The Reverse Hybrid Model
All, Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration. For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model." In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party). As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope. It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA). Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible. While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN. While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered. Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City. Greg Kind regards to both Best Paul
Hi Greg (and Paul), Isn’t this this simply the return of contract co ? And didn’t we in Istanbul decide to leave this further aside a it was quit clear that there was not much of support for it? Maarten From: Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Reply-To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 07:41 To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, Client <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Subject: [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model All, Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration. For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model." In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party). As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope. It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA). Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible. While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN. While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered. Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City. Greg [https://ssl.gstatic.com/ui/v1/icons/mail/images/cleardot.gif] Kind regards to both Best Paul
I personally tend to see it that way Maarten... Thanks for articulating it so clearly though *Cheryl Langdon-O**rr ... *(CLO) about.me/cheryl.LangdonOrr [image: Cheryl Langdon-Orr on about.me] <http://about.me/cheryl.LangdonOrr> On 14 April 2015 at 16:59, Maarten Simon <maarten.simon@sidn.nl> wrote:
Hi Greg (and Paul),
Isn’t this this simply the return of contract co ? And didn’t we in Istanbul decide to leave this further aside a it was quit clear that there was not much of support for it?
Maarten
From: Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org> Reply-To: "cwg-client@icann.org" <cwg-client@icann.org> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 07:41 To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, Client < cwg-client@icann.org> Subject: [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model
All,
Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration.
For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model."
In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party).
As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope.
It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA).
Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible.
While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN.
While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN.
More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability.
I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered.
Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City.
Greg
Kind regards to both
Best
Paul
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Agreed. -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On April 14, 2015 3:04:50 AM EDT, Cheryl Langdon-Orr <langdonorr@gmail.com> wrote:
I personally tend to see it that way Maarten... Thanks for articulating it so clearly though
*Cheryl Langdon-O**rr ... *(CLO)
about.me/cheryl.LangdonOrr [image: Cheryl Langdon-Orr on about.me] <http://about.me/cheryl.LangdonOrr>
On 14 April 2015 at 16:59, Maarten Simon <maarten.simon@sidn.nl> wrote:
Hi Greg (and Paul),
Isn’t this this simply the return of contract co ? And didn’t we in Istanbul decide to leave this further aside a it was quit clear that there was not much of support for it?
Maarten
From: Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org> Reply-To: "cwg-client@icann.org" <cwg-client@icann.org> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 07:41 To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, Client < cwg-client@icann.org> Subject: [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model
All,
Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration.
For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model."
In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party).
As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope.
It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA).
Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible.
While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN.
While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN.
More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability.
I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered.
Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City.
Greg
Kind regards to both
Best
Paul
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
------------------------------------------------------------------------
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Thanks Greg for putting together this variant. I don't see this as the return of the Contract Co model which was a completely separate structure - this variation of the legally separated affiliate model offers far greater predictability and certainty. I support further consideration of this variation by our legal advisers and also wanted to highlight two key points at the end of Greg's e-mail: /While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability./ Matthew On 4/14/2015 8:59 AM, Client Committee List for CWG wrote:
Hi Greg (and Paul),
Isn’t this this simply the return of contract co ? And didn’t we in Istanbul decide to leave this further aside a it was quit clear that there was not much of support for it?
Maarten
From: Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org <mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Reply-To: "cwg-client@icann.org <mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org <mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 07:41 To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, Client <cwg-client@icann.org <mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Subject: [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model
All,
Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration.
For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model."
In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party).
As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope.
It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA).
Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible.
While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN.
While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN.
More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability.
I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered.
Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City.
Greg
Kind regards to both
Best
Paul
_______________________________________________ Cwg-client mailing list Cwg-client@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client
-- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987
Hi Matthew, I do not think it to be useful to open this discussion as it in my opinion is the return of Contract co and it is also clear that the idea behind it (oversight in a separate entity) will not be acceptable for a serious number of us and we have enough other difficulties already on our plate. Best, Maarten From: Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 09:32 To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Thanks Greg for putting together this variant. I don't see this as the return of the Contract Co model which was a completely separate structure - this variation of the legally separated affiliate model offers far greater predictability and certainty. I support further consideration of this variation by our legal advisers and also wanted to highlight two key points at the end of Greg's e-mail: While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. Matthew On 4/14/2015 8:59 AM, Client Committee List for CWG wrote: Hi Greg (and Paul), Isn’t this this simply the return of contract co ? And didn’t we in Istanbul decide to leave this further aside a it was quit clear that there was not much of support for it? Maarten From: Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Reply-To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 07:41 To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, Client <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Subject: [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model All, Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration. For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model." In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party). As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope. It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA). Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible. While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN. While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered. Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City. Greg [https://ssl.gstatic.com/ui/v1/icons/mail/images/cleardot.gif] Kind regards to both Best Paul _______________________________________________ Cwg-client mailing list Cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:Cwg-client@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client -- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987
Maarten: An internal solution is also unacceptable for a serious number of us. Why do we keep discussing it? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Maarten Simon Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 3:48 AM To: Matthew Shears; cwg-client@icann.org; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Hi Matthew, I do not think it to be useful to open this discussion as it in my opinion is the return of Contract co and it is also clear that the idea behind it (oversight in a separate entity) will not be acceptable for a serious number of us and we have enough other difficulties already on our plate. Best, Maarten From: Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 09:32 To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Thanks Greg for putting together this variant. I don't see this as the return of the Contract Co model which was a completely separate structure - this variation of the legally separated affiliate model offers far greater predictability and certainty. I support further consideration of this variation by our legal advisers and also wanted to highlight two key points at the end of Greg's e-mail: While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. Matthew On 4/14/2015 8:59 AM, Client Committee List for CWG wrote: Hi Greg (and Paul), Isn't this this simply the return of contract co ? And didn't we in Istanbul decide to leave this further aside a it was quit clear that there was not much of support for it? Maarten From: Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Reply-To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 07:41 To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, Client <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Subject: [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model All, Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration. For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model." In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party). As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope. It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA). Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible. While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN. While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered. Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City. Greg [Image removed by sender.] Kind regards to both Best Paul _______________________________________________ Cwg-client mailing list Cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:Cwg-client@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client -- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987
Because we decided in Istanbul to go that way From: Milton Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 09:50 To: SIDN SIDN <maarten.simon@sidn.nl<mailto:maarten.simon@sidn.nl>>, Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org>>, "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Maarten: An internal solution is also unacceptable for a serious number of us. Why do we keep discussing it? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Maarten Simon Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 3:48 AM To: Matthew Shears; cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Hi Matthew, I do not think it to be useful to open this discussion as it in my opinion is the return of Contract co and it is also clear that the idea behind it (oversight in a separate entity) will not be acceptable for a serious number of us and we have enough other difficulties already on our plate. Best, Maarten From: Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 09:32 To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Thanks Greg for putting together this variant. I don't see this as the return of the Contract Co model which was a completely separate structure - this variation of the legally separated affiliate model offers far greater predictability and certainty. I support further consideration of this variation by our legal advisers and also wanted to highlight two key points at the end of Greg's e-mail: While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. Matthew On 4/14/2015 8:59 AM, Client Committee List for CWG wrote: Hi Greg (and Paul), Isn’t this this simply the return of contract co ? And didn’t we in Istanbul decide to leave this further aside a it was quit clear that there was not much of support for it? Maarten From: Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Reply-To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 07:41 To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, Client <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Subject: [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model All, Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration. For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model." In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party). As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope. It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA). Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible. While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN. While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered. Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City. Greg [Image removed by sender.] Kind regards to both Best Paul _______________________________________________ Cwg-client mailing list Cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:Cwg-client@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client -- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987
Maarten, I thought the decision at Istanbul was that while Contract Co is not being discarded, an opportunity is being given to discuss the two internal variants of functional separation and legal separation by putting them in the forefront. Avri put this as “It’s not that we’re killing or canceling the Contract Co. It is put it in the background. It sits there.” Your assertion that any discussion on Contract Co should be discouraged, as a result of the Istanbul meeting, is incorrect. Personally, the decision to stop focusing on Contract Co at the Istanbul meeting was quite disturbing for me. This decision was made at the last session of the last day and no clear rationale was offered for it. The transcripts clearly reflect that the CWG made attempts to predict what the US Government may accept as a final proposal. Such determination and predictions went beyond the 4 principles already prescribed by NTIA. The special stakeholder status given to the US Government is completely unacceptable to the equal footing multistakeholder model. https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=52893304 If the pro-internalists are seriously opposed to Contract Co (and anything remotely similar like the reverse hybrid model) to the extent that they discourage discussions on it, I would join Milton is asserting that the functional separation model is completely unacceptable to most of us and should not be discussed at all. Alternatively, we could keep our ears open to all discussions and be flexible to all variants; instead of taking such strong positions. Regards, Guru On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 1:25 PM, Client Committee List for CWG < cwg-client@icann.org> wrote:
Because we decided in Istanbul to go that way
From: Milton Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 09:50 To: SIDN SIDN <maarten.simon@sidn.nl>, Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org>, " cwg-client@icann.org" <cwg-client@icann.org>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model
Maarten:
An internal solution is also unacceptable for a serious number of us. Why do we keep discussing it?
