Comments on draft Section 3 and Annex
Hi, Some comments on the current draft: * How will non-performance related questions be escalated from the CSC? At the moment their mandate is performance issues and the proposed CSC composition lends itself more to performance than policy escalation. o No matter the liaison role of the SO ACs, I would suggest that policy issues can/should also be raised directly with the PRT. * How will the PRT be composed, how often will it meet, etc.? o Representation on the PRT should reflect but also be broader than ICANN (additional independent experts) otherwise I believe we will not have satisfied the key criteria of "support(ing) and enhanc(ing) the multistakeholder model". The PRT should meet annually to review overall IANA operator performance and any policy or other concerns. It should also be convened on an ad hoc basis to address policy or performance issues as they arise or are escalated. * Should the CSC assume the responsibilities of the current NTIA Contracting Officer? I would have through that this should reside with the PRT. (we may need further elaboration on this particular role at NTIA, etc., and where it would best sit.) * The draft has some contract duties assumed by both the PRT and CSC - is this deliberate? C.5.1., C.5.2 and C.5.3. for example. * Do we believe that the role described in the current contract (sections C.3. and C.5.3.) related to the audit of security provisions can be undertaken by CSC or the PRT? * It still remains unclear how the Contract Co could "take action" per the request of the PRT if the contracting Co. is not staffed, etc. And, does it need to be a corporation? We advice on this asap. otherwise we will have to consider another model. * Is the IANA function to have independent legal counsel (per the proposal)? And will that legal counsel role need to have a more expanded role than delegation and re-delegation issues? * Annex 3 already points to a model for contract options including up to two options to extend. I do not recall there being any consensus or agreement on the structuring of the contract or extension options and this section should be reworded accordingly - for example to state that all contract details such as length, options to extend, etc., are TBD. (I do recall that there was some sense of the room that the amended contract should remain with the current operator after the transition for a limited period of time again TDB.) * In Annex 3 there needs to be a careful reread - see below for examples: o It reads "ICANN to Provide Qualified Program Manager" and should read "Contractor....." o Why does the CSC approve contractor personnel changes? Surely it should the PRT as responsible for contracting issues? o Shouldn't the Final Report and Acceptance and Inspection be for the PRT? There seems to be some lack of clarity in the Annex as to what roles/functions are CSC or PRT? o Again C.6 and C.7 should be PRT, not CSC, issues and are identified as such in the section 3 text. Same issue with C.8 and E. Finally, I share a number of the concerns voiced on the list over the past couple of days. In particular there are many critical details yet unresolved. We may rue not addressing these now. On the issue of accountability, I am pleased to see that the Co-chairs of the two WGs are meeting and believe that we need to quickly align as best possible these two work streams. If, as is likely, the amended contract remains with ICANN for some period of time after the transition the recommendations from work stream 1 (and 2) of the Accountability WG are and remain critically important no matter what happens after the initial contract period. Matthew -- Matthew Shears Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) mshears@cdt.org + 44 771 247 2987
Good evening:
Annex 3 there needs to be a careful reread …
Thankyou, Matthew. Indeed. I would add that the Section on COST/PRICE, which refers to the collection of fees, needs to be entirely deleted. If there is one thing that will set global alarm bells ringing, it is the idea that transferring IANA from NTIA to the global Internet community, in practice means the privatisation and commercialisation of an administrative service which has always been cost-less to the final user. We need more than a re-read. We need a re-think. As long as we have an unique global Root (I am in favour) it is quite clear that the IANA function is a natural global monopoly. The scope for abuse is obvious. The structures and policies that we put in place now, must be designed, ab initio, to prevent future abuse. Regards Christopher Wilkinson On 29 Nov 2014, at 13:17, Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org> wrote:
Hi,
Some comments on the current draft:
