April 2019 - comments-biz-renewal-03apr19@icann.org

[Comments-biz-renewal-03apr19] Comments of Leap of Faith Financial Services Inc. opposing proposed .org, .info, .biz and .asia contract renewals
by George Kirikos May 3, 2019

May 3, 2019

Submitted by: George Kirikos Company: Leap of Faith Financial Services Inc. Website: http://www.leap.com/ Date: April 29, 2019 We write to oppose the proposed contract renewals posted by ICANN for the .org, .info, .biz and .asia contracts, as posted for public comments at: https://www.icann.org/public-comments/org-renewal-2019-03-18-en https://www.icann.org/public-comments/info-renewal-2019-03-18-en https://www.icann.org/public-comments/biz-renewal-2019-04-03-en https://www.icann.org/public-comments/asia-renewal-2019-03-27-en While our arguments are focused on the .org TLD, to the extent that the contractual terms are similar for the other TLDs, we repeat the same comments for .info, .biz and .org. Indeed, while the majority of the thousands of public comments to date have focused on .org, ICANN should read those comments as also applying to .info, .biz and .org, even if the submitters did not explicitly submit their comments to all 4 email addresses. 1. We support and endorse the great groundswell of opposition as expressed in the thousands of thoughtful public comments opposed to these proposed agreements. It is shocking that ICANN did not learn its lesson from 2006, when similar massive opposition existed for comparable contracts which would have allowed for unlimited fee increases: https://forum.icann.org/lists/org-tld-agreement/ The proposed contracts are simply unconscionable, and ICANN should instead simply extend the existing contracts by another 6 or 10 years, rather than make any other changes. 2. Within the At-Large, we had a video discussion/debate, archived at: https://freespeech.com/2019/04/10/impact-of-the-urs-and-unlimited-fee-incre… https://youtu.be/KW3I1oFGbv0 where many of the points below are discussed, and I include them here by reference. 3. We particularly agree with the comments and/or blogs submitted/posted by: a) Nat Cohen / Telepathy: https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/comments-org-renewal-18mar19/2019q2/003067.h… http://www.circleid.com/posts/20190423_spurious_justifications_for_eliminat… b) NameCheap: https://www.namecheap.com/blog/keep-domain-prices-in-check/ c) Zak Muscovitch / Internet Commerce Association: https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/comments-org-renewal-18mar19/2019q2/000006.h… d) Jay Chapman / Digimedia: https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/comments-org-renewal-18mar19/2019q2/002967.h… e) Andrew Allemann: https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/comments-org-renewal-18mar19/2019q2/003091.h… 4. It should be noted that in the past ICANN trumpeted lower fees as one of its main achievements. For example, the testimony of ICANN General Counsel and Secretary John Jeffrey at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg30233/html/CHRG-109hhrg3023… "STATEMENT OF JOHN JEFFREY, INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (ICANN) ... Among ICANN's main achievements are the following: ... Market competition. Market competition for generic top-level domain registrations established by ICANN has ****lowered domain name cost in some instances as much as 80 percent with savings for both consumers and businesses.****" (emphasis added) It is not consistent with those past statements for ICANN to abrogate its responsibilities, and permit unlimited fee increases by registry operators. Unlimited fee increases are not in the public interest, and do not even attempt to balance the needs of registrants against those of registry operators. ICANN was handed a responsibility to balance the interest of affected stakeholders when it achieved (against our wishes) independence from US government oversight, and it's now clear that it is not living up to those commitments given such one-sided contracts that have been presented here for public comment. Unlimited fee increases are not balanced, and do not promote stability of the internet or competition. ICANN is engaging in corporate welfare and/or crony capitalism through such anti-competitive proposals as are here before us. 5. As has been pointed out by others, under competition the cost of providing registry services (really just the management of a central database plus the operation of various nameservers) would be under USD $1.00 per domain name per year. This is evidenced by the .IN (India) tender, where Neustar beat Afilias with a winning bid of USD $0.70 per domain name per year (70 cents/domain/yr): http://domainincite.com/23364-afilias-sues-india-to-block-12-million-neusta… A similar competitive tender process happened in France: https://www.thedomains.com/2012/08/07/afnic-awarded-new-contract-to-run-fr-… where AFNIC had to lower the wholesale fees for .FR domain names, and the contract was for 5 years. Similar competitions are held for the .US ccTLD: https://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/press/2007/Neustar_101907.html You'll note that registry operators do not have presumptive renewal in those ccTLD contracts, yet are more than willing and able to compete effectively and make investments. It was a major policy blunder of ICANN to have agreed in the past to presumptive renewal, a decision that has had a multi-billion dollar negative impact upon registrants, compared to a situation where there are regular competitive tenders. Even the US government has argued for those competitive tenders for both initial agreements and for renewals of agreements: https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/icann_081218.pdf (Ms. Garza's analysis begins on the 3rd page of the PDF, after the covering letter by Ms. Baker of the NTIA) The absence of such competitive tenders can only be rectified through the protective fee caps which have been long established, and which the registry operators themselves have agreed to since the times they entered into their respective agreements. If current registry operators are not prepared to renew the existing contracts (which have fee caps in place), then there would be no shortage of other prospective registry operators who would be prepared to step in and replace them (and at a much lower cost, with fee caps in place). Indeed, ICANN themselves have argued (in court) that such caps are *pro-competitive*, see: https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/icann-reply-on-cfit-26may06-en.