Forwarding a bounced message on behalf of Christopher Wilkinson. From: CW Lists <lists@christopherwilkinson.eu> Date: Wednesday, April 8, 2015 at 2:13 PM To: Client Committee <cwg-client@icann.org> Subject: Fwd: CWG IANA Meeting #34 | 17:00 UTC | 7 April FYI - CW Begin forwarded message:
From: CW Lists <lists@christopherwilkinson.eu> Subject: Re: CWG IANA Meeting #34 | 17:00 UTC | 7 April Date: 7 Apr 2015 18:26:51 GMT+02:00 To: Brenda Brewer <brenda.brewer@icann.org>
Good afternoon:
With a view to thisevening's CWG call may I offer a few comments:
1. Regarding complexity: In the Principles, we have:
3. Fit for purpose: Any new IANA governance mechanisms should not be excessively burdensome and should be fit for purpose.
However, meanwhile, we have 60+ pages of the names Transition Plan (with more to come from the DTs), 30+ pages of advice and comments from Sidley and no information, yet, as to how these Names proposals will be integrated with the IETF and RIR proposals.
I fear that we are well on the way to a 'burdensome' outcome.
2. Regarding Accountability: The Client group has been discussing with Sidley the relation between ICANN accountability and IANA accountability. It is argued that IANA accountability has to be established by CWG independently of and in addition to ICANN accountability in the CCWG.
Be that is it may, and whatever were the merits of the case, today that is certainly not a matter for the Client group and Sidley. All stakeholders have designated their participants in ICG, CCWG, CWG, by and large avoiding duplication and respecting the specificity of each group, including their own accountability and reporting back.
At this late stage in proceedings, any basic change in those arrangements is distinctly not on. That would involve shifting the whole architecture of the transition process, albeit already heavy enough.
3. Regarding Separability: It has recently been stated that legal separation of IANA from ICANN is a requirement. I do not agree. It is at most a last resort fail-safe should all normal recourse fail.
From my point of view and experience, the overwhelming case against legal separation of IANA is that it would create a very small technical entity with substantial power over the interoperability of the global Internet. As such it could easily become a target for capture or acquisition. Protecting against that outcome would require the re-constitution of the oversight that has been so laboriously - and to date imperfectly - created in ICANN.
In that context, I continue to have reservations about the term 'customer' of IANA. They are Users of IANA. 'Customers' implies payment for services rendered. That would cross a Red Line for many of us.
4. Regarding competition: It has been suggested that the CSC would be uni-stakeholder, i.e. Registries only. I must say that had not occurred to me. It is not a very good idea and is an invitation to conflict of interests:
(a) the Registry business is highly concentrated: do you include or exclude the largest Registries in the world? (b) we are told that there will soon be hundreds of gTLD Registries; most of them very small. All of them with an existential interest in IANA and the Root Zone. How will they be represented in the CSC?
(b) thanks to the (flawed) 'vertical integration' policy, it is now possible for a significant number of Registries to be owned by a single Registrar or Company. What is to prevent CSC being dominated by a small group of large Registrars and a few Internet companies?
All oversight and decision making bodies must have a balanced multi-stakeholder composition and powers. Granted that is asking much from most stakeholders, which is why it is critically important to create as few new entities as possible.
Regards
CW
On 03 Apr 2015, at 00:59, Brenda Brewer <brenda.brewer@icann.org> wrote: