I believe you are correct Philip than none of the solutions you listed has universal appeal. We already explored a), making one house a supply side; the key problem from my perspective with that is that it mixes those who have blind contractual obligations to follow consensus policies with those who have no such obligation, thereby giving those without such obligations significant influence over those who do. Abandoning new constituencies is contrary to the Board approved recommendations of expanding participation unless a means of accomplishing that objective can be developed differently than through constituencies. Abandoning the bicameral approach would mean starting all over, an option that would set us back several years. The only option that seems to me to have any potential is developing a way to encourage participation of new groups without requiring them to be in constituencies; maybe this is worth further focus. The problems being encountered really only become significant when voting is required. Assuming that we are successful at moving effectively to an improved working group model for policy development that minimizes the need for voting (and I am one who is optimistic about that) and assuming that the Council becomes a manager of that process rather than a policy development body itself, then Council votes should become much less important. One area where they are important is with regard to GNSO Board seats; that is why we designed a specific solution for that. Other Council votes should primarily be related to confirming that the new PDP is adequately followed, that WG's follow the new guidelines being developed, etc. Chuck
-----Original Message----- From: owner-council@gnso.icann.org [mailto:owner-council@gnso.icann.org] On Behalf Of Philip Sheppard Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2009 4:11 AM To: 'Council GNSO' Cc: 'Bruce Tonkin' Subject: [council] Registry Operators et al
As I pointed out months ago on this list, there is a fundamental disconnect in two significant GNSO changes: a) the bicameral model b) new constituencies.
The bicameral model compromise thrashed out last summer was an agreement between the existing constituencies who all neatly fit into the two Houses. The subsequent belief that new constituencies are needed has exposed the impossibility of the bicameral compromise: they do not fit.
Trying to fit supply-related constituencies to the user-related House introduces such conflict and dilution that it brings the very credibility of ICANN into question.
There are solutions: a) change the Houses to be Supply-side and User-side b) abandon new Constituencies c) abandon the bicameral approach and remove contract parties from the GNSO leaving their main ICANN involvement as bilateral negotiators (and as participants in GNSO working groups)
I suggest none of these solutions has universal appeal.
Philip