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Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for ST-WP #7 - 3 June
by Kimberly Carlson June 3, 2015

June 3, 2015

Hello all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the CCWG ACCT Stress Test WP Meeting #7 - 3 June will be available here: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=53772767 A copy of the notes and action items may be found below. Thank you Best regards, Kim ACTION Items ACTION ITEM - Steve to flag that paragraph 439 addresses FIFA scenario. ACTION ITEM: Steve to check that Court is not in ST document ACTION ITEM: Steve to expand on stress test #13 to underline specificity of using IRP. ACTION ITEM: Send draft to STWP list followed by CCWG ACTION ITEM: Cancel June 17 call ACTION ITEM: Respond to couple additional scenarios Steve is putting forward Notes Stress Test WP Meeting #7 - 3 June 2015 This call is being recorded Links Public Comment Period - https://www.icann.org/public-comments/ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-20… Draft Report - https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cwg-accountability-draft-propos… Chat sessions are being archived and follow the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior: http://www.icann.org/en/news/in-focus/accountability/expected-standards NOTES & ACTION ITEMS: These high-level notes are designed to help you navigate through content of the call and do not substitute in any way the transcript. Public comment is starting to come in: there is a need to articulate additional stress tests: Mathieu, Avri Stress test text was sent to Chris Disspain. We reframed it based on dicussion last Wednesday. Two stress tests: 1) In line with Chris Disspain 2) In line with Jonathan Zuck 1) ATRT recommendation does not require PDP, it can be implemented. Scenario where Board rejects implementation. We have a recourse where we can recall Board, we can block budget or strat plan but a change to expenditures does not solve problem. You could go to Court to force ICANN to follow decision. How does the Court get involved in the first scenario? 2) Board follows community recommendation which is reversed by IRP. IRP has standard of review - it could cancel decision. We have ability to recall Board but we could block next decision. We could go to California Court and enforce the IRP recommendation. In neither of these cases is the Board involved in interpreting bylaws, it's implementing IRP decision. Nuances might still need to be discussed. - Underlying concern is that creation of members would give extra standing to go to Court directly and bypass IRP - What would Court say if ignore it? - Becky's slides show that use of IRP can be a binding part of membership with ICANN instead of going directly to Court --> Concerned that we have to keep doing tie-offs to avoid being overly Court driven. - We need to start ensuing that between BA and Dublin, anyone who flags a stress test should articulate it ----- Mathieu's proposed stress test: You may think I am obsessed with recent news, but with the recentspotlight on the FIFA scandals, I think we can reasonably expectquestions regarding how our proposed measures would avoid such a situation. Have we covered corruption? --> p 70 paragraph 439 Under proposed measure we could force the Board If the Board was involved in the corruption, can remove Directors or entire Board. ATRT2 recommendation on serious review about process was ignored. The measure reads quite well but would it be efficient? 442 is a weak point in measures. --> we can surface 442 information through ATRT3 Existing accountability measures are not adequate if ignored. ACTION ITEM - Steve to flag that paragraph 439 addresses FIFA scenario. ---- SO would inform members of community that votes were improperly cast (against instructions). That would have impact on vote that just took place. --> The association between SO and AC is one of them having legal relationship between them. It's the UA that is member not the SO. Voting of cross-community WG, members, not clear who would monitor that Where Board control AC/SO SO/ACs are defined and controlled by Bylaws. Any changes would go through review as part of accountability. The notion of UA is that it is an independent person but an independent actor. If the SO would become UA we would move its Bylaws - --> The UA is bound by ICANN Bylaws There aren't new individuals who would ignore will of AC SO they are representing - If it ignores articles or Bylaws we don't have recourse today but with enhanced IRP we do - if Board ignores IRP it can lead to Court and will lead to them complying i.e. following articles of incorporation - There' is a difference between establishing the court as the underlying authority and establishing the court as the mechanism for redress which we have studiously avoided Transparency needed on how votes are being cast. - Tools need to be applied hypothetically - Spilling the Board wont work if Court not behind you. We have created a system for better or worse. The multistakeholder process gets strong through reviews of each other in transparent way. The membership structure has created very to use legal opening so that when things go wrong: do you continue to go through hard process and finding consensus or do you take it to Court? It will change direction of system and makes it far less multistakeholder because it gives us an authority. It acts as a foil to multistakeholder processes. - It is my understanding that there is a great deal of frustration over process that exists because there weren't ways to review. We are creating more mechanisms for redress and more authority. There is less incentive. There is a growing frustration that Board doing something else. - You don't get to IRP if you did not participate in public comment process. IRP is key solution, not Court ACTION ITEM: Steve to check that Court is not in ST document - Concern of whether we need to have a catching net approach to everything Agrrieved parties abuse a new membership structure or community powers - We should expand it to suggest that they can't go to Court but rather news IRP. ACTION ITEM: Steve to expand on stress test #13 to underline specificity of using IRP. ACTION ITEM: Send draft to STWP list followed by CCWG ACTION ITEM: Cancel June 17 call ACTION ITEM: Respond to couple additional scenarios Steve is putting forward Action Items ACTION ITEM - Steve to flag that paragraph 439 addresses FIFA scenario. ACTION ITEM: Steve to check that Court is not in ST document ACTION ITEM: Steve to expand on stress test #13 to underline specificity of using IRP. ACTION ITEM: Send draft to STWP list followed by CCWG ACTION ITEM: Cancel June 17 call ACTION ITEM: Respond to couple additional scenarios Steve is putting forward

