Thanks Justine! Jonathan Zuck Executive Director Innovators Network Foundation www.Innovatorsnetwork.org<http://www.Innovatorsnetwork.org> ________________________________ From: GTLD-WG <gtld-wg-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org> on behalf of Justine Chew <justine.chew@gmail.com> Sent: Tuesday, December 4, 2018 5:27:15 AM To: cpwg@icann.org Subject: [GTLD-WG] [CPWG] Call for feedback on proposed At-Large/ALAC positions to New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Supplemental Initial Report Dear colleagues, Wiki workspace: https://community.icann.org/x/Jh68BQ<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fcommunity.icann.org%2Fx%2FJh68BQ&sa=D&usd=2&usg=AFQjCNEOcNtA8Lh6VaxYmUHsuAR8hnS4gA> Further to my early Nov call for inputs, I have prepared proposed positions / abbreviated responses to the preliminary recommendations, options and questions posed by the Subsequent Procedures PDP WG on the 5 additional topics. These are contained in slides 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 19, 22 and 23 of the updated presentation posted at the wiki workspace. I invite you to share your feedback on these. Please do so either: (1) preferably, by posting on the relevant wiki workspace - if possible, please post inputs corresponding to each of the 5 additional topics in reply to the 5 posts set out on the wiki page; or (2) by replying to this email thread on the CPWG mail list, citing the topic accordingly in your reply. As a final statement is due for submission on 12 December, I would appreciate receiving feedback promptly to allow me to proceed with drafting a proper statement this coming week. Thank you, Justine Chew ----- On Thu, 8 Nov 2018 at 00:26, Justine Chew <justine.chew@gmail.com<mailto:justine.chew@gmail.com>> wrote: Folks, Sorry, Wrong link provided earlier. The correct wiki workspace link is https://community.icann.org/x/Jh68BQ<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fcommunity.icann.org%2Fx%2FJh68BQ&sa=D&usd=2&usg=AFQjCNEOcNtA8Lh6VaxYmUHsuAR8hnS4gA> Cheers, Justine Chew ----- On Thu, 8 Nov 2018 at 00:22, Justine Chew <justine.chew@gmail.com<mailto:justine.chew@gmail.com>> wrote: Dear colleagues, Further to the backgrounder presentation made during the call earlier today (on 7 Nov) on the New gTLD SubPro Supplemental Initial Report (WT 1-4), I now invite you to share your inputs on the 5 additional topics for the CPWG's onward deliberations. Topic 2.1 Auctions: Mechanism of Last Resort Topic 2.2 Private Resolution of Contention Sets (including Private Auctions) Topic 2.3 Role of Application Comment Topic 2.4 Change Request Topic 2.5 Registrar Support for New gTLDs Please do so either: (1) preferably, by posting on the relevant wiki workspace found at https://community.icann.org/x/_wq8BQ<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fcommunity.icann.org%2Fx%2F_wq8BQ&sa=D&usd=2&usg=AFQjCNG5gCcQGZcdDsxx5GWoRQesb66log> - if possible, please post inputs corresponding to each of the 5 additional topics in reply to the 5 posts set out on the wiki page; or (2) by starting an email thread on the CPWG mail list marked with [SubPro SIR] and the topic. Thank you, Justine Chew -----

Dear Christopher, The new slides are posted in the Wiki workspace: https://community.icann.org/x/Jh68BQ <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fcommunity.icann.org%2Fx%2FJh68BQ&...> or your can *click on this link to download the same* <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/96214566/02.%20At-Large%20-...> and thereon please refer to *slides 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 19, 22 and 23* I will leave it to staff to take up with you your request on walk through on posting on the wiki space. If you're not joining the CPWG call today, please feel free to email your further comments to this list or to me bilaterally. Regards, Justine Chew ----- On Wed, 5 Dec 2018 at 03:23, cw@christopherwilkinson.eu < cw@christopherwilkinson.eu> wrote:

Dear Justine:

Thankyou for this update. However, I don’t find responses to the recommendations/questions on the revised slides. Perhaps the new slides have not yet been posted - ?

I would have a few comments and suggestions,. But I have great technical difficulty in posting on the workspace .Perhaps a staff member could walk me through what I am supposed to be doing to achieve that..

Meanwhile, for reference, I attach my original draft responses.

Best regards

Christopher

On 4 Dec 2018, at 11:27, Justine Chew <justine.chew@gmail.com> wrote:

Dear colleagues,

Wiki workspace: https://community.icann.org/x/Jh68BQ <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fcommunity.icann.org%2Fx%2FJh68BQ&...>

Further to my early Nov call for inputs, I have prepared proposed positions / abbreviated responses to the preliminary recommendations, options and questions posed by the Subsequent Procedures PDP WG on the 5 additional topics. These are contained in *slides 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 19, 22 and 23* of the updated presentation posted at the wiki workspace.

I invite you to share your feedback on these. Please do so either:

(1) *preferably*, by posting on the relevant wiki workspace - if possible, please post inputs corresponding to each of the 5 additional topics in reply to the 5 posts set out on the wiki page; or

(2) by replying to this email thread on the CPWG mail list, citing the topic accordingly in your reply.

As a final statement is due for submission on 12 December, I would appreciate receiving feedback promptly to allow me to proceed with drafting a proper statement this coming week.

Thank you,

Justine Chew -----

On Thu, 8 Nov 2018 at 00:26, Justine Chew <justine.chew@gmail.com> wrote:

...

Folks,

Sorry, Wrong link provided earlier.

The correct wiki workspace link is https://community.icann.org/x/Jh68BQ <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fcommunity.icann.org%2Fx%2FJh68BQ&...>

Cheers,

Justine Chew -----

On Thu, 8 Nov 2018 at 00:22, Justine Chew <justine.chew@gmail.com> wrote:

...

Dear colleagues,

Further to the backgrounder presentation made during the call earlier today (on 7 Nov) on the New gTLD SubPro Supplemental Initial Report (WT 1-4), I now invite you to share your inputs on the 5 additional topics for the CPWG's onward deliberations.

Topic 2.1 Auctions: Mechanism of Last Resort Topic 2.2 Private Resolution of Contention Sets (including Private Auctions) Topic 2.3 Role of Application Comment Topic 2.4 Change Request Topic 2.5 Registrar Support for New gTLDs

Please do so either:

(1) *preferably*, by posting on the relevant wiki workspace found at https://community.icann.org/x/_wq8BQ <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fcommunity.icann.org%2Fx%2F_wq8BQ&...> - if possible, please post inputs corresponding to each of the 5 additional topics in reply to the 5 posts set out on the wiki page; or

(2) by starting an email thread on the CPWG mail list marked with [SubPro SIR] and the topic.

