- CWG-Stewardship - lists.icann.org

Re: [CWG-Stewardship] My concerns with the draft proposal and an alternative option
by Alan Greenberg Dec. 1, 2014

Dec. 1, 2014

Not a clue. Those who are advocating this model and believe in it are surely working on all of those details as we speak. No? Bout to address the question more clearly. I am not sure what accountability issues are relevant for an organization that has been described as blindly taking all of its instructions from the PRT. Alan At 01/12/2014 11:39 AM, Guru Acharya wrote: >@Allan & Olivier: What accountability mechanisms do you suggest >should be built into the Contract Co by-laws?

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Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Concern with Contract Co.
by Alan Greenberg Dec. 1, 2014

Dec. 1, 2014

I have to disagree. >Strawman Proposal 1 > >4 Status of IANA Functions Operator > >a Division of ICANN. The IANA Functions Operator will remain a >division of ICANN. > >b Enhanced Separability. ICANN will maintain the current separation >between ICANN and IANA, and will make the IANA Functions Operator >more easily separable from ICANN, if separation becomes necessary at >some future time. There was a "Review Committee" but clearly no other entity holding the contract. Strawman 1 did, nonsensically, posit that the internal committee could initiate an RFP. for a "new" operator, but this too confirmed the the "old" operator was ICANN. The references to an oversight "mechanism" also alluded to something other than an external contract-holding entity. Alan At 30/11/2014 01:50 PM, Greg Shatan wrote: >Frankly, I don't think an "internal to ICANN" proposal was ever put >on the table within the group prior to Frankfurt in any kind of >tangible, concrete fashion.

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On "Entity" and incorporation - key questions to frame our discussion
by Bertrand de La Chapelle Dec. 1, 2014