… "....in a single supplier market, price caps are, if anything, procompetitive (Mot. at 13-14);" (line 13, page 6 of 15) 6. We would like to openly make ICANN the following offer: We will run the .org registry for USD $5 per domain name per year, and keep all other existing terms the same. [We would then simply subcontract it to one of the many registry operators who would bid for the job at USD $1 per domain per year or less, and pocket the difference!] This is lower than the $9.93 per domain name per year that PIR currently charges. ICANN cannot of course accept this improved deal, even if it wanted to, because its hands are tied by the foolish decision to agree to presumptive renewal in the past. Looking forward, an agreement to permit unlimited fee increases in the future (far beyond the already generous 10% per year permitted increases) would similarly hamper ICANN's ability to negotiate future "win-win" deals, giving it no negotiating leverage in the future, as it would have already given away the farm if it entered into this proposed agreement. Agreeing to permit unlimited fee increases is like letting the genie out of the bottle, as there's no way that registry operators will ever agree to voluntarily undo such a change in the future. Presumptive renewal means that registry operators can safely ignore any future attempts by ICANN to renegotiate. This is why these contractual changes are so important, because they'll be impossible to fix in the future (without giving up even more to registry operators, e.g. via a buyout or something). This alone should be reason for caution. Given there's no urgency to making a change (i.e. registry operators have *falling* costs, not increasing costs), then the status quo should prevail. 6. Some have suggested that the Internet Society and/or PIR would never raise fees by a large amount. However, "hope is not a strategy." Past performance is no guarantee of the future. Leadership can change, as can priorities/missions. It's clear from section 7.5 of the the draft contract itself: https://www.icann.org/sites/default/files/tlds/org/org-proposed-renewal-18m… that ISOC/PIR could simply sell or assign the registry contract to another entity (e.g. Private Equity, just as registry operator Donuts was sold by its founders), and that new owner/entity could take the heat for future egregious fee increases. ICANN would not be able to stop such a deal. Such a sale would allow ISOC to create a huge endowment for itself worth billions of dollars, given that .org is arguably the second most desirable gTLD, after only .com. 7. The ability to renew a domain name for 10 years is not sufficient protection for registrants. Eventually the bill will come due, and nothing can offset the enormous switching costs. Any goodwill/links/etc. built up will be reduced to zero, totally destroying one's investment in one's web identity that may have been built up over 20+ years (even longer than ICANN has existed, in many cases). URLs that have been printed in offline media such as books, DVDs, etc. can't be updated, thus it's impossible for many to simply stop renewing after 10 years and switch, as some people will still see the old URL. E-mails aren't forwarded by the new registrants to those of past registrants, meaning that all existing email addresses can't easily transition to a new domain name without risk. Business cards would need to be reprinted (and can't be "recalled" from past recipients). Registrants expect URLs to be permanent, not transitory. Registrants of legacy gTLDs like com/net/org own their domain names, and are not temporary tenants (like those in the failed new gTLDs). 8. One of the reasons prospective registrants rationally avoid new gTLDs is the lack of certainty over potential future fee increases. As one submission pointed out, they are "leery" of such one-sided contracts, and for good reason. Those failures of the new gTLDs experiment should not be allowed to contaminate the successful and proven legacy gTLDs like .com/net/org. Indeed, if there is to be any harmonization of contracts, the "base agreement" should be that of the successful .com/net/org TLDs which included fee caps, rather than have the future be modeled on the the failed new gTLDs program. Registrants of new gTLDs knew the problems with the lack of price caps, and foolishly agreed to them before registration. Changing the rules for existing registrants of legacy gTLDs is unacceptable, as this amounts to changing the rules in the middle of the game, rules which would never have been acceptable to most prior to registration. One submission suggested that as each new gTLD matures, or reaches a critical mass, it should then transition to the legacy contracts. That was a wise suggestion, to bridge the failed new gTLD program with the successful legacy gTLDs. 9. Even ISOC/PIR doesn't enter into such one-sided agreements, given that its own supplier/subcontractor (Afilias) had to win a competitive tender to retain the contract for managing the back-end of the registry (presumably at an even lower fee than it agreed to years ago -- fees would be able to be estimated once the relevant IRS Form 990 forms become public). https://domainnamewire.com/2016/02/16/32-million-org-contract-up-for-bids/ https://domainnamewire.com/2016/11/14/org-sticks-afilias-backend/ It's entirely inconsistent that Internet Society doesn't give presumptive renewal and/or permits unlimited fee increases for its own suppliers, yet wants such things for themselves. 10. We oppose the ability for the registry operators to unilaterally create and impose their own mandatory RPMs upon registrants. See, for example: https://www.icann.org/sites/default/files/tlds/org/org-proposed-addendum-18… "Specification 7, § 1 The terms of Section 1 of Specification 7 are hereby amended and restated in their entirety as follows: “Rights Protection Mechanisms. Registry Operator shall implement and adhere to the rights protection mechanisms (“RPMs”) specified in this Specification. In addition to such RPMs, Registry Operator ******may develop and implement RPMs that discourage or prevent registration of domain names that violate or abuse another party’s legal rights.