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [ mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Maarten Simon *Sent:* Tuesday, April 14, 2015 3:48 AM *To:* Matthew Shears; cwg-client@icann.org; cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model
Hi Matthew,
I do not think it to be useful to open this discussion as it in my opinion is the return of Contract co and it is also clear that the idea behind it (oversight in a separate entity) will not be acceptable for a serious number of us and we have enough other difficulties already on our plate.
Best,
Maarten
*From: *Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org> *Date: *Tuesday 14 April 2015 09:32 *To: *"cwg-client@icann.org" <cwg-client@icann.org>, " cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> *Subject: *Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model
Thanks Greg for putting together this variant.
I don't see this as the return of the Contract Co model which was a completely separate structure - this variation of the legally separated affiliate model offers far greater predictability and certainty.
I support further consideration of this variation by our legal advisers and also wanted to highlight two key points at the end of Greg's e-mail:
*While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability.*
Matthew
On 4/14/2015 8:59 AM, Client Committee List for CWG wrote:
Hi Greg (and Paul),
Isn’t this this simply the return of contract co ? And didn’t we in Istanbul decide to leave this further aside a it was quit clear that there was not much of support for it?
Maarten
*From: *Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org> *Reply-To: *"cwg-client@icann.org" <cwg-client@icann.org> *Date: *Tuesday 14 April 2015 07:41 *To: *"cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, Client < cwg-client@icann.org> *Subject: *[client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model
All,
Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration.
For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model."
In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party).
As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope.
It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA).
Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible.
While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN.
While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN.
More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability.
I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered.
Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City.
Greg
[image: Image removed by sender.]
Kind regards to both
Best
Paul
_______________________________________________
Cwg-client mailing list
Cwg-client@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client
--
Matthew Shears
Global Internet Policy and Human Rights
Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT)
+ 44 (0)771 247 2987
_______________________________________________ Cwg-client mailing list Cwg-client@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client
For participants who have joined this debate later on it could perhaps be useful that the interested persons elaborate on how this new variant would fit with the aspects of common ground already accepted and how this variant might differentiate itself from the original “contract co” model. In so doing we could enable all of us to have a fact-based approach discussion on this… Best Jorge Cancio Von: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] Im Auftrag von Guru Acharya Gesendet: Dienstag, 14. April 2015 10:30 An: cwg-client@icann.org Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Betreff: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Maarten, I thought the decision at Istanbul was that while Contract Co is not being discarded, an opportunity is being given to discuss the two internal variants of functional separation and legal separation by putting them in the forefront. Avri put this as “It’s not that we’re killing or canceling the Contract Co. It is put it in the background. It sits there.” Your assertion that any discussion on Contract Co should be discouraged, as a result of the Istanbul meeting, is incorrect. Personally, the decision to stop focusing on Contract Co at the Istanbul meeting was quite disturbing for me. This decision was made at the last session of the last day and no clear rationale was offered for it. The transcripts clearly reflect that the CWG made attempts to predict what the US Government may accept as a final proposal. Such determination and predictions went beyond the 4 principles already prescribed by NTIA. The special stakeholder status given to the US Government is completely unacceptable to the equal footing multistakeholder model. https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=52893304 If the pro-internalists are seriously opposed to Contract Co (and anything remotely similar like the reverse hybrid model) to the extent that they discourage discussions on it, I would join Milton is asserting that the functional separation model is completely unacceptable to most of us and should not be discussed at all. Alternatively, we could keep our ears open to all discussions and be flexible to all variants; instead of taking such strong positions. Regards, Guru On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 1:25 PM, Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> wrote: Because we decided in Istanbul to go that way From: Milton Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 09:50 To: SIDN SIDN <maarten.simon@sidn.nl<mailto:maarten.simon@sidn.nl>>, Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org>>, "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Maarten: An internal solution is also unacceptable for a serious number of us. Why do we keep discussing it? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Maarten Simon Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 3:48 AM To: Matthew Shears; cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Hi Matthew, I do not think it to be useful to open this discussion as it in my opinion is the return of Contract co and it is also clear that the idea behind it (oversight in a separate entity) will not be acceptable for a serious number of us and we have enough other difficulties already on our plate. Best, Maarten From: Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 09:32 To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Thanks Greg for putting together this variant. I don't see this as the return of the Contract Co model which was a completely separate structure - this variation of the legally separated affiliate model offers far greater predictability and certainty. I support further consideration of this variation by our legal advisers and also wanted to highlight two key points at the end of Greg's e-mail: While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. Matthew On 4/14/2015 8:59 AM, Client Committee List for CWG wrote: Hi Greg (and Paul), Isn’t this this simply the return of contract co ? And didn’t we in Istanbul decide to leave this further aside a it was quit clear that there was not much of support for it? Maarten From: Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Reply-To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 07:41 To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, Client <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Subject: [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model All, Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration. For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model." In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party). As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope. It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA). Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible. While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN. While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered. Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City. Greg [Image removed by sender.] Kind regards to both Best Paul _______________________________________________ Cwg-client mailing list Cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:Cwg-client@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client -- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987 _______________________________________________ Cwg-client mailing list Cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:Cwg-client@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client
Hi Guru, My personal feeling is that if we want to reach a solution here and within the limited time we still have, we need to follow the path we have chosen and not go back having discussions on the models that we have placed on the back burner. Of course we should go back to it if it becomes clear that the model we are working on does not fulfil the expectations we had. But until now I do not see that to be the case. Best, Maarten From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya@gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya@gmail.com>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 10:29 To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Cc: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Maarten, I thought the decision at Istanbul was that while Contract Co is not being discarded, an opportunity is being given to discuss the two internal variants of functional separation and legal separation by putting them in the forefront. Avri put this as “It’s not that we’re killing or canceling the Contract Co. It is put it in the background. It sits there.” Your assertion that any discussion on Contract Co should be discouraged, as a result of the Istanbul meeting, is incorrect. Personally, the decision to stop focusing on Contract Co at the Istanbul meeting was quite disturbing for me. This decision was made at the last session of the last day and no clear rationale was offered for it. The transcripts clearly reflect that the CWG made attempts to predict what the US Government may accept