December 2014 - Ccwg-accountability4

[Area 4] Icann / root zone management : risk
by Rudolph Daniel Dec. 26, 2014

Dec. 26, 2014

Some considerations for risk assessment. To transition IANA to ICANN begs the question. Does icann have the technical expertise to manage the root zone ? The risk here is a broken DNS system. Icann 's core skills resides in the Domain name registry industry. The root zone is currently maintained by verisign through an arrangement with NTIA... Verisign provides the service as a free to the internet and the world. Therefore, there will be a modification of their role or the service could be transitioned to another provider. How do we apportion the risk of the possibility of corporate control of the root zone DNS system? Quote It’s multi-stakeholder model of governance attempts to bring all parties to the table. But that’s an awfully big table. In the end, the ICANN executive group usually takes the initiative and drives the agenda—and without the check of the NTIA (however modest it has been in the past) they may have greater leeway to do as they please. End quote.. http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117037/us-gives-iana-and-dns-control-ica… Rudi Daniel ICT consulting & LED lighting 784 430 9235

1 0

[Area 4] Some archive material of interest.
by Rudolph Daniel Dec. 23, 2014

Dec. 23, 2014

1 0

Re: [Area 4] Comments from Mr. Kavouss Arasteh (GAC, ICG)
by James M. Bladel Dec. 21, 2014

Dec. 21, 2014

Hello WG4 team: I recognize that there have been several attempts to catalog the various scenarios and situations that would benefit from improved accountability mechanisms. But as a conversation starter, I would propose that there are really only two contingencies: * The ICANN Board takes action that is opposed by a significant majority (or unanimously) of stakeholders (SO/AC), or * The ICANN Board refuses to take action despite significant support (or unanimity) of stakeholders (SO/AC). It's my opinion that addressing these two over-arching contingencies will naturally sweep up nearly all other scenarios. Thoughts? Thanks- J. From: Grace Abuhamad <grace.abuhamad(a)icann.org<mailto:grace.abuhamad@icann.org>> Date: Tuesday, December 16, 2014 at 19:00 To: ccwg-accountability4 <ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability4@icann.org>> Subject: [Area 4] Comments from Mr. Kavouss Arasteh (GAC, ICG) Dear all, Here attached is Mr. Arasteh's first contribution to the work of the CCWG-Accountability as he shared on the main mailing list on 15 December. Below I've copied an excerpt of his document that relates to WA4. 2.4 Working Group 4 This scope of work of this Group is to identify contingencies (especially in relation with WS1) The above-mentioned scope is quite vague and ambiguous Best, Grace

3 2

Re: [Area 4] Compromise of a resource critical to some accountability process as a candidate scenario.
by Rudolph Daniel Dec. 18, 2014

Dec. 18, 2014

Eric Trival pursuit it may be...not sure. Is there a possibility that the IANA function be registered elsewhere With revised "affair. Of commit"...for control & protection of the icann board? ...or ..maybe not in area4's scenario? Rudi Daniel ICT consulting &LED lighting 784 430 9235 On Dec 18, 2014 2:36 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw(a)abenaki.wabanaki.net> wrote: Rudi, If I recall correctly the incorporators worked for Jones Day, and their acts as incorporators were approved by the initial Board on 10-25-98. ISI, where Dr. Jon Postel was employed, and the IANA Function conducted (mostly by Jon), is a unit of USC. You can of course ask Ira, as he may know, or you can ask any of Esther, Michael, or Louis. I don't recall any other jurisdictions being considered at the time, Deleware is the usual, but really offers little advantage. In any event, trivial pursuits of early ICANNia is off-topic for the CCWG, and WG4. Eric On 12/18/14 10:16 AM, Rudolph Daniel wrote: I would also like to know the reason ICANN chose to register in Calif. Other jurisdictions were considered at the time. Rudi Daniel ICT consulting & LED lighting 784 430 9235 On Dec 18, 2014 1:57 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw(a)abenaki.wabanaki.net> wrote: > Dear Colleagues, > > ICANN has disclosed that the email credentials of several members of staff > have been compromised. [1] > > I suggest that a credible scenario is the compromise of some resource > critical to some accountability process. The form of compromise may be loss > of the resource, such as the loss of a cryptographic key, or the disclosure > of the resource, such as email credentials. > > The accountability process compromised could be any one or more of the > Corporation's ByLaws Redress Mechanisms [2], or those which are external to > the Corporation [3]. > > I will follow up with Staff on the existing Business Continuity Plan of > Record, as credential loss and/or disclosure should fall within the > Corporation's BC PoR, and it may be somewhat pertinent at the moment. > > Regards, > Eric Brunner-Williams > Eugene, Oregon > > > [1] https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2014-12-16-en > [2] (a) Reconsideration, (b) Independent third-party review, (c) Periodic > review, and (d) Ombudsman. > [3] (a) Affirmation of Commitments, (b) Jurisdiction of California and the > United States, (c) Other Jurisdictions, and (d) Contractual requirements. > > _______________________________________________ > Ccwg-accountability4 mailing list > Ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ccwg-accountability4 > >