****** Registry Operator will include all RPMs required by this Specification 7 and any additional RPMs developed and implemented by Registry Operator in the Registry-Registrar Agreement entered into by ICANN-accredited registrars authorized to register names in the TLD.” (page 6, emphasis added) This should be left to the GNSO, to develop only policies that have consensus, and which balance the needs of both rights holders and registrants. For example, suppose PIR (or another registry operator) was allowed to unilaterally create a RPM on their own which allowed for complaints to be filed for a fee of $100, but which required registrants post a $1 million bond if they wish to file any response to the complaint. Such a one-sided policy could be created by a registry operator under the proposed terms, and would ignore the requirement that ICANN policies need to balance the concerns of all affected stakeholders (including registrants). 11. We also oppose the searchable WHOIS, which ignores the ongoing EPDP on WHOIS: https://www.icann.org/sites/default/files/tlds/org/org-proposed-renewal-18m… (page 37) "Notwithstanding anything else in this Agreement, Registry Operator must offer a searchable Whois service compliant with the requirements described in Section 1.10 of Specification 4 of this Agreement." as it doesn't properly balance the privacy rights of registrants against those who would go on fishing expeditions. A searchable WHOIS system should only ever be adopted, if and only if the Trademark Clearinghouse (TMCH) equally becomes public and searchable, in return. If the TMCH is kept secret and non-searchable, then the WHOIS should not be searchable either. 12. Additional RPMs that were developed for new gTLDs were the result of bad predictions that were made of massive cybersquatting prior to the adoption of the program. For example, in testimony before the US government: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112shrg74251/html/CHRG-112shrg7425… "First, the immediate costs imposed on business is likely to be in the multi billions of dollars." "This Program in aggregate has multi-billion dollar implications for all marketers, both in the commercial and the nonprofit sectors, and their brands. It would cause irreparable harm and damage to the entire online business community. It would throw the domain name universe into substantial confusion for both marketers and consumers." "So there are billions of dollars that are going to be spent and it's not going to be providing a use for the economy." "And when we're talking about billions of dollars here, when we're talking about companies with 3,000 or more brands, even big companies will be facing really large expenses. So this is a very, very significant economic issue for this country and for the world." "An unlimited expansion of the TLDs will cost the business community billions of dollars." "The unlimited expansion of TLDs would dramatically increase the cost and complexity for trademark holders to protect their rights. The immediate cost imposed on businesses is likely to be in the billions of dollars." "We believe ICANN's gTLD program would impose billions of dollars in unnecessary costs on the restaurant industry at a time when restaurant operators are looking forward to investing in their businesses and hiring employees after the worst recession in decades." These predictions exaggerated and overestimated the actual risk that was realized by the launch of new gTLDs. Thus, the justification for the adoption of the URS and other RPMs turned out to be false predictions, and should now be undone. They were never intended for, nor should be imposed upon, registrants of legacy gTLDs. Prospective registry operators at the time were willing to accept such terms, as the trademark lobby threatened to thwart and delay the release of new gTLDs unless their demands were met. Registry operators were blinded by dollar signs in their eyes, for example, predictions by Name.Space: "Name.Space, whose business has a potential value of over 1 billion dollars, has been deprived the opportunity to fully launch and operate its portfolio of gTLD properties under what we believe is the most responsible, fair, and ethical practices yet to be employed in the commercial domain name industry." (same link as above for testimony) 13. Given that the RPM PDP of the GNSO is actively reviewing the URS, including determining whether or not it should be a consensus policy, no steps should be taken by ICANN staff and/or the registry operators to unilaterally impose it upon registrants. Indeed, there are numerous proposals to actively change the URS (including a proposal to explicitly eliminate it), see: https://community.icann.org/display/RARPMRIAGPWG/URS+Proposals (click the "Individual URS Proposal" tab to see the 33 individual proposals, 14 of them from us) The current URS is deeply flawed. For example of just one of the defects, currently complaints are required to be in English (unlike the language rules for the UDRP, where complaints must be in the language of the registration agreement, which varies by registrar). Thus, many registrants defending a URS dispute have no idea what the actual URS complaint is about, if they do not understand English. This is particularly egregious, given that new gTLDs are most popular in China. Such flawed RPMs whose creation was rushed before the launch of new gTLDs, and which are tilted in favour of large multinational companies, need to be reviewed and corrected before they are ever adopted for legacy gTLDs like .com/net/org. 14. In conclusion, ICANN's proposed contracts represent a failure of the multi-stakeholder model, and are instead evidence that ICANN has been captured by registry operators. ICANN claims these contracts are the result of a negotiation, yet what did registrants receive in return for these contractual changes? We received absolutely nothing in return, except for higher fees and higher regulatory burdens (via the imposition of the URS), with all the gains being received by the registry operators at the expense of registrants. That's not a negotiation -- that's a giveaway. We expect and demand that ICANN and the registry will simply extend the current contracts, rather than enter into these one-sided arrangements. Sincerely, George Kirikos 416-588-0269 http://www.leap.com/

