Agenda item 5 - Alternate proposals
I note that item 5 on the agenda for the 18 December meeting is "Due consideration of alternative proposal (not to exclude other proposals)". I also note that there has been significant discussion about the CWG Stewardship and the CCWG Accountability, their inter-relationship and co-dependency. In light of this, I would like to bring the CWGs attention to a recent e-mail on the CCWG list (copied below). Although I believe that the ALAC proposal (http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-naming-transition-01dec14/msg00011...) is the only such alternative presented here, it is not alone. I am not advocating the exact details of the proposal referenced in the message (see http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/ and http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...), but it does demonstrate that we are not unique in wanting a far simpler mode for the new IANA coupled with real multistakeholder accountability in ICANN. I believe that the CCWG *WILL* deliver and I think that we need to factor that into our deliberations. Specifically, is there really a need for the complexity, cost and associated issues of Contract Co. given the same level of control could be provided by a change such as this? Alan ===================
From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:20:43 +0000 Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community "Membership" group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accountability%20suggestions%20%5Bdraft%203%5D.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1418610739000&api=v2>draft3 for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/>proposing a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-plan-needs-new-ideas-to-ensure-accountability>Op-Ed in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANNâs bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice
<http://www.netchoice.org/>http://www.NetChoice.org and <http://blog.netchoice.org/>http://blog.netchoice.org +1.202.420.7482
Hi I don't see independent oversight and separability of the IANA contract on the one hand and "real multistakeholder accountability" at ICANN on the other as mutually exclusive or that one has to be weakened or sacrificed on the promise of the enhanced accountability of the other. I see them both as desirable, indeed essential, to ensuring appropriate levels of accountability and performance once the USG steps back from its administrative and stewardship roles. I agree that we need to be very pragmatic about the structure and modalities of the IANA proposal - and that these are things we need to start working through asap - but we should not underestimate the importance of separability and independent oversight. Matthew On 12/18/2014 3:55 AM, Alan Greenberg wrote:
I note that item 5 on the agenda for the 18 December meeting is "Due consideration of alternative proposal (not to exclude other proposals)".
I also note that there has been significant discussion about the CWG Stewardship and the CCWG Accountability, their inter-relationship and co-dependency.
In light of this, I would like to bring the CWGs attention to a recent e-mail on the CCWG list (copied below).
Although I believe that the ALAC proposal (http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-naming-transition-01dec14/msg00011... ) is the only such alternative presented here, it is not alone. I am not advocating the exact details of the proposal referenced in the message (see http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/ and http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...), but it does demonstrate that we are not unique in wanting a far simpler mode for the new IANA coupled with *real multistakeholder accountability in ICANN*.
I believe that the CCWG *WILL* deliver and I think that we need to factor that into our deliberations. Specifically, is there really a need for the complexity, cost and associated issues of Contract Co. given the same level of control could be provided by a change such as this?
Alan
===================
From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:20:43 +0000 Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community "~Membership" group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANNâEUR^(TM)s bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org <http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- Matthew Shears Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) mshears@cdt.org + 44 771 247 2987
I don't see independent oversight and separability of the IANA contract on the one hand and "real multistakeholder accountability" at ICANN on the other as mutually exclusive either. Where we differ is that I believe that the latter precludes the need for the former. Alan At 18/12/2014 06:12 AM, Matthew Shears wrote:
Hi
I don't see independent oversight and separability of the IANA contract on the one hand and "real multistakeholder accountability" at ICANN on the other as mutually exclusive or that one has to be weakened or sacrificed on the promise of the enhanced accountability of the other. I see them both as desirable, indeed essential, to ensuring appropriate levels of accountability and performance once the USG steps back from its administrative and stewardship roles. I agree that we need to be very pragmatic about the structure and modalities of the IANA proposal - and that these are things we need to start working through asap - but we should not underestimate the importance of separability and independent oversight.
Matthew
On 12/18/2014 3:55 AM, Alan Greenberg wrote:
I note that item 5 on the agenda for the 18 December meeting is "Due consideration of alternative proposal (not to exclude other proposals)".
I also note that there has been significant discussion about the CWG Stewardship and the CCWG Accountability, their inter-relationship and co-dependency.