as a final proposal. Such determination and predictions went beyond the 4 principles already prescribed by NTIA. The special stakeholder status given to the US Government is completely unacceptable to the equal footing multistakeholder model. https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=52893304 If the pro-internalists are seriously opposed to Contract Co (and anything remotely similar like the reverse hybrid model) to the extent that they discourage discussions on it, I would join Milton is asserting that the functional separation model is completely unacceptable to most of us and should not be discussed at all. Alternatively, we could keep our ears open to all discussions and be flexible to all variants; instead of taking such strong positions. Regards, Guru On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 1:25 PM, Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> wrote: Because we decided in Istanbul to go that way From: Milton Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 09:50 To: SIDN SIDN <maarten.simon@sidn.nl<mailto:maarten.simon@sidn.nl>>, Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org>>, "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Maarten: An internal solution is also unacceptable for a serious number of us. Why do we keep discussing it? From:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Maarten Simon Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 3:48 AM To: Matthew Shears; cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Hi Matthew, I do not think it to be useful to open this discussion as it in my opinion is the return of Contract co and it is also clear that the idea behind it (oversight in a separate entity) will not be acceptable for a serious number of us and we have enough other difficulties already on our plate. Best, Maarten From: Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 09:32 To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Thanks Greg for putting together this variant. I don't see this as the return of the Contract Co model which was a completely separate structure - this variation of the legally separated affiliate model offers far greater predictability and certainty. I support further consideration of this variation by our legal advisers and also wanted to highlight two key points at the end of Greg's e-mail: While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. Matthew On 4/14/2015 8:59 AM, Client Committee List for CWG wrote: Hi Greg (and Paul), Isn’t this this simply the return of contract co ? And didn’t we in Istanbul decide to leave this further aside a it was quit clear that there was not much of support for it? Maarten From: Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Reply-To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 07:41 To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, Client <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Subject: [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model All, Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration. For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model." In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party). As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope. It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA). Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible. While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN. While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered. Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City. Greg [Image removed by sender.] Kind regards to both Best Paul _______________________________________________ Cwg-client mailing list Cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:Cwg-client@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client -- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987 _______________________________________________ Cwg-client mailing list Cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:Cwg-client@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client
Providing we don’t find ourselves retreading ground already covered, I do agree with Guru that “we could keep our ears open to all discussions and be flexible to all variants’, emphasis on ‘variants’ and not on totally new solutions. In other words, I am not advocating on spending a lot of time on totally new models, but if this new model has some ideas that could be included in the models we are now exploring, I think we should do that. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 4:30 AM To: cwg-client@icann.org Cc: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Maarten, I thought the decision at Istanbul was that while Contract Co is not being discarded, an opportunity is being given to discuss the two internal variants of functional separation and legal separation by putting them in the forefront. Avri put this as “It’s not that we’re killing or canceling the Contract Co. It is put it in the background. It sits there.” Your assertion that any discussion on Contract Co should be discouraged, as a result of the Istanbul meeting, is incorrect. Personally, the decision to stop focusing on Contract Co at the Istanbul meeting was quite disturbing for me. This decision was made at the last session of the last day and no clear rationale was offered for it. The transcripts clearly reflect that the CWG made attempts to predict what the US Government may accept as a final proposal. Such determination and predictions went beyond the 4 principles already prescribed by NTIA. The special stakeholder status given to the US Government is completely unacceptable to the equal footing multistakeholder model. https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=52893304 If the pro-internalists are seriously opposed to Contract Co (and anything remotely similar like the reverse hybrid model) to the extent that they discourage discussions on it, I would join Milton is asserting that the functional separation model is completely unacceptable to most of us and should not be discussed at all. Alternatively, we could keep our ears open to all discussions and be flexible to all variants; instead of taking such strong positions. Regards, Guru On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 1:25 PM, Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> wrote: Because we decided in Istanbul to go that way From: Milton Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 09:50 To: SIDN SIDN <maarten.simon@sidn.nl<mailto:maarten.simon@sidn.nl>>, Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org>>, "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: RE: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Maarten: An internal solution is also unacceptable for a serious number of us. Why do we keep discussing it? From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Maarten Simon Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 3:48 AM To: Matthew Shears; cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Hi Matthew, I do not think it to be useful to open this discussion as it in my opinion is the return of Contract co and it is also clear that the idea behind it (oversight in a separate entity) will not be acceptable for a serious number of us and we have enough other difficulties already on our plate. Best, Maarten From: Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 09:32 To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Thanks Greg for putting together this variant. I don't see this as the return of the Contract Co model which was a completely separate structure - this variation of the legally separated affiliate model offers far greater predictability and certainty. I support further consideration of this variation by our legal advisers and also wanted to highlight two key points at the end of Greg's e-mail: While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. Matthew On 4/14/2015 8:59 AM, Client Committee List for CWG wrote: Hi Greg (and Paul), Isn’t this this simply the return of contract co ? And didn’t we in Istanbul decide to leave this further aside a it was quit clear that there was not much of support for it? Maarten From: Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Reply-To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 07:41 To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, Client <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Subject: [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model All, Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration. For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model." In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party). As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope. It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA). Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible. While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN. While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered. Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City. Greg [Image removed by sender.] Kind regards to both Best Paul _______________________________________________ Cwg-client mailing list Cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:Cwg-client@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client -- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987 _______________________________________________ Cwg-client mailing list Cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:Cwg-client@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client
From: Maarten Simon [mailto:maarten.simon@sidn.nl] Because we decided in Istanbul to go that way MM: That's not my understanding of what was decided. What was decided in Istanbul was that Contract Co would be set aside while we explored the middle ground options. There was no point to continue discussing Contract co because we all were familiar with it. But that does not prevent us from exploring a different model that is similar (e.g., reverse hybrid). If the reason for not discussing it is that it cannot achieve consensus, then we have to stop discussing the internal model, too.
