ICANN fighting separabiity in the numbers space
I am at the ARIN meeting in San Francisco, and members of the CRISP team gave a report on the status of their proposal. That discussion revealed several very interesting facts about how ICANN legal is negotiating with the numbers community over the CRISP proposal. Apparently, ICANN legal is fighting very hard against the ability of the numbers community to terminate the contract with notice. It is also resisting the idea that the numbers community could do periodic review and competitive selection of an alternate provider if it was deemed necessary The CRISP team pointed out that the contract termination clauses of their proposed contract with ICANN was much less one-sided than the current NTIA contract, yet ICANN is still resisting it. It seems clear to me that ICANN will fight very hard to maintain control of IANA, and is doing everything it can to mitigate separability as a real option. This provides us with a very clear caution regarding internal proposals. When ICANN controls IANA and there is no legal separation we should not be naïve about how easy it will be to create "nuclear option" procedures that provide for separability. Milton L Mueller Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ Internet Governance Project http://internetgovernance.org<http://internetgovernance.org/>
I'm shocked, SHOCKED that ICANN is pushing back against separability.... I agree that this is a warning sign and a reminder of earlier conversations in and around the CWG. Greg On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 4:31 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
I am at the ARIN meeting in San Francisco, and members of the CRISP team gave a report on the status of their proposal.
That discussion revealed several very interesting facts about how ICANN legal is negotiating with the numbers community over the CRISP proposal.
Apparently, ICANN legal is fighting very hard against the ability of the numbers community to terminate the contract with notice.
It is also resisting the idea that the numbers community could do periodic review and competitive selection of an alternate provider if it was deemed necessary
The CRISP team pointed out that the contract termination clauses of their proposed contract with ICANN was much less one-sided than the current NTIA contract, yet ICANN is still resisting it.
It seems clear to me that ICANN will fight very hard to maintain control of IANA, and is doing everything it can to mitigate separability as a real option.
This provides us with a very clear caution regarding internal proposals. When ICANN controls IANA and there is no legal separation we should not be naïve about how easy it will be to create “nuclear option” procedures that provide for separability.
Milton L Mueller
Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor
Syracuse University School of Information Studies
http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/
Internet Governance Project
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Thanks for the update, its interesting that CRISP has not provided this update on its global list where they communicate with the RIR community OR perhaps you mean ICANN legal is presently at ARIN meeting where the discussion is happening? if that is the case, i will really appreciate if you could post url to transcript so i can follow as well. Its really news to me and i think its something that should be followed up. I recall specifically asking ICANN board Chair about the proposal of the CRISP team during the public comment session in Singapore and his response was very positive (generally indicating they did not have any significant issue with it). Regards On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 9:31 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
I am at the ARIN meeting in San Francisco, and members of the CRISP team gave a report on the status of their proposal.
That discussion revealed several very interesting facts about how ICANN legal is negotiating with the numbers community over the CRISP proposal.
Apparently, ICANN legal is fighting very hard against the ability of the numbers community to terminate the contract with notice.
It is also resisting the idea that the numbers community could do periodic review and competitive selection of an alternate provider if it was deemed necessary
The CRISP team pointed out that the contract termination clauses of their proposed contract with ICANN was much less one-sided than the current NTIA contract, yet ICANN is still resisting it.
It seems clear to me that ICANN will fight very hard to maintain control of IANA, and is doing everything it can to mitigate separability as a real option.
This provides us with a very clear caution regarding internal proposals. When ICANN controls IANA and there is no legal separation we should not be naïve about how easy it will be to create “nuclear option” procedures that provide for separability.
Milton L Mueller
Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor
Syracuse University School of Information Studies
http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/
Internet Governance Project
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* The key to understanding is humility - my view !