Thank you,

Justine Chew -----

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---

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Dear colleagues, on our last CPWG call, Christopher Wilkinson presented his opposition to Auction being used as a mechanism of last resort to resolve contention sets within the Program. The current proposed ALAC response ( https://community.icann.org/x/Jh68BQ ) says: *The ALAC supports the retention of auctions to be conducted by ICANN-appointed auction service providers as a mechanism of last resort to resolve contention sets within the Program in the first instance, with more guidance and resources to be put in place to help applicants get out of contentions sets voluntarily. The ALAC further proposes the ICANN Community explore the introduction of a multiplier-enhanced Vickrey auction in place of the regular highest-bid auction process as the resolution mechanism of last resort. *Multiplier enhanced Vickrey auctions are sealed bid auctions where the applicants benefiting from Applicant Support Program, or Community Priority Evaluation, have their secret bid automatically upgraded by a fixed but capped multiplier (such as factor of 1.25 for example) (eg. such an applicant’s bid of US$400,000 is automatically deemed as US$500,000 when eventually ‘revealed’ in a Vickrey auction) The ALAC response also says: "/The ALAC continues to hold the belief that auctions, by design wherein the highest bid prevails, will naturally favour applicants with access to the greatest financial resources or deepest pockets and by extension, disadvantage less wealthy applicants (such as Applicant Support Program applicants). Whereas it is not always the case that the “best” applicant is the one with the most resources./" Christopher's proposed response says: /2.1.c.1    In general I do not support auctions They favour the parties with the 'deepest pockets'. They also burden the successful applicant with financial liabilities, particularly if the auction has been financed by debt or third party investment. Those additional costs will be passed on to the eventual registrants through fees and charges.// // //It would be better if TLD registries were operated on a not-for-profit basis in the public interest. This would also reduce the financial incentive not to cooperate and to go to a forced auction.// / and /2.1.d.2.1    Agreed. The RFP options should be thoroughly explored and codified. In the case of geographical TLDs the RFP should be undertaken by the public authority or other responsible entity in the geography concerned. The successful applicant's registry should be incorporated in that jurisdiction./ Thus Christopher favours a RFP process to choose the winner of a contention set. With only a few days to go until this Statement is frozen (19th Dec), we need to reach a consensus on this - as I have heard several people mention they do not want auctions, should a minority Statement be included in response to this question? Let's please discuss this topic now. Kindest regards, Olivier **

Thanks for this Olivier. All, If I could just pose a reminder, in my positions presentation I did highlight more than once the point about auctions being unfair to applicants without deep pockets -- and to bring a long story short, I attempted to meld a few aspects together by taking the earlier consensus for Vickrey auction to help discourage attempts at speculative applications and suggesting the addition of the multiplier feature intended to help to level the playing field for less wealthy applicants (namely ASP and CPE applications). Note also that because some members felt that a criteria-based Request for Proposal (RFP) process would necessarily involved value judgment being made by evaluators (whoever they may be) which is in practice difficult to implement - CPE from 2012 as the case in point - so they thought the Vickrey auction option might lead to less 'dubious' results. And finally, in the draft statement we have advocated that greater effort should be put into guiding and facilitating resolution of contention sets through (permissible) voluntary resolution mechanisms (again criteria proposed to be more fully explored) so as to minimize the number of contention sets going through to auction (ie. Vickrey auction). So, perhaps I should have started off with that .... as a proposed revision of the blue text paragraph which Olivier highlighted (which was meant to act of a summary of the ensuing paragraphs of explanation) .... *The ALAC proposes that** the ICANN Community explore the introduction of a multiplier-enhanced Vickrey auction in place of the regular highest-bid auction process as the resolution mechanism of last resort** but emphasizes that more guidance and resources to be put in place to help applicants get out of contentions sets voluntarily in order to avoid going through to auctions for resolution. In the event a Vickrey auction is to proceed, then it should be **conducted by ICANN-appointed auction service providers.* I can re-write the draft statement subject to the outcome of this discussion. Thank you. Justine ----- On Fri, 14 Dec 2018 at 17:11, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:

Hello Olivier,

Thanks for bringing this to our attention. I share the concern of CW but I think the proposed text may be an incomplete solution.

Unless RFP is an acronym with different meaning within ICANN, if it means Request For Proposal then it needs to be clear how the selection will be done between all submitted RFPs as I think that is the difficult part. It may be good to hear details/summary of how CW envisage this happening.

Regards

Sent from my mobile Kindly excuse brevity and typos

On Fri, 14 Dec 2018, 09:45 Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com wrote:

...

Dear colleagues,

on our last CPWG call, Christopher Wilkinson presented his opposition to Auction being used as a mechanism of last resort to resolve contention sets within the Program.

The current proposed ALAC response ( https://community.icann.org/x/Jh68BQ ) says:

*The ALAC supports the retention of auctions to be conducted by ICANN-appointed auction service providers as a mechanism of last resort to resolve contention sets within the Program in the first instance, with more guidance and resources to be put in place to help applicants get out of contentions sets voluntarily. The ALAC further proposes the ICANN Community explore the introduction of a multiplier-enhanced Vickrey auction in place of the regular highest-bid auction process as the resolution mechanism of last resort. *Multiplier enhanced Vickrey auctions are sealed bid auctions where the applicants benefiting from Applicant Support Program, or Community Priority Evaluation, have their secret bid automatically upgraded by a fixed but capped multiplier (such as factor of 1.25 for example) (eg. such an applicant’s bid of US$400,000 is automatically deemed as US$500,000 when eventually ‘revealed’ in a Vickrey auction)

The ALAC response also says: "*The ALAC continues to hold the belief that auctions, by design wherein the highest bid prevails, will naturally favour applicants with access to the greatest financial resources or deepest pockets and by extension, disadvantage less wealthy applicants (such as Applicant Support Program applicants). Whereas it is not always the case that the “best” applicant is the one with the most resources.*"

Christopher's proposed response says:

*2.1.c.1 In general I do not support auctions They favour the parties with the 'deepest pockets'. They also burden the successful applicant with financial liabilities, particularly if the auction has been financed by debt or third party investment. Those additional costs will be passed on to the eventual registrants through fees and charges.*

*It would be better if TLD registries were operated on a not-for-profit basis in the public interest. This would also reduce the financial incentive not to cooperate and to go to a forced auction.*

and

*2.1.d.2.1 Agreed. The RFP options should be thoroughly explored and codified. In the case of geographical TLDs the RFP should be undertaken by the public authority or other responsible entity in the geography concerned. The successful applicant's registry should be incorporated in that jurisdiction.*

Thus Christopher favours a RFP process to choose the winner of a contention set.