Dec. 1, 2014

Dear Greg, dear all, Two things: 1) a comment on the notion of "entity" and 2) a few key questions that I would like to see clearly answered to move forward *1) ON THE NOTION OF "ENTITY" AND COMMON UNDERSTANDING* In your exchange below with Holly, you mentioned two definitions of the term "entity". She rightly pointed there were of two types: one from a legal perspective and another one a more general, layman's perspective. Naturally, the first one (the legal one) focuses on incorporation, with mentions such as "separate existence for tax purposes". The second one, however, from the Merriam-Webster was more generic: *1 a : being <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/being>, existence <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/existence>; especially : independent, separate, or self-contained existence* *b : the existence of a thing as contrasted with its attributes* *2: something that has separate and distinct existence and objective or conceptual reality* *3: an organization (as a business or governmental unit) that has an identity separate from those of its members* I have a simple question: is the IETF an "entity" acccording to that definition, although it is not incorporated? I believe the answer is yes. As you know, the W3C, at least for a long period of time, was not incorporated, relying on three separate MoUs with "host" structures. (It may have changed since then but that was the case for several years). Isn't the W3C an "entity" for the purpose of the discussion we're having? Likewise, aren't the gNSO and the ccNSO, "organizations" (it is in their name) that have "an identity separate from those of (their) members", and "something that has a separate and distinct existence and objective or conceptual reality", and a "self-contained existence"? And therefore "entities" in light of the MW definition above? You may have had a legal meaning in mind for the term "entity" because of your own background but it seems clear that in Frankfurt, several people clearly understood the word in its more general meaning. *2) KEY QUESTIONS* In my view, the core of the discussion here can be summarized as follows: 1) *Is incorporation required to "contract"?* Given that the IETF seems to have an MoU with ICANN (among other arrangements with other "entities"), I would suppose that the answer is no. Can someone clarify this important point? 2) If the answer above is indeed no, is there any practical, legal or other constraint that would *expressly forbid IETF, the NRO (or ASO), the ccNSO and the gNSO to have each an MoU* with ICANN or any other contractor for the IANA functions? 3) If the answer to 2) above is no, what are *the pros and cons to establishing instead a specific contracting Corporation*, in terms of simplicity, compatibility between the mechanisms for the different groups (parameters, numbers, names), guarantee of accountability, stability and security of the system. Unless these questions are clearly answered, I am afraid we will be running in circles and losing time. Thanks for the feedback. Best Bertrand "*Le plus beau métier des hommes, c'est d'unir les hommes*", Antoine de Saint Exupéry ("*There is no greater mission for humans than uniting humans*")BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLEInternet & Jurisdiction Project | Director On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 7:42 AM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Holly and all: > > If we are turning to the dictionary, please consider the following: > > Entity > > *A real being; existence. An organization or being that possesses separate > existence for tax purposes. Examples would be corporations, partnerships, > estates, and trusts. The accounting entity for which accounting statements > are prepared may not be the same as the entity defined by law.* > > Entity *includes corporation and foreign corporation; not-for-profit > corporation; profit and not for-profit unincorporated association;* Business > Trust <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Business+Trust>, *estate, > partnership, trust, and two or more persons having a joint or common > economic interest; and state, U.S., and foreign governments.* > > *An existence apart, such as a corporation in relation to its > stockholders.* > > *Entity includes person, estate, trust, governmental unit.* > West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. Copyright 2008 The Gale > Group, Inc. All rights reserved. > > This is what I mean when I say "entity." I'll try to say "legal entity" > to avoid any doubt in future. But there was no doubt in my mind (or many > others) that when we were talking about creating an entity -- and in > particular, an entity that could enter into a contract -- that this is what > we were talking about. > > For what it's worth, the Merriam-Webster's definition that I found first > when searching the Internet is as follows: > > 1* a* *:* being <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/being>, > existence <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/existence>; > *especially* *:* independent, separate, or self-contained existence > *b* *:* the existence of a thing as contrasted with its attributes > 2*:* something that has separate and distinct existence and objective or > conceptual reality > 3*:* an organization (as a business or governmental unit) that has an > identity separate from those of its members > > Greg > > On Sat, Nov 29, 2014 at 11:16 PM, Holly Raiche <h.raiche(a)internode.on.net> > wrote: > >> Thank you Alan for the time and thought you have put into this. My >> comments, for what they are worth, interspersed. >> >> Holly >> >> On 29 Nov 2014, at 4:23 pm, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg(a)mcgill.ca> >> wrote: >> >> As I have mentioned during the F2F meeting in Frankfurt and