January 2015 - Ccwg-accountability2

Fwd: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 28, 2015

Jan. 28, 2015

Dear All, This is one option . We need to llok at other options At anyrate, the apportionment of representation is an important issue. There is no equal footing between SO ,AC as some wouls have more qwider representation which should be respected. Regards Kavouss ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Drazek, Keith <kdrazek(a)verisign.com> Date: 2015-01-28 20:58 GMT+01:00 Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure To: "accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org" < accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> Eric, To be clear, no one has ever said that, “…only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management.” Where did you get that? In order for any accountability structure to be meaningful and acceptable, it should represent all members of the community and there should be appropriate balance among all community participants and interests. As an employee of a gTLD Registry and Chair of the GNSO Registries Stakeholder Group, I can state definitively that we have a strong interest in ICANN’s accountability to us and to the rest of the community. I find your suggestion that registries might not have a place in a possible cross-community membership model odd, to say the least. Regards, Keith *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Eric Brunner-Williams *Sent:* Wednesday, January 28, 2015 12:51 PM *To:* accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure On 1/28/15 8:50 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote: If a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me understand how they are impacted and why they would care about the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community. I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently being addressed via the CWG Transition. It is not so very long ago that a (previous) Executive and (previous) Board made changes requested by delegees of iso3166 code points conditional upon a form of agreement. The policy pursued by that Executive and that Board were not subject to substantive community review (notice and comment) prior to being implemented, with the accountability issue I hope many, not just the directly concerned, still recall. Additionally, the interests of parties (of any type) need not encompass the union of all interests of all parties in the mechanisms and policies relating to accountability. The pursuit of the narrow self-interest of a hypothetical ccTLD, or gTLD, delegee or contractual party, through its operator, should not, by itself, remove a party pursuing its narrow self-interest from what ever may eventually be a body of "members". Were it so, the removed would be at least some of those the USG observed in the AOC which constitute " a group of participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users generally." However, given the general awareness that the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners is of fundamental importance, and the limited interest _as_delegees_or_contractees_ in issues other than the continued function of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, it seems unnecessary to encumber the problem of accountability-via-membership (already quite difficult if not intractable, in my opinion) with notions that delegees and contractees, as delegees or contractees, contribute an interest absent but for their status as "members", whether represented en toto, or as self-organized aggregates, or by lottery. In simple terms, why registries-as-members at all? Does anyone believe only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone Management? I think that the function of the Board is general oversight of the registries, arising from its technical coordination of unique endpoint identifiers delegated authority, and contractual oversight arising from its delegated contracting authority, so the assumption that registries have a necessary place in a hypothetical membership model is one that should be examined carefully for self-interest and self-dealing, as well as for necessity and utility. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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Mining the Work Area 2 inventory for 'Requirements'
by Steve DelBianco Jan. 19, 2015

Jan. 19, 2015

Chairs — to help kick things off tomorrow and to use some of the prior of work area 2, I went thru our 15-Jan version of WA2 inventory and extracted some requirements. Just did the first page here. We could do the second and third page too, if you think that will be helpful. Note1: ‘Community’ refers to cross-community accountability group, whether by Members, Supervisory Board, or other mechanism. Community powers: Community appoints representatives to the Affirmation of Commitments Review Teams. Community has standing to send any board decision to independent Review Panel (may begin the IRP with a Cooperative Engagement Process) Community has standing to begin a reconsideration request on decisions of board or ICANN management, on matters of process or of substance. Community may approve/disapprove proposed ICANN annual budget. Community may approve/disapprove proposed changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles of Incorporation. Community may recall one or all ICANN board members. Review and Redress Mechanisms: Decisions of Independent Review Panel are binding on ICANN’s board. Panelists in the IRP pool should be selected by the Community. The standard for Independent Review should be lower. The cost to prosecute an Independent Review should be reduced. IRP should address errors or ethical lapses. Ombudsman should be able to investigate any accountability-related complaint brought by an ICANN employee, while protecting confidentiality of the employee Affirmation of Commitments: The Affirmation of Commitments should not be a bilateral agreement with USG that can be canceled by either party. It could be merged into ICANN bylaws, for example. The Accountability & Transparency Review Team (ATRT) could recommend sunset of previously required reviews, and create new reviews. Mission/Scope of ICANN: ICANN should be prevented from imposing obligations on others, unless supported by consensus of affected parties and necessary to protect the integrity and availability of unique identifiers in the DNS. ICANN should be prevented from acting outside its Bylaws and Articles — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482