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Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for ST-WP #6 - 27 May
by Kimberly Carlson May 27, 2015

May 27, 2015

Hello all, The notes, recordings and transcripts for the CCWG ACCT Stress Test WP Meeting #6 - 27 May will be available here: https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=53772513 A copy of the notes and action items may be found below. Thank you Best regards, Kim ACTION Items Action: answer to Avri's question "What is special about being members or not members in our test." Seek an answer to this Action: Steve to write up the scenario, and review on a future call. Action to re-write a stress test scenario to address the main issues in the thesis. To be sent to Chris and Paul to check issues have been captured. And this may take the group to test 28 (expansion of stress test 12). Notes Stress Test WP Meeting #6 - 27 May 2015 This call is being recorded. Links ST-WP Drafts - http://tinyurl.com/mye8o3e Chat sessions are being archived and follow the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior: http://www.icann.org/en/news/in-focus/accountability/expected-standards AGENDA: NOTES & ACTION ITEMS: These high-level notes are designed to help you navigate through content of the call and do not substitute in any way the transcript. Roll call as AC room Towards the end of the public comment phase. Tuesday's 26 May CCWG call, re-start the stress tests and consider the implications of the different members and UA models on the test scenarios. Will powers be enforceable, and legal counsel seems to be advising that enforceability comes through California law. A common thread on the stress tests: almost all have the words: block, veto, challenge, binding. Sends a signal that the powers would be enforceable, not to rely on persuasion. If we look at the stress tests and remove blocking, veto, challenging, binding, do the tests still pass. When listening to the lawyers, also hear them saying we could take eachother to court right now. So this is not a special new power. For those who don't like courts, hear the answer that but that's the answer for the US. If we created shadow UA, where there is the SO/AC chair or other as the person making decisions, what holds them accountable to the group that sent them? So unless the SO/AC are the UA, you are creating another legal entity that is accountable to another non-legal entity. Case of the At Large: the existing rules of procedure for the At Large have clear rules for the removal of officers. Can be removed without cause at any stage. This might need to be considered across the SO/AC. Is a stress test needed: what if the designated member, the UA representative, then what happens if they don't follow directions of their community. Should the stress test team look at the role of each SO/AC to see of they means to remove there offices. Or produce a normative statement recommending SO/AC action? See stress test 12. But stress test group's task is not to produced such normative statements. That's the task of the whole CCWG. Consideration of capture internal to the SO/AC. Might requrie fine tuning of stress test 12. Text that when the representative is not heeding the wishes of their SO/AC membership, this should trigger recall of a representative New stress test that describes the flaw, when creating the individual to represent the membership in the UA, when they are not listening/heeding the membership, that recall and reappointment is appropriate. They should act as instructed or as agreed by their community. GNSO has five votes. And if one of the SG believes that the individual holding the vote on their behalf is not acting, behaving ask directed by that SG, then the SG would be able to remove that person. 