With only a few days to go until this Statement is frozen (19th Dec), we need to reach a consensus on this - as I have heard several people mention they do not want auctions, should a minority Statement be included in response to this question? Let's please discuss this topic now.

Kindest regards,

Olivier

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Tijani, While I share your resentment against ICANN auctions – I do not see that “the richest will win”. There have been auctions where multi-billion corporations lost. Look at it from other perspectives: * Those who do NOT have access to financial resources will lose! * Those whose business model allows only a certain investment will lose (even IF they could bring up the cash – at some point the business model doesn’t carry it anymore). * In the end it is those who are planning to RUTHLESSLY exploit the new namespace (the new gTLD) AND have access to money will win! Those who do not care about the registrants and the Internet users, those who sell “premium domain names” to the “highest bidder”: not to the entity that will use it best! * What the ICANN community wants is a balanced, longtail solution based, sustainable namespace management! That implies: lower profits! It’s like with a wood: you can either care about the nature, and the wellbeing of animals and the wood; or you radically deforest and “make money”. Someone who auctions of a forest and then deforests it can still make money – but the forest doesn’t like it! The animals in the forest will suffer. Nature suffers. But the worst about the ICANN auction is: The future registrants are being forced to pay off a “tax” that was artificially assigned by ICANN: The “auction tax” so to speak. And what do they get in return? NOTHING! These amounts could be used to market the TLD – to create outreach, to foster some gTLD “brand”-recognition. In the case of “non-profit” gTLDs (I have launched a non-profit gTLD applicant entity for the 2020 round over a year ago already) it gets even WORSE: As a non-profit EVERY SINGLE CENT that is going into auction will be “taken” from the target community; one way or other. It’s not that your “profits” are diminished: there are no profits anyways. Non-profit, public-benefit, community applicants should be exempt from the auction. And note that most community applicants did NOT win the CPE! Thanks, Alexander Schubert (.berlin and .gay) From: GTLD-WG [mailto:gtld-wg-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org] On Behalf Of Tijani BEN JEMAA Sent: Friday, December 14, 2018 1:11 PM To: Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com> Cc: cpwg@icann.org; cw@christopherwilkinson.eu Subject: Re: [GTLD-WG] [CPWG] Auctions // At-Large/ALAC positions to New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Supplemental Initial Report Yes Olivier, we need to discuss it. I have always been against the auction as a mean for contention resolution. The reason is that the winner would be the richest. I remember in Mexico (2009) I said any other mean will be better even if it is a random draw because in this case rich and poor people will be on the same footing. The only advantage of the auction option is that money will enter ICANN account. As Seun rightly noticed, even an RFP would need evaluation, and if there is a tie (both applicants have equal evaluation score), we find ourselves in the same situation. I would prefer that Community application have priority, and more evidently, applications that passed the Applicant Support program evaluation, and thus, they don’t compete with the other applicants in case of contention. Now, when we have sting contention between 2 Community applications (or 2 Supported applications), or between a community application and a supported one, we will be in a tied situation too. To solve all these tied situations, we may find a criterion such as the application coming from the most underserved region wins or any other criterion. In case there is none, we may proceed to a random draw. This is what I prefer, but I know it’s not easy to implement. I find Justine proposal a way to mitigate the harm a little bit, but it is far from eliminating it. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - Tijani BEN JEMAA Executive Director Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) Phone: +216 98 330 114 +216 52 385 114 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - Le 14 déc. 2018 à 09:45, Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com <mailto:ocl@gih.com> > a écrit : 2.1.c.1 In general I do not support auctions They favour the parties with the 'deepest pockets'. They also burden the successful applicant with financial liabilities, particularly if the auction has been financed by debt or third party investment. Those additional costs will be passed on to the eventual registrants through fees and charges. It would be better if TLD registries were operated on a not-for-profit basis in the public interest. This would also reduce the financial incentive not to cooperate and to go to a forced auction. and 2.1.d.2.1 Agreed. The RFP options should be thoroughly explored and codified. In the case of geographical TLDs the RFP should be undertaken by the public authority or other responsible entity in the geography concerned. The successful applicant's registry should be incorporated in that jurisdiction.