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Re: [Area 2] [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition
by Robin Gross Jan. 16, 2015

Jan. 16, 2015

I support Matthew's points and amendments. Thanks, Robin On Jan 16, 2015, at 12:07 AM, Fares, David wrote: > I support Matthew’s comments and amendments as well. > > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith > Sent: 15 January 2015 16:27 > To: Burr, Becky; Matthew Shears; Jordan Carter; Kavouss Arasteh > Cc: ccwg-accountability3; ianatransition(a)icann.org; ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org; ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] [Area 2] Work Streams definition > > +1 from me too. I support Matthew’s points…it’s both. > > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Burr, Becky > Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2015 11:19 AM > To: Matthew Shears; Jordan Carter; Kavouss Arasteh > Cc: ccwg-accountability3; accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org; ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org; ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org; ianatransition(a)icann.org > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] [Area 2] Work Streams definition > > +1 > > J. Beckwith Burr > Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer > 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 > Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr(a)neustar.biz / www.neustar.biz > > From: Matthew Shears <mshears(a)cdt.org> > Date: Thursday, January 15, 2015 at 11:16 AM > To: Jordan Carter <jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz>, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> > Cc: ccwg-accountability3 <ccwg-accountability3(a)icann.org>, "ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org" <ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org>, "ianatransition(a)icann.org" <ianatransition(a)icann.org>, "ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org" <ccwg-accountability1(a)icann.org>, Accountability Community <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > Subject: Re: [Area 2] [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition > > Not to belabor this much more, and I may be being pedantic... > > It appears to read as if WS1 is about putting in place mechanisms that "provide the community with confidence" but not specifically about putting in place accountability mechanisms or measures. There is a big difference between putting in in place process mechanisms to provide confidence (as it now seems to imply) and putting in place actual accountability mechanisms which is what the original definition suggested. The second definition is fine for so long as it explicitly includes the first as well. > > It might be better if it read something like: > > Work Stream 1: is focused on mechanisms that 1) enhance ICANN's accountability and must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition, and 2) that provide the community with confidence that any accountability measures that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter ICANN management resistance or if it were against the interest of ICANN as a corporate entity. > > Matthew > > > > On 1/15/2015 10:40 AM, Jordan Carter wrote: > I agree with Paul, Mathieu etc - the Charter language is the skeleton. The language proposed sets out to characterise why we would select items - i.e. why they have to be done before the transition. > > We have to set out transparently the criteria we are using to decide what has to be in place. This language helps do that. > > best > Jordan > > On 16 January 2015 at 04:17, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Dear All, > I do not understand who agreed with whom > What has been changed from the Charter. > I personally fully agree with the following > Quote > " in the absence “mechanisms [that] would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability ( in relation with work stream 1 of CCWG ,for three distinct areas , Naming, Numbers and Protocols, including parameter ) could be implemented if it had consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should not occur." > Unquote > > Kavouss > > 2015-01-15 16:06 GMT+01:00 Edward Morris <emorris(a)milk.toast.net>: > +1 > > Paul has eloquently expressed my views in a manner far superior to anything I could write. Thanks. > > One could argue that our current system of accountability and transparency (reconsideration, Appeal, CEP, IR, DIDP), with some tweaks, should actually be sufficient going forward. It looks great: on paper. The problem is that a system designed for redress (per Bruce) actually functions as a system of review (per Robin), and a rather cursory review system at that. We simply must have mechanisms designed to ensure that we have real systems of accountability, ones that does not rely on the good faith and open-mindedness of any particular Board or staff member or group, in place before the transition can be allowed to occur. > -----Original Message----- > From: "Paul Rosenzweig" <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com> > To: "'Tijani BEN JEMAA'" <tijani.benjemaa(a)fmai.org.tn>, <accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2015 09:22:26 -0500 > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition > > Respetful disagreement. I think the way it describes types of mechanisms in the “new” definition is exactly what needs to be in place before the Stewardship transition takes place. Put another way, I think that the exposition in WS1 precisely describes the commitments that MUST be made before a transition is allowed to occur. More importantly, I think there is growing consensus across the community that this is so. To state it affirmatively – in the absence “mechanisms [that] would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should not occur. > > Paul > > **NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 *** > 509 C St. NE > Washington, DC 20002 > > Paul Rosenzweig > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 > Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 > Link to my PGP Key > > From: Tijani BEN JEMAA [mailto:tijani.benjemaa@fmai.org.tn] > Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2015 4:53 AM > To: accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition > > Dear all, > > I read again the new proposed definition of the Work Streams, and I found it too different from the one in our charter: > > In the charter: > · Work Stream 1: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition; > · Work Stream 2: focused on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition > > The new proposal: > · Work Stream 1 mechanisms are those that, when in place or committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even if it were to encounter ICANN management resistance or if it were against the interest of ICANN as a corporate entity. > · All other consensus items could be in Work Stream 2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from ICANN management and board. > > I don’t believe that we are allowed to change any part of the charter without going back to the chartering organizations and ask for their approval. > > On the other hand, the separation of WS 1 and WS 2 was for the purpose of having the accountability mechanisms necessary before the transition done in time, and the new definition doesn’t satisfy this requirement > > I would prefer stay with the charter definition for all those reasons > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Tijani BEN JEMAA > Executive Director > Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) > Phone: + 216 41 649 605 > Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 > Fax: + 216 70 853 376 > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > Ce courrier électronique ne contient aucun virus ou logiciel malveillant parce que la protection Antivirus avast! est active. > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > > _______________________________________________ > Ccwg-accountability2 mailing list > Ccwg-accountability2(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ccwg-accountability2 > > > > > -- > Jordan Carter > > Chief Executive > InternetNZ > > 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob) > jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz > Skype: jordancarter > > To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential. > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > > -- > Matthew Shears > Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights > Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) > mshears(a)cdt.org > + 44 771 247 2987 > This message and its attachments may contain legally privileged or confidential information. It is intended solely for the named addressee. If you are not the addressee indicated in this message (or responsible for delivery of the message to the addressee), you may not copy or deliver this message or its attachments to anyone. Rather, you should permanently delete this message and its attachments and kindly notify the sender by reply e-mail. Any content of this message and its attachments that does not relate to the official business of Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. or its subsidiaries must be taken not to have been sent or endorsed by any of them. No representation is made that this email or its attachments are without defect. _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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Re: [Area 2] [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 16, 2015

