Avri, I agree. We could communicate with the other operational communities before this goes to the ICG, or let the ICG sort it out. If we do the latter, we may want to put these alternatives in the proposal, to save them the step of thinking them up. Greg *Gregory S. Shatan **ï* *Abelman Frayne & Schwab* *Partner* *| IP | Technology | Media | Internet* *666 Third Avenue | New York, NY 10017-5621* *Direct* 212-885-9253 *| **Main* 212-949-9022 *Fax* 212-949-9190 *|* *Cell *917-816-6428 *gsshatan@lawabel.com <gsshatan@lawabel.com>* *ICANN-related: gregshatanipc@gmail.com <gregshatanipc@gmail.com>* *www.lawabel.com <http://www.lawabel.com/>* On Tue, Apr 7, 2015 at 10:30 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
Yes, I should have said apparent assumption.
I think only option 1 is viable unless the other operational communities inform us otherwise.
avri
On 07-Apr-15 19:24, Greg Shatan wrote:
I don't believe they assumed that the contracts would move to IANA. I read the language in I.A.7 as a bit of a "fudge"/ambiguity. In any event, I think that all 3 options are open:
1. ICANN retains the contracts with the RIRs and IETF, with a minor amendment allowing ICANN to offer the service, but have the service fulfilled by its wholly-controlled affiliate (or wholly-owned subsidiary) PTI. 2. ICANN enters into an "assignment and assumption" agreement whereby PTI takes over ICANN's position in the agreements. 3, ICANN and the RIRs/IETF terminate the current agreements, and PTI enters into new agreements with the RIRs and IETF.
The first option fits the principle of "change as little as possible (and explain any change you make". The second option fits the principle of "make PTI as easily separable from ICANN as possible." The third option fits the principle of "let's make everything messy and complicated."
Greg
On Tue, Apr 7, 2015 at 7:16 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
One of my comment for the Sidley report is this assumption that the contracts would move to IANA.
I see no reason for this to happen unless the IETF/IAB & RIRs/CRISP want them to. It seems to me that the contracts could remain with ICANN and that ICANN would use the affiliate to do the work.
avri
On 07-Apr-15 15:29, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
Hi,
On Mon, Apr 06, 2015 at 11:04:14AM +0200, Lise Fuhr wrote:
Please see the attached initial discussion draft of the two models from our legal counsel.
Thanks for this. I've read it. I have some questions. Questions for Sidley are listed, and then some observations for our own discussion (which needn't take up Sidley's time) follow when appropriate in square brackets.
In I.A, particularly in numbers 4 and 6, I can't tell whether the assumption is that there are new agreements between PTI and the RIRs, and PTI and IETF. I think the fact that PTI is a new legal entity means that new agreements would be required. Is that correct? [The reason I ask this is because there is a possible risk of things coming apart if the other operational communities need to be engaged in a new negotiation. If PTI just takes the existing agreements and does a global search and replace for ICANN with PTI, that's nice, but it doesn't solve everything. For instance, the IETF would have to publish a new version of RFC 2860. It's worth remembering that every grievance everyone has with an existing document comes into play once the document is opened for editing.]
By way of comparison, in II.B, does using Functional Separation permit ICANN to continue working under its existing MoUs? I'd assume yes, because AFAIK none of the existing agreements specify the internal arrangements of how ICANN delivers the service. [Notwithstanding Milton's point about getting it "right", given the timeline there is a significant advantage to not having to negotiate, I think, no?]
III.C talks about CSC. In the case of a full legal separation with independent governance, would the CSC be needed at all? Presumably the arrangements between PRI and their customers would be a contractual one, and as such the management of such contractual disputes ought to be via those contracts, and not through an extra body. Or is the point that the way such a contractual arrangement would solve such disputes ought to be along the lines of the CSC?
In III.D.2 there is a question about "ultimate accountability over ICANN's stewardhip". I'm not entirely sure which cases this applies to. If there is a legal separation, how is this question relevant for CWG? Under the legal separation described, PTI becomes the new IANA functions operator. If there's full independent governance of PTI, for instance, isn't ICANN's stewardship completely gone -- it has only responsibility for policy, and not for IANA operation at all, right? Is that part of the point of this question?
On III.I, I'm not sure what the difference is between CSC and IRP. Why are both things needed?
Best regards,
A
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