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Doodle Poll for CCWG Accountability Stress Tests SubTeam
by Brenda Brewer March 12, 2015

March 12, 2015

Hello Everyone! The CCWG Accountability Stress Tests SubTeam is planning a meeting for next week 16, 17, 18 March. Please see the Doodle Poll link: http://doodle.com/ry46rnpyftk4cbdg and select the best time(s) available for you. Remember to change the time zone to view time zone for you personally. Thank you for completing the poll and as soon as possible I will proceed to book the call based on the poll results. Kind regards, Brenda Brewer ICANN Staff

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Re: [ST-WP] [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Additional Stress Tests to discuss
by "Carlos Raúl G." March 8, 2015

March 8, 2015

Dear all! As far as I remember this question has been around for years and at least one serious legal study was commissioned to compare the present jurisdiction with "good" alternatives. And, again if I remember well, less than a handful alternatives where considered attractive enough. Just one or two European countries met the conditions. Maybe we should go back and read that document, because there may not be many alternatives out there. Best regards Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez +506 8837 7176 (New Number) Enviado desde mi iPhone > El mar 4, 2015, a las 16:28, Phil Corwin <psc(a)vlaw-dc.com> escribió: > > Pedro: > > This is a very important point. I was in the room at the Senate Commerce hearing last week, and also at another event at the US Chamber of Commerce two days later. At both events Fadi stressed that ICANN would remain subject to US “jurisdiction" post-transition, not just maintain its nominal HQ in the US. As you correctly point out, there is a big “difference between "headquarter location" and "legal presence/legal jurisdiction". > > Choice of legal jurisdiction is a very important point for multiple reasons, among them: > · Stable and predictable legal regime for contracted parties. As all of ICANN’s authority vis-à-vis registries and registrars is based on its contracts with them, reliable and predictable contract enforcement is a key consideration. The US is generally regarded as having one of the best legal systems in the world. > · Design of both the IANA and ICANN accountability measures. Both the CWG and the CCWG are going to engage independent legal counsel to advise them on the design of accountability measures within the context of California public benefits corporation law. If the legal context changes those accountability measures may not fit properly within it; they may become less effective or even unworkable. > · Security concerns. As a US corporation, ICANN is forbidden by OFAC regulations form engaging in any transactions with entities classified as criminal or terrorist. This consideration is particularly potent for the Administration and Congress. > > As to your point that “The community should be given the ability to decide, in the future, which jurisdiction better serves the purpose of ICANN acting in accordance to the global public interest.” , that is not necessarily foreclosed, at some future date, depending on what mechanisms are provided for Bylaws amendments. > > But for the immediate future those engaged in this transition exercise should have some idea whether ICANN’s continued legal existence as a non-profit California corporation is acceptable to other nations or whether it will become the new “irritant” (as described by Secretary Strickling) that replaces the IANA counterparty status as cause for complaint and basis for calls for further alterations in its structure and status. > > This is central to the issue of whether the transition we are designing will be stable for the foreseeable future or will just be a short-term transitional stage from which new initiatives for change are launched not long after the ink dries. > > Regards, > Philip > > > Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal > Virtualaw LLC > 1155 F Street, NW > Suite 1050 > Washington, DC 20004 > 202-559-8597/Direct > 202-559-8750/Fax > 202-255-6172/cell > > Twitter: @VlawDC > > "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey > > > -----Original Message----- > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva > Sent: Wednesday, March 04, 2015 4:55 PM > To: 'Steve DelBianco'; Accountability Cross Community > Cc: ACCT-Staff; ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org > Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: [ST-WP] Additional Stress Tests to discuss > > Dear Steve, > > Thank you very much for the update on the Stress Tests. > > With respect to ST #15, it is very valuable, but I think we should be very cautious about proposed measures. > > The following option makes sense and should be further debated: " If ICANN board voted to vacate a legal presence, the community veto could enable reversal of that decision". > > However, we anticipate objections to the alternative solution below: > > "One proposed measure is to import AoC provisions into the ICANN bylaws, and dispense with the bilateral AoC with NTIA. Bylaws would be amended to include AoC commitments 8, requiring it to maintain legal presence in the US, where it is subject to legal redress by any aggrieved party." > > Paragraph 8 of the AoC requires US legal presence most probably due to the present scenario where the US government (i.e.NTIA) is the steward of the IANA functions. Once that link is no longer there, and especially because that stewardship is being inherited by the global multistakeholder community (stressing the word "global") a legal presence in the US (or in any other specific country) should not be etched in stone. The community should be given the ability to decide, in the future, which jurisdiction better serves the purpose of ICANN acting in accordance to the global public interest. > > During yesterday's call, some colleagues mentioned ICANN CEO's Testimony in the American Senate last week. What he stated was literally: " Further, ICANN has its global headquarters in the United States, and there are no plans for that to change". Although such a decision/affirmation may be debatable, it is important, once again, to stress the difference between "headquarter location" and "legal presence/legal jurisdiction". Under e.g. an international jurisdiction, an entity could potentially be headquartered anywhere. > > Regards, > > Sec. Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva > Division of Information Society > Ministry of External Relations - brazil > T: + 55 61 2030-6609 > > > -----Mensagem original----- > De: ccwg-accountability4-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto:ccwg-accountability4-bounces@icann.org] Em nome de Steve DelBianco Enviada em: segunda-feira, 2 de março de 2015 23:36 > Para: Accountability Cross Community > Cc: ACCT-Staff; ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org > Assunto: [ST-WP] [CCWG-ACCT] Additional Stress Tests to discuss > > For tomorrow’s call, we applied 4 more of our stress tests against the draft package of proposed accountability measures. > > Stress Tests #1 and 2 (together), #24, and #15, are shown below and in the attached draft document. > > Stress Test: > > #1. Change authority for the IANA Root Zone ceases to function, in part or in whole. > #2. Delegation authority for the IANA Root Zone ceases to function, in part or in whole. > > > Consequence: interference with existing policy relating to IANA Root Zone and/or prejudice to the security and stability of one or several TLDs. > > > Existing Accountability Measures: > > Under the present IANA contract, NTIA can revoke ICANN’s authority to perform IANA functions and re-assign to different entity/entities. > > After NTIA relinquishes the IANA contract, this measure will no longer be available. > > > Proposed Accountability Measures: > > The CWG planning the IANA stewardship transition might design mechanisms and structures that enable separation, such that the IANA functions could be readily revoked and re-assigned. > > To manage the revocation of IANA functions, the CWG might also propose an emergency backup provider and procedures, pending re-assignment of the IANA functions. > > > Preliminary Conclusions: > > This threat is directly related to the transition of IANA stewardship > > Existing measures would be inadequate after NTIA terminates the IANA contract. > > At this point, CWG’s recommendations are still in development. > > ——————————————————— > > Stress Test: > > #24. An incoming Chief Executive institutes a “strategic review” that arrives at a new, extended mission for ICANN. The Board, having just hired the new CEO, approves the new mission and strategy without community consensus. > > > Consequence: Community ceases to see ICANN as the community’s own mechanism for discharging limited technical functions, and views ICANN as an independent, sui generis entity with its own agenda, not necessarily supported by the community. Ultimately, community questions why ICANN’s original functions should remain controlled by a body that has acquired a much broader and less widely supported mission. > > > Existing Accountability Measures: > > As long as NTIA controls the IANA contract, ICANN could risk losing IANA functions if it were to expand scope too broadly. > > The Community has some input in ICANN budgeting and Strat Plan, and could register objections to plans and spending on extending ICANN’s mission. > > California’s Attorney General has jurisdiction over non-profit entities acting outside Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation. > > > Proposed Accountability Measures: > > One proposed measure is empowering the community to veto ICANN’s proposed annual budget. This measure could block a proposal by ICANN to increase its expenditure on extending its mission beyond what the community supported. > > If the ICANN board voted to approve the CEO’s plans, one proposed measure would give the community standing to veto a board decision. > > Another proposed measure is empowering the community to challenge a board decision, referring it to an Independent Review Panel (IRP) with the power to issue a binding decision. [What would be the standard used for this review?] > > > Preliminary Conclusions: > > This threat is directly related to the transition of IANA stewardship > > Existing measures would be inadequate after NTIA terminates the IANA contract. > > Proposed measures in combination are adequate. > > ——————————————————— > > > Stress Test: > > #15. ICANN terminates its legal presence in a nation where Internet users or domain registrants are seeking legal remedies for ICANN’s failure to enforce contracts, or other actions. > > Consequence: affected parties could be prevented from seeking legal redress for commissions or omissions by ICANN. > > > Existing Accountability Measures: > > As long as NTIA controls the IANA contract, ICANN could risk losing IANA functions if it were to move in order to avoid legal jurisdiction. > > Paragraph 8 of the AoC requires ICANN to remain headquartered in the US, but the AoC can be terminated by ICANN at any time. As long as NTIA controls the IANA contract, ICANN feels pressure to maintain the AoC. > > > Proposed Accountability Measures: > > One proposed measure is to give the community standing to veto a board decision. If ICANN board voted to vacate a legal presence, the community veto could enable reversal of that decision. > > One proposed measure is to import AoC provisions into the ICANN bylaws, and dispense with the bilateral AoC with NTIA. Bylaws would be amended to include AoC commitments 8, requiring it to maintain legal presence in the US, where it is subject to legal redress by any aggrieved party. > > If ICANN’s board proposed to amend the AoC provisions added to the bylaws, another proposed measure would empower the community to veto that proposed bylaws change. > > > Preliminary Conclusions: > > This threat is directly related to the transition of IANA stewardship > > Existing measures would be inadequate after NTIA terminates the IANA contract. > > Proposed measures improve upon existing measures, and may be adequate. > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > > ----- > No virus found in this message. > Checked by AVG - www.avg.com > Version: 2015.0.5751 / Virus Database: 4299/9218 - Release Date: 03/03/15 > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community

