@All: A couple of though/questions. If IANA is moved outside ICANN, where will be it incorporated if at all? What about proposing more than one IANA like structure/organization/company (or whatever) outside ICANN to promote competition among themself? In other words, if you do not like the services provided by X you contract with Z and so forth. -ed On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 6:44 AM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
Hello Tijani, Olivier, all
In view of the recent events, I think it will be good to hear from list members on what we expect the transitioned oversight for names to look like. This will help inform those of us on the cwg.
I will really encourage as many members on this list to subscribe to the cwg list as well so things can be more synchronised in real-time as things are moving at an exponential pace and I fear we may overtook some aspects if we don't have as many eye balls on the watch.
Cheers!
sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 25 Oct 2014 01:40, "Tijani BEN JEMAA" <tijani.benjemaa@planet.tn> wrote:
Olivier and Alan,
I share the point of Olivier. I have the feeling that the trend is to give the role to the DNS industry, ignoring the remaining stakeholders and especially in our case the end users. In the CCWG charter drafting team, someone from GNSO chaired the first call and said that they are waiting the ccNSO to appoint a co-chair. I asked the following question:
How the chairs have been chosen? While I understood that for the CWG charter drafting team, the co-chairs were from GNSO and ccNSO because the CWG was mainly about the transition of the stewardship of the IANA naming function, I can’t see why it is also the GNSO and the ccNSO who are de facto chairing this team who will draft the charter of the ICANN accountability and governance CCWG.
I also made it clear that I don’t contest those chairs or their affiliation, but need to understand.
The answer was very evasive, and no reason was provided. I think that they think that it’s their business, and we are there to complete the MSM scene only.
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*De :* iana-issues-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org [mailto: iana-issues-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org] *De la part de* Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond *Envoyé :* vendredi 24 octobre 2014 19:52 *À :* Alan Greenberg; iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org *Objet :* Re: [IANA-issues] Oversight -- with or without Internet end users?
Dear Alan,
well -- this is where the idea of creation of a DNSA - the DNS Authority, which is advocated by Milton Mueller's paper http://www.internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ICANNreformgl... takes hold. However, it is devoid of any end user input. Upon discussion on the CWG, Milton's now mentioned there would be two seats on a "DROC" (whatever that means -- DNS Regulatory Oversight Committee?) for the GAC... which again means nothing because as someone quite rightly reminded the mailing list, members of the GAC cannot represent the GAC - they represent their own country only.
Note that not one time is the "end user" mentioned anywhere in the above paper.
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 24/10/2014 19:16, Alan Greenberg wrote:
Olivier, you are probably correct about the split, but I find it hard to accept any situation where IANA can be allowed to with impunity not follow policy.
I will wait a bit for any further comments here before posting to the CWG list.
Alan
At 24/10/2014 01:50 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
Dear Alan,
I think your observations are right on target. I can however certainly see serious pushback about the advocating of the following:
*"If the oversight is purely by the ccTLD and gTLD community, then there is no mechanism to correct IANA diverging from policy, essentially giving the operational communities, with the collusion of IANA, the ability to override policy (essentially a veto of policy established by the MSM." * This, in my opinion, is going to be the huge disagreement and with all parties showing entrenched positions at the moment, I do not know how this deadlock will be resolved.
Forgetting all of the other procedural stuff which is currently going on in the CWG, I feel that this is probably going to be the matter to resolve. Suggestions anyone?
Kind regards,
Olivier
On 24/10/2014 17:33, Alan Greenberg wrote:
Interesting issue.
Apart from wanting to feel loved and part of the club, to substantively justify the larger community being part of the oversight body, we need a scenario where oversight by the operational TLD entities is not sufficient.
Consider scenario where: - the ccTLD and gTLD community are satisfied; - IANA is following policy; - users, industry, or some other part of the MSM are not happy.
The issue should be addressed by changing the policy, which by both Milton and Greg's definition, does involve the entire MSM.
The remaining scenario is: - the ccTLD and gTLD community are satisfied; - IANA is *NOT* following policy; - users, industry, or some other part of the MSM are not happy that lack of following policy, either because of undesireable outcomes or simply beleiving that IANA must adhere to established policy.