In light of this, I would like to bring the CWGs attention to a recent e-mail on the CCWG list (copied below).
Although I believe that the ALAC proposal ( http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-naming-transition-01dec14/msg00011... ) is the only such alternative presented here, it is not alone. I am not advocating the exact details of the proposal referenced in the message (see http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/ and <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-plan-needs-new-ideas-to-ensure-accountability>http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-plan-needs-new-ideas-to-ensure-accountability), but it does demonstrate that we are not unique in wanting a far simpler mode for the new IANA coupled with real multistakeholder accountability in ICANN.
I believe that the CCWG *WILL* deliver and I think that we need to factor that into our deliberations. Specifically, is there really a need for the complexity, cost and associated issues of Contract Co. given the same level of control could be provided by a change such as this?
Alan
===================
From: Steve DelBianco <mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org><sdelbianco@netchoice.org> To: Accountability Cross Community <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:20:43 +0000 Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community "Membership" group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accountability%20suggestions%20%5Bdraft%203%5D.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1418610739000&api=v2>draft3 for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/>proposing a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-plan-needs-new-ideas-to-ensure-accountability>Op-Ed in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote: California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANNâs bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice
<http://www.netchoice.org/>http://www.NetChoice.org and <http://blog.netchoice.org/>http://blog.netchoice.org +1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list <mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org>CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- Matthew Shears Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) <mailto:mshears@cdt.org>mshears@cdt.org + 44 771 247 2987
Interesting that Shawn’s membership proposal (the one published in The Hill) is put forward as something “simpler” than the CWG proposal. Though I am sympathetic to this proposal, establishing a membership would be an extremely complicated and drawn-out change, fraught with all kinds of unanticipated implications and implementation difficulties. Likewise, Alan is suggesting that a set of yet-unknown changes coming out of an incomplete process is also “less complicated.” That is not a supportable claim. It would be more accurate to say that the separability we propose here dramatically simplifies the work of the CCWG-Accountability. Del Bianco’s “cross-community membership group” (described at the end of Alan’s message below) is another proposal mentioned. That would be an alternative board that could second-guess ICANN’s board in numerous ways and would create a competing power center. The complications caused by such a structure are _enormous_, far more so than the Contract Co. It is interesting that advocates of ICANN controlling everything see such problems with the MRT but no such problems with a committee that not only mirrors the composition of the MRT but has an unrestricted mandate to overrule the board. --MM From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg Although I believe that the ALAC proposal ( http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-naming-transition-01dec14/msg00011... ) is the only such alternative presented here, it is not alone. I am not advocating the exact details of the proposal referenced in the message (see http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/ and http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...), but it does demonstrate that we are not unique in wanting a far simpler mode for the new IANA coupled with real multistakeholder accountability in ICANN. I believe that the CCWG *WILL* deliver and I think that we need to factor that into our deliberations. Specifically, is there really a need for the complexity, cost and associated issues of Contract Co. given the same level of control could be provided by a change such as this? Alan =================== From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:20:43 +0000 Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community "˜Membership" group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3<https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2: Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to: Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members One of the groups proposing<http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed<http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote: California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law. Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482
Milton, can I respectfully but firmly ask you to refrain from labeling people who have concerns with the complexities of the currently discussed architecture as "advocates of ICANN controlling everything". You know it is not true and are too well versed in these discussions not to see that the issues are a bit more complex than that. Such an attitude does not serve the feeling of mutual respect and trust that I would like to prevail in designing a community solution. Thanks. Bertrand "*Le plus beau métier des hommes, c'est d'unir les hommes*", Antoine de Saint Exupéry ("*There is no greater mission for humans than uniting humans*")BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLEInternet & Jurisdiction Project | Directoremail bdelachapelle@internetjurisdiction.netemail bdelachapelle@gmail.comtwitter @IJurisdiction <https://twitter.com/IJurisdiction> | @bdelachapelle <https://twitter.com/bdelachapelle>mobile +33 (0)6 11 88 33 32 www.internetjurisdiction.net[image: A GLOBAL MULTI-STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE PROCESS] On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 12:20 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
Interesting that Shawn’s membership proposal (the one published in The Hill) is put forward as something “simpler” than the CWG proposal. Though I am sympathetic to this proposal, establishing a membership would be an extremely complicated and drawn-out change, fraught with all kinds of unanticipated implications and implementation difficulties.