2 2

[Area 4] Compromise of a resource critical to some accountability process as a candidate scenario
by Eric Brunner-Williams Dec. 18, 2014

Dec. 18, 2014

Dear Colleagues, ICANN has disclosed that the email credentials of several members of staff have been compromised. [1] I suggest that a credible scenario is the compromise of some resource critical to some accountability process. The form of compromise may be loss of the resource, such as the loss of a cryptographic key, or the disclosure of the resource, such as email credentials. The accountability process compromised could be any one or more of the Corporation's ByLaws Redress Mechanisms [2], or those which are external to the Corporation [3]. I will follow up with Staff on the existing Business Continuity Plan of Record, as credential loss and/or disclosure should fall within the Corporation's BC PoR, and it may be somewhat pertinent at the moment. Regards, Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon [1] https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2014-12-16-en [2] (a) Reconsideration, (b) Independent third-party review, (c) Periodic review, and (d) Ombudsman. [3] (a) Affirmation of Commitments, (b) Jurisdiction of California and the United States, (c) Other Jurisdictions, and (d) Contractual requirements.

2 3

Re: [Area 4] Compromise of a resource critical to some accountability process as a candidate scenario.
by Rudolph Daniel Dec. 18, 2014

Dec. 18, 2014

I would also like to know the reason ICANN chose to register in Calif. Other jurisdictions were considered at the time. Rudi Daniel ICT consulting & LED lighting 784 430 9235 On Dec 18, 2014 1:57 PM, "Eric Brunner-Williams" <ebw(a)abenaki.wabanaki.net> wrote: > Dear Colleagues, > > ICANN has disclosed that the email credentials of several members of staff > have been compromised. [1] > > I suggest that a credible scenario is the compromise of some resource > critical to some accountability process. The form of compromise may be loss > of the resource, such as the loss of a cryptographic key, or the disclosure > of the resource, such as email credentials. > > The accountability process compromised could be any one or more of the > Corporation's ByLaws Redress Mechanisms [2], or those which are external to > the Corporation [3]. > > I will follow up with Staff on the existing Business Continuity Plan of > Record, as credential loss and/or disclosure should fall within the > Corporation's BC PoR, and it may be somewhat pertinent at the moment. > > Regards, > Eric Brunner-Williams > Eugene, Oregon > > > [1] https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2014-12-16-en > [2] (a) Reconsideration, (b) Independent third-party review, (c) Periodic > review, and (d) Ombudsman. > [3] (a) Affirmation of Commitments, (b) Jurisdiction of California and the > United States, (c) Other Jurisdictions, and (d) Contractual requirements. > > _______________________________________________ > Ccwg-accountability4 mailing list > Ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ccwg-accountability4 > >

2 1

[Area 4] Comments from Mr. Kavouss Arasteh (GAC, ICG)
by Grace Abuhamad Dec. 17, 2014

Dec. 17, 2014

Dear all, Here attached is Mr. Arasteh's first contribution to the work of the CCWG-Accountability as he shared on the main mailing list on 15 December. Below I've copied an excerpt of his document that relates to WA4. 2.4 Working Group 4 This scope of work of this Group is to identify contingencies (especially in relation with WS1) The above-mentioned scope is quite vague and ambiguous Best, Grace

2 1

[Area 4] WG4 reminders
by Eric Brunner-Williams Dec. 16, 2014

Dec. 16, 2014

Dear Colleagues, Please submit your SOI before engaging in substantive contribution. At present, I don't see SOIs for the following: o Dina Beer o Malcom Hutty o Sarah Kiden o Rudolph Daniel And of course, for those who have SOIs, if your circumstances have changed since your last SOI update, please check your SOI and if an update is needed, please do so. We have a mailing list, ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org <mailto:ccwg-accountability4@icann.org>. Please use it for WG4 contributions. I look forward to our work together. Thanks in Advance, Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon *Work Area 4: Identify Contingencies (especially in relation to WS1)* *Coordinator/Rapporteur*: Eric Brunner-Williams Volunteers: > * > > Sivasubramanian Muthusamy > > * > > Cheryl Langdon-Orr > > * > > Dina Beer > > * > > Malcolm Hutty > > * > > Edward Morris > > * Sarah Kiden > * Rudolph Daniel > * Olga Cavalli > > Link: https://community.icann.org/x/aIMQAw > > Mailing List Address: ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org > <mailto:ccwg-accountability4@icann.org> > > Public Archives: http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/ccwg-accountability4/ > <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/ccwg-accountability4/> > >

3 5

[Area 4] A reading of the Business Constituency's ten "Stress Tests"
by Eric Brunner-Williams Dec. 16, 2014