Seun, et al, There are details in the current presentation that were not included previously. When I spoke at ICANN 53 and in other fora, I did indeed feel there wasn’t any significant issue. There are always details to work out, of course, but my feeling at the time was there was sufficient alignment of goals and requirements for me to express optimism. I am not at the ARIN meeting and I am only seeing the slides without hearing the presentation. Let me suggest it is very premature to conclude there is some sort of unsolvable problem. The persistent fact is the numbers community is getting the service it needs and ICANN is committed to continuing to provide it. With respect to the claims that ICANN is “fighting” or that “separability” is a principle that has to be taken above all else, I think these are false statements. Neither body lives in the “what if” world. Trying to work out a perfect solution to a set of contingencies that are hard to specify, have not occurred and have no common points of reference — and, yes, I am saying that’s the nature of the debates on this list — is likely to be contentious and unbounded Steve . On Apr 13, 2015, at 4:57 PM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
Thanks for the update, its interesting that CRISP has not provided this update on its global list where they communicate with the RIR community OR perhaps you mean ICANN legal is presently at ARIN meeting where the discussion is happening? if that is the case, i will really appreciate if you could post url to transcript so i can follow as well.
Its really news to me and i think its something that should be followed up. I recall specifically asking ICANN board Chair about the proposal of the CRISP team during the public comment session in Singapore and his response was very positive (generally indicating they did not have any significant issue with it).
Regards
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 9:31 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote: I am at the ARIN meeting in San Francisco, and members of the CRISP team gave a report on the status of their proposal.
That discussion revealed several very interesting facts about how ICANN legal is negotiating with the numbers community over the CRISP proposal.
Apparently, ICANN legal is fighting very hard against the ability of the numbers community to terminate the contract with notice.
It is also resisting the idea that the numbers community could do periodic review and competitive selection of an alternate provider if it was deemed necessary
The CRISP team pointed out that the contract termination clauses of their proposed contract with ICANN was much less one-sided than the current NTIA contract, yet ICANN is still resisting it.
It seems clear to me that ICANN will fight very hard to maintain control of IANA, and is doing everything it can to mitigate separability as a real option.
This provides us with a very clear caution regarding internal proposals. When ICANN controls IANA and there is no legal separation we should not be naïve about how easy it will be to create “nuclear option” procedures that provide for separability.
Milton L Mueller
Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor
Syracuse University School of Information Studies
http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/
Internet Governance Project
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Seun Ojedeji, Federal University Oye-Ekiti web: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng Mobile: +2348035233535 alt email: seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng
The key to understanding is humility - my view !
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
I am not at the ARIN meeting and I am only seeing the slides without hearing the presentation. Let me suggest it is very premature to conclude there is some sort of unsolvable problem. MM: ??? No one suggested there was an insoluble problem. The point was that the RIRs, while currently satisfied with ICANN's IANA service and don't want to change providers as part of the transition, will insist on the right to terminate the contract for IANA services if they are dissatisfied. What is also clear is that ICANN legal doesn't want to give them that right, or is trying to limit it severely. The persistent fact is the numbers community is getting the service it needs and ICANN is committed to continuing to provide it. MM: This misses the point. The fact that they are satisfied with the service now doesn't mean it will be forever, and especially after NTIA oversight ends. So it is perfectly reasonable for the numbers community to insist on the right to switch providers. The burden of proof should rest with those who say they should not. With respect to the claims that ICANN is "fighting" or that "separability" is a principle that has to be taken above all else, I think these are false statements. Neither body lives in the "what if" world. Trying to work out a perfect solution to a set of contingencies that are hard to specify, have not occurred and have no common points of reference - and, yes, I am saying that's the nature of the debates on this list - is likely to be contentious and unbounded MM: There is nothing contentious or unbounded about the simple ability to contact or withdraw from a contract. Either that right exists or it doesn't. It is a matter of who is in charge - do the customers have the right to switch or is the supplier a permanent monopoly, with all that that implies for (lack of) accountability?
Seun,
Thanks for the update, its interesting that CRISP has not provided this update on its global list where they communicate with the RIR community OR perhaps you mean ICANN legal is presently at ARIN meeting where the discussion is happening?
No, ICANN legal is not at the ARIN meeting.
I recall specifically asking ICANN board Chair about the proposal of the CRISP team during the public comment session in Singapore and his response was very positive (generally indicating they did not have any significant issue with it).