Likewise, Alan is suggesting that a set of yet-unknown changes coming out of an incomplete process is also “less complicated.” That is not a supportable claim. It would be more accurate to say that the separability we propose here dramatically simplifies the work of the CCWG-Accountability.
Del Bianco’s “cross-community membership group” (described at the end of Alan’s message below) is another proposal mentioned. That would be an alternative board that could second-guess ICANN’s board in numerous ways and would create a competing power center. The complications caused by such a structure are _*enormous*_, far more so than the Contract Co. It is interesting that advocates of ICANN controlling everything see such problems with the MRT but no such problems with a committee that not only mirrors the composition of the MRT but has an unrestricted mandate to overrule the board.
--MM
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Alan Greenberg
Although I believe that the ALAC proposal ( http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-naming-transition-01dec14/msg00011... ) is the only such alternative presented here, it is not alone. I am not advocating the exact details of the proposal referenced in the message (see http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/ and http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...), but it does demonstrate that we are not unique in wanting a far simpler mode for the new IANA coupled with *real multistakeholder accountability in ICANN*.
I believe that the CCWG *WILL* deliver and I think that we need to factor that into our deliberations. Specifically, is there really a need for the complexity, cost and associated issues of Contract Co. given the same level of control could be provided by a change such as this?
Alan
===================
From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:20:43 +0000 Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community "˜Membership" group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams
Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel)
Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval
Approve annual proposed ICANN budget
Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org
+1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Bertrand Correction accepted: I should say the “internal to ICANN solution”…. ;-) From: Bertrand de La Chapelle [mailto:bdelachapelle@gmail.com] Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 11:10 AM To: Milton L Mueller Cc: Alan Greenberg; CWG Stewardship Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Agenda item 5 - Alternate proposals Milton, can I respectfully but firmly ask you to refrain from labeling people who have concerns with the complexities of the currently discussed architecture as "advocates of ICANN controlling everything". You know it is not true and are too well versed in these discussions not to see that the issues are a bit more complex than that. Such an attitude does not serve the feeling of mutual respect and trust that I would like to prevail in designing a community solution. Thanks. Bertrand "Le plus beau métier des hommes, c'est d'unir les hommes", Antoine de Saint Exupéry ("There is no greater mission for humans than uniting humans") BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLE Internet & Jurisdiction Project | Director email bdelachapelle@internetjurisdiction.net<mailto:bdelachapelle@internetjurisdiction.net> email bdelachapelle@gmail.com<mailto:bdelachapelle@gmail.com> twitter @IJurisdiction<https://twitter.com/IJurisdiction> | @bdelachapelle<https://twitter.com/bdelachapelle> mobile +33 (0)6 11 88 33 32 www.internetjurisdiction.net<http://www.internetjurisdiction.net> [A GLOBAL MULTI-STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE PROCESS] On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 12:20 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu<mailto:mueller@syr.edu>> wrote: Interesting that Shawn’s membership proposal (the one published in The Hill) is put forward as something “simpler” than the CWG proposal. Though I am sympathetic to this proposal, establishing a membership would be an extremely complicated and drawn-out change, fraught with all kinds of unanticipated implications and implementation difficulties. Likewise, Alan is suggesting that a set of yet-unknown changes coming out of an incomplete process is also “less complicated.” That is not a supportable claim. It would be more accurate to say that the separability we propose here dramatically simplifies the work of the CCWG-Accountability. Del Bianco’s “cross-community membership group” (described at the end of Alan’s message below) is another proposal mentioned. That would be an alternative board that could second-guess ICANN’s board in numerous ways and would create a competing power center. The complications caused by such a structure are _enormous_, far more so than the Contract Co. It is interesting that advocates of ICANN controlling everything see such problems with the MRT but no such problems with a committee that not only mirrors the composition of the MRT but has an unrestricted mandate to overrule the board. --MM From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg Although I believe that the ALAC proposal ( http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-naming-transition-01dec14/msg00011... ) is the only such alternative presented here, it is not alone. I am not advocating the exact details of the proposal referenced in the message (see http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/ and