I note that item 5 on the agenda for the 18 December meeting is "Due consideration of alternative proposal (not to exclude other proposals)". I also note that there has been significant discussion about the CWG Stewardship and the CCWG Accountability, their inter-relationship and co-dependency. In light of this, I would like to bring the CWGs attention to a recent e-mail on the CCWG list (copied below). Although I believe that the ALAC proposal (http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-naming-transition-01dec14/msg00011...) is the only such alternative presented here, it is not alone. I am not advocating the exact details of the proposal referenced in the message (see http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/ and http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-pla...), but it does demonstrate that we are not unique in wanting a far simpler mode for the new IANA coupled with real multistakeholder accountability in ICANN. I believe that the CCWG *WILL* deliver and I think that we need to factor that into our deliberations. Specifically, is there really a need for the complexity, cost and associated issues of Contract Co. given the same level of control could be provided by a change such as this? Alan ===================
From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco@netchoice.org> To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:20:43 +0000 Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent cross-community group as ultimate authority
This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, cross-community "Membership" group to hold ICANN board and management accountable to the community. It was described this way in <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accountability%20suggestions%20%5Bdraft%203%5D.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1418610739000&api=v2>draft3 for work area 2:
Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with authority to:
Appoint members of Affirmation review teams Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use independent panel) Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval Approve annual proposed ICANN budget Recall one or all ICANN Board members
One of the groups <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/>proposing a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-plan-needs-new-ideas-to-ensure-accountability>Op-Ed in a Washington paper today. Daniel Castro of the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
California state law applies since ICANN is a registered nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members. Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN with extensive authority over the board. This authority could include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc. The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO) responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this modification to ICANNâs bylaws in conformance with California law.
Steve DelBianco Executive Director NetChoice
<http://www.netchoice.org/>http://www.NetChoice.org and <http://blog.netchoice.org/>http://blog.netchoice.org +1.202.420.7482