - democratic participation/control >> >> - moral probity; ecological integrity; peace; etc. >> >> >> (4) Accountability by whom? >> >> - challenge of pinning down and specifying impact in the context >>of >> complex polycentric governance >> >> >> (5) for what? >> >> - actual formal mandate >> >> - desired mandate (content? spam? digital access?) >> >> >> (6) to whom? >> >> - 'the public' of significantly affected people (but >>metaphysical, >> ecological?) >> >> - 'the public' not unitary, as different people are differently >> affected >> >> - constituencies (divisions within and overlaps between) >> >> >> (7) for whom? >> >> - myth of a universal 'global community' with same interests and >> equal >> power >> >> - skewed accountability on lines of age, caste, class, >> (dis)ability, >> faith, gender, geography, language, nationality, race, sexuality >> >> >> (8) via what channels? >> >> - hegemonic veto >> >> - intergovernmental multilateralism >> >> - (global) political parties and parliaments >> >> - multi-stakeholder arrangements >> >> - civil society deliberation and mobilization >> >> - judiciary (court, inspection panel, evaluation exercises, >> ombudsman) >> >> - mass media >> >> >> (9) how accountably? >> >> - 'When you point a finger, you need to do it with a clean hand' >> >> - transparency, consultation, monitoring and redress of those >>who >> (claim to) speak for affected publics >> >> Regards, >> Bruce Tonkin
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