on the most >> recent teleconference, I have significant problems with the proposal >> currently on the table. I am taking this opportunity to present my concerns >> in somewhat more detail, and I will also present what I believe to be a >> viable alternative. The ideas presented are my own, but I do know that they >> are largely shared by my At-Large colleagues and by some others in the >> community. >> >> I am also quite aware that my alternative options are likely to be >> vehemently opposed by some. >> >> I should also add that there are aspects of the current draft CWG >> proposal that I strongly support. The Independent Appeals Panel is perhaps >> the most important one. >> >> >> >> *Overview *Many of my concerns are due to the large number of "details" >> that are, as yet, unspecified. Perhaps some of my concerns will be negated >> once there are sufficient answers, but I have the nagging feeling that for >> many, there will be no viable answer. This message will necessarily be long >> - my apologies for that. >> >> >> >> *Contract Co. *Many of the issues surround the "entity" (as it was >> referred to in Frankfurt). >> >> >> First - using a Webster’s Dictionary (for the many Americans commenting) >> entity is defined as a ‘thing which has reality and distinctness’. NB: It >> does NOT NECESSARILY imply any corporate status. So there was a big and >> surprising leap from entity - which many of us supported - to some kind of >> corporate structure - which seems to have become a done deal in the minds >> of some. However, if it ‘signs a contract’, it necessarily has some legal >> status. And the tasks given below suggest it should. Is it too late to ask >> whether it is possible to have the PRT without a contract company. >> >> The draft somewhat glibly says that it will only sign the contract. But >> it seems to be outsourcing much of its responsibility to the >> Multistakeholder Periodic Review Team (PRT), and that seems problematic. >> Perhaps the intent is not that all of these things go to the PRT, but there >> does not seem to be anywhere else for the functions to go. Among the tasks >> that it has outsourced are consultation regarding the contents of future >> RFPs, RFP issuance, RFP evaluation, contract negotiation and contract >> enforcement. What it cannot outsource is addressing legal issues such as >> being sued by a bidder who failed for win the contract and other such >> possibilities. Whether it is possible to have such an empty company do all >> this remains to be demonstrated. I will deal with problems with this >> outsourcing under the PRT. >> >> The jurisdiction under which the company is registered has been the >> subject of some discussion. Clearly there are those who feel that under no >> conditions can it be the US. At the same time, there are some indications >> (such as terms in the Kelly bill) that imply that the US Government may not >> be willing to accept anything other than the US. Note that I understand >> that the Kelly bill itself may wither and die, but to quote Milton Meuller, >> "We should also pay attention to it because the bill provides a very good >> benchmark for preparing for the kind of questions that the NTIA is likely >> to be asked after they get a complete proposal from the ICG and begin to >> implement it. The Kelly bill can be considered a list of the concerns that >> US-based interests are going to be using to assess the final proposal. The >> GAO Report is equally important in this regard. Ignore them at your peril." >> (E-mail to the CWG-Stewardship list on 23 Nov 2014) >> >> Without details of exactly how this corporation will exist, it is >> impossible to assure oneself that it cannot be captured or controlled by >> some entity or government(s). Running IANA will be a treasured target by >> some countries and we do not know what lengths they would go to capture the >> contract. NTIA had the strength of the US (and its battleships and such) >> behind it. Contract Co. will not. >> >> There has been no discussion about how this entity, or any part of the >> overall proposal, is funded. More on this later. >> >> >> *Multistakeholder Periodic Review Team (PRT)* >> >> >> >> The PRT is effectively the operational arm of Contract Co. It is the >> entity that makes decision for Contract Co., presumably including those >> related to the RFP, contract negotiations, contract enforcement and much >> more. But by its very name, it is Periodic. It does not exist at all times >> and there are some in the community that have said it should be >> re-constituted afresh every time it is needed (perhaps like the Phoenix >> born from the ashes of its predecessor). I fail to understand to how it can >> take action on problems if it is not an ongoing entity. >> >> The description says that it is a "body" with representatives selected by >> the relevant bodies. Accepting that "relevant" is to be decided later, it >> is unclear under whose auspices this body is convened, and how we can >> ensure that it remains free from capture or malformation. It was suggested >> in Frankfurt that this body could be akin to (or even identical to) the >> IANA-CWG, but given that the entire concept of this elaborate >> infrastructure is to allow ICANN to be completely excluded from the IANA >> management process, presumably because it has ceased to carry out this >> function as well as all parties claim it is now doing, what makes us think >> that ICANN would take responsibility for this, or more to the point, could >> be trusted to do it properly? >> >> The idea behind talking about an entity rather than a corporate structure >> was to suggest that it is possible to have structures with functions, >> without those structures have an individual corporate personality. ALAC, >> GNSO,ccNSO, SSAC are all examples of entities that have an ongoing >> existence, functions, etc