I again agree with Maarten... *Cheryl Langdon-O**rr ... *(CLO) about.me/cheryl.LangdonOrr [image: Cheryl Langdon-Orr on about.me] <http://about.me/cheryl.LangdonOrr> On 14 April 2015 at 17:47, Maarten Simon <maarten.simon@sidn.nl> wrote:
Hi Matthew,
I do not think it to be useful to open this discussion as it in my opinion is the return of Contract co and it is also clear that the idea behind it (oversight in a separate entity) will not be acceptable for a serious number of us and we have enough other difficulties already on our plate.
Best,
Maarten
From: Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 09:32 To: "cwg-client@icann.org" <cwg-client@icann.org>, " cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model
Thanks Greg for putting together this variant.
I don't see this as the return of the Contract Co model which was a completely separate structure - this variation of the legally separated affiliate model offers far greater predictability and certainty.
I support further consideration of this variation by our legal advisers and also wanted to highlight two key points at the end of Greg's e-mail:
*While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability.*
Matthew
On 4/14/2015 8:59 AM, Client Committee List for CWG wrote:
Hi Greg (and Paul),
Isn’t this this simply the return of contract co ? And didn’t we in Istanbul decide to leave this further aside a it was quit clear that there was not much of support for it?
Maarten
From: Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org> Reply-To: "cwg-client@icann.org" <cwg-client@icann.org> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 07:41 To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org>, Client < cwg-client@icann.org> Subject: [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model
All,
Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration.
For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model."
In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party).
As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope.
It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA).
Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible.
While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN.
While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN.
More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability.
I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered.
Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City.
Greg
Kind regards to both
Best
Paul
_______________________________________________ Cwg-client mailing listCwg-client@icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client
-- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT)+ 44 (0)771 247 2987
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
I could be wrong because I haven't spent a lot of time analyzing the new model, but I am not convinced that it is a return to contract co. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Maarten Simon Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 3:48 AM To: Matthew Shears; cwg-client@icann.org; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Hi Matthew, I do not think it to be useful to open this discussion as it in my opinion is the return of Contract co and it is also clear that the idea behind it (oversight in a separate entity) will not be acceptable for a serious number of us and we have enough other difficulties already on our plate. Best, Maarten From: Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 09:32 To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model Thanks Greg for putting together this variant. I don't see this as the return of the Contract Co model which was a completely separate structure - this variation of the legally separated affiliate model offers far greater predictability and certainty. I support further consideration of this variation by our legal advisers and also wanted to highlight two key points at the end of Greg's e-mail: While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. Matthew On 4/14/2015 8:59 AM, Client Committee List for CWG wrote: Hi Greg (and Paul), Isn't this this simply the return of contract co ? And didn't we in Istanbul decide to leave this further aside a it was quit clear that there was not much of support for it? Maarten From: Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Reply-To: "cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>" <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Date: Tuesday 14 April 2015 07:41 To: "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>>, Client <cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:cwg-client@icann.org>> Subject: [client com] The Reverse Hybrid Model All, Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration. For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model." In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party). As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope. It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA). Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible. While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN. While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN. More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability. I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered. Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City. Greg [https://ssl.gstatic.com/ui/v1/icons/mail/images/cleardot.gif] Kind regards to both Best Paul _______________________________________________ Cwg-client mailing list Cwg-client@icann.org<mailto:Cwg-client@icann.org>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client -- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987
Reading this after being woken up at 02:50 am makes my head hurt!!!!!!!!!!!! -- Sent from my mobile. Please excuse brevity and typos. On April 14, 2015 1:41:41 AM EDT, Client Committee List for CWG <cwg-client@icann.org> wrote:
All,
Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration.
For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model."
In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party).
As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope.
It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA).
Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible.
While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN.
While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN.
More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability.
I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered.
Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City.
Greg
Kind regards to both
Best
Paul
------------------------------------------------------------------------
_______________________________________________ Cwg-client mailing list Cwg-client@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-client
Thanks for this Greg and thanks to Paul for the suggestion. I know that time is of the essence and a resource that nobody appears to have enough of, but a diagram (even very simple, perhaps drawn by hand & scanned) would help in our understanding. Kindest regards, Olivier On 14/04/2015 07:41, Greg Shatan wrote:
All,
Paul Kane among others has suggested a variation on the current "internal" models. Rather than quashing it, I thought it was proper to give it appropriate consideration. As Paul is traveling, I thought I would put this together so that it could be given such consideration.
For the sake of convenience, I'm calling it the "Reverse Hybrid Model."
In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions. Rather than having the right to perform the IANA Functions itself, the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator. (Thus, the Affiliate would be set up as a supervisor, not as an operator.) Initially (but not perpetually), that subcontracted entity would be ICANN, the current IANA Functions Operator. However, the Affiliate would have the option, under the circumstances designated by the CWG, to separate the performance of the IANA Functions from ICANN (e.g., by issuing an RFP and enter into an agreement with a third party).
As with the current internal models, ICANN Corporate would be the only member of the Affiliate. The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate, which would have a limited (and defined) scope.
It may appear that ICANN is granting a right to itself, through the Affiliate. However, the key is that the Affiliate would have the oversight and stewardship responsibility over the IANA Functions, by exercising the rights and powers it has under the agreement with the IANA Functions Operator. In other words, the Affiliate would be the contractor with oversight of ICANN-as-IANA Functions Operator, and would also have the right to exercise escalation rights, up to and including issuing an RFP and potentially a contract to a third party if the designated triggers warranted it. The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator (initially, ICANN-as-IANA).
Under the irrevocable agreement, ICANN would retain "ownership" of the IANA Function Operator rights but the Affiliate would (irrevocably) hold the right to subcontract for the performance of those services. Although ICANN would be the only member, we would need to insure that its rights as the member to override the Board were as limited as possible.
While this does not structurally separate the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN, it does separate the stewardship and the decision-making rights regarding the performance of the operations from ICANN. As with the second option under the current hybrid proposal, there would be functional separation of the IANA Function operations from the rest of ICANN.
While structural separation of the IANA Functions operations does make a certain kind of future total separation easier (spinning off the current IANA Functions Operator within ICANN), this is really the less likely form of total separation. The more likely form of total separation would be the selection of a new IANA Functions Operator, and that right would be structurally separated from ICANN.
More importantly from an operational perspective, the oversight and stewardship over the operations of the IANA Functions would be structurally separated from ICANN. It would be firmly in the CSC, the PRT and the multistakeholder board. This would be the primary job of the Affiliate, putting service accountability front and center. Yet, it does not slight separability.
I believe this proposal has sufficient merit to warrant due consideration. One of the reasons we have engaged Sidley is so that we can understand the viability and desirability of various models and mechanisms (and so I and other don't have to "play lawyer"). In that spirit, I am forwarding this model to both the CCWG and the Client Committee so that this "Reverse Hybrid" model can be appropriately considered.
Speak to you all in a few hours, as dawn rises over New York City.
Greg
Kind regards to both
Best
Paul
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- Olivier MJ Crépin-Leblond, PhD http://www.gih.com/ocl.html
Hi Greg, Thanks for taking the time to lay out this model carefully. I think it's good to expose it, but I think the exposure makes it clear it isn't worth pursuing in greater depth. More below. On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 01:41:41AM -0400, Greg Shatan wrote:
In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions.