Jan. 16, 2015

Dear All, I do not understand who agreed with whom What has been changed from the Charter. I personally fully agree with the following Quote "* in the absence “**mechanisms [that] would provide the community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability ( in relation with work stream 1 of CCWG ,for three distinct areas , Naming, Numbers and Protocols, including parameter ) could be implemented if it had consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should not occur." * *Unquote* *Kavouss * 2015-01-15 16:06 GMT+01:00 Edward Morris <emorris(a)milk.toast.net>: > +1 > > Paul has eloquently expressed my views in a manner far superior to > anything I could write. Thanks. > > One could argue that our current system of accountability and transparency > (reconsideration, Appeal, CEP, IR, DIDP), with some tweaks, should > actually be sufficient going forward. It looks great: on paper. The problem > is that a system designed for redress (per Bruce) actually functions as a > system of review (per Robin), and a rather cursory review system at that. > We simply must have mechanisms designed to ensure that we have real systems > of accountability, ones that does not rely on the good faith and > open-mindedness of any particular Board or staff member or group, in place > before the transition can be allowed to occur. > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Paul Rosenzweig" <paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com> > To: "'Tijani BEN JEMAA'" <tijani.benjemaa(a)fmai.org.tn>, < > accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2015 09:22:26 -0500 > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition > > Respetful disagreement. I think the way it describes types of mechanisms > in the “new” definition is exactly what needs to be in place before the > Stewardship transition takes place. Put another way, I think that the > exposition in WS1 precisely describes the commitments that MUST be made > before a transition is allowed to occur. More importantly, I think there > is growing consensus across the community that this is so. To state it > affirmatively – in the absence “mechanisms [that] would provide the > community with confidence that any accountability mechanism that would > further enhance ICANN's accountability would be implemented if it had > consensus support from the community” the IANA Functions transition should > not occur. > > Paul > > ***NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS -- EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 **** > 509 C St. NE > Washington, DC 20002 > > Paul Rosenzweig > paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com > <paul.rosenzweigesq(a)redbranchconsulting.com> > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 > Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 > Link to my PGP Key > <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl…> > > *From:* Tijani BEN JEMAA [mailto:tijani.benjemaa@fmai.org.tn] > *Sent:* Thursday, January 15, 2015 4:53 AM > *To:* accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org > *Subject:* [CCWG-Accountability] Work Streams definition > > Dear all, > > I read again the new proposed definition of the Work Streams, and I found > it too different from the one in our charter: > > In the charter: > · *Work Stream 1*: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN > accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame > of the IANA Stewardship Transition; > · *Work Stream 2*: focused on addressing accountability topics > for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may > extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition > > The new proposal: > · *Work Stream 1* mechanisms are those that, when in place or > committed to, would provide the community with confidence that any > accountability mechanism that would further enhance ICANN's accountability > would be implemented if it had consensus support from the community, even > if it were to encounter ICANN management resistance or if it were against > the interest of ICANN as a corporate entity. > · All other consensus items could be in *Work Stream 2*, provided > there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items > despite resistance from ICANN management and board. > > I don’t believe that we are allowed to change any part of the charter > without going back to the chartering organizations and ask for their > approval. > > On the other hand, the separation of WS 1 and WS 2 was for the purpose of > having the accountability mechanisms necessary before the transition done > in time, and the new definition doesn’t satisfy this requirement > > I would prefer stay with the charter definition for all those reasons > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > *Tijani BEN JEMAA * > Executive Director > Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (*FMAI*) > Phone: + 216 41 649 605 > Mobile: + 216 98 330 114 > Fax: + 216 70 853 376 > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > ------------------------------ > <http://www.avast.com/> > Ce courrier électronique ne contient aucun virus ou logiciel malveillant > parce que la protection Antivirus avast! <http://www.avast.com/> est > active. > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > >

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CCWG Work Area 2 (inventory of accountability suggestions -- updated 15-Jan-2015
by Steve DelBianco Jan. 16, 2015

Jan. 16, 2015

here’s a follow-up for Work Area 2 (WA2) arising from our 13-Jan call (link<https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=51414985>). (Will post these to the WA2 wiki soon as I can get access) First, I updated the WA2 inventory to reflect the new proposed definition for Work Stream 1 (WS1), as discussed on our 13-Jan call. Second, I updated the inventory to reflect additional Accountability suggestions and detail provided by Malcolm Hutty, the GNSO-NCSG (Non-Commercial Stakeholders Group), Robin Gross, Milton Mueller, the GNSO-IPC (Intellectual Property Constituency), and David Johnson. As rapporteur for WA2 I am trying to accommodate all suggestions, but also looking forward to the exercise of prioritizing this ever-expanding list of accountability mechanisms. Regards, Steve — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482

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Re: [Area 2] [Internal-cg] RFP, CCWG-Accountability, and timeline
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 15, 2015

Jan. 15, 2015

Alissa Thankj you very much for that explanation However, I draw your attention to the part of the CCWG Charter as ststed below: Quote “In the discussions around the accountability process, the CCWG-Accountabili ty will proceed with two Work Streams: · *Work Stream 1: focused on mechanisms enhancing ICANN accountability that must be in place or committed to within the time frame of the IANA Stewardship Transition*; Whereas · *Work Stream 2: focused on addressing accountability topics for which a timeline for developing solutions and full implementation may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition* *In that sense , ICG is expected to receive the results of activities of Work Stream 1 .No doubt the activities of that Work Stream should include but not limited to cover the outcome of the CWG accountability part on naming . * *Moreover, Work Stream 1 shall also receive the inputs from **for **CRISP( for numbers ) **; and from **IANAPLAN.( foir protocol and parameters ) .* *In other words all accountabilities relating to Naming, Numbers , and proptocol including parapametrs ,irrespective their transmission to ICG as You have mentioned , must be seen together in a pachkage by CCWG under Work Stream 1. .Without that information from CCWG the accountability actions referred to in WS1 IANA TRANSITION WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE.* *This is an issue that must be discussed in CCWG thoroughly.* *Moreover, I do not understand the term “ CONDITIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY” the accountability is not coherenet and understandable with such qualification.* *In addition the results of CWG ,efven if it come to ICG at the end of Januar , it must have the consensus of community . I have doubt that community would have sufficient time to comment on the output of CWG.* *I therefroe see a major difficulty here that such a proposal may come from CWG at the end of Jan. 2015 without being sufficiently discussed by the community and not reached consensus.* *We are rushing to do something which may have serious inconsistencies . * *Regards* *Kavouss * 2015-01-15 7:49 GMT+01:00 Joseph Alhadeff <joseph.alhadeff(a)oracle.com>: > Agreed. > > Sent from my iPad > > On Jan 14, 2015, at 6:22 PM, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek(a)verisign.com> wrote: > > Thanks Alissa, > > > > I think this is spot on. > > > > Best, > > Keith Drazek > > > > *From:* internal-cg-bounces(a)icann.org [ > mailto:internal-cg-bounces@icann.org <internal-cg-bounces(a)icann.org>] *On > Behalf Of *Alissa Cooper > *Sent:* Wednesday, January 14, 2015 6:05 PM > *To:* ICG > *Subject:* [Internal-cg] RFP, CCWG-Accountability, and timeline > > > > Kavouss started a discussion on our call earlier today concerning the > relationship between the CCWG-Accountability and the ICG, and since we ran > the call right down to the end, I wanted to reiterate some points here and > make sure we are all on the same page. > > > > In our RFP < > https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/rfp-iana-stewardship-08sep14-en…> > we asked for a complete formal response from each of the operational > communities: names, numbers, and protocol parameters. Each community was > convened in its own way and chartered its own group to develop an RFP > response. The group that was created for names was the CWG; for numbers it > was CRISP; and for protocol parameters it was IANAPLAN. > > > > RFP Section III asks the communities to detail the changes they propose to > the existing IANA oversight and accountability mechanisms. If any proposal > that gets sent to us does not include these details, we will have to send > it back to the community to be completed. We cannot proceed with proposals > that are missing the oversight and accountability component. > > > > We set January 15 as a target for receiving responses from the > communities. For the ICG, this is the first step in the process — not the > last. We have explained the full process that will take place over the rest > of the year to get from individual community proposals to a final proposal > for submission to NTIA < > https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-transition-assembly-finali…>. > As such, while the responses we receive from the communities need to be > complete in detailing their proposed transition plans, those plans need not > be actually implemented before the responses are submitted to the ICG. > > > > Indeed, one feature that all of the proposals may end up having in common > is that they create expectations or conditions that must be met or steps > that must be carried out before the transition itself may take place (but > not before the proposal is submitted to the ICG), and that various other > bodies may need to act to meet those conditions or take those steps. For > example, the CWG proposal might outline accountability measures that it > expects the CCWG-Accountability to take up. The CRISP proposal might > outline steps it expects the RIR legal teams to take on. The IANAPLAN > proposal lists a couple of expectations about acknowledgements it expects > other parties to make. > > > > I think it’s perfectly fine — and expected — for the proposals to have > this feature when they come to us. We didn’t ask the communities to finish > the implementation of the transition. We asked them to propose plans. We > have many months of further review and public comment in front of us, and > we have established that if issues arise further down the line, we will > send the proposals back to the communities to work those issues out. Thus > if we receive a proposal that puts a condition on another body and it turns > out that that body cannot or will not fulfill the condition, we have both > the time and the process in place to work through it. I hope we won’t have > to do that, but we’ve built our process to accommodate it. > > > > Alissa > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Internal-cg mailing list > Internal-cg(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/internal-cg > > > _______________________________________________ > Internal-cg mailing list > Internal-cg(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/internal-cg > >

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A paper of possible interest
by Paul Rosenzweig Jan. 13, 2015

Jan. 13, 2015

Participants might be interested on this paper from the Global Commission on Internet Governance: https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig_paper_no3.pdf It touches on many of the issues we have been considering. Regards Paul **NOTE: OUR NEW ADDRESS BELOW, EFFECTIVE 12/15/14 *** Paul Rosenzweig Red Branch Consulting, PLLC 509 C St. NE Washington, DC 20002 paul.rosenzweig(a)redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 Skype: +1 (202) 738-1739 or paul.rosenzweig1066 www.redbranchconsulting.com <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/> www.paulrosenzweigesq.com <http://www.paulrosenzweigesq.com/> Link to my PGP Key <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl e&id=19&Itemid=9>

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Fwd: Re: [Area 4] Business Constituency Stress Test #1
by Malcolm Hutty Jan. 12, 2015