http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...), but it does demonstrate that we are not unique in wanting a far simpler mode for the new IANA coupled with real multistakeholder accountability in ICANN. I believe that the CCWG *WILL* deliver and I think that we need to factor that into our deliberations. Specifically, is there really a need for the complexity, cost and associated issues of Contract Co. given the same level of control could be provided by a change such as this? Alan =================== From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org<mailto:sdelbianco@netchoice.org>> To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:20:43 +0000 Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community "˜Membership" group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3<https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2: Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to: Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members One of the groups proposing<http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed<http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote: California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus). We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law. Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice http://www.NetChoice.org<http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org<http://blog.netchoice.org/> +1.202.420.7482<tel:%2B1.202.420.7482> _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Milton, As I mentioned on the call, we need to be careful even when we label this "internal to iCANN" solution. Because we then confuse, as we too often do, ICANN staff, ICANN Board and ICANN community. I think what people exploring alternatives or potential improvements mean is that they want to build upon the existing building blocks of the ICANN community rather than something entirely external. One of the arguments that I think underpins this effort is the perceived vulnerability of any entirely new, unfunded and unstaffed architecture that would in many ways resemble the vulnerability of the early ICANN. Just to try and clarify the terms of the debate. B. "*Le plus beau métier des hommes, c'est d'unir les hommes*", Antoine de Saint Exupéry ("*There is no greater mission for humans than uniting humans*")BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLEInternet & Jurisdiction Project | Directoremail bdelachapelle@internetjurisdiction.netemail bdelachapelle@gmail.comtwitter @IJurisdiction <https://twitter.com/IJurisdiction> | @bdelachapelle <https://twitter.com/bdelachapelle>mobile +33 (0)6 11 88 33 32 www.internetjurisdiction.net[image: A GLOBAL MULTI-STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE PROCESS] On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 6:10 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
Bertrand
Correction accepted: I should say the “internal to ICANN solution”….
;-)
*From:* Bertrand de La Chapelle [mailto:bdelachapelle@gmail.com] *Sent:* Thursday, December 18, 2014 11:10 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller *Cc:* Alan Greenberg; CWG Stewardship *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Agenda item 5 - Alternate proposals
Milton,
can I respectfully but firmly ask you to refrain from labeling people who have concerns with the complexities of the currently discussed architecture as "advocates of ICANN controlling everything".
You know it is not true and are too well versed in these discussions not to see that the issues are a bit more complex than that.
Such an attitude does not serve the feeling of mutual respect and trust that I would like to prevail in designing a community solution.
Thanks.
Bertrand
"*Le plus beau métier des hommes, c'est d'unir les hommes*", Antoine de Saint Exupéry ("*There is no greater mission for humans than uniting humans*")
BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLE
Internet & Jurisdiction Project | Director
email bdelachapelle@internetjurisdiction.net
email bdelachapelle@gmail.com
twitter @IJurisdiction <https://twitter.com/IJurisdiction> | @bdelachapelle <https://twitter.com/bdelachapelle>
mobile +33 (0)6 11 88 33 32
www.internetjurisdiction.net
[image: A GLOBAL MULTI-STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE PROCESS]
On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 12:20 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
Interesting that Shawn’s membership proposal (the one published in The Hill) is put forward as something “simpler” than the CWG proposal. Though I am sympathetic to this proposal, establishing a membership would be an extremely complicated and drawn-out change, fraught with all kinds of unanticipated implications and implementation difficulties.
Likewise, Alan is suggesting that a set of yet-unknown changes coming out of an incomplete process is also “less complicated.” That is not a supportable claim. It would be more accurate to say that the separability we propose here dramatically simplifies the work of the CCWG-Accountability.
Del Bianco’s “cross-community membership group” (described at the end of Alan’s message below) is another proposal mentioned. That would be an alternative board that could second-guess ICANN’s board in numerous ways and would create a competing power center. The complications caused by such a structure are _*enormous*_, far more so than the Contract Co. It is interesting that advocates of ICANN controlling everything see such problems with the MRT but no such problems with a committee that not only mirrors the composition of the MRT but has an unrestricted mandate to overrule the board.