How will non-performance related questions be escalated from the CSC? At the moment their mandate is performance issues and the proposed CSC composition lends itself more to performance than policy escalation. No matter the liaison role of the SO ACs, I would suggest that policy issues can/should also be raised directly with the PRT. How will the PRT be composed, how often will it meet, etc.? Representation on the PRT should reflect but also be broader than ICANN (additional independent experts) otherwise I believe we will not have satisfied the key criteria of "support(ing) and enhanc(ing) the multistakeholder model". The PRT should meet annually to review overall IANA operator performance and any policy or other concerns. It should also be convened on an ad hoc basis to address policy or performance issues as they arise or are escalated. Should the CSC assume the responsibilities of the current NTIA Contracting Officer? I would have through that this should reside with the PRT. (we may need further elaboration on this particular role at NTIA, etc., and where it would best sit.) The draft has some contract duties assumed by both the PRT and CSC - is this deliberate? C.5.1., C.5.2 and C.5.3. for example. Do we believe that the role described in the current contract (sections C.3. and C.5.3.) related to the audit of security provisions can be undertaken by CSC or the PRT? It still remains unclear how the Contract Co could "take action" per the request of the PRT if the contracting Co. is not staffed, etc. And, does it need to be a corporation? We advice on this asap. otherwise we will have to consider another model. Is the IANA function to have independent legal counsel (per the proposal)? And will that legal counsel role need to have a more expanded role than delegation and re-delegation issues? Annex 3 already points to a model for contract options including up to two options to extend. I do not recall there being any consensus or agreement on the structuring of the contract or extension options and this section should be reworded accordingly - for example to state that all contract details such as length, options to extend, etc., are TBD. (I do recall that there was some sense of the room that the amended contract should remain with the current operator after the transition for a limited period of time again TDB.) In Annex 3 there needs to be a careful reread - see below for examples: It reads "ICANN to Provide Qualified Program Manager" and should read "Contractor....." Why does the CSC approve contractor personnel changes? Surely it should the PRT as responsible for contracting issues? Shouldn't the Final Report and Acceptance and Inspection be for the PRT? There seems to be some lack of clarity in the Annex as to what roles/functions are CSC or PRT? Again C.6 and C.7 should be PRT, not CSC, issues and are identified as such in the section 3 text. Same issue with C.8 and E. Finally, I share a number of the concerns voiced on the list over the past couple of days. In particular there are many critical details yet unresolved. We may rue not addressing these now. On the issue of accountability, I am pleased to see that the Co-chairs of the two WGs are meeting and believe that we need to quickly align as best possible these two work streams. If, as is likely, the amended contract remains with ICANN for some period of time after the transition the recommendations from work stream 1 (and 2) of the Accountability WG are and remain critically important no matter what happens after the initial contract period. Matthew -- Matthew Shears Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) mshears@cdt.org + 44 771 247 2987 _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
Christopher, Why should it be cost-less to the final user? There is cost so either the final user pays it or someone else pays it for the final user. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Christopher Wilkinson Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2014 2:32 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Comments on draft Section 3 and Annex Importance: High Good evening:
Annex 3 there needs to be a careful reread ...
Thankyou, Matthew. Indeed. I would add that the Section on COST/PRICE, which refers to the collection of fees, needs to be entirely deleted. If there is one thing that will set global alarm bells ringing, it is the idea that transferring IANA from NTIA to the global Internet community, in practice means the privatisation and commercialisation of an administrative service which has always been cost-less to the final user. We need more than a re-read. We need a re-think. As long as we have an unique global Root (I am in favour) it is quite clear that the IANA function is a natural global monopoly. The scope for abuse is obvious. The structures and policies that we put in place now, must be designed, ab initio, to prevent future abuse. Regards Christopher Wilkinson On 29 Nov 2014, at 13:17, Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org>> wrote: Hi, Some comments on the current draft: * How will non-performance related questions be escalated from the CSC? At the moment their mandate is performance issues and the proposed CSC composition lends itself more to performance than policy escalation. * No matter the liaison role of the SO ACs, I would suggest that policy issues can/should also be raised directly with the PRT. * How will the PRT be composed, how often will it meet, etc.? * Representation on the PRT should reflect but also be broader than ICANN (additional independent experts) otherwise I believe we will not have satisfied the key criteria of "support(ing) and enhanc(ing) the multistakeholder model". The PRT should meet annually to review overall IANA operator performance and any policy or other concerns. It should also be convened on an ad hoc basis to address policy or performance issues as they arise or are escalated. * Should the CSC assume the responsibilities of the current NTIA Contracting Officer? I would have through that this should reside with the PRT. (we may need further elaboration on this particular role at NTIA, etc., and where it would best sit.) * The draft has some