but do not have separate corporate identities. >> It can be done - indeed, is being done. >> >> >> So how this body, which is the critical keystone [ >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keystone_(architecture)] on which this >> entire superstructure depends, constituted, and funded. And how does one >> ensure that it is not corrupted, or captured? Or sued. >> >> This was always my concern with creating a new corporate structure. >> >> A body as large as it will have to be will require infrastructure such as >> a secretariat - how do we ensure that IT is not subverted (just look at all >> the effort that has gone into ensuring an independent ICG secretariat)? And >> without a corporate backing of the PRT, its members would be personally >> liable in the case of a lawsuit. Who would want to serve on such a group? >> Moreover, in an environment where the PRT is taking very significant >> decisions, both financial offers and personal threats would be an effective >> method of capture (and presumably this is all volunteer work, or at most a >> modest stipend). >> >> For my money, these are critical questions - which remain unanswered. >> >> >> Surely, the PRT, which is implicitly all powerful, would need a new >> oversight mechanism over it! And who oversees THAT oversight body? >> >> EXACTLY - but the same can be said of the Contract Company. Who funds >> it, who monitors it. And do we not then wind up with accountability issues >> for ICANN AND its oversight body. >> >> >> >> >> *Customer Standing Panel (CSC) *It is unclear exactly what this body >> monitors. If it is JUST service levels committed to by IANA, the >> composition may be ok. But if it is also responsible for ensuring that IANA >> is following policy, then the composition MUST reflect the >> multi-stakeholder body or bodies that created such policy. You cannot >> presume that the customers, who may have been vehemently opposed to any >> specific policy, will report that such a policy is not being policy. If the >> CSC is NOT monitoring adherence to policy, then who is? It does not seem to >> be covered in the proposal. During e-mail discussions, someone said it was >> the job of the (for the gTLD space) GNSO. But it does not have the staff or >> Bylaw mandate to do so, nor would it have any standing to complain to >> whoever it is that would attempt enforcement (the PRT??). >> >> Absolutely agree. I think the problem with the concept is the word >> ‘customer’; it does not encompass all those who are impacted by IANA/ICANN >> decisions. And agree with the comment abut the GNSO. >> >> >> There is reference to Liaison from ACs and SOs on the CSC. In the ICANN >> context, a Liaison has no power other than that of persuasion. They have no >> power to act if they are in disagreement with the majority of the full >> members. >> >> Which is why a Standing Panel based on the MSM is the better model. >> >> >> >> >> *Cost *Cost has been mentioned briefly above, but it is a significant >> issue. Aside from the costs of the infrastructure we are discussing here, >> there is the cost of IANA. Currently this is funded by ICANN. If ICANN were >> to be taken out of the picture (and the possibility of doing that is the >> ONLY reason for building all of this), where does the funding come from? >> From ICANN, out of the goodness of its heart, despite no longer having ANY >> control over how much money is demanded or how it is spent? By the gTLD >> registries, who have said they would likely fund THEIR part of the costs, >> but not the entire thing. By the ccTLDs who have clearly said we should not >> depend on them (with a few exceptions)? >> >> WELL SAID >> >> >> >> >> *Acceptability *The last time I heard Larry Strickling talk about the >> stewardship transition, he said it would only take place if sufficient >> controls were put in place to address ICANN messing up (i.e., in the >> extreme, a rogue Board). That PRESUMES that it is ICANN at the centre of >> the IANA stewardship - why else would we care about ICANN accountability if >> ICANN were not involved. From that, my take is they envision the IANA >> responsibility being transferred to ICANN. The Kelly bill clearly presumes >> this as well - why else would it be attempting to put so many constraints >> on ICANN? >> >> Again, well said >> >> >> It is not at all clear that a proposal such as one that the CWG has put >> in this draft would be acceptable to the US government. >> >> I don’t think it would be either. >> >> >> It will certainly not be a favoured proposal from the point of view of >> the ICANN Board (who may not have a direct say in this but cannot be >> totally ignored either). >> >> >> >> *Integratability *The ICG will be tasked with integrating the CWG >> proposal with that of the RIRs and the IETF. Although this is clearly their >> job and not ours, I have always believed that one needs to look ahead to >> ensure that there are no impassable roadblocks ahead. >> >> We do not definitively know what those proposals will be, but indications >> are emerging. Both bodies seem to be happy with how ICANN is managing IANA, >> but both feel that in the event of any untoward action, they could move the >> responsibility associated with their areas somewhere else. Since in both >> cases, it is the same body that sets the policy that would judge it, no >> great complexity is involved. In ICANN's case, since the bodies that set >> policy in the names space are (to a large extent) an integral part of >> ICANN, they cannot take action against their "parent" (so to speak). Thus >> this cumbersome alternative. >> >> Integrating these two approaches may be difficult. >> >> >> >> *Lost Opportunity *Part of the IANA Stewardship Transition is to put in >> place suitable ICANN accountability and governance changes so as to ensure >> the continuity of the