--MM
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Alan Greenberg
Although I believe that the ALAC proposal ( http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-naming-transition-01dec14/msg00011... ) is the only such alternative presented here, it is not alone. I am not advocating the exact details of the proposal referenced in the message (see http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/ and http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...), but it does demonstrate that we are not unique in wanting a far simpler mode for the new IANA coupled with *real multistakeholder accountability in ICANN*.
I believe that the CCWG *WILL* deliver and I think that we need to factor that into our deliberations. Specifically, is there really a need for the complexity, cost and associated issues of Contract Co. given the same level of control could be provided by a change such as this?
Alan
===================
From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:20:43 +0000 Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community "˜Membership" group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams
Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel)
Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval
Approve annual proposed ICANN budget
Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org
+1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Just to say i agree with Bertrand 100%, Thanks On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 7:08 PM, Bertrand de La Chapelle < bdelachapelle@gmail.com> wrote:
Milton,
As I mentioned on the call, we need to be careful even when we label this "internal to iCANN" solution. Because we then confuse, as we too often do, ICANN staff, ICANN Board and ICANN community.
I think what people exploring alternatives or potential improvements mean is that they want to build upon the existing building blocks of the ICANN community rather than something entirely external.
One of the arguments that I think underpins this effort is the perceived vulnerability of any entirely new, unfunded and unstaffed architecture that would in many ways resemble the vulnerability of the early ICANN.
Just to try and clarify the terms of the debate.
B.
"*Le plus beau métier des hommes, c'est d'unir les hommes*", Antoine de Saint Exupéry ("*There is no greater mission for humans than uniting humans*")BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLEInternet & Jurisdiction Project | Directoremail bdelachapelle@internetjurisdiction.netemail bdelachapelle@gmail.com twitter @IJurisdiction <https://twitter.com/IJurisdiction> | @bdelachapelle <https://twitter.com/bdelachapelle>mobile +33 (0)6 11 88 33 32www.internetjurisdiction.net[image: A GLOBAL MULTI-STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE PROCESS]
On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 6:10 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
Bertrand
Correction accepted: I should say the “internal to ICANN solution”….
;-)
*From:* Bertrand de La Chapelle [mailto:bdelachapelle@gmail.com] *Sent:* Thursday, December 18, 2014 11:10 AM *To:* Milton L Mueller *Cc:* Alan Greenberg; CWG Stewardship *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Agenda item 5 - Alternate proposals
Milton,
can I respectfully but firmly ask you to refrain from labeling people who have concerns with the complexities of the currently discussed architecture as "advocates of ICANN controlling everything".
You know it is not true and are too well versed in these discussions not to see that the issues are a bit more complex than that.
Such an attitude does not serve the feeling of mutual respect and trust that I would like to prevail in designing a community solution.
Thanks.
Bertrand
"*Le plus beau métier des hommes, c'est d'unir les hommes*", Antoine de Saint Exupéry ("*There is no greater mission for humans than uniting humans*")
BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLE
Internet & Jurisdiction Project | Director
email bdelachapelle@internetjurisdiction.net
email bdelachapelle@gmail.com
twitter @IJurisdiction <https://twitter.com/IJurisdiction> | @bdelachapelle <https://twitter.com/bdelachapelle>
mobile +33 (0)6 11 88 33 32
www.internetjurisdiction.net
[image: A GLOBAL MULTI-STAKEHOLDER DIALOGUE PROCESS]
On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 12:20 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
Interesting that Shawn’s membership proposal (the one published in The Hill) is put forward as something “simpler” than the CWG proposal. Though I am sympathetic to this proposal, establishing a membership would be an extremely complicated and drawn-out change, fraught with all kinds of unanticipated implications and implementation difficulties.
Likewise, Alan is suggesting that a set of yet-unknown changes coming out of an incomplete process is also “less complicated.” That is not a supportable claim. It would be more accurate to say that the separability we propose here dramatically simplifies the work of the CCWG-Accountability.
Del Bianco’s “cross-community membership group” (described at the end of Alan’s message below) is another proposal mentioned. That would be an alternative board that could second-guess ICANN’s board in numerous ways and would create a competing power center. The complications caused by such a structure are _*enormous*_, far more so than the Contract Co. It is interesting that advocates of ICANN controlling everything see such problems with the MRT but no such problems with a committee that not only mirrors the composition of the MRT but has an unrestricted mandate to overrule the board.