3 scenarios. An identity between the SO/AC. The other extreme is the chairs are designated as the members of the SO/AC. And fuzzy, when the SO/AC is not an UA or has a UA attached to it. May 3rd legal memo: 4 stress tests in that document, but only relating to the UA. If a councillor refused to leave the stage, what would we do? May quote from the memo in the new test. See https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/52890082/REVISED%20Memo%20 on%20Unincorporated%20Associations%20May%203%2C%202015-207411876-v4.pdf But, as the US can already take them to court. The end of every process, potentially. What is special about being members or not members in our test? Question of winning. Should have standing, and members have that. And winning once there. Action: answer to Avri's question "What is special about being members or not members in our test." Seek an answer to this Stress test on budgets: power to veto: veto and block. we are talking of an enforceable power. Without the power, we haven't improved accountability. Have the ability to challenge through an IRP. And might reverse the decision, but when reversed we expect it to be binding, enforceable. So see a weakening of the first bunch of stress tests without enforceability. And to what degree is enforceability different for each member arrangements? from ST-WP that the action of comparison of powers from CCWG call of 6 May will be required. Stress test 9. Corruption/fraud. Force the board. To veto or block a budget tainted by fraud. If board members were involved then they should be recalled. This requires enforceability. Go to court, or vote someone out. These are basically two unacceptable ways of achieving a goal. What membership adds, is not acceptable. Why the degree of enforceability rests in a court of law. But doesn't change the answer in a column 3 of the stress test. For consideration by the lawyers/legal team: a comparison of enforceability among the different structures. A comparision of enforceability. Standing and the likelihood to prevail Chris Disspain suggested stress test (email displayed) 1. A vote that directs the board to take an action. The ability to force to board to do something seems to be part of the CCWG myth. The AoC review teams recommend and action, the Board decides not to as it's outside the mission, the rejection of the Board action becomes a reversal of the Board's decision to do nothing. Rephrase 1. 2. A disagreement about whether the issue was outside the scope of the bylaws. Is it directing the board, or canceling the decision? Action: Steve to write up the scenario, and review on a future call. Is the court evaluation the authority of the community to make the changes, or is it testing the substance of the issue. The court affirms the community's authority. i.e. ultimate authority is being handed to the members. If an IRP evaluates a decision and revokes that decision, nothing has changed. Consideration of the email, analysis of it. Action to re-write a stress test scenario to address the main issues in the thesis. To be sent to Chris and Paul to check issues have been captured. And this may take the group to test 28 (expansion of stress test 12). First 30 on of the next call to review the rest of the stress test. And the remaining hour for the two new scenarios: Disspain email and the modification of the capture Invite Chirs and or Paul Szyndler, and Leon if legal input needed.

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Re: [ST-WP] [CWG-Stewardship] PTI Board Composition
by Avri Doria May 25, 2015

May 25, 2015

Hi On 25-May-15 08:23, Gomes, Chuck wrote: > In my opinion, having a couple Directors who understand the functioning of the IFO in meeting TLD registry needs would increase the chances that the Board would " have the requisite skills and knowledge to do that quickly and effectively". What guarantee is there that just because the Registries appoint the people they would be knowledgeable about the all issues before the PTI on any particular year or that they would understand the IFO any better than anyone else. Does every person in Registry SG have the requisite knowledge and judgement? Additionally wouldn't the fact that they were from Registries mean it was more likely they had a bone to pick with the IFO? I expect that the Registries would have to use some sort of judgement in deciding. As the Registries particpate in the nomcom they can bring their judgement to bear in that group in a multistakeholder manner. As with others, I am speaking personally and have not gone to my SG yet to check on what they thought of a PTI Board biased toward Registries. avri --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. http://www.avast.com

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Stress Test and Accountability
by Avri Doria May 16, 2015