IANA function. >> >> If all of the questions posed here, and the ones raised by others are >> addressed, we would end up moving from a situation where an entity (the >> NTIA of the US government) awards the IANA contract. The contract is >> currently held by ICANN but in theory at some future date, it could be >> awarded to some other organization, removing ICANN from any operational >> connection to ICANN. >> >> The new situation would be where Contract Co. awards the IANA contract. >> The contract will initially be held by ICANN but in theory at some future >> date, it could be awarded to some other organization, removing ICANN from >> any operational connection to ICANN. >> >> Notice the parallel wording. ICANN really has no motivation to change to >> effect this change. And in all likelihood any change associated with this >> transition will be minimal. >> >> If we go down the path of the current draft CWG proposal, I believe that >> a major opportunity will have been lost to reform ICANN. >> >> >> >> *Alternative *Simply criticizing the current CWG draft proposal is not >> particularly useful without alternatives. My alternative is certain to not >> please some of the parties in this discussion, but I believe that it is >> both possible and viable. >> >> All of the complexity of the CWG draft proposal is there to cover the >> eventuality that ICANN suddenly or gracefully stops performing the IANA >> function to the satisfaction of the community. That was indeed the >> situation a number of years ago, and ICANN took effective action to rectify >> the problems (that is, the NTI did not have to yank the contract to fix the >> problems). At the moment all parties seem to agree that there are no >> significant outstanding major problems, certainly none that could justify a >> change in the status quo. But there is a recurrent fear of "what if". What >> if ICANN had the IANA responsibility in perpetuity and stopped caring. Or >> had a Board that deliberately and without community support took action or >> inaction to harm how the IANA functions are carried out (the "rogue Board >> scenario). >> >> These worst case alternatives are indeed possible. And since under the >> current ICANN Bylaws, the Board is effectively sovereign, little could be >> done short of changing the Board over a period of 3+ years. >> >> And this is what worries Larry Strickling - what he said publicly at the >> last ICANN meeting. He does want a credible answer that will satisfy his >> masters (including Congress) >> >> >> I suggest that there are ways to alter ICANN's Bylaws to allow the >> effective control of an out-of-control Board. These mechanisms will not be >> particularly appreciated by the ICANN Board, but I believe that such >> measures (or something similar) would be adopted if that is what is >> required to be granted IANA. >> >> There are a number of components that I will describe. They are not >> necessarily a complete or even the correct set. Putting in place a complete >> set of cohesive recommendations is what the Accountability CCWG is being >> convened for. But the existence of the following as a starting point, I >> believe, demonstrates that there IS a way to proceed forward. >> >> - ACs and SOs must be given the ability to recall their sitting >> Board member. There will be no need to await the end of the current 3-year >> term. >> - Certain classes of decision regarding IANA can only be made with >> (for an example) a supermajority (2/3) of the Board's maximum >> Bylaw-mandated membership approving the decision. Without the bulk of the >> AC/SO Board members, there will not be a critical mass of Board members to >> take such a decision. >> - Certain classes of decision regarding IANA may only be made >> after notification period and public comment. This would allow the ACs and >> SOs sufficient time to act to recall their Board members >> - It is possible that the composition of the Board might need to >> be slightly altered to ensure that a recall of most but not all AC/SO Board >> members would be effective in halting action. Or a higher threshold than >> supermajority might be needed. >> - Bylaws regarding GAC advice related to IANA might need to >> somewhat altered to compensate for the GAC not having sitting Board members. >> - Similarly, non-affiliated ccTLDs would need to be worked into >> the equation. >> - If allowed under California law, the Bylaws could be require >> that under certain circumstances, a Board decision could be appealed to an >> external body (similar to the proposal's Independent Appeal for IANA >> decisions) and that the decision would be binding and enforceable in courts. >> >> I don’t think this is the entire answer BUT it goes a long way towards a >> workable response that can dovetail nicely with what both the numbers and >> protocols community are coming up with. >> >> Again, that you Alan - this is a really good summary of both concerns and >> a very positive way forward. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> CWG-Stewardship mailing list >> CWG-Stewardship(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> CWG-Stewardship mailing list >> CWG-Stewardship(a)icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship >> >> > > > -- > > *Gregory S. Shatan **ï* *Abelman Frayne & Schwab* > > *666 Third Avenue **ï** New York, NY 10017-5621* > > *Direct* 212-885-9253 *| **Main* 212-949-9022 > > *Fax* 212-949-9190 *|* *Cell *917-816-6428 > > *gsshatan(a)lawabel.com <gsshatan(a)lawabel.com>* > > *ICANN-related: gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com <gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com> * > > *www.lawabel.com <http://www.lawabel.com/>* > > _______________________________________________ > CWG-Stewardship mailing list > CWG-Stewardship(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship > >

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Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Concern with Contract Co.
by Alan Greenberg Dec. 1, 2014

Dec. 1, 2014

I guess it is all in the reading. When you combine the section I identified (and others) and the "mix and match" process it was there from my sperspective. Alan At 01/12/2014 01:35 AM, Greg Shatan wrote: >Alan: > >Strawman 1 was not an "internal to ICANN" >proposal. The part that you quote refers to the >IANA Functions Operator remaining ICANN. That >does not make it an internal to ICANN >approach. The current proposal also leaves >ICANN as the IANA Functions Operator. By that >measure, the current proposal is just as much "internal to ICANN." > >An "internal to ICANN" approach would be one >where there was no external entity (legal or >otherwise involved) and oversight, >accountability and all of the other roles >currently performed by NTIA are performed by bodies internal to ICANN. > >You go on to say that there was "clearly no >other entity holding the contract." This is >incorrect. I draw your attention to the section >"Documentation to Replace NTIA Contract," which reads: > >Service Level Agreement. The OPRC and ICANN >will enter into a Service Level Agreement for >the performance of the technical and >administrative IANA functions. The SLA would >run for an initial term of three years and would >be renewed upon the agreement of the OPRC and the IANA Functions Operator. > >A "Service Level Agreement" is a form of >contract -- so there is clearly a contract. And >it states that the "OPRC and ICANN will enter >into" this contact. So there is clearly an >"other entity" holding the contract. > >You also state that the OPRC is an "internal >committee." This is also incorrect. The section >on legal status of OPRC states "Legal >Status. The OPRC will be a committee rather >than a separate incorporated entity. [The >committee may be considered an âunincorporated >association,â and will be domiciled in >[California or the U.S. or Switzerland or some >other place] to the extent that the committee >has a legal identity.]." Nowhere does this >state or even imply that the OPRC is an ICANN >Committee. Indeed the fact that there is a >discussion of domicile and that OPRC will enter >into an agreement with ICANN can only lead to >the conclusion that the OPRC is external ICANN. > >I stand by my earlier statement -- I don't think >an "internal to ICANN" proposal was ever put on >the table within the group prior to Frankfurt in >any kind of tangible, concrete fashion. > >Greg > > > > > >On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 11:42 PM, Alan Greenberg ><<mailto:alan.greenberg@mcgill.ca>alan.greenberg(a)mcgill.ca> wrote: >I have to disagree. > >>Strawman Proposal 1 >> >>4 Status of IANA Functions Operator >> >>a Division of ICANN. The IANA Functions >>Operator will remain a division of ICANN. >> >>b Enhanced Separability. ICANN will maintain >>the current separation between ICANN and IANA, >>and will make the IANA Functions Operator more >>easily separable from ICANN, if separation >>becomes necessary at some future time. > >There was a "Review Committee" but clearly no >other entity holding the contract. Strawman 1 >did, nonsensically, posit that the internal >committee could initiate an RFP. for a "new" >operator, but this too confirmed the the "old" operator was ICANN. > >The references to an oversight "mechanism" also >alluded to something other than an external contract-holding entity. > >Alan > >At 30/11/2014 01:50 PM, Greg Shatan wrote: >>Frankly, I don't think an "internal to ICANN" >>proposal was ever put on the table within the >>group prior to Frankfurt in any kind of tangible, concrete fashion. > > > > >-- > >Gregory S. Shatan Ã¯ Abelman Frayne & Schwab > >666 Third Avenue Ã¯ New York, NY 10017-5621 > >Direct 212-885-9253 | Main 212-949-9022 > >Fax 212-949-9190 | Cell 917-816-6428 > ><mailto:gsshatan@lawabel.com>gsshatan(a)lawabel.com > >ICANN-related: <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com > >www.lawabel.com

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Relationship between CCWG-Accountability and CWG-IANA (Was: My concerns...)
by Milton L Mueller Dec. 1, 2014