--MM
*From:* cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Alan Greenberg
Although I believe that the ALAC proposal ( http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-naming-transition-01dec14/msg00011... ) is the only such alternative presented here, it is not alone. I am not advocating the exact details of the proposal referenced in the message (see http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/ and http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...), but it does demonstrate that we are not unique in wanting a far simpler mode for the new IANA coupled with *real multistakeholder accountability in ICANN*.
I believe that the CCWG *WILL* deliver and I think that we need to factor that into our deliberations. Specifically, is there really a need for the complexity, cost and associated issues of Contract Co. given the same level of control could be provided by a change such as this?
Alan
===================
From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> To: Accountability Cross Community < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:20:43 +0000 Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community "˜Membership" group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accoun...> for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams
Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel)
Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval
Approve annual proposed ICANN budget
Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...> in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and http://blog.netchoice.org
+1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* The key to understanding is humility - my view !
the perceived vulnerability of any entirely new …
+ 1 I have already queried the issue of acquisition or capture over an extended period of time. CW On 18 Dec 2014, at 19:08, Bertrand de La Chapelle <bdelachapelle@gmail.com> wrote:
Milton,
As I mentioned on the call, we need to be careful even when we label this "internal to iCANN" solution. Because we then confuse, as we too often do, ICANN staff, ICANN Board and ICANN community.
I think what people exploring alternatives or potential improvements mean is that they want to build upon the existing building blocks of the ICANN community rather than something entirely external.
One of the arguments that I think underpins this effort is the perceived vulnerability of any entirely new, unfunded and unstaffed architecture that would in many ways resemble the vulnerability of the early ICANN.
Just to try and clarify the terms of the debate.
B.
"Le plus beau métier des hommes, c'est d'unir les hommes", Antoine de Saint Exupéry ("There is no greater mission for humans than uniting humans") BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLE Internet & Jurisdiction Project | Director email bdelachapelle@internetjurisdiction.net email bdelachapelle@gmail.com twitter @IJurisdiction | @bdelachapelle mobile +33 (0)6 11 88 33 32 www.internetjurisdiction.net
On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 6:10 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote: Bertrand
Correction accepted: I should say the “internal to ICANN solution”….
;-)
From: Bertrand de La Chapelle [mailto:bdelachapelle@gmail.com] Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 11:10 AM To: Milton L Mueller Cc: Alan Greenberg; CWG Stewardship Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Agenda item 5 - Alternate proposals
Milton,
can I respectfully but firmly ask you to refrain from labeling people who have concerns with the complexities of the currently discussed architecture as "advocates of ICANN controlling everything".
You know it is not true and are too well versed in these discussions not to see that the issues are a bit more complex than that.
Such an attitude does not serve the feeling of mutual respect and trust that I would like to prevail in designing a community solution.
Thanks.
Bertrand
"Le plus beau métier des hommes, c'est d'unir les hommes", Antoine de Saint Exupéry ("There is no greater mission for humans than uniting humans")
BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLE
Internet & Jurisdiction Project | Director
email bdelachapelle@internetjurisdiction.net
email bdelachapelle@gmail.com
twitter @IJurisdiction | @bdelachapelle
mobile +33 (0)6 11 88 33 32
www.internetjurisdiction.net
On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 12:20 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
Interesting that Shawn’s membership proposal (the one published in The Hill) is put forward as something “simpler” than the CWG proposal. Though I am sympathetic to this proposal, establishing a membership would be an extremely complicated and drawn-out change, fraught with all kinds of unanticipated implications and implementation difficulties.
Likewise, Alan is suggesting that a set of yet-unknown changes coming out of an incomplete process is also “less complicated.” That is not a supportable claim. It would be more accurate to say that the separability we propose here dramatically simplifies the work of the CCWG-Accountability.
Del Bianco’s “cross-community membership group” (described at the end of Alan’s message below) is another proposal mentioned. That would be an alternative board that could second-guess ICANN’s board in numerous ways and would create a competing power center. The complications caused by such a structure are _enormous_, far more so than the Contract Co. It is interesting that advocates of ICANN controlling everything see such problems with the MRT but no such problems with a committee that not only mirrors the composition of the MRT but has an unrestricted mandate to overrule the board.