The difficulty I see with the proposal lies in those two statements. My view is that ICANN is not the "source of the right" to perform the functions. The source of the right to perform the protocol parameters function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the IETF), and the source of the right to perform the number resources function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the RIRs). The basic problem with this model (and this interpretation of your description) is that it requires a fundamental assumption that the functions are welded together, and that there is a single body responsible for "stewardship" of them. This is something that the other communities simply don't believe. I therefore don't think there would be value in further elaboration of study of this model, because anything that proposes a single source of stewardship for all the functions won't fly. If, on the other hand, the model is supposed to be one in which the affiliate gets the right to contract for an entity to act as the naming functions operator only, then it isn't clear to me what work this wheel is supposed to do. In order for it to be an effective steward of only those functions, it basically needs somehow to perform the job of the community for names functions. But we already have a policy body for names functions, however imperfect: ICANN, or perhaps some subset of it. So, to perform this stewardship function for names, the affiliate would have to instantiate most (or all) of the accountability measures that ICANN needs anyway. This seems like an excellent way to re-open a number of prior decisions. Moreover, it strikes me that it's quite likely to deliver subtle differences with the existing mechanisms, which would offer a tempting opportunity to game the system, a potential for procedural deadlock, or both. Therefore, no matter which way I interpret this model, it seems to me that it can't possibly yield enough benefit to be worth exploring in greater detail. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
Your points Andrew seem useful to me as well as the points made by others regarding this model. Like several have said, I am not in favor of reopening closed issues but I do wonder if there are some elements of the this new model that could be used to improve our solution. But before the CWG spends any more time on this model, I would at least like to get a high level response from Sidley as to whether they think there may be some ideas in the model that could be useful. Chuck -----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 4:17 AM To: Greg Shatan Cc: Client; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The Reverse Hybrid Model Hi Greg, Thanks for taking the time to lay out this model carefully. I think it's good to expose it, but I think the exposure makes it clear it isn't worth pursuing in greater depth. More below. On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 01:41:41AM -0400, Greg Shatan wrote:
In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions.
The difficulty I see with the proposal lies in those two statements. My view is that ICANN is not the "source of the right" to perform the functions. The source of the right to perform the protocol parameters function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the IETF), and the source of the right to perform the number resources function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the RIRs). The basic problem with this model (and this interpretation of your description) is that it requires a fundamental assumption that the functions are welded together, and that there is a single body responsible for "stewardship" of them. This is something that the other communities simply don't believe. I therefore don't think there would be value in further elaboration of study of this model, because anything that proposes a single source of stewardship for all the functions won't fly. If, on the other hand, the model is supposed to be one in which the affiliate gets the right to contract for an entity to act as the naming functions operator only, then it isn't clear to me what work this wheel is supposed to do. In order for it to be an effective steward of only those functions, it basically needs somehow to perform the job of the community for names functions. But we already have a policy body for names functions, however imperfect: ICANN, or perhaps some subset of it. So, to perform this stewardship function for names, the affiliate would have to instantiate most (or all) of the accountability measures that ICANN needs anyway. This seems like an excellent way to re-open a number of prior decisions. Moreover, it strikes me that it's quite likely to deliver subtle differences with the existing mechanisms, which would offer a tempting opportunity to game the system, a potential for procedural deadlock, or both. Therefore, no matter which way I interpret this model, it seems to me that it can't possibly yield enough benefit to be worth exploring in greater detail. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 9:54 AM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com> wrote:
Your points Andrew seem useful to me as well as the points made by others regarding this model. Like several have said, I am not in favor of reopening closed issues but I do wonder if there are some elements of the this new model that could be used to improve our solution.
+1 and will be good if that ponder can come after we have a clear direction on the 2 proposals we currently have under review
But before the CWG spends any more time on this model, I would at least like to get a high level response from Sidley as to whether they think there may be some ideas in the model that could be useful.
I am of a personal opinion that we don't load-up/increase the working hours of Sidley with this for now....we have set some directions for them already and they are working on it. Perhaps when we have exhausted the 2 options we currently have on the table and could not come to a single option then we can task Sidley. Regards
Chuck
-----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 4:17 AM To: Greg Shatan Cc: Client; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The Reverse Hybrid Model
Hi Greg,
Thanks for taking the time to lay out this model carefully. I think it's good to expose it, but I think the exposure makes it clear it isn't worth pursuing in greater depth. More below.
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 01:41:41AM -0400, Greg Shatan wrote:
In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions.
The difficulty I see with the proposal lies in those two statements.
My view is that ICANN is not the "source of the right" to perform the functions. The source of the right to perform the protocol parameters function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the IETF), and the source of the right to perform the number resources function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the RIRs).
The basic problem with this model (and this interpretation of your description) is that it requires a fundamental assumption that the functions are welded together, and that there is a single body responsible for "stewardship" of them. This is something that the other communities simply don't believe.
I therefore don't think there would be value in further elaboration of study of this model, because anything that proposes a single source of stewardship for all the functions won't fly.
If, on the other hand, the model is supposed to be one in which the affiliate gets the right to contract for an entity to act as the naming functions operator only, then it isn't clear to me what work this wheel is supposed to do. In order for it to be an effective steward of only those functions, it basically needs somehow to perform the job of the community for names functions. But we already have a policy body for names functions, however imperfect: ICANN, or perhaps some subset of it. So, to perform this stewardship function for names, the affiliate would have to instantiate most (or all) of the accountability measures that ICANN needs anyway. This seems like an excellent way to re-open a number of prior decisions. Moreover, it strikes me that it's quite likely to deliver subtle differences with the existing mechanisms, which would offer a tempting opportunity to game the system, a potential for procedural deadlock, or both.
Therefore, no matter which way I interpret this model, it seems to me that it can't possibly yield enough benefit to be worth exploring in greater detail.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* The key to understanding is humility - my view !
Note Seun that I suggested that we ask Sidley to provide ‘a high level response’; that was intentional on my part because I also think it is important to use Sidley’s time as effectively as possible. And I also have concerns about working in a serial manner because I don’t think we have the time for that. Besides, if there are ideas in this new model that can be used in what we are currently considering, it would be better to identify them now rather than later. Chuck From: Seun Ojedeji [mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 5:20 AM To: Gomes, Chuck Cc: Andrew Sullivan; Greg Shatan; Client; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The Reverse Hybrid Model On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 9:54 AM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com<mailto:cgomes@verisign.com>> wrote: Your points Andrew seem useful to me as well as the points made by others regarding this model. Like several have said, I am not in favor of reopening closed issues but I do wonder if there are some elements of the this new model that could be used to improve our solution. +1 and will be good if that ponder can come after we have a clear direction on the 2 proposals we currently have under review But before the CWG spends any more time on this model, I would at least like to get a high level response from Sidley as to whether they think there may be some ideas in the model that could be useful. I am of a personal opinion that we don't load-up/increase the working hours of Sidley with this for now....we have set some directions for them already and they are working on it. Perhaps when we have exhausted the 2 options we currently have on the table and could not come to a single option then we can task Sidley. Regards Chuck -----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 4:17 AM To: Greg Shatan Cc: Client; cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The Reverse Hybrid Model Hi Greg, Thanks for taking the time to lay out this model carefully. I think it's good to expose it, but I think the exposure makes it clear it isn't worth pursuing in greater depth. More below. On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 01:41:41AM -0400, Greg Shatan wrote:
In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions.
