Martin, You are making the common mistake of assuming away the institutional underpinnings of the current system and assuming that all will remain the same once those underpinnings change. Separation from policy is currently enforced by the IANA functions contract. The contract ends, then what enforces this separation? I am unconvinced by your arguments that all will be well with a purely internal solution. On its face, making IANA an affiliate, which has some immediate costs but establishes a clearer and more stable organizational arrangement for the long term, provides a stronger and more enforceable separation between policy and clerical implementation. I also don't see how the internal solution provides real separability. --MM
-----Original Message----- Actually, the separation with policy works reasonably well at the moment, with many of the registries being involved on both policy and IANA sides. It just means that the IANA functions operator cannot invent policy on the fly, but has to go back to the policy source if the policy is not clear.
Hope this helps
Martin
-----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship- bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: 13 April 2015 15:57 To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Question for Sidley
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 02:26:02PM +0000, Martin Boyle wrote:
I’m actually quite happy with looking to include much of the IANA
functions operator accountability mechanisms under an enhanced ICANN accountability regime. In my mind this has one crucial element in it – that the stakeholders are present in ICANN already and accountability is to them. Move it somewhere else and the stakeholders have another organisation to watch.
Just to make sure we're in agreement (I assume we are, but best to check), you mean the names-community stakeholders, and not all the IANA stakeholders, right?
Assuming so, then this is a good point. The IETF has (and it appears the RIRs want) one mechanism for accountability, which is the ability to end the agreement and have someone else perform those functions. (Moreover, the RIRs of course do have a formal presence within ICANN, in the ASO.) But if the names community is not to get such an option (I don't know whether it could be negotiated in time), then it could be argued that it would be easier for the names community to provide oversight of one organization than of two.
This does, however, have the negative effect that IANA itself remains entangled with the policy organization. It seems to me that some of those who are worried are mostly worried about that entanglement.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship