Maarten Again I think we are talking past each other. Maybe we should clarify definitions. You talk of "splitting up functions" and based on your comments below, it sounds like you are discussing the splitting up of _names_-related IANA functions. I don't see any reason to do that. When I talk about the different IANA functions, I am talking about the difference between 1) names, 2) protocols and 3) numbers. In fact, the execution of those 3 functions is already 'split' because they are performed by different people in different ways, and the relevant oversight authorities (1. DNS registries and stakeholders, 2. IETF, 3. RIRs and address holders) are all different. There are very few intersections between the IANA functions for names, numbers and protocols. Are we clear(er) now? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Maarten Botterman GNKS Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 5:02 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] CWG RFP 2C - Draft Triage of IANA Functions Contract Milton - taking the risk of asking more questions, and maybe I am indeed the only one taking it in this way, but: I don't think the problem with oversight of names is with the fact that the execution of several functions is carried out by one body. I just don't understand stand why the splitting up of the execution would be needed when indeed realizing that the oversight for different functions is not in one body, nor is likely to be part of one body. And again taking the risk that my contribution may not be what you think it should be, I would highly appreciate it to talk off line, directly if you think I am wasting the time of this forum or your time. Indeed the intent of my contribution is to be helpful, not to waste time. My summary conclusion so far is that: 1- We mostly agree that oversight should be given in the hands of those stakeholders that care most, as their "business" would be directly affected when execution fails; 2- Some stakeholders do not seem to be prepared to invest time in oversight, even if excellent execution is of utmost importance to them, and we seem to want to seek ways to still involve them. My personal opinion is that we should be willing to educate them and involve them, but that we have no power nor right to drag them in by their hairs - and there is currently clearly no common understanding on how to deal with this (ref: to discussion about ccTLDs, specifically ... and IMHO it goes beyond ccTLDs alone). A proposal that may be helpful is the following consideration for managing "names": - Have general oversight from an SSAC/RSAC perspective; - Have specific oversight per domain by stakeholders in those domains (i.e. at the lowest possible level), and consider defining those domains by their specific needs. For instance, I can see that brand domains have very little in common with open gTLDs, or ccTLDs. So (recognizing it is not a full solution, merely a possible direction for solving the problem) my proposal would be to embrace the principle of "subsidiarity" ... taking decisions at the lowest level where they can be taken, ideally by those that are directly affected. And this would require defining specific domains. Hope this is helpful. Best Maarten From: Milton L Mueller [mailto:mueller@syr.edu] Sent: maandag 27 oktober 2014 21:18 To: 'Maarten Botterman GNKS'; 'cwg-stewardship@icann.org' Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] CWG RFP 2C - Draft Triage of IANA Functions Contract Maarten I guess you didn't understand my point. The possibility of separating the execution of the functions has nothing to do with how well or how poorly the IANA practical work is performed now. It has to do precisely with what you say needs attention: the oversight function. Oversight for names may or may not be optimized by combining it with oversight for the other functions. What happens, e.g., if one part is performed well and the other poorly? The requirements and procedures are radically different. This is a fact. At any rate, I would encourage you to follow your own advice and "keep busy" developing a proposal that solve the problem for names, and let the other functions worry about their issues, and let the ICG worry about how they fit together when the proposals are in. Deal? --MM From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Maarten Botterman GNKS Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 1:11 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] CWG RFP 2C - Draft Triage of IANA Functions Contract I'm with Avri on this. Never heard anyone being unhappy about the IANA practical work ("IANA functions") as such, I think the world sees that that works, and an old saying in IT is "don't fix it if it isn't broken". It works. Let's keep the focus on where it is to be, effectively: on the oversight function organization. A challenge big enough to keep us busy without also considering a different organization of the functions at the same time - in particular when there is no apparent need for that. Or did I miss something? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Avri Doria Sent: maandag 27 oktober 2014 3:20 To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] CWG RFP 2C - Draft Triage of IANA Functions Contract On 27-Oct-14 00:31, Milton L Mueller wrote: C.2.4. Assumes that all of the IANA functions are in the same entity. This assumption is not warranted at the present time. Except that the assumption of this exercise is to change as few things as possible and an assumption that they can or even should be moved to seperate entities is not warranted. The solition does not need to match the structure of the operational communities doing the recommendations. Without an anaylisis of the effect of seperation, I think it unwise to assume they can or should be split. I therefore would rather assume that the unity of IANA should be preserved until such time as it is proved that sperating them is the better solution. And until it is proven that sperating them invovles no risk. Even the IETF which is assuming it can pull out of IANA at any time has not done a complete analysis of the risks of doing so. Until we are sure that it does not pose a risk to the Internet, we ought to be careful about dumping this requirement. avri