Dec. 16, 2014

Dear Colleagues, During the December 9th CCWG-Accountability conference call Steve DelBianco (BC) mentioned a document prepared by the Business Constituency entitled "Stress Tests". The URL for this document is at [1] below. In this note I'll discuss the BC's ten suggested scenarios, and I urge you all to read through the original document. -- BC #1. Cancellation of the AoC. I am not a lawyer, but my wife is, and restating the hypothetical as "what constrains the conduct of the successor contractor in the absence of the existing contractual conditions" seems to avoid the question of accountability altogether. I suggest this item be deferred until clarified. -- BC #2. Flight to avoid jurisdiction. I am not a lawyer, but my wife is, and restating the hypothetical as "in what jurisdictions would Verisign, GoDaddy, ... be unable to determine likely contested issue outcomes" yields a very unlikely set of possible answers. I suggest this item should be discarded as a distraction. -- BC #3. Insolvency. The is a business continuity question, for which a number of equivalent, and more likely, scenarios exist. I think this item can be improved by asking what Continuity issues are reflected in the Corporation's plan of record, and whether distinct accountability issues exist. -- BC #4. Applicant Support Revisited. The ICANN BoC indicated at the Nairobi meeting that "diversity" necessitated activity -- realized in that period by the (Cross Community) Applicant Support Working Group (ASG), which inter alia, included the possibility that the support provided to some applicants could come directly from ICANN, in the form of reduced regulatory burdens, reduced application fees, reduced recurring costs, etc. Recommendations by the ASWG to this effect were opposed during the public comments periods by the BC, hence my summary that this revisits the BC's position of record on the ASWG sets of recommendations. I suggest that this item can be improved by asking what happens if ICANN attempts to regulate some activity which is outside of the usual three buckets of names, protocol parameters, and addresses, and without implicitly privileging early adopters. Then a meaningful accountability question can be posed and a credible scenario constructed. -- BC #5. Ignoring SSAC The accountability issue here isn't obvious to me. The bylaws create several Advisory Councils, and when they function they can provide the Board with advice opposed to some decision the AC anticipates the Board may make. No accountability necessarily arises when the Board (frequently) does not follow the advice offered by an AC. The BC comments refer to "new accountability mechanisms" in the context of gTLD delegation. I suggest that this item can be improved by asking what accountability issues exist with respect to new gTLD (re)delegeation. See also BC #7 and BC #8, infra. -- BC #6. GAC votes The accountability issue here isn't obvious to me. The bylaws create several Advisory Councils, each of which may have distinct internal processes resulting in the issuance of advice. A change in any AC's internal process does not necessarily create an accountability issue. I suggest this item should be discarded. -- BC #7. .xxx redux This appears to revisit the .xxx issue, within the hypothetical framework of BC #6 -- a GAC vote rather than a lack of GAC consensus and overt (and covert) expressions of displeasure by Governments. As this is an instance of #6, I suggest this item should be discarded as with BC #6. -- BC #8. Contested gTLD Regelegation This revisits BC #2, supra, the hypothetical case assumes some novel jurisdiction in which Verisign and others which maintain and publish the IANA root zone. As this is an instance of #2, I suggest this item should be discarded as with BC #2. -- BC #9. Enjoined Delegation This revisits BC #2, supra, the hypothetical case assumes some novel jurisdiction in which "ICANN and the IANA" are "empowered" to litigate a registry contract. As this is an instance of #2, I suggest this item should be discarded as with BC #2. -- BC #10. Contested ccTLF Redelegation The policy for ccTLD redelegation has been, with the exception of .iq, where the incumbent delegee was in the custody of the United States, agreement by all parties. Until this policy is formally changed this does not appear to exercise an accountability issue beyond the existing practice of accounting for ccTLD change requests. I suggest this item should be discarded. ---- After several readings of the BC's document I'm unable to discern significant likely scenarios for which accountability issues exist. It is quite possible that I'm reading this with insufficient information, or unfairly due to long familiarity with the BC's positions of record on diversity and access, or unfairly due to a personal impression that several of the "scenarios" are quite unlikely, or ambiguous to the point of non-meaning, or both. To its credit, the BC has attempted to find scenarios of general utility, and offers these suggestions, so that "we [c]ould consider ... scenarios that could arise." Any colleague who arrives at a different reading I hope will articulate his or her reading on any or all of BC #1 through BC #10, as mine is only one view of a document offered for collegial review. Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon [1] http://www.bizconst.org/StressTests/

2 1

[Area 4] Welcome to Work Area 4
by Grace Abuhamad Dec. 11, 2014

Dec. 11, 2014

Hi Eric -- At the moment, you are the only person who has signed up for Work Area 4. Work Area 4: Identify Contingencies (especially in relation to WS1) Coordinator/Rapporteur: Eric Brunner-Williams Volunteers: Link: https://community.icann.org/x/aIMQAw Mailing List Address: ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org Public Archives: http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/ccwg-accountability4/

1 0