Sebastien, I am afraid it will be all “gamed”: * “New Applicant”? How do we know an applicant is “new”? Every SINGLE application in the next round will be submitted via unique applicant entity (freshly minted legal entity): people have learned THAT much from the last round. So the entity is “new” anyways. How do we determine “new”? New “officers”? * Region? Like: “ICANN Region”? You can get a shell company in ANY ICANN region. So what exactly do we yield here? * Language? How does that help to solve contention sets? It’s several applicant entities and ONE string. Doesn’t matter in what language that string is. The contention set is existing anyways. Or do you mean that if an African company applies for “.weed” and specifies it would mean an African word: they would be preferred? GAMING: These ideas invite gaming. And please do not think that only “bad actors” will be gaming. Entities with “shareholder value” MUST try to use all “legal ways” to “maximize the profits”: and if a simply offshore registration can win an application; they do not see it as “gaming”, but as “clever management decision”. Regarding private contention sets: I think we shouldn’t deny them auctions; if all contention set members agree to it. However: if a non-profit, public-benefit doesn’t want to enter into a private auction (or ANY auction for that matter): they can simply deny to do so – and ICANN will have to find a way to determine who is the winner! And yes I agree: In the relatively few cases where it isn’t “for profit portfolio applicants” that are squaring each other off in private auctions; why not having the ICANN community involved. Thanks, Alexander From: GTLD-WG [mailto:gtld-wg-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org] On Behalf Of Sebastien Bachollet Sent: Saturday, December 15, 2018 12:21 AM To: CPWG <cpwg@icann.org> Subject: Re: [GTLD-WG] [CPWG] Auctions // At-Large/ALAC positions to New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Supplemental Initial Report Hello, Thanks for this exchange, useful and interesting. When we talk about big pocket, it may be not the biggest but if it is not it jeopardizes the project of the winer. It is why we need to avoid any type of auction at any level (private or run by ICANN). Priority for specific type of applicants is important. Insuring or enhancing diversity must be taken into account (new applicant, region with less applicants, language…). Beauty contest was to be avoided but it has work not to badly in 2000 and 2004 round. If needed I support Tijani idea around draw. All the best SeB Le 14 déc. 2018 à 20:35, Alexander Schubert <alexander@schubert.berlin <mailto:alexander@schubert.berlin> > a écrit : Tijani, While I share your resentment against ICANN auctions – I do not see that “the richest will win”. There have been auctions where multi-billion corporations lost. Look at it from other perspectives: * Those who do NOT have access to financial resources will lose! * Those whose business model allows only a certain investment will lose (even IF they could bring up the cash – at some point the business model doesn’t carry it anymore). * In the end it is those who are planning to RUTHLESSLY exploit the new namespace (the new gTLD) AND have access to money will win! Those who do not care about the registrants and the Internet users, those who sell “premium domain names” to the “highest bidder”: not to the entity that will use it best! * What the ICANN community wants is a balanced, longtail solution based, sustainable namespace management! That implies: lower profits! It’s like with a wood: you can either care about the nature, and the wellbeing of animals and the wood; or you radically deforest and “make money”. Someone who auctions of a forest and then deforests it can still make money – but the forest doesn’t like it! The animals in the forest will suffer. Nature suffers. But the worst about the ICANN auction is: The future registrants are being forced to pay off a “tax” that was artificially assigned by ICANN: The “auction tax” so to speak. And what do they get in return? NOTHING! These amounts could be used to market the TLD – to create outreach, to foster some gTLD “brand”-recognition. In the case of “non-profit” gTLDs (I have launched a non-profit gTLD applicant entity for the 2020 round over a year ago already) it gets even WORSE: As a non-profit EVERY SINGLE CENT that is going into auction will be “taken” from the target community; one way or other. It’s not that your “profits” are diminished: there are no profits anyways. Non-profit, public-benefit, community applicants should be exempt from the auction. And note that most community applicants did NOT win the CPE! Thanks, Alexander Schubert (.berlin and .gay) From: GTLD-WG [mailto:gtld-wg-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org] On Behalf Of Tijani BEN JEMAA Sent: Friday, December 14, 2018 1:11 PM To: Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com <mailto:ocl@gih.com> > Cc: cpwg@icann.org <mailto:cpwg@icann.org> ; cw@christopherwilkinson.eu <mailto:cw@christopherwilkinson.eu> Subject: Re: [GTLD-WG] [CPWG] Auctions // At-Large/ALAC positions to New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Supplemental Initial Report Yes Olivier, we need to discuss it. I have always been against the auction as a mean for contention resolution. The reason is that the winner would be the richest. I remember in Mexico (2009) I said any other mean will be better even if it is a random draw because in this case rich and poor people will be on the same footing. The only advantage of the auction option is that money will enter ICANN account. As Seun rightly noticed, even an RFP would need evaluation, and if there is a tie (both applicants have equal evaluation score), we find ourselves in the same situation. I would prefer that Community application have priority, and more evidently, applications that passed the Applicant Support program evaluation, and thus, they don’t compete with the other applicants in case of contention. Now, when we have sting contention between 2 Community applications (or 2 Supported applications), or between a community application and a supported one, we will be in a tied situation too. To solve all these tied situations, we may find a criterion such as the application coming from the most underserved region wins or any other criterion. In case there is none, we may proceed to a random draw. This is what I prefer, but I know it’s not easy to implement. I find Justine proposal a way to mitigate the harm a little bit, but it is far from eliminating it. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tijani BEN JEMAA Executive Director Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) Phone: +216 98 330 114 +216 52 385 114 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Le 14 déc. 2018 à 09:45, Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com <mailto:ocl@gih.com> > a écrit : 2.1.c.1 In general I do not support auctions They favour the parties with the 'deepest pockets'. They also burden the successful applicant with financial liabilities, particularly if the auction has been financed by debt or third party investment. Those additional costs will be passed on to the eventual registrants through fees and charges. It would be better if TLD registries were operated on a not-for-profit basis in the public interest. This would also reduce the financial incentive not to cooperate and to go to a forced auction. and 2.1.d.2.1 Agreed. The RFP options should be thoroughly explored and codified. In the case of geographical TLDs the RFP should be undertaken by the public authority or other responsible entity in the geography concerned. The successful applicant's registry should be incorporated in that jurisdiction. _______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list CPWG@icann.org <mailto:CPWG@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cpwg _______________________________________________ GTLD-WG mailing list GTLD-WG@atlarge-lists.icann.org <mailto:GTLD-WG@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gtld-wg Working Group direct URL: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/New+GTLDs