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nearly complete draft of Applying Stress Tests
by Steve DelBianco March 7, 2015

March 7, 2015

Cheryl and team — the attached is a nearly-complete draft of how we might apply those 25 Stress Tests<https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/ST-WP+--+Stress+Tests+Wor…> to what the CWG and CCWG are presently considering. As we’ve said, you can’t apply stress tests definitively until you have a defined mechanism/structure to test. Nonetheless, we’ll do our best with the proposed mechanisms at this point. Please review over the weekend and provide edits. We can discuss on our call Wednesday 11-March at 11:00 UTC. Regards, Steve — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.703.615.6206

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[CCWG-ACCT] Additional Stress Tests to discuss
by Steve DelBianco March 4, 2015

March 4, 2015

For tomorrow’s call, we applied 4 more of our stress tests against the draft package of proposed accountability measures. Stress Tests #1 and 2 (together), #24, and #15, are shown below and in the attached draft document. Stress Test: #1. Change authority for the IANA Root Zone ceases to function, in part or in whole. #2. Delegation authority for the IANA Root Zone ceases to function, in part or in whole. Consequence: interference with existing policy relating to IANA Root Zone and/or prejudice to the security and stability of one or several TLDs. Existing Accountability Measures: Under the present IANA contract, NTIA can revoke ICANN’s authority to perform IANA functions and re-assign to different entity/entities. After NTIA relinquishes the IANA contract, this measure will no longer be available. Proposed Accountability Measures: The CWG planning the IANA stewardship transition might design mechanisms and structures that enable separation, such that the IANA functions could be readily revoked and re-assigned. To manage the revocation of IANA functions, the CWG might also propose an emergency backup provider and procedures, pending re-assignment of the IANA functions. Preliminary Conclusions: This threat is directly related to the transition of IANA stewardship Existing measures would be inadequate after NTIA terminates the IANA contract. At this point, CWG’s recommendations are still in development. ——————————————————— Stress Test: #24. An incoming Chief Executive institutes a “strategic review” that arrives at a new, extended mission for ICANN. The Board, having just hired the new CEO, approves the new mission and strategy without community consensus. Consequence: Community ceases to see ICANN as the community’s own mechanism for discharging limited technical functions, and views ICANN as an independent, sui generis entity with its own agenda, not necessarily supported by the community. Ultimately, community questions why ICANN’s original functions should remain controlled by a body that has acquired a much broader and less widely supported mission. Existing Accountability Measures: As long as NTIA controls the IANA contract, ICANN could risk losing IANA functions if it were to expand scope too broadly. The Community has some input in ICANN budgeting and Strat Plan, and could register objections to plans and spending on extending ICANN’s mission. California’s Attorney General has jurisdiction over non-profit entities acting outside Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation. Proposed Accountability Measures: One proposed measure is empowering the community to veto ICANN’s proposed annual budget. This measure could block a proposal by ICANN to increase its expenditure on extending its mission beyond what the community supported. If the ICANN board voted to approve the CEO’s plans, one proposed measure would give the community standing to veto a board decision. Another proposed measure is empowering the community to challenge a board decision, referring it to an Independent Review Panel (IRP) with the power to issue a binding decision. [What would be the standard used for this review?] Preliminary Conclusions: This threat is directly related to the transition of IANA stewardship Existing measures would be inadequate after NTIA terminates the IANA contract. Proposed