Dec. 1, 2014

I am very much with Malcolm and Chuck on this issue, we all believe that the IANA transition and CCWG Accountability are "interrelated and interdependent." I also believe in a clear separation of policy making and implementation, so, like several others, I don't want to see PRT and the IANA contracting process be distorted into a way of making policy or a kind of coup d'etat that can veto policy. What is acceptable, however, is for the PRT to consider moving the IANA contract on the following grounds: a) a failure of IANA to implement community agreed policy b) for implementing IANA changes that the legitimate policy process did not agree That is where IANA authority and the policy process intersect. Of course, both type a) and type b) abuses could be stopped by the proposed appeals process, but I think a PRT could and should see a pattern of such problems as grounds for moving the IANA contract. Do people consider this an adequate definition of how our CWG relates to the Accountability CCWG? > -----Original Message----- > From: cwg-stewardship-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship- > bounces(a)icann.org] On Behalf Of Gomes, Chuck > Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 4:39 PM > To: Malcolm Hutty; Martin Boyle; Phil Corwin; Olivier Crepin-Leblond; > cwg-stewardship(a)icann.org > Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] My concerns with the draft proposal > and an alternative option > > Malcolm, > > I of course cannot speak for Martin nor am I trying to, but let me say > that I think I have the same concerns as you regarding ICANN > Accountability and I think we need to continue to ensure that the > connection to what we are doing in the IANA CWG connects with > overall ICANN accountability. I think our end product must ensure that > or we will have ignored one the most unified points that the > community has communicated. That said though, I don't how the PRT > can enforce that as you suggest. But we can write our proposal in such > a way that it will ultimately require that. We don't need to do that for > this version though. > > Chuck > > -----Original Message----- > From: cwg-stewardship-bounces(a)icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship- > bounces(a)icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty > Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 4:23 PM > To: Martin Boyle; Phil Corwin; Olivier Crepin-Leblond; cwg- > stewardship(a)icann.org > Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] My concerns with the draft proposal > and an alternative option > > On 30/11/2014 19:51, Martin Boyle wrote: > > As for the link to ICANN accountability: with what we've got from > > Frankfurt, I think we have a reasonable idea of what we need from > > stream 1. We cannot tell stream 1 what answer we want, but we can > > tell it what issue(s) we need them to consider. Again, if we seek to > > engineer the whole piece, we risk simply missing the deadline and > > trespassing on the responsibilities of others. > > Martin, > > This paragraph opened my eyes to a possible misunderstanding on my > part of your position. > > As you know, I think that resolving some (not all, but some critical) > ICANN accountability issues is essential to a successful NTIA transition. > After Frankfurt, I had begun to lose confidence that CCWG- > Stewardship shared this view. > > This was very disheartening to me. I have no objection to leaving > ICANN accountability issues to be developed by CCWG-Accountability, > so long as the essential Workstream 1 issues make it into the final ICG > proposal to NTIA. But since CCWG-Accountability doesn't report to the > ICG but the ICANN Board, I think it is incumbent on this working group > to pick up on their output, and to ensure that ICG hears their output as > part of the "naming community's proposal". Hence my request for > some placeholder text in this proposal that CCWG-Accountability can > fill out. > > Seeing that there is no such placeholder text now, and having had > several of my approaches to try to achieve such text rejected in > Frankfurt, I had begun to think that the rest of this group wanted to > exclude anything relating to ICANN's policy-making role from the > ultimate transition proposal. That worried me greatly. > > Your paragraph above gives me new hope that we can have a meeting > of minds, so please let me check that I have understood you correctly. > When you say "what we need from workstream 1", do you indeed > mean that the proposal from the names community, that goes to ICG, > and ultimately to NTIA, must include such proposals for ICANN > accountability as CCWG-Accountability decide are an essential > precondition for NTIA transition? > > Or to put it another way, if CCWG-Accountability decide that ICANN > must be contractually bound to certain commitments to ensure that > gTLD policy remains transparent, community-based bottom policy (and > so forth), are you open to the possibility of having those commitments > written into the requirements that the PRT is to enforce on ICANN, > alongside the requirements for the IANA functions that this CCWG has > defined? > > Kind Regards, > > Malcolm. > > -- > Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 > Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London > Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ > > London Internet Exchange Ltd > 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY > > Company Registered in England No. 3137929 > Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA > > > _______________________________________________ > CWG-Stewardship mailing list > CWG-Stewardship(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship > _______________________________________________ > CWG-Stewardship mailing list > CWG-Stewardship(a)icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship

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Concern with Contract Co.
by Avri Doria Dec. 1, 2014

Dec. 1, 2014

Hi, I think this has exactly a 180 degree wrong approach > . Contract Co. -- This is a not for profit company whose only function > is to be signatory to the contract with the IANA Functions Operator. > As such this entity would have no staff. I think that this should have nothing but staff, a minimal staff of one or two I.e it should have a neutral Administrator that does what the PRT tells her to do in terms of the contract adminstration, and perhaps a backup/aise. It could also be the Root Zone Management Process Administrator as that is a clerical staff function. avri

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Fwd: [Ianaplan] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-06.txt
by Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond Nov. 29, 2014