Hi all. My opinion is that the choice of contention resolution methodology depends on the purpose of the introduction of new gTLDs. For instance, if the purpose is to maximise the circulation of money, the auction should be the winner. If the purpose is to address the underserved regions or communities, we should design a measure of “underservedness” and allocate according to these scores. And so on. The problem is that, so far, I do not understand what is the real purpose of a next round. Once upon a time, I was in strong support of new gTLDs for breaking a monopoly, but since this has happened only too late, that objective has failed a full achievement. Later on, I came to the conclusion that one major area where new TLDs could really be a game changer was IDN. However, for the reasons that we all know, the use of IDNs is not up to the expectations - and the introduction of new TLDs before we have completely solved universal acceptance limitations is not going to solve this problem. So, frankly, not having a clue on what is the primary purpose of the new round, it is difficult for me to say what would be the ideal tie breaker algorithm. Cheers, Roberto On 14.12.2018, at 23:20, Sebastien Bachollet <sebicann@bachollet.fr<mailto:sebicann@bachollet.fr>> wrote: Hello, Thanks for this exchange, useful and interesting. When we talk about big pocket, it may be not the biggest but if it is not it jeopardizes the project of the winer. It is why we need to avoid any type of auction at any level (private or run by ICANN). Priority for specific type of applicants is important. Insuring or enhancing diversity must be taken into account (new applicant, region with less applicants, language…). Beauty contest was to be avoided but it has work not to badly in 2000 and 2004 round. If needed I support Tijani idea around draw. All the best SeB Le 14 déc. 2018 à 20:35, Alexander Schubert <alexander@schubert.berlin<mailto:alexander@schubert.berlin>> a écrit : Tijani, While I share your resentment against ICANN auctions – I do not see that “the richest will win”. There have been auctions where multi-billion corporations lost. Look at it from other perspectives: • Those who do NOT have access to financial resources will lose! • Those whose business model allows only a certain investment will lose (even IF they could bring up the cash – at some point the business model doesn’t carry it anymore). • In the end it is those who are planning to RUTHLESSLY exploit the new namespace (the new gTLD) AND have access to money will win! Those who do not care about the registrants and the Internet users, those who sell “premium domain names” to the “highest bidder”: not to the entity that will use it best! • What the ICANN community wants is a balanced, longtail solution based, sustainable namespace management! That implies: lower profits! It’s like with a wood: you can either care about the nature, and the wellbeing of animals and the wood; or you radically deforest and “make money”. Someone who auctions of a forest and then deforests it can still make money – but the forest doesn’t like it! The animals in the forest will suffer. Nature suffers. But the worst about the ICANN auction is: The future registrants are being forced to pay off a “tax” that was artificially assigned by ICANN: The “auction tax” so to speak. And what do they get in return? NOTHING! These amounts could be used to market the TLD – to create outreach, to foster some gTLD “brand”-recognition. In the case of “non-profit” gTLDs (I have launched a non-profit gTLD applicant entity for the 2020 round over a year ago already) it gets even WORSE: As a non-profit EVERY SINGLE CENT that is going into auction will be “taken” from the target community; one way or other. It’s not that your “profits” are diminished: there are no profits anyways. Non-profit, public-benefit, community applicants should be exempt from the auction. And note that most community applicants did NOT win the CPE! Thanks, Alexander Schubert (.berlin and .gay) From: GTLD-WG [mailto:gtld-wg-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org] On Behalf Of Tijani BEN JEMAA Sent: Friday, December 14, 2018 1:11 PM To: Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> Cc: cpwg@icann.org<mailto:cpwg@icann.org>; cw@christopherwilkinson.eu<mailto:cw@christopherwilkinson.eu> Subject: Re: [GTLD-WG] [CPWG] Auctions // At-Large/ALAC positions to New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Supplemental Initial Report Yes Olivier, we need to discuss it. I have always been against the auction as a mean for contention resolution. The reason is that the winner would be the richest. I remember in Mexico (2009) I said any other mean will be better even if it is a random draw because in this case rich and poor people will be on the same footing. The only advantage of the auction option is that money will enter ICANN account. As Seun rightly noticed, even an RFP would need evaluation, and if there is a tie (both applicants have equal evaluation score), we find ourselves in the same situation. I would prefer that Community application have priority, and more evidently, applications that passed the Applicant Support program evaluation, and thus, they don’t compete with the other applicants in case of contention. Now, when we have sting contention between 2 Community applications (or 2 Supported applications), or between a community application and a supported one, we will be in a tied situation too. To solve all these tied situations, we may find a criterion such as the application coming from the most underserved region wins or any other criterion. In case there is none, we may proceed to a random draw. This is what I prefer, but I know it’s not easy to implement. I find Justine proposal a way to mitigate the harm a little bit, but it is far from eliminating it. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tijani BEN JEMAA Executive Director Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) Phone: +216 98 330 114 +216 52 385 114 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Le 14 déc. 2018 à 09:45, Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> a écrit : 2.1.c.1 In general I do not support auctions They favour the parties with the 'deepest pockets'. They also burden the successful applicant with financial liabilities, particularly if the auction has been financed by debt or third party investment. Those additional costs will be passed on to the eventual registrants through fees and charges. It would be better if TLD registries were operated on a not-for-profit basis in the public interest. This would also reduce the financial incentive not to cooperate and to go to a forced auction. and 2.1.d.2.1 Agreed. The RFP options should be thoroughly explored and codified. In the case of geographical TLDs the RFP should be undertaken by the public authority or other responsible entity in the geography concerned. The successful applicant's registry should be incorporated in that jurisdiction. _______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list CPWG@icann.org<mailto:CPWG@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cpwg _______________________________________________ GTLD-WG mailing list GTLD-WG@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gtld-wg Working Group direct URL: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/New+GTLDs _______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list CPWG@icann.org<mailto:CPWG@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cpwg _______________________________________________ GTLD-WG mailing list GTLD-WG@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:GTLD-WG@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gtld-wg Working Group direct URL: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/New+GTLDs