measures in combination are adequate. ——————————————————— Stress Test: #15. ICANN terminates its legal presence in a nation where Internet users or domain registrants are seeking legal remedies for ICANN’s failure to enforce contracts, or other actions. Consequence: affected parties could be prevented from seeking legal redress for commissions or omissions by ICANN. Existing Accountability Measures: As long as NTIA controls the IANA contract, ICANN could risk losing IANA functions if it were to move in order to avoid legal jurisdiction. Paragraph 8 of the AoC requires ICANN to remain headquartered in the US, but the AoC can be terminated by ICANN at any time. As long as NTIA controls the IANA contract, ICANN feels pressure to maintain the AoC. Proposed Accountability Measures: One proposed measure is to give the community standing to veto a board decision. If ICANN board voted to vacate a legal presence, the community veto could enable reversal of that decision. One proposed measure is to import AoC provisions into the ICANN bylaws, and dispense with the bilateral AoC with NTIA. Bylaws would be amended to include AoC commitments 8, requiring it to maintain legal presence in the US, where it is subject to legal redress by any aggrieved party. If ICANN’s board proposed to amend the AoC provisions added to the bylaws, another proposed measure would empower the community to veto that proposed bylaws change. Preliminary Conclusions: This threat is directly related to the transition of IANA stewardship Existing measures would be inadequate after NTIA terminates the IANA contract. Proposed measures improve upon existing measures, and may be adequate.

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Doodle Poll for CCWG Accountability Stress Test SubTeam
by Brenda Brewer March 3, 2015

March 3, 2015

Hello Everyone! The CCWG Accountability Stress Test SubTeam is planning a meeting for next week. Please see the Doodle Poll link: http://doodle.com/fffvgn2upkcnmkmf and select the best time(s) available for you. Remember to change the time zone to view times for you personally. Thank you for completing the poll and as soon as possible I will proceed to book the call based on the poll results. Kind regards, Brenda Brewer ICANN Staff

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[CCWG-ACCT] Another Stress Test to discuss
by Steve DelBianco Feb. 24, 2015

Feb. 24, 2015

Per a request from Adam Peake, we applied another of our stress tests against the draft package of proposed accountability measures. This is for stress test #17, shown below and on page 2 of the attached document. Stress Test: #17. ICANN attempts to add a new top-level domain in spite of security and stability concerns expressed by technical community or other stakeholder groups. Consequence: DNS security and stability could be undermined, and ICANN actions could impose costs and risks upon external parties. Existing Accountability Measures: In 2013-14 the community demonstrated that it could eventually prod ICANN management to attend to risks identified by SSAC (security certificates and name collisions such as .mail, .home, etc.). NTIA presently gives clerical approval for each delegation to indicate that ICANN has followed its processes. NTIA could delay a delegation if its finds that ICANN has not followed its processes. Not clear if that would/could have been a finding if ICANN attempted to delegate a new TLD such as .mail or .home CCWG Proposed Accountability Measures: One proposed measure is to empower the community to force ICANN’s board to implement a recommendation arising from an AoC Review – namely, 9.2 Review of Security, Stability, and Resiliency. Another possibility is to empower the community to force ICANN to respond to recommendations from advisory committees like as SSAC. If the board took a decision to reject or only partially accept SSAC recommendations, the community could be empowered to challenge that board decision and/or refer to IRP. Preliminary Conclusions: This threat is partially related to the transition of IANA stewardship Existing measures were adequate to mitigate the risks of this scenario. Proposed measures enhance community’s power to mitigate the risks of this scenario.