The difficulty I see with the proposal lies in those two statements. My view is that ICANN is not the "source of the right" to perform the functions. The source of the right to perform the protocol parameters function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the IETF), and the source of the right to perform the number resources function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the RIRs). The basic problem with this model (and this interpretation of your description) is that it requires a fundamental assumption that the functions are welded together, and that there is a single body responsible for "stewardship" of them. This is something that the other communities simply don't believe. I therefore don't think there would be value in further elaboration of study of this model, because anything that proposes a single source of stewardship for all the functions won't fly. If, on the other hand, the model is supposed to be one in which the affiliate gets the right to contract for an entity to act as the naming functions operator only, then it isn't clear to me what work this wheel is supposed to do. In order for it to be an effective steward of only those functions, it basically needs somehow to perform the job of the community for names functions. But we already have a policy body for names functions, however imperfect: ICANN, or perhaps some subset of it. So, to perform this stewardship function for names, the affiliate would have to instantiate most (or all) of the accountability measures that ICANN needs anyway. This seems like an excellent way to re-open a number of prior decisions. Moreover, it strikes me that it's quite likely to deliver subtle differences with the existing mechanisms, which would offer a tempting opportunity to game the system, a potential for procedural deadlock, or both. Therefore, no matter which way I interpret this model, it seems to me that it can't possibly yield enough benefit to be worth exploring in greater detail. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email: <http://goog_1872880453> seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng<mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng> The key to understanding is humility - my view !
Hi Chuck, Don't want to over-stretch this but i think the subject of this write-up says it all. "The *Reverse* Hybrid Model" this practically means its a write-up (won't call it a full proposal yet) that is definitely different from what is on the table. I don't know what other element we will need to pick from it into existing proposals...perhaps to generate a hybrid hybrid version ;-). Nevertheless i agree with your rationale about maximising time hence Sidley could have a look at it so long as it will not affect the focus of this working group and most especially not change the direction of the current meeting. That said, i really don't think the actual "look" is within the scope of Sidley as it is still this working group that knows what is required. Unfortunately we have not achieve consensus on what we want as a group. Regards PS: Filtered client list since its read-only for me On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 10:32 AM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com> wrote:
Note Seun that I suggested that we ask Sidley to provide ‘a high level response’; that was intentional on my part because I also think it is important to use Sidley’s time as effectively as possible. And I also have concerns about working in a serial manner because I don’t think we have the time for that. Besides, if there are ideas in this new model that can be used in what we are currently considering, it would be better to identify them now rather than later.
Chuck
*From:* Seun Ojedeji [mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com] *Sent:* Tuesday, April 14, 2015 5:20 AM *To:* Gomes, Chuck *Cc:* Andrew Sullivan; Greg Shatan; Client; cwg-stewardship@icann.org
*Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The Reverse Hybrid Model
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 9:54 AM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com> wrote:
Your points Andrew seem useful to me as well as the points made by others regarding this model. Like several have said, I am not in favor of reopening closed issues but I do wonder if there are some elements of the this new model that could be used to improve our solution.
+1 and will be good if that ponder can come after we have a clear direction on the 2 proposals we currently have under review
But before the CWG spends any more time on this model, I would at least like to get a high level response from Sidley as to whether they think there may be some ideas in the model that could be useful.
I am of a personal opinion that we don't load-up/increase the working hours of Sidley with this for now....we have set some directions for them already and they are working on it. Perhaps when we have exhausted the 2 options we currently have on the table and could not come to a single option then we can task Sidley.
Regards
Chuck
-----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 4:17 AM To: Greg Shatan Cc: Client; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The Reverse Hybrid Model
Hi Greg,
Thanks for taking the time to lay out this model carefully. I think it's good to expose it, but I think the exposure makes it clear it isn't worth pursuing in greater depth. More below.
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 01:41:41AM -0400, Greg Shatan wrote:
In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions.
The difficulty I see with the proposal lies in those two statements.
My view is that ICANN is not the "source of the right" to perform the functions. The source of the right to perform the protocol parameters function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the IETF), and the source of the right to perform the number resources function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the RIRs).
The basic problem with this model (and this interpretation of your description) is that it requires a fundamental assumption that the functions are welded together, and that there is a single body responsible for "stewardship" of them. This is something that the other communities simply don't believe.
I therefore don't think there would be value in further elaboration of study of this model, because anything that proposes a single source of stewardship for all the functions won't fly.
If, on the other hand, the model is supposed to be one in which the affiliate gets the right to contract for an entity to act as the naming functions operator only, then it isn't clear to me what work this wheel is supposed to do. In order for it to be an effective steward of only those functions, it basically needs somehow to perform the job of the community for names functions. But we already have a policy body for names functions, however imperfect: ICANN, or perhaps some subset of it. So, to perform this stewardship function for names, the affiliate would have to instantiate most (or all) of the accountability measures that ICANN needs anyway. This seems like an excellent way to re-open a number of prior decisions. Moreover, it strikes me that it's quite likely to deliver subtle differences with the existing mechanisms, which would offer a tempting opportunity to game the system, a potential for procedural deadlock, or both.
Therefore, no matter which way I interpret this model, it seems to me that it can't possibly yield enough benefit to be worth exploring in greater detail.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: * *http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> **Mobile: +2348035233535 <%2B2348035233535>* *alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>*
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* The key to understanding is humility - my view !
+ 1 Chuck On 4/14/2015 11:32 AM, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
Note Seun that I suggested that we ask Sidley to provide ‘a high level response’; that was intentional on my part because I also think it is important to use Sidley’s time as effectively as possible. And I also have concerns about working in a serial manner because I don’t think we have the time for that. Besides, if there are ideas in this new model that can be used in what we are currently considering, it would be better to identify them now rather than later.
Chuck
*From:*Seun Ojedeji [mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com] *Sent:* Tuesday, April 14, 2015 5:20 AM *To:* Gomes, Chuck *Cc:* Andrew Sullivan; Greg Shatan; Client; cwg-stewardship@icann.org *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The Reverse Hybrid Model
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 9:54 AM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes@verisign.com <mailto:cgomes@verisign.com>> wrote:
Your points Andrew seem useful to me as well as the points made by others regarding this model. Like several have said, I am not in favor of reopening closed issues but I do wonder if there are some elements of the this new model that could be used to improve our solution.
+1 and will be good if that ponder can come after we have a clear direction on the 2 proposals we currently have under review
But before the CWG spends any more time on this model, I would at least like to get a high level response from Sidley as to whether they think there may be some ideas in the model that could be useful.
I am of a personal opinion that we don't load-up/increase the working hours of Sidley with this for now....we have set some directions for them already and they are working on it. Perhaps when we have exhausted the 2 options we currently have on the table and could not come to a single option then we can task Sidley.