Jan. 12, 2015

The second part of the message below, which was part of a discussion in Area 4, uncovered what is suggested may be a flaw in our criteria for distributing items between WS1 and WS2. I therefore draw it to the attention of this subgroup. -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Re: [Area 4] Business Constituency Stress Test #1 Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2015 12:47:37 +0000 From: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm(a)linx.net> To: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco(a)netchoice.org>, Eric Brunner-Williams <ebw(a)abenaki.wabanaki.net>, mathieu.weill(a)afnic.fr <mathieu.weill(a)afnic.fr>, rickert(a)anwaelte.de <rickert(a)anwaelte.de>, leonfelipe(a)sanchez.mx >> León Felipe Sánchez Ambía <leonfelipe(a)sanchez.mx> CC: ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org <ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org> Eric Brunner-Williams wrote: > Would you be so kind as to convey the Business Constituency's > assigned probability for: > > 1. termination of the AoC between the USG and the incumbent > contractor, by the USG, while leaving the IANA Functions contract > otherwise unchanged? > > 2. termination of the AoC between the USG and the Corporation, by the > Corporation, while retaining the IANA Functions contract otherwise > unchanged? On 12/01/2015 01:59, Steve DelBianco wrote: > Eric — there is no need to assign probabilities for contingencies or > for consequences. I refer you to the charter for our CCWG > <https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/Charter>, > regarding scenarios: That's fair enough, but in this case I think Eric's question prompts a useful thought. The explicitly announced intention of the NTIA is to transition the USG's historic role in stewardship of the DNS to the community. At the same time, the clear expectation of many governments and others is that transition should bring about a situation where the US no longer has a privileged relationship with ICANN, and especially no special ability to set requirements and enforce them. The AoC is part of the NTIA's historic stewardship role. I am sure that many people will also regard it as an example of the privileged relationship USG has that they wish to see ended. Not necessarily because they disagree with its content, but because they object to its form. So I would regard it as entirely plausible and, sooner or later, quite likely that either ICANN or the USG might terminate the AoC. More likely, both together will do so by agreement. The reason for terminating would be that it is a mechanism that belonged to the era of USG stewardship. Accordingly, insofar as the AoC contains items relevant to accountability, it is the responsibility of this CCWG to identify them and propose how they may be continued or replaced in a post-NTIA world. Listing this as a "contingency" is, to my mind, just a convenient way of ensuring it is on our agenda. The thought that Eric's question prompts is that maybe this discloses a flaw in our criteria for the WS1/WS2 distinction. WS1 is for items that must be dealt with (implemented, or firmly committed) prior to or as part of transition. We have been assuming that this just means those things which are necessarily to give assurance that the rest of the improvements can be implemented later. When we consider the AoC requirements relevant to accountability (and also requirements of the IANA functions contract that are relevant to ICANN accountability beyond IANA) it is immediately apparent that it is an error to assume we need only consider improvements. There are existing mechanisms for accountability as well. Surely, it should be a precondition for transition to ensure that existing accountability functions are continued without interruption? Surely, it is not sufficient that we merely have in place a mechanism to re-institute them later? If this is so, then the criteria for WS1 ought to accomodate that. I shall therefore also forward this message to Area 2. Kind Regards, Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA _______________________________________________ Ccwg-accountability4 mailing list Ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ccwg-accountability4

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Comments on accountabilty
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 12, 2015

Jan. 12, 2015

Dear Mathieu Dear All Please find attached my comments on the document provided by mathieu on accountabilty Regards Kavouss

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Re: [Area 2] [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding role of Board directors
by Kavouss Arasteh Jan. 12, 2015