There is enough demand, even from TLDs that ALAC would likely support, to proceed. And it is unlikely we could stop the train even if we wanted to. So this question for us is: Is there enough benefit for USERS to put additional focus on this particular issue, and if there is, is it one we can win. I would suggest that for most of the TLDs that went to auction, we would have had an interest in only a small percentage. So perhaps this is not sufficiently a "user" issue for us to put more time into it. On whether we could win if we really favoured an RFP process (which as I said before I do not), I think it is too much like a "beauty contest" which ICANN will definitely not go into again after the results of the rounds earlier in the millennium. Alan At 16/12/2018 07:02 PM, Holly Raiche wrote: Thanks Roberto I think that is the issue that we are really raising when many ALAC people (including me) asked WHY are we proceeding at all. In a sense, how new gTLDs are allocated are a subset of that larger question. And, as we discussed on the last ALAC call, the difficulty with the new form for responding to public comments is that responses are channeled - and to ask the larger questions is to risk having the response thrown into the bin because it doesn’t fit within the allocated slots for responses. That said, can ALAC actually stop the next ‘round’ if and when there is one? If not, can we try to maximize benefits to end users - or at least mitigate harm? I agree, IDNs were the big benefit - we thought. And maybe better support for underserved regions is another plus. And maybe trying to ameliorate a straight auction process - as Justine was arguing for - is the right direction. But maybe we should also look as well at other rules surrounding the use of any new gTLD - what should we be supporting on the Consumer Trust outcomes? Back to Jonathan - and let’s take care on the fights we pick Holly On Dec 17, 2018, at 10:33 AM, Roberto Gaetano < roberto_gaetano@hotmail.com<mailto:roberto_gaetano@hotmail.com>> wrote: Hi all. My opinion is that the choice of contention resolution methodology depends on the purpose of the introduction of new gTLDs. For instance, if the purpose is to maximise the circulation of money, the auction should be the winner. If the purpose is to address the underserved regions or communities, we should design a measure of “underservedness” and allocate according to these scores. And so on. The problem is that, so far, I do not understand what is the real purpose of a next round. Once upon a time, I was in strong support of new gTLDs for breaking a monopoly, but since this has happened only too late, that objective has failed a full achievement. Later on, I came to the conclusion that one major area where new TLDs could really be a game changer was IDN. However, for the reasons that we all know, the use of IDNs is not up to the expectations - and the introduction of new TLDs before we have completely solved universal acceptance limitations is not going to solve this problem. So, frankly, not having a clue on what is the primary purpose of the new round, it is difficult for me to say what would be the ideal tie breaker algorithm. Cheers, Roberto On 14.12.2018, at 23:20, Sebastien Bachollet <sebicann@bachollet.fr<mailto:sebicann@bachollet.fr>> wrote: Hello, Thanks for this exchange, useful and interesting. When we talk about big pocket, it may be not the biggest but if it is not it jeopardizes the project of the winer. It is why we need to avoid any type of auction at any level (private or run by ICANN). Priority for specific type of applicants is important. Insuring or enhancing diversity must be taken into account (new applicant, region with less applicants, language�). Beauty contest was to be avoided but it has work not to badly in 2000 and 2004 round. If needed I support Tijani idea around draw. All the best SeB Le 14 déc. 2018 � 20:35, Alexander Schubert < alexander@schubert.berlin<mailto:alexander@schubert.berlin>> a écrit : Tijani, While I share your resentment against ICANN auctions � I do not see that “the richest will win”. There have been auctions where multi-billion corporations lost. Look at it from other perspectives: · Those who do NOT have access to financial resources will lose! · Those whose business model allows only a certain investment will lose (even IF they could bring up the cash � at some point the business model doessn’t carry it anymore). · In the end it is those who are planning to RUTHLESSLY exploit the new namespace (the new gTLD) AND have access to money will win! Those who do not care about the registrants and the Internet users, those who sell “premium domain names” to the “highest bidder”: not to the entity that will use it best! · What the ICANN community wants is a balanced, longtail solution based, sustainable namespace management! That implies: lower profits! It’s like with a wood: you can either care about the nature, and the wellbeing of animals and the wood; or you radically deforest and “make money”. Someone who auctions of a forest and then deforests it can still make money � but the forest doesn’�t like it! The animals in the forest will suffer. Nature suffers. But the worst about the ICANN auction is: The future registrants are being forced to pay off a “tax” that was artificially assigned by ICANN: The “auction tax” so to speak. And what do they get in return? NOTHING! These amounts could be used to market the TLD � to create outreach, to foster some gTLD “brand”--recognition. In the case of “non-profit” gTLDs (I have launched a non-profit gTLD applicant entity for the 2020 round over a year ago already) it gets even WORSE: As a non-profit EVERY SINGLE CENT that is going into auction will be “taken” from the target community; one way or other. It’s not that your “profits” are diminished: there are no profits anyways. Non-profit, public-benefit, community applicants should be exempt from the auction. And note that most community applicants did NOT win the CPE! Thanks, Alexander Schubert (.berlin and .gay) From: GTLD-WG [ mailto:gtld-wg-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org] On Behalf Of Tijani BEN JEMAA Sent: Friday, December 14, 2018 1:11 PM To: Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> Cc: cpwg@icann.org<mailto:cpwg@icann.org>; cw@christopherwilkinson.eu<mailto:cw@christopherwilkinson.eu> Subject: Re: [GTLD-WG] [CPWG] Auctions // At-Large/ALAC positions to New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Supplemental Initial Report Yes Olivier, we need to discuss it. I have always been against the auction as a mean for contention resolution. The reason is that the winner would be the richest. I remember in Mexico (2009) I said any other mean will be better even if it is a random draw because in this case rich and poor people will be on the same footing. The only advantage of the auction option is that money will enter ICANN account. As Seun rightly noticed, even an RFP would need evaluation, and if there is a tie (both applicants have equal evaluation score), we find ourselves in the same situation. I would prefer that Community application have priority, and more evidently, applications that passed the Applicant Support program evaluation, and thus, they don’t compete with the other applicants in case of contention. Now, when we have sting contention between 2 Community applications (or 2 Supported applications), or between a community application and a supported one, we will be in a tied situation too. To solve all these tied situations, we may find a criterion such as the application coming from the most underserved region wins or any other criterion. In case there is none, we may proceed to a random draw. This is what I prefer, but I know it’s not easy to implement. I find Justine proposal a way to mitigate the harm a little bit, but it is far from eliminating it. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tijani BEN JEMAA Executive Director Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI) Phone: +216 98 330 114 +216 52 385 114 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Le 14 déc. 2018 � 09:45, Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com<mailto:ocl@gih.com>> a écrit : 2.1.c.1 In general I do not support auctions They favour the parties with the 'deepest pockets'. They also burden the successful applicant with financial liabilities, particularly if the auction has been financed by debt or third party investment. Those additional costs will be passed on to the eventual registrants through fees and charges. It would be better if TLD registries were operated on a not-for-profit basis in the public interest. This would also reduce the financial incentive not to cooperate and to go to a forced auction. and 2.1.d.2.1 Agreed. The RFP options should be thoroughly explored and codified. In the case of geographical TLDs the RFP should be undertaken by the public authority or other responsible entity in the geography concerned. The successful applicant's registry should be incorporated in that jurisdiction. _______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list CPWG@icann.org<mailto:CPWG@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cpwg _______________________________________________ GTLD-WG mailing list GTLD-WG@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:GTLD-WG@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gtld-wg Working Group direct URL: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/New+GTLDs _______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list CPWG@icann.org<mailto:CPWG@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cpwg _______________________________________________ GTLD-WG mailing list GTLD-WG@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:GTLD-WG@atlarge-lists.icann.org> https://atlarge-lists.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gtld-wg Working Group direct URL: https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/New+GTLDs _______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list CPWG@icann.org<mailto:CPWG@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cpwg _______________________________________________ registration-issues-wg mailing list registration-issues-wg@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/registration-issues-wg _______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list CPWG@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cpwg _______________________________________________ registration-issues-wg mailing list registration-issues-wg@atlarge-lists.icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/registration-issues-wg

Christopher: Although I am not a fan of the idea of an auction of any type, I am warming to the idea that this might be the most feasible alternative. Of the other candidate solutions, the best would probably be the Request for Proposal (RFP) route. This would answer the one question that auctions are weakest on - how is this applicant qualified to operate this particular TLD? Having said that, Requests for Proposal would need to be quite carefully crafted. Criteria for selection of an applicant would need to be carefully and specifically described in order to measure the applicant against the purpose of the new TLD. This is not easy and, in fact, can be expensive. Collection and evaluation of the responses, which is going to involve carefully measuring the response against the RFP's criteria to find “the best fit” .is another effort that would need to be considered and costed out. Part of that cost, by the way, is the time required to develop the RFP, collect the responses and evaluate them – all of which contribute to the length of time needed to make a decision. My own experience suggests that these costs would need to be examined and compared to the cost of an auction of whatever type. Gordon Chillcott Greater Toronto Area Linux Users Group On Wed, 2018-12-12 at 21:28 +0100, cw@christopherwilkinson.eu wrote:

Pour memoire

CW

...