May 16, 2015

Hi, Was reading something that was quoting Strickling and came across: it is critical that this group conduct “stress testing” of proposed solutions to safeguard against future contingencies such as attempts to influence or take over ICANN—be it the Board,staff or any stakeholder group—that are not currently possible given its contract with NTIA. Which got me wondering. To what extent, and how, would NTIA been able to respond to all of our stress tests. Is our answer in all cases: Not renew the contract a few years from now. Is that an answer we should be able to give? If we were to be challenged that some of our stress test go beyond anything that NTIA could have done anything about, do we have an answer? Is the NTIA contract a hammer for all stress tests. Sitting here on Saturday morning in Geneva during a break in the ITU Council meeting, I wonder. There have been accountability problems at ICANN for a while, and various of us do beleive that it has at least been partially captured at various times (we may even beleive that it is currently captured to some degree - though the better part of collegiality indicates we should not talk about that too much). What has NTIA done on those occasions? avri --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. http://www.avast.com

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Do we cover this condition
by Avri Doria May 5, 2015

May 5, 2015

Hi, One of the concern going around at the moment is that if we legally separate IANA as the CWG is close to planning, that some rich mega corporation could come along and gain control. I tend to believe this could only happen if ICANN were to sell it to them. Which seems unlikely. What do you all think? avri --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. http://www.avast.com

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CCWG Stress Tests v10.3 as of Wed 29-Apr
by Steve DelBianco April 29, 2015

April 29, 2015

Thanks to the Stress Test team for discussion on today’s call. As promised, here is v10.3 of Applying Stress Tests. I made the in-line edits we covered on the call. And I added two placeholder paragraphs for your consideration: [placeholder for Do-It-Yourself paragraph: Public comment participants may conceive of other contingencies and risks beyond the 26 stress tests identified in this section. In that case, we encourage commenters to apply their own stress test analysis. To do so, a commenter can examine ICANN’s present accountability mechanisms to determine whether they adequately address the contingency. Then, the commenter can examine the proposed accountability enhancements in this document, and assess whether they give the community adequate means to challenge board decisions and to hold the board accountable for its actions. For example, the stress test team evaluated contingencies that could generally be described as external events (cyber attack, financial crisis, etc.). We discovered that while some risk mitigation was possible, it became clear that no accountability framework could entirely eliminate the risk of such events nor thoroughly alleviate their impact. Instead, it was critical to explore the ability of the community to hold ICANN board and management accountable for their preparation and reaction to the external events. The proposed accountability measures do provide adequate means to do so. [placeholder for management summary paragraph requested by Mathieu: The stress test exercise demonstrates that WS1 recommendations do enhance the community’s ability to hold ICANN board and management accountable, relative to present accountability measures. It is also clear that the CWG proposals are complementary to CCWG measures. One stress test regarding appeals of ccTLD revocations and assignments (ST 21) has not been adequately addressed in either the CWG or CCWG proposals, awaing policy development from the ccNSO. We understand that staff will attempt to include v10.3 in the draft to be circulated for the full CCWG call at 5:00 UTC on Thursday. From: Steve DelBianco Date: Tuesday, April 28, 2015 at 10:26 PM To: "ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability4@icann.org>" Cc: Cheryl Langdon-Orr, ACCT-Staff, Mathieu Weill, Thomas Rickert, León Felipe Sánchez Ambía Subject: CCWG Stress Tests v10.2 for discussion on Wed 29-Apr at 11:00 UTC To: Stress Test Work party Over the weekend, we amended our 'Applying Stress Tests’ section to reflect the latest CWG proposal and our CCWG discussions last week. (see attached v10.2) In two places I've noted text in RED requiring your insights. While I know we are enabling challenge to board decisions, I don't see where are we recommending any proscriptive measure preventing ICANN from going beyond its limited technical mission. If I have that right, we should remove the red text on 2 Stress Tests: Another proposed measure is to amend ICANN bylaws to prevent the organization from expanding scope beyond what is needed for SSR in DNS operations and to meet mission and core values of ICANN. Also, co-chair Mathieu Weill added some edit suggestions (in blue underline). Mathieu also suggested we develop a sort of "management summary for stress tests". Reading the document overall, he observes that: - the stress tests demonstrate that our WS1 recommendations do increase Icann's accountability significantly, providing adequate mitigation measures in situations where that was not the case without these recommendations - we can confirm that some of the CWG proposals are providing a useful complement to our own measures. - our accountability measures do not transform Icann into a body that would be "above the laws", and that's a good sign. - there is one stress test we do not cover, pending ccTLD adequate process, about delegation and revocations. ICANN Staff suggested we add a brief guide for readers who come up with their own risks/contingencies/scenarios. Adam Peake suggested we add a ‘Do-It-Yourself’ section explaining how anyone can use our method to apply their own stress test to the existing and proposed accountability measures. Best, Steve — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.703.615.6206