--MM
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg
Although I believe that the ALAC proposal ( http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-naming-transition-01dec14/msg00011... ) is the only such alternative presented here, it is not alone. I am not advocating the exact details of the proposal referenced in the message (see http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/ and http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...), but it does demonstrate that we are not unique in wanting a far simpler mode for the new IANA coupled with real multistakeholder accountability in ICANN.
I believe that the CCWG *WILL* deliver and I think that we need to factor that into our deliberations. Specifically, is there really a need for the complexity, cost and associated issues of Contract Co. given the same level of control could be provided by a change such as this?
Alan
===================
From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:20:43 +0000 Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community "˜Membership" group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams
Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel)
Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval
Approve annual proposed ICANN budget
Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org and http://blog.netchoice.org
+1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
From: Bertrand de La Chapelle [mailto:bdelachapelle@gmail.com] As I mentioned on the call, we need to be careful even when we label this "internal to iCANN" solution. Because we then confuse, as we too often do, ICANN staff, ICANN Board and ICANN community. MM: I am utterly without such confusion, and always have been. When I say ICANN I mean ICANN, Inc. This includes the staff and the board; as the staff is supposed to be doing what the board tells it to do. Indeed, I think it is the people who call for an internal solution who reveal such confusion; they do not distinguish between ICANN’s self-interest as an organization and the community around ICANN who uses its organizational and institutional apparatus to participate in DNS governance. I think what people exploring alternatives or potential improvements mean is that they want to build upon the existing building blocks of the ICANN community rather than something entirely external. MM: If that were true, there would be no objections to the MRT-CSC-Contract Co model, because it draws heavily on the ICANN community. Look at the MRT composition I proposed, for example; the most potent criticism that could be made of it is that it mirrors too closely and depends too heavily on ICANN representational organs: GNSO, ccNSO, SSAC, the ACs, etc. No, my friend, the issue really _is_ whether there are contractual and organizational relations external to the ICANN corporation, or not. So I will continue to refer to any proposal that has no external contracting authority and relies entirely on ICANN bylaw modifications as an internal-to-ICANN solution. Because I value accuracy and clarity. You are advocating an internal solution. One of the arguments that I think underpins this effort is the perceived vulnerability of any entirely new, unfunded and unstaffed architecture that would in many ways resemble the vulnerability of the early ICANN. I have trouble understanding this concern. ICANN entered an almost entirely uninstitutionalized environment in 1997, and was at the center of a huge dispute between Network Solutions (which vastly exceeded ICANN in resources at the time), a rather weak and poor ISOC, and the Department of Commerce. Now we have a very well-solidified transnational policy network formed around ICANN, ICANN is accepted as the policy authority for DNS, and there are much more well-defined relationships with IETF/IAB, registries, international organizations, user groups, and so on. The biggest danger now is that ICANN itself might dominate or overwhelm any new entity and become locked in and unaccountable.
On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 8:24 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote:
*From:* Bertrand de La Chapelle [mailto:bdelachapelle@gmail.com]
<snip>
So I will continue to refer to any proposal that has no external contracting authority and relies entirely on ICANN bylaw modifications as an internal-to-ICANN solution. Because I value accuracy and clarity.
Please can you show me where it is written that we MUST create an external contracting authority?
You are advocating an internal solution.
and what is wrong about this Milton? i think calling it internal solution but not recognising that the solution intends to have strong accountability is concerning.
One of the arguments that I think underpins this effort is the perceived vulnerability of any entirely new, unfunded and unstaffed architecture that would in many ways resemble the vulnerability of the early ICANN.
I have trouble understanding this concern. ICANN entered an almost entirely uninstitutionalized environment in 1997, and was at the center of a huge dispute between Network Solutions (which vastly exceeded ICANN in resources at the time), a rather weak and poor ISOC, and the Department of Commerce.
Now we have a very well-solidified transnational policy network formed
around ICANN, ICANN is accepted as the policy authority for DNS, and there are much more well-defined relationships with IETF/IAB, registries, international organizations, user groups, and so on.