Nov. 29, 2014

FYI -- if any of you have spare cycles to read the draft of the IETF proposal. Kind regards, Olivier -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [Ianaplan] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-06.txt Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 07:50:29 -0800 From: internet-drafts(a)ietf.org To: i-d-announce(a)ietf.org CC: ianaplan(a)ietf.org A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Planning for the IANA/NTIA Transition Working Group of the IETF. Title : Draft Response to the Internet Coordination Group Request for Proposals on the IANA protocol parameters registries Authors : Eliot Lear Russ Housley Filename : draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-06.txt Pages : 30 Date : 2014-11-26 Abstract: This document contains the IETF response to a request for proposals from the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group regarding the protocol parameters registries. It is meant to be included in an aggregate proposal that also includes contributions covering domain names and numbering resources that will be submitted from their respective operational communities. The IETF community is invited to comment and propose changes to this document. The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response/ There's also a htmlized version available at: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-06 A diff from the previous version is available at: http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-06 Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ _______________________________________________ Ianaplan mailing list Ianaplan(a)ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ianaplan

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Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Concern with Contract Co.
by Alan Greenberg Nov. 29, 2014

Nov. 29, 2014

In Frankfurt we used the term "entity" as if it was something other than some for of company or corporation. We have now replaced it with "corporation". Others assure me that a corporation is possible with no Board or members or owners or shareholders or officers or bank account, but I have yet to fully understand how this works. I will be addressing some of this in my comments, hopefully later tonight. Alan At 28/11/2014 06:32 PM, Greg Shatan wrote: >Olivier, > >I'm not sure exactly what you mean by the >"configuration" of Contract Co. We certainly >have discussed the "form" the entity would take, >i.e., a nonprofit corporation. Place of >incorporation has not been significantly >discussed in recent days, though we had a number >of email exchanges and some discussion of >jurisdiction earlier in a variety of contexts. > >Greg > >On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 6:19 PM, Olivier MJ >Crepin-Leblond <<mailto:ocl@gih.com>ocl(a)gih.com> wrote: > >On 28/11/2014 16:36, Milton L Mueller wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >>From: >><mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>cwg-stewardship-bounces(a)icann.org >>[mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Bertrand de La Chapelle >> >>Is the idea of a contract Co. a done deal? >>Establishing any organization with whatever >>limited staff is usually a recipe for its growth in time. >> >> >> >>MM: The idea that there should be a contracting >>entity separate from ICANN is, I believe, a >>done deal. It reflects some of the principles >>we agreed on (such as separability) and the >>general agreement that, as the draft proposal says, >> >>âThe current arrangements provided by the >>NTIA for the oversight and accountability of >>the IANA Functions are generally satisfactory >>and the objective of the CWG is to replicate >>these as faithfully as possibleâ > >This is not at all how I understood it. The >discussion on whether the "contracting entity" >should be a contract co. or something else has >never been touched - certainly no alternatives have been seriously considered. > >> >> >>MM: On the other hand, whether the specific >>configuration of the Contract Co. is optimal >>for achieving those purposes could still be >>open. I would say is still open to >>_modification_; any modification that >>accomplishes the agreed objectives but avoids >>any problems that might arise would be welcomed by the CWG I imagine. > >The configuration of the Contract Co. has not >been discussed either. We know what functions >should be undertaken and what broad >characteristics would be needed. No discussion >of jurisdiction nor configuration of the entity >has been done except on RFP4 call today where we started to touch on it. > >Kind regards, > >Olivier > >_______________________________________________ >CWG-Stewardship mailing list ><mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>CWG-Stewardship(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship > > > > >-- > >Gregory S. Shatan Ã¯ Abelman Frayne & Schwab > >666 Third Avenue Ã¯ New York, NY 10017-5621 > >Direct 212-885-9253 | Main 212-949-9022 > >Fax 212-949-9190 | Cell 917-816-6428 > ><mailto:gsshatan@lawabel.com>gsshatan(a)lawabel.com > >ICANN-related: <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>gregshatanipc(a)gmail.com > >www.lawabel.com >_______________________________________________ >CWG-Stewardship mailing list >CWG-Stewardship(a)icann.org >https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship

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Chairs' Statement with progress update and route ahead
by Jonathan Robinson Nov. 29, 2014

Nov. 29, 2014

All, Please see attached a Chairs' Statement with progress update and route ahead. Thank-you. Lise Fuhr & Jonathan Robinson

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Outreach Tracking for RFP5
by Grace Abuhamad Nov. 28, 2014

Nov. 28, 2014

Dear all, On behalf of the RFP5 subgroup, we'd like to start collecting information about the consultations within communities that have taken place to date. This is in order to validate the NTIA requirements and principles. Please reply with an outline of your community consultations to date and/or a description of your outreach efforts to date. We will compile this information and provide it to the RFP5 subgroup for review. Best, Grace

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