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[Comments-biz-renewal-03apr19] How is a 10% fee increase allotment not enough?
by David L. Rager April 30, 2019

April 30, 2019

Hi, A potential of a 10% fee increase per year seems like more than enough to cover costs. In general I'm against regulation, but when a single company has all of the power, such limits are appropriate. Not fully informed but of course I have an opinion anyway, David

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[Comments-biz-renewal-03apr19] ICA Comment on Proposed Renewal of .biz Registry Agreement
by Zak Muscovitch April 30, 2019

April 30, 2019

Please see the below Comment of the Internet Commerce Association, which is also attached herewith as a PDF letter. Zak Muscovitch General Counsel, ICA Zak(a)InternetCommerce.org<mailto:Zak@InternetCommerce.org> .... April 30, 2019 ICANN 12025 Waterfront Drive, Suite 300 Los Angeles, California 90094-2536, USA Attn: Mr. Russ Weinstein, Global Domains Division Dear Mr. Weinstein: Re: Proposed Renewal of .biz Registry Agreement I write to you on behalf of members of the Internet Commerce Association. Founded in 2006, the Internet Commerce Association (the "ICA") is a non-profit trade organization representing domain name registrants, including domain name investors, domain name secondary marketplaces, domain name brokers, escrow service companies, and related service providers. The ICA's mission is to assist with the development of domain name related policy. ICA members own a substantial percentage of all Internet domains and provide crucial domain name-related services to millions of Internet users. We are pleased to provide herein, our comments on the Proposed Renewal of the .biz Registry Agreement (the "Proposed Renewal Agreement" or the "Agreement"). 1. ICANN Should Seek Community Input Before Negotiating Registry Agreement Renewals The Proposed Renewal Agreement was ostensibly already negotiated and agreed to by ICANN and Afilias before seeking input from stakeholders on the very serious policy matters that arise from the Agreement. At this point, ICANN seeks public comment not to renegotiate the Agreement, but only to make a report of public comments "available for the ICANN Board in its consideration of the proposed renewal agreement". This puts the cart before the horse. Prior to negotiating and agreeing on any such Agreement, ICANN should be seeking community input as otherwise ICANN will not have the benefit of understanding what stakeholders want or need will thereby not be responsive to the stakeholders that it is mandated to serve. That is precisely what has regrettably occurred here. 2. ICANN Once Again Circumvents Dedicated Volunteers When it Comes to URS and So-Called "Bottom-up Multi-Stakeholder" Policy Development ICANN prides itself on bottom-up multi-stakeholder policy development, but yet again, ICANN staff has attempted to circumvent the established policy development process. The Proposed .biz Renewal Agreement includes Uniform Rapid Suspension ("URS") when ICANN Staff are well aware that the question of whether URS should become a Consensus Policy is currently undergoing extensive review by the Rights Protection Mechanism Working Group (the "RPM WG"). In fact, the question of whether URS should be applicable to all gTLD's as a Consensus Policy is one of the primary questions that numerous experts from the ICANN community have been engaged in for the last two years. These experts have dedicated thousands of person hours to determining whether URS should be a Consensus Policy and yet ICANN Staff has purported to circumvent them and render all these efforts largely moot with the unilateral implementation of URS in registry agreements as they come up for renewal. It is an affront to the ICANN Community, and in particular to those dedicated volunteers that are following the established policy development process, that right under the noses of the ICANN Board, ICANN Staff continue to subvert and circumvent the required procedures by unilateral implementation of policy. This is at least the 7th instance where the Global Domains Division ("GDD") has circumvented the policy development process by unilateral introduction of the URS and ICANN has been put on notice through Comments by various parties on each occasion.[i] The question then becomes whether there is any point in continuing to engage in the established "bottom-up multi-stakeholder model" if efforts from volunteers, included members of the Internet Commerce Association, are ostensibly engaged in mere "busy work" at tremendous expense and opportunity cost, when the actual policy making happens behind closed doors by ICANN Staff. Given that ICANN Staff has ignored all previous entreaties to abide by the established policy development procedure when it comes to URS, it must be concluded that ICANN pays mere lip service to the bottom-up multi-stakeholder model and putting the Proposed .biz Renewal Agreement out for public comment is mere window dressing. Nevertheless, once again, and despite every indication that ICANN Staff remains intent upon continuing their unilateral policy making mission and circumventing its dedicated volunteers, we must demand that ICANN await the completion of the Working Group's deliberations on the inclusion of URS as a Consensus Policy and refrain from unilateral imposition. 