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CCWG Stress Tests v10.2 for discussion on Wed 29-Apr at 11:00 UTC
by Steve DelBianco April 29, 2015

April 29, 2015

To: Stress Test Work party Over the weekend, we amended our 'Applying Stress Tests’ section to reflect the latest CWG proposal and our CCWG discussions last week. (see attached v10.2) In two places I've noted text in RED requiring your insights. While I know we are enabling challenge to board decisions, I don't see where are we recommending any proscriptive measure preventing ICANN from going beyond its limited technical mission. If I have that right, we should remove the red text on 2 Stress Tests: Another proposed measure is to amend ICANN bylaws to prevent the organization from expanding scope beyond what is needed for SSR in DNS operations and to meet mission and core values of ICANN. Also, co-chair Mathieu Weill added some edit suggestions (in blue underline). Mathieu also suggested we develop a sort of "management summary for stress tests". Reading the document overall, he observes that: - the stress tests demonstrate that our WS1 recommendations do increase Icann's accountability significantly, providing adequate mitigation measures in situations where that was not the case without these recommendations - we can confirm that some of the CWG proposals are providing a useful complement to our own measures. - our accountability measures do not transform Icann into a body that would be "above the laws", and that's a good sign. - there is one stress test we do not cover, pending ccTLD adequate process, about delegation and revocations. ICANN Staff suggested we add a brief guide for readers who come up with their own risks/contingencies/scenarios. Adam Peake suggested we add a ‘Do-It-Yourself’ section explaining how anyone can use our method to apply their own stress test to the existing and proposed accountability measures. Best, Steve — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.703.615.6206

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v10.1 of Applying Stress Tests, to meet the draft report "freeze" deadline
by Steve DelBianco April 21, 2015

April 21, 2015

To meet the need for tonight's document ‘freeze’, Cheryl and I quickly generated v10.1 (attached) We added more explanatory overview to page 1. We removed the previously struck-thru measure describing a general community veto of any decision, since that is not being proposed. We updated ST 21 to refer to GAC principles and Framework of Interpretations Mathieu’s suggested security measures in ST 1&2 and ST 11 were not taken up in Work Stream 1, so we noted these for Work Stream 2. We corrected measures where we assumed the community could force implementation of consensus or prior AoC recommendations. Now it reads: "Another measure would allow an ATRT to recommend ICANN implement a recommendation of a prior AoC Review” and/or "A proposed bylaws change would require ICANN board to respond to formal advice from advisory committees such as SSAC and RSSAC." Made several other small edits to reflect what we know about the snapshot of CWG measures coming our way. We will likely have to revisit this after we see which proposed measures from CCWG and CWG will be published for comment. —Steve and Cheryl

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Re: [ST-WP] [CCWG-ACCT] Fwd: [CCWG-Advisors] jan comments on 17 april ccwg materials
by Rudolph Daniel April 21, 2015