Jan. 12, 2015

Dear Malcolm, Dear Keith Dear All Thank you very much for your contributions. First I will comment on Malcolm,s position He indicated Quote *"I would say that it is the responsibility of the Board to find ways to reconcile the community consensus with their legal obligations. Normally this is done through a combination of engagement with the community (so as to relieve unrealistic or unachievable expectations) and creative approaches to implementation (so that the objectives of the community are met in a manner compatible other obligations, which may not be the implementation originally envisaged)."* Unquote Kavouss Comment 1.Since currently ICANN functions , amongs others, Under the Incorporation Articles and Californian Laws and Rules ,it is incumbent to it to respect those Laws and Rules, thus the pressure or the burden would be shifted to the community. Consequently ,the argument is not a balanced approach. This inconsistency between the communit6y consensus outcome and those Laws and Rules was raised before and is not yet resolved 2. Malcolm also said Quote *"These twin duties are, in my view, *both* fundamental. The latter should not be allowed to become an excuse for the Board to go its own way, in defiance of the community"* Unqupote Comment from Kavouss I fully agree with your analysis 3. Malcolm also POINTED OUT Quote "Ultimately, if a Board member believes they are incapable of satisfying all their duties, then their responsibility is to resign their office" Unquote Comment from Kavouss Here also I fully agree with the analysis . 4. The last part of Malcolms opinion is Quote *"The radical idea would be to propose that directors are entitled, in the final analysis, to advance their own preferences in defiance of the community they are appointed to serve"* Unquote Comment from Kavouss *Here I disagree with the analysis* Now on the Keith's position Quote "The radical idea would be to propose that directors > are entitled, in the final analysis, to advance their own preferences, OR THE PREFERENCES OF ICANN'S LEGAL COUNSEL, in" Unquote Comment from Kavouss *Here also I disagree with the amendment made by Keith* Now on the Alan's position Quote *"But I "hope" that the answer is "it depends". I would like to think that the risk of being sued and the potential liabilities (and the chances of losing!) would be weighed against the ICANN Mission, Core Values and its Articles of Incorporation which includes the phrase "The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole".* Unquote Comment from Kavouss It is not clear whether Alan in favour of Malcolm's views or against it The argument he made is a double face argument.,on the one hand he expressed worries about being sued and ,on the other hand, he refers to *A**rticles of *incorporation which includes the phrase "the corporation shall operate for the benefit of the internet community as a whole" There seems to be a need to clarify his position i.e in favour or anaist Malcolm’s views Tks Kavouss 2015-01-12 9:24 GMT+01:00 Edward Morris <emorris(a)milk.toast.net>: > I would like to strongly support Keith's proposal that we 1) request the > ability to consult legal expert in California corporate law (as opposed to > strictly nonprofit corporate law, as the new Benefits Corporation is a > vehicle we may want to consider) and 2) we ensure the expert is not > affiliated in any way with ICANN legal or any legal contractor, such as > Jones Day, which has a a historical relationship with ICANN. To the extent > any participant can or would be allowed to be involved in the process by > which such an expert is selected, I certainly would like to be part of any > such effort. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Drazek, Keith" <kdrazek(a)verisign.com> > To: Adebunmi AKINBO <akinbo.adebunmi(a)gmail.com> > Cc: "accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org" < > accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> > Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2015 04:57:27 +0000 > Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding role of Board directors > > In response to Akinbo's question below, I would like to ask the Co-Chairs > to add a discussion of expert legal advice to Tuesday's agenda. > > I believe the CCWG will likely need our own subject matter expert in > California not-for-profit corporate law. > > It's probably time we discuss how best to secure these services and to > ensure that individual is in the service of the CCWG and the community, so > we are not relying only on ICANN's interpretations. > > Thanks, > Keith > > On Jan 11, 2015, at 3:32 AM, "Adebunmi AKINBO" <akinbo.adebunmi(a)gmail.com> > wrote: > > > +1 DelBianco = So, when the Board is confronting a community consensus > to take an action that could put the corporation at risk of a lawsuit … how > do you believe a board member is obliged to react? > > On the above, can we seek a legal opinion? > Its important to address this scenario. > > This can happen at anytime in the lifetime of ICANN. > -Akinbo. > > > > On Sun, Jan 11, 2015 at 4:33 AM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg(a)mcgill.ca> > wrote: >> >> I am not an ICANN Board Member. I am not a lawyer. I am not a California >> law expert. >> >> But I "hope" that the answer is "it depends". I would like to think that >> the risk of being sued and the potential liabilities (and the chances of >> losing!) would be weighed against the ICANN Mission, Core Values and its >> Articles of Incorporation which includes the phrase "The Corporation shall >> operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole". >> >> Alan >> >> At 10/01/2015 08:40 PM, Steve DelBianco wrote: >> >> >> Thanks for the larger context around that bylaws provision, Bruce. But >> if we are considering whether the bylaws refer to â€˜ICANNâ€™ as the >> corporation or the *community*, see ICANNâ€™s own Management Operating >> Principles (2008 link >> <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/acct-trans-frameworks-principle…>, >> p. 5): >> "The third and perhaps most critical point of tension is between the >> accountability to the participating community to perform functions in >> keeping with the expectations of the community and the corporate and legal >> responsibilities of the Board to meet its fiduciary obligations. The >> ultimate legal accountability of the organization lies with the Board, not >> with the individuals and entities that make up the ICANN community.