3. There are Major Oversights Within the Agreement Leaving Registrants Unprotected a) The Agreement does not require that existing registrants receive notice of pending increases or renewal increases from the Registry Operator or registrars. Sections 2.10(a) and 2.10(b) merely require that the Registry Operator provide notice to registrars, not registrants. Accordingly, registrants may not receive adequate notice, and this is an example of how ICANN has made sure to look after registrars, but not registrants. b) There is no requirement that registrants be afforded the opportunity to renew a domain name for up to 10 years. Section 2.10(b) merely provides registrars with the option (i.e. in their "discretion") to offer up to ten year renewals. That means that a registrar may decide in its discretion, to only allow their customer to renew for a single year rather than ten, so that they can charge more after the one-year renewal term. Again, nobody at ICANN adequately looked out for registrants, but merely looked after its own service providers. 4. Does ICANN Care About Registrants and the Public Interest? We are very troubled by the what appears to be ICANN Staff's complete disregard for registrants and the public interest when it comes to the removal of all price caps in the Proposed .biz Renewal Agreement. New gTLDs created entirely new namespaces where any registrant knew that they were subject to price changes and price increases at the whim of the new gTLD operator. It was clearly 'buyer beware' in the new gTLDs. In contrast, with legacy extensions such as .biz, the name spaces were not bought and paid for by the registry operator and the reasonable expectation of .biz registrants was that prices would be capped in order for pricing to remain stable and reasonable. The operators of legacy extensions such as .biz don't "own" those name spaces. They were created for the public at large and are to be administered in the public interest by ICANN as essentially a trustee. The contracted registry operators are merely providing a service of maintaining the database and the underlying infrastructure on behalf of ICANN which is the caretaker of the public interest in the name spaces. That is why it is so surprising and concerning that ICANN Staff expressly stated that the ostensible objective in removing the price caps on .biz registrations under the existing Registry Agreement, was to "align" it with the current "base registry agreement". First of all, the crucial problem with this purported "alignment" is that in effect it constitutes a fundamental policy-making initiative that is beyond the scope of ICANN Staff without the support of the established policy development process. Second, this purported "aligning" totally disregards the fact that .biz is a legacy registry that is supposed to be operated in the public interest. Although "alignment" may be convenient from an administrative perspective, there is no factual or legitimate policy basis for treating the .biz registry the same as all others, when it is clearly different. So, other than conveniently "aligning" registry agreements to purportedly treat all registries alike despite their respective and dramatically different mandates, registrant base, and histories, what justification is there for unlimited price increases? There is no evidence whatsoever that the .biz registry requires unlimited additional funds to maintain reliable operations. There is no evidence that the .biz registry needs unlimited funds in order to "compete" with other registries. There is simply no justification for permitting the .biz registry operator to raise prices at all, let alone with a sky-is-the-limit approach. Moreover, .biz registrants can't simply pick up and move to a different domain name if prices are jacked up. For example, a business or non-profit or individual registrant who chose to "build a home" in .biz and who invested heavily in web development, branding, and marketing all connected to the .biz extension, did so with the reasonable expectation that ICANN would ensure, as the trustee of the .biz registry in the public interest, that reasonable prices would be maintained. If a registrant is faced with a substantial price increase for renewing their domain name they would have little choice but to pay it or face the potentially even greater costs of moving locations, rebranding, and remarketing, not to mention to potentially massive issue of losing their original email address. Similarly, if a new business wants to take its place it the .biz as a suitable namespace for its enterprise, and is met with a totally unjustifiable and expensive registration fee, it will force them to take their place in another less suitable registry. As such, existing registrants are a captive audience with little practical means of avoiding a registry-imposed price hike, and prospective registrants would be hugely disadvantaged if the price of a .biz domain name became unaffordable. 