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Oops … 2018 Cw

On 15 Dec 2018, at 14:54, cw@christopherwilkinson.eu wrote:

my original paper dated 8 November 2018

I think we really need to choose our battles in this one and that doesn't include changing the whole program over... Jonathan Zuck Executive Director Innovators Network Foundation www.Innovatorsnetwork.org<http://www.Innovatorsnetwork.org> ________________________________ From: GTLD-WG <gtld-wg-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org> on behalf of Alexander Schubert <alexander@schubert.berlin> Sent: Sunday, December 16, 2018 5:37:38 PM To: cpwg@icann.org Subject: Re: [GTLD-WG] [CPWG] Fwd: [registration-issues-wg] Call for feedback on proposed At-Large/ALAC positions to New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Supplemental Initial Report Hi, To that point (RFP-type of solution): It seems that in the OVERWHELMING MAJORITY of cases it has been "portfolio applicants" squaring off against each other; and they just wanted a "fair compensation" for "giving up their asset". All of them are the same "good" or "bad": they make the TLD available via registrar channel. Only a very small percentage of contention sets ended up at the ICANN last resort love-fest. So I think these few cases could be resolved in a RFP style way....... The question is: Even if ALAC is in agreement with such stipulation; how to convince the rest of ICANN? Thanks, Alexander -----Original Message----- From: GTLD-WG [mailto:gtld-wg-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org] On Behalf Of Gordon Chillcott Sent: Friday, December 14, 2018 11:16 PM To: cw@christopherwilkinson.eu Cc: cpwg@icann.org Subject: Re: [GTLD-WG] [CPWG] Fwd: [registration-issues-wg] Call for feedback on proposed At-Large/ALAC positions to New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Supplemental Initial Report Christopher: Although I am not a fan of the idea of an auction of any type, I am warming to the idea that this might be the most feasible alternative. Of the other candidate solutions, the best would probably be the Request for Proposal (RFP) route. This would answer the one question that auctions are weakest on - how is this applicant qualified to operate this particular TLD? Having said that, Requests for Proposal would need to be quite carefully crafted. Criteria for selection of an applicant would need to be carefully and specifically described in order to measure the applicant against the purpose of the new TLD. This is not easy and, in fact, can be expensive. Collection and evaluation of the responses, which is going to involve carefully measuring the response against the RFP's criteria to find “the best fit” .is another effort that would need to be considered and costed out. Part of that cost, by the way, is the time required to develop the RFP, collect the responses and evaluate them – all of which contribute to the length of time needed to make a decision. My own experience suggests that these costs would need to be examined and compared to the cost of an auction of whatever type. Gordon Chillcott Greater Toronto Area Linux Users Group On Wed, 2018-12-12 at 21:28 +0100, cw@christopherwilkinson.eu wrote:

Pour memoire

CW

...

_______________________________________________ CPWG mailing list CPWG@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cpwg

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I also think it is now too late to throw this one into the package -- too many loose ends we haven't considered. Marita On 12/16/2018 6:31 PM, Holly Raiche wrote:

I’m afraid I am with Jonathan and Alan on this one.  Have we really worked through what an RFP would look like/be administered?  Maybe a bold statement looks terrific, but Justine has spent a lot of time and effort working through how a process could be modified to accommodate our concerns (well done Justine) - and as Alan points out, have we really tested an RFP regime enough - against the benefits to the end user - such that we are confident in its benefits?

Holly

...

On Dec 17, 2018, at 9:52 AM, Jonathan Zuck <JZuck@innovatorsnetwork.org <mailto:JZuck@innovatorsnetwork.org>> wrote:

I think we really need to choose our battles in this one and that doesn't include changing the whole program over...

Jonathan Zuck Executive Director Innovators Network Foundation www.Innovatorsnetwork.org <http://www.innovatorsnetwork.org/>

------------------------------------------------------------------------ *From:*GTLD-WG <gtld-wg-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org <mailto:gtld-wg-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org>> on behalf of Alexander Schubert <alexander@schubert.berlin <mailto:alexander@schubert.berlin>> *Sent:*Sunday, December 16, 2018 5:37:38 PM *To:*cpwg@icann.org <mailto:cpwg@icann.org> *Subject:*Re: [GTLD-WG] [CPWG] Fwd: [registration-issues-wg] Call for feedback on proposed At-Large/ALAC positions to New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Supplemental Initial Report Hi,

To that point (RFP-type of solution):

It seems that in the OVERWHELMING MAJORITY of cases it has been "portfolio applicants" squaring off against each other; and they just wanted a "fair compensation" for "giving up their asset". All of them are the same "good" or "bad": they make the TLD available via registrar channel.

Only a very small percentage of contention sets ended up at the ICANN last resort love-fest. So I think these few cases could be resolved in a RFP style way.......

The question is: Even if ALAC is in agreement with such stipulation; how to convince the rest of ICANN?

Thanks,

Alexander

-----Original Message----- From: GTLD-WG [mailto:gtld-wg-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org] On Behalf Of Gordon Chillcott Sent: Friday, December 14, 2018 11:16 PM To:cw@christopherwilkinson.eu <mailto:cw@christopherwilkinson.eu> Cc:cpwg@icann.org <mailto:cpwg@icann.org> Subject: Re: [GTLD-WG] [CPWG] Fwd: [registration-issues-wg] Call for feedback on proposed At-Large/ALAC positions to New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Supplemental Initial Report

Christopher:

Although I am not a fan of the idea of an auction of any type, I am warming to the idea that this might be the most feasible alternative.

Of the other candidate solutions, the best would probably be the Request for Proposal (RFP) route. This would answer the one question that auctions are weakest on - how is this applicant qualified to operate this particular TLD?

Having said that, Requests for Proposal would need to be quite carefully crafted.      Criteria for selection of an applicant would need to be carefully and specifically described in order to measure the applicant against the purpose of the new TLD.  This is not easy and, in fact, can be expensive.