Right. While this is not really in my bailiwick (I try to focus on the technical side of things), that was my impression as well. As I mentioned at the microphone, my understanding of Larry's speech at the State of the Net was that the issue of whether or not there is separability isn't all that germane to the question of acceptability of proposal, what matters in this context is whether or not the accountability requirements imposed by NTIA can be met with the resulting structures. That is, if you posit a world in which the RIRs can separate themselves from ICANN, how can the RIRs/NRO guarantee the subsequent management of Internet Numbers resources are accountable to the global stakeholder community and are not subject to capture, not susceptible to double-dealing/corruption/influence-peddling, etc.? My impression is that NTIA is not setting a pre-condition that everything must be associated with ICANN, rather they are setting a pre-condition that the accountability mechanisms of whatever structure is proposed must be as good or greater than the existing (or perhaps post-CCWG WG1 outcomes) accountability mechanisms. Regards, -drc
As I mentioned at the microphone, my understanding of Larry's speech at the State of the Net was that the issue of whether or not there is separability isn't all that germane to the question of acceptability of proposal, what matters in this context is whether or not the accountability requirements imposed by NTIA can be met with the resulting structures. That is, if you posit a world in which the RIRs can separate themselves from ICANN, how can the RIRs/NRO guarantee the subsequent management of Internet Numbers resources are accountable to the global stakeholder community and are not subject to capture, not susceptible to double-dealing/corruption/influence-peddling, etc.? MM: And as Mr. Woodcock replied to you, the numbers community (and I would say the names community too) knows what it needs and is capable of exercising the most basic, fundamental form of accountability -- the ability to change providers.
Milton,
As I mentioned at the microphone, my understanding of Larry's speech at the State of the Net was that the issue of whether or not there is separability isn't all that germane to the question of acceptability of proposal, what matters in this context is whether or not the accountability requirements imposed by NTIA can be met with the resulting structures. That is, if you posit a world in which the RIRs can separate themselves from ICANN, how can the RIRs/NRO guarantee the subsequent management of Internet Numbers resources are accountable to the global stakeholder community and are not subject to capture, not susceptible to double-dealing/corruption/influence-peddling, etc.?
MM: And as Mr. Woodcock replied to you, the numbers community (and I would say the names community too) knows what it needs and is capable of exercising the most basic, fundamental form of accountability -- the ability to change providers.
I've no doubt all the communities are well aware of their needs, but I believe Larry was suggesting accountability in the other direction. As Vint Cerf pointed out at the microphone during the ARIN meeting, there are more folks involved here than just those communities. My interpretation of what Larry said at the State of the Net, is that if a model that allows for separation is chosen, how will the communities (e.g., the naming community, the IETF, and the NRO) demonstrate accountability at least as strong as what ICANN provides _to the global stakeholder community_ if that separation occurs? Regards, -drc
On Tue, Apr 14, 2015 at 05:00:15PM +0000, David Conrad wrote:
separation is chosen, how will the communities (e.g., the naming community, the IETF, and the NRO) demonstrate accountability at least as strong as what ICANN provides _to the global stakeholder community_ if that separation occurs?
The problem with phrasing the question that way is that it suggests, if not assumes, that ICANN adds anything at all to the IETF's or NRO's accountability. I suppose the assumption is that if one of those communities adopted a policy through their normal methods, and someone didn't like that, then they could appeal to ICANN to stop the IANA actions attendant on such a policy. I would like to suggest that, if ICANN actually refused to perform the IANA actions as instructed by either one of those communities when those communities had already followed their well-defined, participatory processes to reach a conclusion, we'd almost certainly have a crisis that would result in the end of IANA as we know it. Therefore, it seems to me that there is no accountability change _at all_ in the event the separation is chosen. The conditions after such separation would be no different than those before: the policy is developed in one community, and the outcome is published faithfully by the relevant IANA functions operator. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
Its really news to me and i think its something that should be followed up. I recall specifically asking ICANN board Chair about the proposal of the CRISP team during the public comment session in Singapore and his response was very positive (generally indicating they did not have any significant issue with it). Yes, this was noted by the CRISP team, too: ICANN board did indeed say they had no problem with the proposal in Singapore, and I believe they said so sincerely. It is ICANN-legal that CRISP is dealing with, however. I believe the presentation of the CRISP team was transcribed.
participants (6)
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Andrew Sullivan -
David Conrad -
Greg Shatan -
Milton L Mueller -
Seun Ojedeji -
Steve Crocker