5. ICANN Misapprehends its Role and Ignores the Department of Justice The rationale that GDD staff are putting forth for removing price caps is that ICANN does not want "to become a price regulator". This is a misleading formulation since ICANN as a trustee of the public interest for the legacy domains has set prices within the legacy extensions. Has ICANN throughout its history been overstepping its authority when it entered into agreements that included terms governing pricing? The US Department of Justice viewed ICANN's role as creating competitive mechanisms, such as putting registry agreements out for rebid, to keep prices low for registrants, and failing that, the DOJ clearly stated it was ICANN's role to manage the TLDs in a manner that "safeguards the interests of registrants in obtaining high quality domains at the lowest possible prices."[ii] The DOJ expressly stated that ICANN should set price caps in the absence of putting out registries for competitive bid: "Because ICANN's proposed registry agreement lacks any [pricing] safeguards,... ICANN should consider revising the proposed registry agreement, at least for instances where there is not competitive bidding to operate a new gTLD, to include provisions designed to limit the ability of the registry operator to exercise market power, i.e., price caps..." The DOJ called for agreements that included a maximum price and limitations on price increases: "ICANN's requests for bids [to operate a new gTLD] should expressly call for bids to specify an initial maximum price that would be charged by the operator for domain registrations, as well as limitations on price increases over time.." The DOJ knew that relying on market forces and competition were not adequate where registries had market power. The DOJ found that .com and other gTLD registry operators had market power: "our investigation of the .com agreement found evidence that other gTLD registry operators may possess a degree of market power. The market power inherent in other gTLDs is less than the market power in .com, but is still material..." And; "Further, the introduction of new gTLDs is not likely to constrain the market power by existing gTLDs..." ICANN has apparently totally ignored this longstanding advice and direction of the DOJ. Although .biz may have less market power than .com or .org, for example, it still has a degree of market power and no economic studies have been conducted by ICANN prior to purporting to eliminate all price caps. ICANN is therefore wading into treacherous territory, as by removing all price caps after it created an anti-competitive environment by not enabling competition via a tender process and by on top of it, by providing perpetual contracts with presumptive rights of renewal, it is unwittingly or perhaps negligently, created an egregious situation which may compel the DOJ to once again intervene. As the DOJ has stated, "ICANN should take steps to protect consumers from the exercise of market power by gTLD operators", and has abjectly failed to do so with the proposed Agreement. Lastly, ICANN should not blithely state that it is "not a regulator" when the fact is that it is more than a regulator - it is the effective owner and trustee of registries. As such, it is entirely within its purview to set prices in the public interest. It is nonsensical to rely on the truism that it is 'not a regulator' (only governments are regulators), when the fact is that it has the right to set prices, subject to complying with its obligation to create a competitive environment and pricing in the interest of the public. In other words, nobody - especially the DOJ - would complain (other than the registries who receive ICANN's largess through un-competitive and perpetual contracts) if ICANN maintained low prices incrementally above the cost of operating registries in the public interest. Yours truly, INTERNET COMMERCE ASSOCIATION Zak Muscovitch General Counsel, ICA ________________________________ [i] See for example "Comments Run Overwhelmingly Against ICANN Staff Attempt to Impose URS on Legacy gTLD's, June 22, 2015 (https://www.internetcommerce.org/comments-oppose-dottravel-urs/) see also "Comment on Proposed Renewal of .Coop Sponsored Registry Agreement, Business Constituency Submission, July 27, 2018 (https://www.bizconst.org/assets/docs/positions-statements/2018/2018_07July_…) See also: "ICA Files ICANN Comment on Proposed .Museum RA Renewal", October 22, 2017 (https://www.internetcommerce.org/ica-files-icann-comment-on-proposed-museum…) [ii] https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/baker-to-dengate-thrush-18dec08…

