On 05-Feb-14 18:43, Mike O'Connor wrote:
<grin> i yield on the subject-line — looks good to me.
thank you. I have trouble with longer subject lines.
sorry this reply took so long, email got thrown overboard to cope with complications on other fronts
OK - points of agreement (i’m really glad we agree on these two fundamental points)
— we are not overseer of the whole GNSO
— the Council is overseer of the policy process
points of discussion
— SGs are self-organizing, organized with a by-your-leave from the Board, without need of further oversight.
i need convincing on that last bit -
Well, I can try to give my reasons for this belief. As for convincing you, my experience tells me most people convince themselves if they are going to be convinced. But maybe my arguments will be useful in your deliberations.
there’s the possibility of trouble when there are functional organizations that report to nobody, not even a coordinating body.
Basic for me in the definition of a bottom-up organization: the oversight of a group is by the group, as that is who they are accountable to. Now by the group I don't necessarily mean the self selected folks who work in the SG or are (s)elected for roles, but rather the larger set of members (in the case of a GNSO SG or C, the appropriate population varies by group) In ICANN we have an additional top-down wild card - the Board is oversight for everything except maybe the Ombudsman and AOC Review teams (a bottom-up oversight mechanism in itself) From By-laws X.2
Except as otherwise defined in these Bylaws, the four Stakeholder Groups and the Constituencies will be responsible for defining their own charters with the approval of their members and of the ICANN Board of Directors.
So that is 4 points of oversight: Hard oversight - their word is law - the group itself through means defined in its charter - the SIC that pretty much does what it feels needs to be done with theappproval of the entire Board. Soft oversight - the Ombudsman - in the case of a complaint of unfairness - the ATRT - if SG/C issues or accountability and transparency were the topic selected by the ATRT based on the community's advice, as necessary to review in a particular cycle. I find it hard to think of them as reporting to nobody.
btw, none of these are do-or-die issues for me, i put them more in the “opportunities lost” column.
Now, I believe in regulatory structures as much as the next person, but I do not see a need for yet further oversight. Where I do see a need is for the organization of cooperation. Cooperation can happen in many ways including by not limited to: - ad hoc - e.g. cooperation among SG reps to achieve a policy goal in the council - self-organization - something like the ccWG Ig, assuming it ever becomes real, where there was a decision on the part of some to attract the rest of the community to work on a particular issue and there are organizational aspirations. - top-down suggested/enforced - e.g. the GNSO that was told by the Board to figure out a solution to reorganizing the GNSO structure a few years back that resulted in a set of SIC requirements for Constituencies and Stakeholder Groups.
— Council as service organization to SGs when they have common cause to effect change beyond GNSO policy. i also need convincing on this one - can you point me at documentation that supports this role?
A thought or two occur to me on this. I tend to think that a group that can help coordinate the efforts of the willing is of course always authorized to help the willing cooperate. To say that we need a document to tell us we may coordinate the goals of our SG and Cs when they consent, is difficult for me to understand. I don't really understand needing to be convinced that helping people cooperate needs permission from some authority. That is indeed another feature of a bottom-up organization - you are as organized as you decide to be (again with the caveat that having an authoritative Board does add a touch of the top down to make any analysis a bit more complex). Note I do not argue that the SGs could not come together and create an organizational framework - I would still argue against it for various reasons, but that would at least be a bottom-up process of self-aggregation and self-imposition of further oversight. But, the fact that this could happen does not mean that the action of the council in regard to organizing cooperation are in any way limited by the by-laws now.
it seems quite different than my understanding of what we’re supposed to do.
We have some designated activities: - managing policy process - electing seats 13 and 14 of the Board But the By-Laws X.9 do no limit the GNSO to those actions:
9. Except as otherwise specified in these Bylaws, Annex A hereto, or the GNSO Operating Procedures, the default threshold to pass a GNSO Council motion or other voting action requires a simple majority vote of each House. The voting thresholds described below shall apply to the following GNSO actions:
This is then followed by the complexity of PDP voting. This indicates that the council is not barred from other activities. They just haven't been specifically assigned. If electing and policy management were the only activities the GNSO Council were permitted, then there would have been no need for this clause. The fact that it exists indicates that the representatives of the SG and the community (i.e. the NCAs) may do things other than those that have specific voting threshholds. While these activities are limited to the GNSO and gTLDs by the nature of ICANN organizational Architecture, there are no limitations put on the actions of the GNSO Council within these boundaries. So, while I do not have evidence of a specific clause that the GNSO Council can help organize other activities according to the simple majority vote of the council, I believe I have shown evidence that the council MAY do more than just manage policy if the GNSO SGs, by a majority, decide to do so. The only things we MUST do are Manage Policy and Elect Board members and a GNSO. Also I would note that: By-Laws x.3.4
4. The GNSO Council is responsible for managing the policy development process of the GNSO.
Does not say: 4. The GNSO Council is ONLY responsible for managing the policy development process of the GNSO and nothing more. Further By-Laws X.5.5 says:
Whenever the Board posts a petition or recommendation for a new Constituency for public comment, the Board shall notify the GNSO Council and the appropriate Stakeholder Group affected and shall consider any response to that notification prior to taking action.
Why would the Board notify the Council of the creation of new Constituencies if it was not the case thatt the council of the GNSO, had a say in the GNSO as an organization. Additionally By-Laws X.3.7 says:
7. The GNSO Council shall select the GNSO Chair for a term the GNSO Council specifies, but not longer than one year.
Note, it says "the GNSO chair," not the "GNSO Council chair." The vice-chairs on the other hand are specifically referred to as "Vice-Chair of the whole of the GNSO Council". So, why do I think the Council as a service group that should serve the GNSO in any way it needs? Because I guess I believe all those elected as volunteer leaders are volunteers in service. So, to my mind, if the representatives of the SGs in the council decide, as determined by the by-laws, that they need for us to take on a task, I see support in the by-laws for us doing so.
thanks! again, sorry about the sluggish reply.
No worries. I do not expect this is a conversation we will resolve anytime soon. The only reason I try to answer quickly is because if I don't, it is likely to get pushed down the stack so far, it may never surface again without a ping and guilt on my part.
mikey
thanks, avri Ps. while looking a various bits of history, I ran into the following http://gnso.icann.org/en/group-activities/inactive/2012/improvements/restruc... http://gnso.icann.org/en/group-activities/inactive/2012/improvements/restruc... Representation
a. All four stakeholder groups must strive to fulfill pre-established objective criteria regarding broadening outreach and deepening participation from a diverse range of participants.
b. All stakeholder groups must have rules and processes in place that make it possible for any and all people and organizations eligible for the stakeholder group to join, participate and be heard regardless of their policy viewpoints.
This is the recommendation that resulted from Report To ICANN Board of Directors From Working Group On GNSO Council Restructuring 25 July 2008. It recommended the structure we have now to the Board, which the Board essentially accepted. This is to some extent, an example that may go against the first principle we agreed on - that the GNSO has no oversight over the GNSO itself. In this case, the sub team of council members did indeed make recommendations with regard to the Stakeholder groups - it not only recommended a reorganization but made recommendations on details internal to those SGs. The more I work on this topic, the more I start to believe that if there is a need for further oversight of the whole GNSO, it would not be inappropriate or outside the bounds on what has gone before, for that to become a GNSO council task. I do not think this level of oversight is currently required, but I am always willing to reconsider. I.e. I may be convincing myself that Point of Agreement 1 is based on weak arguments.