April 21, 2015

Of note, Jan's comments are very valuable; the one which sticks out in my mind would be; "How does one ensure that the community empowerment mechanism does not become a vehicle for capture of ICANN by insider activists?" RD On Apr 20, 2015 6:02 AM, "Mathieu Weill" <mathieu.weill(a)afnic.fr> wrote: > Dear Colleagues, > > Please find below a contribution on our draft public comment report by Jan > Aart Scholte, in his capacity as one of our Advisors. > > Best regards, > Mathieu > > > -------- Message transféré -------- Sujet : [CCWG-Advisors] jan comments > on 17 april ccwg materials Date : Mon, 20 Apr 2015 07:19:58 +0000 De : Jan > Aart Scholte <jan.scholte(a)globalstudies.gu.se> > <jan.scholte(a)globalstudies.gu.se> Pour : CCWG-Advisors > <ccwg-advisors(a)icann.org> <ccwg-advisors(a)icann.org>, > jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz <jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz> > <jordan(a)internetnz.net.nz> > > Hello All > > > > Great to see that CCWG continues to make impressive headway after the > productive Istanbul meeting. Many thanks, Adam, for your thorough briefing > accompanying the documents circulated on Friday. My read of the materials > prompts the following thoughts, mainly concerning the community empowerment > mechanism: > > > > (1) The community empowerment mechanism increasingly looks to be based on > SOs and ACs. A key question of course remains with what distribution of > seats, and also whether any other body such as GAC or SSAC would have a > voting representation. > > > > (2) Would any adjustments in the AC and SO constructions be advisable at > this juncture, concurrent with the IANA transition, in order that 'the > Community' as institutionalised in the empowerment mechanism aligns > sufficiently closely with the present actual constellation of ICANN > stakeholders in the world at large? > > > > (3) How (and how readily) could the the formula which constitutes 'the > Community' in the empowerment mechanism be adjusted in future, as and when > the prevailing arrangement is found inadequately to reflect the > constellation of ICANN stakeholders at that future time? Consider how > difficult it has been to adjust membership of the UN Security Council and > the Boards of the Bretton Woods institutions, which remain largely frozen > in the world of 1945. The world of 2045 is likely to be quite different > from that of 2015 - will ICANN's constitution allow it readily to change > with the times? > > > > (4) Related to (3), could overly high supermajorities have unwanted > consequences of excessive constitutional conservatism? To be sure, too low > a threshold could invite constitutional instability, but too high a > threshold could invite institutional ossification. For example, > constitutional reform of the International Monetary Fund has been so > difficult in good part because an 85% vote is needed to alter the Articles > of Agreement, which has effectively entrenched a US Government veto. > > > > (5) Then there is that ever-present thorn of the accountability of those > who hold ICANN to account. How will participants in the empowerment > mechanism be held accountable to wider stakeholder circles, both within > ICANN (i.e. the ACs and SOs) *and beyond*? Legislators in democratic > nation-states are subject to election by the general population, but > delegates in the ICANN 'parliament' would only be elected by ACs and SOs, > whose connections to wider constituencies - and that so-called 'global > public interest' - can be quite thin? How does one ensure that the > community empowerment mechanism does not become a vehicle for capture of > ICANN by insider activists? > > > > Happy for this note to be made available to all CCWG if thought suitable. > Not sure about the protocols of advisors' communications. > > > > Greetings > > > > Jan > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > >

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Legal advice request for clarification
by León Felipe Sánchez Ambía April 15, 2015

April 15, 2015

Dear Cheryl and Steve (ladies first, of course), We have received a request from staff to ask questions to the external legal advisors regarding some of the work of the stress test work party. Staff's comment was: "The stress-test work party is asking for external legal advice on mechanisms/community powers to 'remedy' Board inaction. Specifically whether, for example, if consensus advice from an AC is not acted on by the Board might this 'trigger' a mechanism? ST-WP particularly asks if the external legal advisory could review Stress test 17, and provided an MP3 clip of the relevant part of discussions of their last call, and supporting email from Jonathan Zuck." If staff's comments are a fair reflection of your request, could you formulate these into questions we can put to lawyers? Some suggested wording for the questions could be along “Considering the different mechanisms that have already been analyzed: Which would be the requisites to trigger community action against Board inaction? Do this requisites or situations need to be specified in some document i.e. bylaws?” I would welcome your feedback on this suggested wording. Would you also like us to forward the document "Applying Stress Tests [Draft v9]" https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/ST-WP+Draft+Documents <https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/ST-WP+Draft+Documents> to the laywers to have read in anticipation of future questions from the ST-WP? Best regards, León

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