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[Comments-biz-renewal-03apr19] (no subject)
by Hoonie Park April 30, 2019

April 30, 2019

I am against raising the price. I do not want to see price-caps removed and believe price increases would be unfair.

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[Comments-biz-renewal-03apr19] Please Keep The Cap
by Luke Hackenberg April 30, 2019

April 30, 2019

Please keep the price cap that has allowed the internet to be accessible to all; raising rates only lessens that.

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[Comments-biz-renewal-03apr19] .biz registration comment
by Steve Epstein April 30, 2019

April 30, 2019

Maintaining some form of price controls will both help smaller users keep long-standing domains, and possibly increase the value for the registrar overall with increased volume of registrations. Otherwise, many will be force to jump to other TLDs. Please maintain the price controls currently in place.

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[Comments-biz-renewal-03apr19] I oppose the removal of the price cap
by Paul Pliska April 30, 2019

April 30, 2019

I use use a .biz domain for my small business, and I understand that existing registrants will keep their price protection, but even so I oppose the removal of the price cap. It would be unfortunate if tomorrow's start-ups don't have the same chance at an affordable domain that I did. Moreover, I don't think older TLDs, such as .biz, first created when there were still vary few options, can be compared to newer, incredibly specific TLDs like .doctor and .farm. As such I see no reason to give the Registry Operator a new better deal, let them stick to what was originally agreed.

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[Comments-biz-renewal-03apr19] Tucows Comment on Legacy TLD Contracts
by Graeme Bunton April 29, 2019

April 29, 2019

Please see the attached comment from Tucows. Regards Graeme -- ____________________________ Graeme Bunton Director, Analytics & Policy Tucows Inc. PH: 416 535 0123 ext 1634

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[Comments-biz-renewal-03apr19] biz pricing
by Burt Culver April 29, 2019

April 29, 2019

Please do not change the domain pricing policy for .biz domains. Allowing the prices of domains to increase dramatically will mean that non-profits and small companies will struggle to pay for their domain names and will eventually be priced off the internet. Regards, Burt Burt Culver Los Angeles, CA

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[Comments-biz-renewal-03apr19] Price cap removal an abdication of responsibility
by Kevin Ohashi April 29, 2019

April 29, 2019

Removing the price cap on legacy gTLDs is an act of regulatory capture, plain and simple. These are non-competitive, monopoly contracts providing internet services with diminishing costs at scale and for years ICANN has allowed them to raise their prices on consumers. The fixed increases were bad enough, but uncapping it and saying the market will decide is dangerous and irresponsible. Do your job properly and keep price cap provisions in the contract. Kevin Ohashi

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