â€ >> >> So, when the Board is confronting a community consensus to take an action >> that could put the corporation at risk of a lawsuit … how do you bellieve a >> board member is obliged to react? >> >> >> From: Robin Gross < robin(a)ipjustice.org> >> Date: Saturday, January 10, 2015 at 8:10 PM >> To: Bruce Tonkin < Bruce.Tonkin(a)melbourneit.com.au> >> Cc: " accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org" < >> accountability-cross-community(a)icann.org> >> Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] Regarding role of Board directors >> >> Thanks for the info, Bruce. It is worth pointing out that regardless of >> how those bylaws are interpreted, under California law, nonprofit board >> members owe a legal duty of loyalty to the corporation and there isn't >> anything that this working group can do change California corporations law >> and the legal duty of loyalty each board member owes to the corporation (as >> a corporation, yes, not staff). This is where a tension comes in for >> trying to do public governance via a private corporation - the two concepts >> weren't "built" for the other, so there are gaps and some issues as a >> result. I think this is an issue our group should explore. >> >> Best, >> Robin >> >> >> On Jan 10, 2015, at 4:43 PM, Bruce Tonkin wrote: >> Hello Steve, ICANN Bylaws Article 6 Section 7 defines the duty of >> directors to ICANN the Corporation: >> Directors shall serve as individuals who have the duty to act in what >> they reasonably believe are the best interests of ICANN and not as >> representatives of the entity that selected them, their employers, or any >> other organizations or constituencies. >> I have often heard you refer to that specific clause in the bylaws >> over the past year. I think it is worth understanding it a little >> more. I personally believe that the intent of putting this clause in the >> bylaws is that several Board members are appointed to the Board from a >> specific stakeholder group, and this makes it clear that Board members need >> to act on behalf of all stakeholders not just the stakeholder group that >> appointed them. So from my perspective it is a higher level of >> accountability than simply being accountable to the group that appointed >> them. We certainly make that clear as new directors join the Board. The >> clause does not mean that somehow a Board director is now accountable to >> the staff in the organization rather than the "ICANN community". For >> those appointed to the Board by the nominating committee - I think it is >> already clear to them that they represent stakeholders as a whole, as they >> go through a rigorous interview process in front of the whole nominating >> committee. In my experience as Board director, Boards in general operate >> on behalf of their stakeholders - these stakeholders could be the general >> public, shareholders, or members. Under its articles of incorporation, >> ICANN is structured to act on behalf of the global public interest - i.e. >> the general public. In addition to acting on behalf of stakeholders, a >> board is also accountable to govern an organization in accordance with the >> law. This to me is the "corporate" obligation that you often refer. >> This includes ensuring that the organization can meet its financial >> commitments, ensure the staff have a safe workplace, ensure there are >> financial controls to stop fraud, ensure the organization complies with any >> contracts it has entered into etc. Directors of ICANN can be held >> personally liable under law if they are negligent. After the ATRT1 >> review, a set of governance guidelines were established to make this >> clearer: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/guidelines-2012-05-15-en From >> the section on the role of directors: "The fundamental responsibility of >> Directors (as defined below) is to exercise their business judgment to act >> in what they reasonably believe to be the best interests of ICANN and in >> the global public interest, taking account of the interests of the Internet >> community as a whole rather than any individual group or interest" "It >> is the duty of the Board to oversee management's performance to ensure that >> ICANN operates in an effective, efficient and ethical manner. The Board >> will also be responsible for overseeing the development of ICANN's short, >> medium and long-term strategic plans, ensuring that they will result in >> sustainable outcomes, and taking account of the critical interdependencies >> of financial, human, natural, manufactured, social and intellectual >> capitals." "Some of the Board's key responsibilities are to ensure that >> ICANN's ethics are managed effectively, that ICANN as a whole (as well as >> individual Board and staff members) operates pursuant to the highest >> ethical standards, that ICANN complies with applicable laws, and that ICANN >> considers adherence to best practices in all areas of operation." The >> bylaws could certainly be enhanced to incorporate the notion in the >> Governance Guidelines that Board directors are accountable to the Internet >> community as a whole. Regards, Bruce Tonkin >> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community >> mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >> Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community >> > > > > -- > *Evang. Akinbo A. A. Cornerstone, Nigeria.* > +2348064464545, +2348089118151 | 2BAC511D. > www.akinbo.ng > > *Member, Executive Board of Directors*, > Nigeria Internet Registration Association (NiRA) > www.nira.org.ng | akinbo(a)nira.org.ng <akinbo(a)yips.org.ng> > @niraworks > > *Acting Chief Operating Officer,* > DNS Africa Magazine > www.dnsafrica.org | akinbo(a)dnsafrica.org > @dnsafrica > > *National Convener,* > Nigerian Youth Coalition on Internet Governance (NG-YCIG) > www.ycig.org.ng <http://www.nira.org.ng/> > > *President,* > Young Internet Professionals (YiPS) > www.yips.gnbo.com.ng <http://wwwyips.org.ng/> | akinbo(a)yips.org.ng > > *The RedHub.* > 12, Afonka Odebunmi Street, Lagos State. > http://www.theredhub.org/ > > *National Focal Point ( Nigeria ) 2009-2011.* > Global Youth Coalition on HIV/AIDS (a program of TakingITGlobal) > www.youthaidscoalition.org www.takingitglobal.com > www.iaids.org > About me: http://profiles.tigweb.org/pscornerstone > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > >

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