Regards
Chuck
-----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 4:17 AM To: Greg Shatan Cc: Client; cwg-stewardship@icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The Reverse Hybrid Model
Hi Greg,
Thanks for taking the time to lay out this model carefully. I think it's good to expose it, but I think the exposure makes it clear it isn't worth pursuing in greater depth. More below.
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 01:41:41AM -0400, Greg Shatan wrote:
> In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform > the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN > would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the > IANA Functions.
The difficulty I see with the proposal lies in those two statements.
My view is that ICANN is not the "source of the right" to perform the functions. The source of the right to perform the protocol parameters function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the IETF), and the source of the right to perform the number resources function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the RIRs).
The basic problem with this model (and this interpretation of your description) is that it requires a fundamental assumption that the functions are welded together, and that there is a single body responsible for "stewardship" of them. This is something that the other communities simply don't believe.
I therefore don't think there would be value in further elaboration of study of this model, because anything that proposes a single source of stewardship for all the functions won't fly.
If, on the other hand, the model is supposed to be one in which the affiliate gets the right to contract for an entity to act as the naming functions operator only, then it isn't clear to me what work this wheel is supposed to do. In order for it to be an effective steward of only those functions, it basically needs somehow to perform the job of the community for names functions. But we already have a policy body for names functions, however imperfect: ICANN, or perhaps some subset of it. So, to perform this stewardship function for names, the affiliate would have to instantiate most (or all) of the accountability measures that ICANN needs anyway. This seems like an excellent way to re-open a number of prior decisions. Moreover, it strikes me that it's quite likely to deliver subtle differences with the existing mechanisms, which would offer a tempting opportunity to game the system, a potential for procedural deadlock, or both.
Therefore, no matter which way I interpret this model, it seems to me that it can't possibly yield enough benefit to be worth exploring in greater detail.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com <mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org <mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org <mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
/Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: //http://www.fuoye.edu.ng //Mobile: +2348035233535// //alt email:<http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <mailto:seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>/
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- Matthew Shears Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) + 44 (0)771 247 2987
[Note: I trimmed the cc: list, since I think this is really just a CWG discussion now.] Hi, On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 08:54:38AM +0000, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
would at least like to get a high level response from Sidley as to whether they think there may be some ideas in the model that could be useful.
I don't especially mind if we ask Sidley for an opinion, but I'm wondering what ideas you think might be in here that are useful. For I think the entire model starts from the wrong premise. As Greg quite correctly notes in his description, Paul Kane has been clear that the issue for him is stewardship of IANA (see http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/2015-April/002613.html). This is because he starts from the position that that stewardship is currently provided by the US DoC through NTIA. My claim is that such stewardship does not in fact apply to all the operational communities, and therefore stewardship of IANA overall is not actually a problem we ought to be solving (nor one that we can solve). Once you reject the stewardship premise, as I argued, there's actually nothing distinct in the "reverse hybrid" model that ought to be preserved. It might provide at best duplication of functions that ought properly to live within the names policy community. The only reason I can imagine for creating such duplication is that one does not believe that the names community actually can provide the needed policy checks. If that's the case, no model will save us: the plan to move out from under NTIA is doomed. This is somewhat related to the discussion of "spilling the board" yesterday. If the problem we're defending against has to do with some sort of non-performance or malfeasance of the purely clerical functions of IANA, then it's absurd to talk about removing ICANN board members (or even the entire board) when, plainly, much less dramatic intervention is possible. But if the problem actually is ICANN board interference in carrying out the IANA function, or an ICANN board that insisted IANA act contrary to legitimate legal requirements or something like that, then removal of the board _would_ be legitimate to consider. But this would not be because of some IANA failing, but because the board was acting contrary to its responsibilities to the ICANN community.
Chuck
-----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 4:17 AM To: Greg Shatan Cc: Client; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The Reverse Hybrid Model
Hi Greg,
Thanks for taking the time to lay out this model carefully. I think it's good to expose it, but I think the exposure makes it clear it isn't worth pursuing in greater depth. More below.
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 01:41:41AM -0400, Greg Shatan wrote:
In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions.
The difficulty I see with the proposal lies in those two statements.
My view is that ICANN is not the "source of the right" to perform the functions. The source of the right to perform the protocol parameters function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the IETF), and the source of the right to perform the number resources function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the RIRs).
The basic problem with this model (and this interpretation of your description) is that it requires a fundamental assumption that the functions are welded together, and that there is a single body responsible for "stewardship" of them. This is something that the other communities simply don't believe.
I therefore don't think there would be value in further elaboration of study of this model, because anything that proposes a single source of stewardship for all the functions won't fly.
If, on the other hand, the model is supposed to be one in which the affiliate gets the right to contract for an entity to act as the naming functions operator only, then it isn't clear to me what work this wheel is supposed to do. In order for it to be an effective steward of only those functions, it basically needs somehow to perform the job of the community for names functions. But we already have a policy body for names functions, however imperfect: ICANN, or perhaps some subset of it. So, to perform this stewardship function for names, the affiliate would have to instantiate most (or all) of the accountability measures that ICANN needs anyway. This seems like an excellent way to re-open a number of prior decisions. Moreover, it strikes me that it's quite likely to deliver subtle differences with the existing mechanisms, which would offer a tempting opportunity to game the system, a potential for procedural deadlock, or both.
Therefore, no matter which way I interpret this model, it seems to me that it can't possibly yield enough benefit to be worth exploring in greater detail.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
At first glance, here are some ideas that I think might have value Andrew: - irrevocable agreement - the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator - The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate - The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator. Chuck -----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 7:49 AM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] The reverse hybrid model starts from a faulty premise (was: The Reverse Hybrid Model) [Note: I trimmed the cc: list, since I think this is really just a CWG discussion now.] Hi, On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 08:54:38AM +0000, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
would at least like to get a high level response from Sidley as to whether they think there may be some ideas in the model that could be useful.
I don't especially mind if we ask Sidley for an opinion, but I'm wondering what ideas you think might be in here that are useful. For I think the entire model starts from the wrong premise. As Greg quite correctly notes in his description, Paul Kane has been clear that the issue for him is stewardship of IANA (see http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/2015-April/002613.html). This is because he starts from the position that that stewardship is currently provided by the US DoC through NTIA. My claim is that such stewardship does not in fact apply to all the operational communities, and therefore stewardship of IANA overall is not actually a problem we ought to be solving (nor one that we can solve). Once you reject the stewardship premise, as I argued, there's actually nothing distinct in the "reverse hybrid" model that ought to be preserved. It might provide at best duplication of functions that ought properly to live within the names policy community. The only reason I can imagine for creating such duplication is that one does not believe that the names community actually can provide the needed policy checks. If that's the case, no model will save us: the plan to move out from under NTIA is doomed. This is somewhat related to the discussion of "spilling the board" yesterday. If the problem we're defending against has to do with some sort of non-performance or malfeasance of the purely clerical functions of IANA, then it's absurd to talk about removing ICANN board members (or even the entire board) when, plainly, much less dramatic intervention is possible. But if the problem actually is ICANN board interference in carrying out the IANA function, or an ICANN board that insisted IANA act contrary to legitimate legal requirements or something like that, then removal of the board _would_ be legitimate to consider. But this would not be because of some IANA failing, but because the board was acting contrary to its responsibilities to the ICANN community.