If the oversight is purely by the ccTLD and gTLD community, then there is no mechanism to correct IANA diverging from policy, essentially giving the operational communities, with the collusion of IANA, the ability to override policy (essentially a veto of policy established by the MSM.
Am I missing something here? Would there be some OTHER mechanism for getting IANA to follow policy if the only overseer were happy with them not doing so.
Alan
At 24/10/2014 10:56 AM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond wrote:
Hello all,
no doubt you have been following the discussions on the CWG Stewardship list. Greg Shatan mentioned (below) that all Stakeholder Groups should be part of the entity/group with ICANN oversight. You'll note the robust response from Milton Mueller. I must say I think that I would agree with Greg and disagree with Milton, but what do you think? Milton makes some convincing points too.
Our At-Large WG needs to be quite clear about what would be acceptable for Internet users.
Kind regards,
Olivier
-------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2014 19:38:43 +0000 From: Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> <mueller@syr.edu> To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> <gregshatanipc@gmail.com>, cwg-stewardship@icann.org <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>
2. *All Stakeholder Groups should be part of the Entity/Group with ICANN Oversight*. Oversight of the IANA functions for the naming community should not be left solely (or even primarily) to its direct "customers." An essential part of the multistakeholder construct is that all Internet stakeholders (aka "the Global Multistakeholder Community") are affected, directly or indirectly, by these matters. This CWG is roughly representative of those stakeholders. Any group or entity designated or created to hold steward/oversight responsibility should be similarly representative.
MM: I disagree at the most fundamental level. This position is based on a fallacy. The fallacy is to confuse the accountability and input of ICANN̢۪s policy making process with the accountability of and input into the IANA functions.
All stakeholders should have a voice in and fair representation in the process of policy development. But once a policy is agreed, the implementation of policies by the IANA is a derivative technical and operational function in which its direct customers are the primary stakeholders. Broad public oversight would be meaningless at best (because random members of the public would not know what is going on at that level) and dangerous at worst (because there would be temptations to circumvent agreed policies by politically intervening at the implementation level).
I suspect that people who argue for broad representation of IANA contracting function are people who want there to be a capability for some kind of political circumvention of the policy process at the IANA level. In other words, they think policy should be made by IANA rather than by ICANN. That’s wrong, fundamentally wrong, and that is why IGP – and many others – have argued as a principle that policy and IANA implementation need to be clearly separated. If you want to change policy, do it in the policy process. If you want to monitor technical implementation of a policy by a registry, the operators of a registry are in the best position to do that. Yes, there should be some public interest representation in a contracting authority (IGP proposed that, too) but mainly for transparency purposes and for keeping them honest. IANA should be primarily accountable to the people who actually use its services and whose basic functions and activities are dependent on those services.
Whether or not one thinks they used it, the US government̢۪s authority over modifications to the root zone created the potential for that kind of political intervention at the implementation level. This set a very bad precedent for the world that we are still dealing with. Now some people are trying to reproduce that situation by making IANA oversight a way for interest groups who don̢۪t get what they want in a policy process to get a second, back door bite at the apple. Let̢۪s reject that clearly.
If one knows what the performance of the IANA functions actually are, the idea that every stakeholder in the world should be engaged in “oversight†of its performance is pretty ridiculous. You might as well say there should be public, multistakeholder oversight over what secretaries a registry hires, what cars they rent, what buildings they live in. After all if their cars break down you as a customer might be affected, right? If their building power goes out, you might be affected, right?
If the ccTLD for .za submits a request for a change in its root zone file data neither you, Greg – nor I – are in a position to say whether the request should happen or whether it has been implemented correctly. You may argue that internet users under .za will be affected if the IANA implementation of a root zone change for .za is performed badly, but the answer is that the .za registry would be affected immediately and far more damagingly than any individual customer would be, and in terms of both incentives and knowledge, is in a much better position to prevent that from happening than any other stakeholder. So if you really care about the security, accuracy and accountability of registry changes, we will be relying on the primary users, no matter what kind of a structure we set up.
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