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Updated document on Applying Stress Tests
by Steve DelBianco Feb. 17, 2015

Feb. 17, 2015

Cheryl — attached is an updated version 4 of our stress test document. Give it a look and you may decide it’s worth circulating before our call Tuesday. First, I made the updates that came up during our working session Thursday morning in Singapore. Second, I added application of stress test #18 in Category IV (see page 3). This is a stress test regarding GAC Advice: 18. Governments in ICANN’s Government Advisory Committee (GAC) amend their operating procedures to change from consensus decisions to majority voting for advice to ICANN’s board. Consequence: Under current bylaws, ICANN must consider and respond to GAC advice, even if that advice were not supported by consensus. A majority of governments could thereby approve GAC advice that restricted free online expression, for example. Existing Accountability Measures: Current ICANN Bylaws (Section XI) give due deference to GAC advice, including a requirement to try and find “a mutually acceptable solution.” This is required for any GAC advice, not just for GAC consensus advice. Today, GAC adopts formal advice according to its Operating Principle 47: “consensus is understood to mean the practice of adopting decisions by general agreement in the absence of any formal objection.” But the GAC may at any time change its procedures to use majority voting instead of consensus. CCWG Proposed Accountability Measures: One proposed measure is to give the community standing to veto a board decision. If ICANN board acquiesced to GAC advice that was not supported by GAC consensus, the community veto could enable reversal of that decision. Another proposed measure is to amend ICANN bylaws (Section XI 1j) to give due deference only to GAC consensus advice, and add a definition of “consensus”. The GAC could change its Operating Principle 47 to use majority voting for formal GAC advice, but ICANN bylaws would require due deference only to advice that had GAC consensus. Best, Steve — Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.703.615.6206

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Re: [ST-WP] Updated document on Applying Stress Tests
by Samantha Eisner Feb. 17, 2015

Feb. 17, 2015

Listening to our call today, I think we need to add in a stress test addressing the situation where a community veto results in the overturning of a board decision that is consistent with GAC advice (assuming consensus advice, etc.). That has the potential for a crisis point in the organization that we need to consider. From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco(a)netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> Date: Tuesday, February 17, 2015 at 4:42 AM To: Cheryl Langdon-Orr <langdonorr(a)gmail.com<mailto:langdonorr@gmail.com>> Cc: "ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability4@icann.org>" <ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org<mailto:ccwg-accountability4@icann.org>> Subject: [ST-WP] Updated document on Applying Stress Tests Cheryl - attached is an updated version 4 of our stress test document. Give it a look and you may decide it's worth circulating before our call Tuesday. First, I made the updates that came up during our working session Thursday morning in Singapore. Second, I added application of stress test #18 in Category IV (see page 3). This is a stress test regarding GAC Advice: 18. Governments in ICANN's Government Advisory Committee (GAC) amend their operating procedures to change from consensus decisions to majority voting for advice to ICANN's board. Consequence: Under current bylaws, ICANN must consider and respond to GAC advice, even if that advice were not supported by consensus. A majority of governments could thereby approve GAC advice that restricted free online expression, for example. Existing Accountability Measures: Current ICANN Bylaws (Section XI) give due deference to GAC advice, including a requirement to try and find "a mutually acceptable solution." This is required for any GAC advice, not just for GAC consensus advice. Today, GAC adopts formal advice according to its Operating Principle 47: "consensus is understood to mean the practice of adopting decisions by general agreement in the absence of any formal objection." But the GAC may at any time change its procedures to use majority voting instead of consensus. CCWG Proposed Accountability Measures: One proposed measure is to give the community standing to veto a board decision. If ICANN board acquiesced to GAC advice that was not supported by GAC consensus, the community veto could enable reversal of that decision. Another proposed measure is to amend ICANN bylaws (Section XI 1j) to give due deference only to GAC consensus advice, and add a definition of "consensus". The GAC could change its Operating Principle 47 to use majority voting for formal GAC advice, but ICANN bylaws would require due deference only to advice that had GAC consensus. Best, Steve - Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.703.615.6206

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Re: [ST-WP] Our current 'state of play' regarding applying stress tests to a sample selection of our catagorised contingencies for your receipt and action.
by Cheryl Langdon-Orr Feb. 8, 2015