Collection and evaluation of the responses, which is going to involve carefully measuring the response against the RFP's  criteria to find “the best fit”   .is another effort that  would need to be considered and costed out.

Part of that cost, by the way, is the time required to develop the RFP, collect the responses and evaluate them – all of which contribute to the length of time needed to make a decision.

My own experience suggests that these costs would need to be examined and compared to the cost of an auction of whatever type.

Gordon Chillcott Greater Toronto Area Linux Users Group

On Wed, 2018-12-12 at 21:28 +0100,cw@christopherwilkinson.eu <mailto:cw@christopherwilkinson.eu>wrote:

...

Pour memoire

CW

...

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Working Group direct URL:https://community.icann.org/display/atlarge/New+GTLDs

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I think we need to be very careful with the notion that “a lot of work was put into the comment so we shouldn’t change it.” That’s a slippery slope that I believe even Justine in this case would prefer to avoid. That said, we’ve had a pretty full throated discussion of CW’s proposal and did not reach a level of support that would justify a call for consensus. Justine’s draft DOES condemn auctions for the flaws that Christopher identifies but we also have to deal with the reality that rich entities have a lot of ways to win so we need to focus on the edge cases we care about and maximize protections in those cases, such applications from underserved regions and CPEs. Truthfully, as Alan and Alexander stated, in MOST cases there will not even be a clear winner from a public interest standpoint so a formally objective process will be replaced by a horrendously political subjective one to no real end. We really don’t want some panel discussing whether .Photography should go to Donuts or Affilias. However, I continue to believe that the Vickrey auction (as the method of last resort) has the potential at least to address some of the most egregious behavior from the 2012 round that is likely to expand in future rounds. While we would be alone in trying to throw out auctions altogether, we have allies and leverage in efforts to decrease the incentives to speculate and game the system. I suggest we focus hard on those opportunities and on underserved regions and CPEs and not fold so easily as Carlton suggests took place last time. Just some thoughts. J From: Maureen Hilyard <maureen.hilyard@gmail.com> Date: Sunday, December 16, 2018 at 9:05 PM To: Marita Moll <mmoll@ca.inter.net> Cc: Holly Raiche <h.raiche@internode.on.net>, Jonathan Zuck <JZuck@innovatorsnetwork.org>, "alexander@schubert.berlin" <alexander@schubert.berlin>, "cpwg@icann.org" <cpwg@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CPWG] [registration-issues-wg] [GTLD-WG] Fwd: Calltfortfeedback on proposed At-Large/ALAC positions to NewtgTLDtSubsequent Procedures Supplemental Initial Report +1 Marita, Holly et al There has been a lot of time and effort that has gone into what we have already agreed to. Its too late to bring up anything new. On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 1:35 PM Marita Moll <mmoll@ca.inter.net<mailto:mmoll@ca.inter.net>> wrote: I also think it is now too late to throw this one into the package -- too many loose ends we haven't considered. Marita On 12/16/2018 6:31 PM, Holly Raiche wrote: I’m afraid I am with Jonathan and Alan on this one. Have we really worked through what an RFP would look like/be administered? Maybe a bold statement looks terrific, but Justine has spent a lot of time and effort working through how a process could be modified to accommodate our concerns (well done Justine) - and as Alan points out, have we really tested an RFP regime enough - against the benefits to the end user - such that we are confident in its benefits? Holly On Dec 17, 2018, at 9:52 AM, Jonathan Zuck <JZuck@innovatorsnetwork.org<mailto:JZuck@innovatorsnetwork.org>> wrote: I think we really need to choose our battles in this one and that doesn't include changing the whole program over... Jonathan Zuck Executive Director Innovators Network Foundation www.Innovatorsnetwork.org<http://www.innovatorsnetwork.org/> ________________________________ From: GTLD-WG <gtld-wg-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:gtld-wg-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org>> on behalf of Alexander Schubert <alexander@schubert.berlin<mailto:alexander@schubert.berlin>> Sent: Sunday, December 16, 2018 5:37:38 PM To: cpwg@icann.org<mailto:cpwg@icann.org> Subject: Re: [GTLD-WG] [CPWG] Fwd: [registration-issues-wg] Call for feedback on proposed At-Large/ALAC positions to New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Supplemental Initial Report Hi, To that point (RFP-type of solution): It seems that in the OVERWHELMING MAJORITY of cases it has been "portfolio applicants" squaring off against each other; and they just wanted a "fair compensation" for "giving up their asset". All of them are the same "good" or "bad": they make the TLD available via registrar channel. Only a very small percentage of contention sets ended up at the ICANN last resort love-fest. So I think these few cases could be resolved in a RFP style way....... The question is: Even if ALAC is in agreement with such stipulation; how to convince the rest of ICANN? Thanks, Alexander -----Original Message----- From: GTLD-WG [mailto:gtld-wg-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org] On Behalf Of Gordon Chillcott Sent: Friday, December 14, 2018 11:16 PM To: cw@christopherwilkinson.eu<mailto:cw@christopherwilkinson.eu> Cc: cpwg@icann.org<mailto:cpwg@icann.org> Subject: Re: [GTLD-WG] [CPWG] Fwd: [registration-issues-wg] Call for feedback on proposed At-Large/ALAC positions to New gTLD Subsequent Procedures Supplemental Initial Report Christopher: Although I am not a fan of the idea of an auction of any type, I am warming to the idea that this might be the most feasible alternative. Of the other candidate solutions, the best would probably be the Request for Proposal (RFP) route. This would answer the one question that auctions are weakest on - how is this applicant qualified to operate this particular TLD? Having said that, Requests for Proposal would need to be quite carefully crafted. Criteria for selection of an applicant would need to be carefully and specifically described in order to measure the applicant against the purpose of the new TLD. This is not easy and, in fact, can be expensive. Collection and evaluation of the responses, which is going to involve carefully measuring the response against the RFP's criteria to find “the best fit” .is another effort that would need to be considered and costed out. Part of that cost, by the way, is the time required to develop the RFP, collect the responses and evaluate them – all of which contribute to the length of time needed to make a decision. My own experience suggests that these costs would need to be examined and compared to the cost of an auction of whatever type. Gordon Chillcott Greater Toronto Area Linux Users Group On Wed, 2018-12-12 at 21:28 +0100, cw@christopherwilkinson.eu<mailto:cw@christopherwilkinson.eu> wrote:

Pour memoire

CW

...

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