Wow! now i understand your motive which seem to be that you indeed want to create another ICANN-like body perhaps for the fun of it otherwise i will like you to tell me what is the difference between the current multistakeholder community within ICANN and the one you will be proposing. The biggest danger now is that ICANN itself might dominate or overwhelm any
new entity and become locked in and unaccountable.
Sorry i am not sure i get your point, we recognise that accountability is not yet strong within ICANN and that is what we are trying to work on but you seem to be of the opinion that subjecting a already mature organisation (both in community and reach) to a new organisation that will be setup is the ONLY way that ensures ICANN's accountability. Perhaps you care to clarify the scenario of what new entity ICANN will dominate Regards
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* The key to understanding is humility - my view !
On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 1:08 PM, Bertrand de La Chapelle < bdelachapelle@gmail.com> wrote:
One of the arguments that I think underpins this effort is the perceived vulnerability of any entirely new, unfunded and unstaffed architecture that would in many ways resemble the vulnerability of the early ICANN.
+1. I have been waiting to see how we factor the protection that is afforded existing arrangement by the 'full faith and credit' of the USG. And, whether the configurations offered ever address this, overtly or covertly. -Carlton ============================== Carlton A Samuels Mobile: 876-818-1799 *Strategy, Planning, Governance, Assessment & Turnaround* =============================
+1 CW On 18 Dec 2014, at 17:09, Bertrand de La Chapelle <bdelachapelle@gmail.com> wrote:
Milton,
can I respectfully but firmly ask you to refrain from labeling people who have concerns with the complexities of the currently discussed architecture as "advocates of ICANN controlling everything".
You know it is not true and are too well versed in these discussions not to see that the issues are a bit more complex than that.
Such an attitude does not serve the feeling of mutual respect and trust that I would like to prevail in designing a community solution.
Thanks.
Bertrand
"Le plus beau métier des hommes, c'est d'unir les hommes", Antoine de Saint Exupéry ("There is no greater mission for humans than uniting humans") BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLE Internet & Jurisdiction Project | Director email bdelachapelle@internetjurisdiction.net email bdelachapelle@gmail.com twitter @IJurisdiction | @bdelachapelle mobile +33 (0)6 11 88 33 32 www.internetjurisdiction.net
On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 12:20 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller@syr.edu> wrote: Interesting that Shawn’s membership proposal (the one published in The Hill) is put forward as something “simpler” than the CWG proposal. Though I am sympathetic to this proposal, establishing a membership would be an extremely complicated and drawn-out change, fraught with all kinds of unanticipated implications and implementation difficulties.
Likewise, Alan is suggesting that a set of yet-unknown changes coming out of an incomplete process is also “less complicated.” That is not a supportable claim. It would be more accurate to say that the separability we propose here dramatically simplifies the work of the CCWG-Accountability.
Del Bianco’s “cross-community membership group” (described at the end of Alan’s message below) is another proposal mentioned. That would be an alternative board that could second-guess ICANN’s board in numerous ways and would create a competing power center. The complications caused by such a structure are _enormous_, far more so than the Contract Co. It is interesting that advocates of ICANN controlling everything see such problems with the MRT but no such problems with a committee that not only mirrors the composition of the MRT but has an unrestricted mandate to overrule the board.
--MM
From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg
Although I believe that the ALAC proposal ( http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-naming-transition-01dec14/msg00011... ) is the only such alternative presented here, it is not alone. I am not advocating the exact details of the proposal referenced in the message (see http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/ and http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...), but it does demonstrate that we are not unique in wanting a far simpler mode for the new IANA coupled with real multistakeholder accountability in ICANN.
I believe that the CCWG *WILL* deliver and I think that we need to factor that into our deliberations. Specifically, is there really a need for the complexity, cost and associated issues of Contract Co. given the same level of control could be provided by a change such as this?
Alan
===================
From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:20:43 +0000 Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community "˜Membership" group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in draft3 for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams
Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel)
Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval
Approve annual proposed ICANN budget
Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups proposing a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant Op-Ed in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANN’s bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice
http://www.NetChoice.org and http://blog.netchoice.org
+1.202.420.7482
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
_______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
participants (7)
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Alan Greenberg -
Bertrand de La Chapelle -
Carlton Samuels -
Christopher Wilkinson -
Matthew Shears -
Milton L Mueller -
Seun Ojedeji