For tomorrow’s call, we applied 4 more of our stress tests against the draft package of proposed accountability measures. Stress Tests #1 and 2 (together), #24, and #15, are shown below and in the attached draft document. Stress Test: #1. Change authority for the IANA Root Zone ceases to function, in part or in whole. #2. Delegation authority for the IANA Root Zone ceases to function, in part or in whole. Consequence: interference with existing policy relating to IANA Root Zone and/or prejudice to the security and stability of one or several TLDs. Existing Accountability Measures: Under the present IANA contract, NTIA can revoke ICANN’s authority to perform IANA functions and re-assign to different entity/entities. After NTIA relinquishes the IANA contract, this measure will no longer be available. Proposed Accountability Measures: The CWG planning the IANA stewardship transition might design mechanisms and structures that enable separation, such that the IANA functions could be readily revoked and re-assigned. To manage the revocation of IANA functions, the CWG might also propose an emergency backup provider and procedures, pending re-assignment of the IANA functions. Preliminary Conclusions: This threat is directly related to the transition of IANA stewardship Existing measures would be inadequate after NTIA terminates the IANA contract. At this point, CWG’s recommendations are still in development. ——————————————————— Stress Test: #24. An incoming Chief Executive institutes a “strategic review” that arrives at a new, extended mission for ICANN. The Board, having just hired the new CEO, approves the new mission and strategy without community consensus. Consequence: Community ceases to see ICANN as the community’s own mechanism for discharging limited technical functions, and views ICANN as an independent, sui generis entity with its own agenda, not necessarily supported by the community. Ultimately, community questions why ICANN’s original functions should remain controlled by a body that has acquired a much broader and less widely supported mission. Existing Accountability Measures: As long as NTIA controls the IANA contract, ICANN could risk losing IANA functions if it were to expand scope too broadly. The Community has some input in ICANN budgeting and Strat Plan, and could register objections to plans and spending on extending ICANN’s mission. California’s Attorney General has jurisdiction over non-profit entities acting outside Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation. Proposed Accountability Measures: One proposed measure is empowering the community to veto ICANN’s proposed annual budget. This measure could block a proposal by ICANN to increase its expenditure on extending its mission beyond what the community supported. If the ICANN board voted to approve the CEO’s plans, one proposed measure would give the community standing to veto a board decision. Another proposed measure is empowering the community to challenge a board decision, referring it to an Independent Review Panel (IRP) with the power to issue a binding decision. [What would be the standard used for this review?] Preliminary Conclusions: This threat is directly related to the transition of IANA stewardship Existing measures would be inadequate after NTIA terminates the IANA contract. Proposed measures in combination are adequate. ——————————————————— Stress Test: #15. ICANN terminates its legal presence in a nation where Internet users or domain registrants are seeking legal remedies for ICANN’s failure to enforce contracts, or other actions. Consequence: affected parties could be prevented from seeking legal redress for commissions or omissions by ICANN. Existing Accountability Measures: As long as NTIA controls the IANA contract, ICANN could risk losing IANA functions if it were to move in order to avoid legal jurisdiction. Paragraph 8 of the AoC requires ICANN to remain headquartered in the US, but the AoC can be terminated by ICANN at any time. As long as NTIA controls the IANA contract, ICANN feels pressure to maintain the AoC. Proposed Accountability Measures: One proposed measure is to give the community standing to veto a board decision. If ICANN board voted to vacate a legal presence, the community veto could enable reversal of that decision. One proposed measure is to import AoC provisions into the ICANN bylaws, and dispense with the bilateral AoC with NTIA. Bylaws would be amended to include AoC commitments 8, requiring it to maintain legal presence in the US, where it is subject to legal redress by any aggrieved party. If ICANN’s board proposed to amend the AoC provisions added to the bylaws, another proposed measure would empower the community to veto that proposed bylaws change. Preliminary Conclusions: This threat is directly related to the transition of IANA stewardship Existing measures would be inadequate after NTIA terminates the IANA contract. Proposed measures improve upon existing measures, and may be adequate.