Feb. 8, 2015

Dear CCWG Chairs and Grace, As you all know Steve, late yesterday released on behalf of our WP, a draft for final edit of a document that you requested we have available for the CCWG at this meeting, where a sample set of our identified risk scenarios' were subject to 'stress testing. Please be advised that as of our deadline this morning we received no further edits from the WP team, and therefore we request that you now consider the .PDF distributed to you all late yesterday, as the current 'state of play' for application of these 'stress tests' to our sample set, and we would request that this document be now distributed to the wider CCWG. Additionally, we would particularly like you to note and give to recognise our thanks for the prompt attention and edit contributions to our starting document, that were contributed by our ST-WP members over the last 24 hrs. We would also appreciate your advice on when during this meeting will you wish to discuss or use this WP output, and what if anything you wish our WP to do to facilitate this. Thanks On Feb 7, 2015 10:13 PM, "Steve DelBianco" <sdelbianco(a)netchoice.org> wrote: > Many thanks for fast feedback today from James Bladel, Samantha Eisner, > Malcolm Hutty, Greg Shatan, Tony Holmes, and Cheryl Miller. > > Cheryl L-O and I met at 5:45 and reviewed comments and edits received > today. Attached are clean v2 and redline from v1. We had to reconcile > conflicting edits and did not address every comment made, but are happy to > discuss with each of you. > > We are now open for further edits, but would need them by Sunday morning > if the CCWG chairs ask us to present Stress Testing during Sunday’s CCWG > session. > > — > Steve DelBianco and Cheryl Langdon-Orr > > > From: Cheryl Langdon-Orr > Date: Saturday, February 7, 2015 at 11:20 AM > To: "ccwg-accountability4(a)icann.org", Mathieu Weill, Thomas Rickert, León > Felipe Sánchez Ambía, Grace Abuhamad, Brenda Brewer > Subject: [ST-WP] 1st take from Steve and I on applying stress tests to a > sample selection of our catagorised contingencies for your rapid review and > comment ASAP please... > > Hi team (et.al.) Steve (bless him as he has done all the heavy > lifting here) and I met briefly earlier today to draft up some sample > exercises of applying Stress Tests and responding the the questions the > CCWG wants to have posed and of course most importantly our charter... > > The attached is a start, and I have separated each tabulated exercise so > that there is 1 issue per page so we all have lots of room to make comments > and contribute edits... > > Steve and I believe this (providing as many of the ST-WP as possible can > read, and respond as required, as soon as possible) can be a basic > contribution from our WP to the upcoming CCWG meeting(s) here in > Singapore. So please take a quick look and get back to this distribution > list which you should note at this early draft stage does NOT include the > full CCWG list... > > We would also like to propose that for those of you in Singapore , and > able to attend, we take a few minutes to huddle and review this draft > before sending to the full CCWG later today... We believe that we can take > a small time slot at 1745 to 1800(15) at the seats outside Sophia and > Olivia rooms (GNSO and ccNSO meeting rooms). After that I will transfer > our updated work to our wiki and of course have a link for a PDF to be able > to be downloaded for local view and print etc., > > Then we can forward to the CCWG for further review and discussion >

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1st take from Steve and I on applying stress tests to a sample selection of our catagorised contingencies for your rapid review and comment ASAP please...
by Cheryl Langdon-Orr Feb. 7, 2015

Feb. 7, 2015

Hi team (et.al.) Steve (bless him as he has done all the heavy lifting here) and I met briefly earlier today to draft up some sample exercises of applying Stress Tests and responding the the questions the CCWG wants to have posed and of course most importantly our charter... The attached is a start, and I have separated each tabulated exercise so that there is 1 issue per page so we all have lots of room to make comments and contribute edits... Steve and I believe this (providing as many of the ST-WP as possible can read, and respond as required, as soon as possible) can be a basic contribution from our WP to the upcoming CCWG meeting(s) here in Singapore. So please take a quick look and get back to this distribution list which you should note at this early draft stage does NOT include the full CCWG list... We would also like to propose that for those of you in Singapore , and able to attend, we take a few minutes to huddle and review this draft before sending to the full CCWG later today... We believe that we can take a small time slot at 1745 to 1800(15) at the seats outside Sophia and Olivia rooms (GNSO and ccNSO meeting rooms). After that I will transfer our updated work to our wiki and of course have a link for a PDF to be able to be downloaded for local view and print etc., Then we can forward to the CCWG for further review and discussion

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