Modified Option ii combined with modified option i which gives: An existing body agree with ICANN to self regulate only with community created policies/processes Cheers! sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 15 Oct 2014 14:11, "Guru Acharya" <gurcharya@gmail.com> wrote:
How the names community approach will differ from the approach adopted by the numbers community and protocols community?
Numbers Community: APNIC has reached consensus on its proposal. According to the proposal, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. It proposes to replace NTIA oversight with a Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Affirmation of Commitment (AOC) between NRO and ICANN. www.slideshare.net/fullscreen/apnic/report-ianatransition/1
Protocols Community: The IETF draft proposal suggests that no structural changes are required as a result of the transition. The MOU between ICANN and the IETF community will continue to govern the existing relationship. Again, IANA will continue to reside in ICANN. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-00
Therefore, neither the numbers community, nor the protocol community appear to be in the direction of suggesting a new MS Oversight Entity to replace NTIA and its oversight. Merely contracts between existing entities will be updated to replace NTIA oversight.
Can the names community adopt a similar approach? Can a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO be expected to replace NTIA oversight?
Clearly NO! This approach can not be adopted by the names community because the names community resides within ICANN, which is also the IANA operator. Specifically, GNSO and CCNSO are essentially subsets of ICANN, and therefore a contractual agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) between ICANN and GNSO/CCNSO can not be expected to replace NTIA oversight.
Therefore, it is essential to either
Option (i): create a new legal entity, which has a contractual oversight relationship with ICANN. This would be similar to http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/08/04/students-school-faculty-on-iana...
Option (ii): expect ICANN to self-regulate
Option (iii): make a new legal entity comprising of CCNSO and GNSO that is structurally independent of ICANN and require that new entity to enter into a contractual oversight agreement (SLA/AOC/MOU) with ICANN.
From the above three options, clearly option (ii) is not acceptable because of the lack of trust in the ICANN enhanced accountability process.
I also feel that option (iii) is not feasible because the CCNSO and GNSO are heavily integrated with ICANN and structural separation of these two communities from ICANN will be in-feasible.
Also, from the Jordan Carter document, the option on page 7 can be discarded, which makes ICANN the oversight body, as IANA will continue to reside in ICANN, as clearly suggested by the proposals of the protocols and numbers community.
Therefore, option (i) is clearly the only option available with the names community.
Regards, Acharya
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