Chuck
-----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 4:17 AM To: Greg Shatan Cc: Client; cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The Reverse Hybrid Model
Hi Greg,
Thanks for taking the time to lay out this model carefully. I think it's good to expose it, but I think the exposure makes it clear it isn't worth pursuing in greater depth. More below.
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 01:41:41AM -0400, Greg Shatan wrote:
In this model, ICANN would still be the source of the right to perform the IANA Functions, as in the current internal model. However, ICANN would enter into an irrevocable agreement with the Affiliate for the IANA Functions.
The difficulty I see with the proposal lies in those two statements.
My view is that ICANN is not the "source of the right" to perform the functions. The source of the right to perform the protocol parameters function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the IETF), and the source of the right to perform the number resources function is the policy community for those parameters (i.e. the RIRs).
The basic problem with this model (and this interpretation of your description) is that it requires a fundamental assumption that the functions are welded together, and that there is a single body responsible for "stewardship" of them. This is something that the other communities simply don't believe.
I therefore don't think there would be value in further elaboration of study of this model, because anything that proposes a single source of stewardship for all the functions won't fly.
If, on the other hand, the model is supposed to be one in which the affiliate gets the right to contract for an entity to act as the naming functions operator only, then it isn't clear to me what work this wheel is supposed to do. In order for it to be an effective steward of only those functions, it basically needs somehow to perform the job of the community for names functions. But we already have a policy body for names functions, however imperfect: ICANN, or perhaps some subset of it. So, to perform this stewardship function for names, the affiliate would have to instantiate most (or all) of the accountability measures that ICANN needs anyway. This seems like an excellent way to re-open a number of prior decisions. Moreover, it strikes me that it's quite likely to deliver subtle differences with the existing mechanisms, which would offer a tempting opportunity to game the system, a potential for procedural deadlock, or both.
Therefore, no matter which way I interpret this model, it seems to me that it can't possibly yield enough benefit to be worth exploring in greater detail.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Hi Chuck, Thanks, this is nice and concrete. I do wonder, however, whether this list offers some of the evidence for my claim that the reverse hybrid model provides for mechanisms that ought properly to live in some other organization (probably ICANN). See below. On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 12:37:08PM +0000, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
At first glance, here are some ideas that I think might have value Andrew: - irrevocable agreement
This irrevocable agreement is a necessary device in order to make it possible for ICANN to delegate the responsibility for a function that it operates to someone else, and not be able to change that. That is, ICANN is the policy body for the names IANA function; but under this model instead of ICANN just doing its oversight job the model, it sets up an affiliate and gives it the power to do that oversight and then takes away its own power to undo that transfer of power. This seems rather an indirect way to achieve the oversight goal. What is the reason to prefer this to the more straightforward approach?
- the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator
The only reason that is necessary in this model is because the function operation itself remains inside ICANN. If the goal is to solve that internality, the legal separation model is considerably simpler. Moreover, what isn't clear to me in this model is the extent to which the affiliate is given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA functions operator for all IANA functions. If it is able to do that, then what happens to arranement if the other operational communities change operators? The need to handle such an issue appears to be a by-product of creating this complication.
- The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate
Well, which multi-stakeholder community would be one of the things to work out; but of course, this ability to select an independent board of the affiliate isn't unique to the reverse hybrid approach.
- The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator.
I think that approach quite nicely illustrates the way I think this approach forces duplication of other functions. It appears that the CSC and PRT need to be somewhere, but there's a whole new multistakeholder board here that is apparently responsible for oversight of appeals functions, and that will be able to bid the contract out. I'd be astonished if that didn't result in venue-shopping for appeals whenever there is some sort of dispute. I expect it will attract people who are dissatisfied with some policy decision to try to argue that some IANA procedure was violated. This function is rather similar to the Contract Co proposal from before, in that it has all the disadvantages of that approach. So, from my point of view, there are considerable disadvantages to the approach, and many of the advantages appear to be such only if one concludes that the names community can't offer proper oversight of this IANA function. Have we really conceded that? Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
Good points and questions Andrew. I just don't like to throw ideas out too quickly. At the same time I also don't want to waste time. Chuck -----Original Message----- From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2015 9:23 AM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] The reverse hybrid model starts from a faulty premise (was: The Reverse Hybrid Model) Hi Chuck, Thanks, this is nice and concrete. I do wonder, however, whether this list offers some of the evidence for my claim that the reverse hybrid model provides for mechanisms that ought properly to live in some other organization (probably ICANN). See below. On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 12:37:08PM +0000, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
At first glance, here are some ideas that I think might have value Andrew: - irrevocable agreement
This irrevocable agreement is a necessary device in order to make it possible for ICANN to delegate the responsibility for a function that it operates to someone else, and not be able to change that. That is, ICANN is the policy body for the names IANA function; but under this model instead of ICANN just doing its oversight job the model, it sets up an affiliate and gives it the power to do that oversight and then takes away its own power to undo that transfer of power. This seems rather an indirect way to achieve the oversight goal. What is the reason to prefer this to the more straightforward approach?
- the Affiliate would be given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA Functions Operator
The only reason that is necessary in this model is because the function operation itself remains inside ICANN. If the goal is to solve that internality, the legal separation model is considerably simpler. Moreover, what isn't clear to me in this model is the extent to which the affiliate is given the right to contract for an entity to act as IANA functions operator for all IANA functions. If it is able to do that, then what happens to arranement if the other operational communities change operators? The need to handle such an issue appears to be a by-product of creating this complication.
- The multi-stakeholder community would (s)elect the independent Board of the Affiliate
Well, which multi-stakeholder community would be one of the things to work out; but of course, this ability to select an independent board of the affiliate isn't unique to the reverse hybrid approach.
- The CSC and the PRT would be activities of the Affiliate, created by bylaws of the Affiliate, with a multistakeholder board providing oversight over the CSC and the PRT and ultimately over the IANA Functions Operator.
I think that approach quite nicely illustrates the way I think this approach forces duplication of other functions. It appears that the CSC and PRT need to be somewhere, but there's a whole new multistakeholder board here that is apparently responsible for oversight of appeals functions, and that will be able to bid the contract out. I'd be astonished if that didn't result in venue-shopping for appeals whenever there is some sort of dispute. I expect it will attract people who are dissatisfied with some policy decision to try to argue that some IANA procedure was violated. This function is rather similar to the Contract Co proposal from before, in that it has all the disadvantages of that approach. So, from my point of view, there are considerable disadvantages to the approach, and many of the advantages appear to be such only if one concludes that the names community can't offer proper oversight of this IANA function. Have we really conceded that? Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
participants (12)
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Alan Greenberg -
Andrew Sullivan -
Cheryl Langdon-Orr -
Gomes, Chuck -
Greg Shatan -
Guru Acharya -
Jorge.Cancio＠bakom.admin.ch -
Maarten Simon -
Matthew Shears -
Milton L Mueller -
Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond -
Seun Ojedeji