contract duties assumed by both the PRT and CSC - is this deliberate? C.5.1., C.5.2 and C.5.3. for example. * Do we believe that the role described in the current contract (sections C.3. and C.5.3.) related to the audit of security provisions can be undertaken by CSC or the PRT? * It still remains unclear how the Contract Co could "take action" per the request of the PRT if the contracting Co. is not staffed, etc. And, does it need to be a corporation? We advice on this asap. otherwise we will have to consider another model. * Is the IANA function to have independent legal counsel (per the proposal)? And will that legal counsel role need to have a more expanded role than delegation and re-delegation issues? * Annex 3 already points to a model for contract options including up to two options to extend. I do not recall there being any consensus or agreement on the structuring of the contract or extension options and this section should be reworded accordingly - for example to state that all contract details such as length, options to extend, etc., are TBD. (I do recall that there was some sense of the room that the amended contract should remain with the current operator after the transition for a limited period of time again TDB.) * In Annex 3 there needs to be a careful reread - see below for examples: * It reads "ICANN to Provide Qualified Program Manager" and should read "Contractor....." * Why does the CSC approve contractor personnel changes? Surely it should the PRT as responsible for contracting issues? * Shouldn't the Final Report and Acceptance and Inspection be for the PRT? There seems to be some lack of clarity in the Annex as to what roles/functions are CSC or PRT? * Again C.6 and C.7 should be PRT, not CSC, issues and are identified as such in the section 3 text. Same issue with C.8 and E. Finally, I share a number of the concerns voiced on the list over the past couple of days. In particular there are many critical details yet unresolved. We may rue not addressing these now. On the issue of accountability, I am pleased to see that the Co-chairs of the two WGs are meeting and believe that we need to quickly align as best possible these two work streams. If, as is likely, the amended contract remains with ICANN for some period of time after the transition the recommendations from work stream 1 (and 2) of the Accountability WG are and remain critically important no matter what happens after the initial contract period. Matthew -- Matthew Shears Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org> + 44 771 247 2987 _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
This is a difficult issue. Christopher is correct that “user fees” will raise red flags, but Chuck is correct that someone has to pay in the end. J. Beckwith Burr Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer 1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 Office: + 1.202.533.2932 Mobile: +1.202.352.6367 / becky.burr@neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr@neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz From: <Gomes>, Chuck Gomes <cgomes@verisign.com<mailto:cgomes@verisign.com>> Date: Wednesday, December 3, 2014 at 2:48 PM To: Christopher Wilkinson <lists@christopherwilkinson.eu<mailto:lists@christopherwilkinson.eu>>, "cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Comments on draft Section 3 and Annex Christopher, Why should it be cost-less to the final user? There is cost so either the final user pays it or someone else pays it for the final user. Chuck From: cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Christopher Wilkinson Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2014 2:32 PM To: cwg-stewardship@icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Comments on draft Section 3 and Annex Importance: High Good evening:
Annex 3 there needs to be a careful reread …
Thankyou, Matthew. Indeed. I would add that the Section on COST/PRICE, which refers to the collection of fees, needs to be entirely deleted. If there is one thing that will set global alarm bells ringing, it is the idea that transferring IANA from NTIA to the global Internet community, in practice means the privatisation and commercialisation of an administrative service which has always been cost-less to the final user. We need more than a re-read. We need a re-think. As long as we have an unique global Root (I am in favour) it is quite clear that the IANA function is a natural global monopoly. The scope for abuse is obvious. The structures and policies that we put in place now, must be designed, ab initio, to prevent future abuse. Regards Christopher Wilkinson On 29 Nov 2014, at 13:17, Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org>> wrote: Hi, Some comments on the current draft: * How will non-performance related questions be escalated from the CSC? At the moment their mandate is performance issues and the proposed CSC composition lends itself more to performance than policy escalation. * No matter the liaison role of the SO ACs, I would suggest that policy issues can/should also be raised directly with the PRT. * How will the PRT be composed, how often will it meet, etc.? * Representation on the PRT should reflect but also be broader than ICANN (additional independent experts) otherwise I believe we will not have satisfied the key criteria of "support(ing) and enhanc(ing) the multistakeholder model". The PRT should meet annually to review overall IANA operator performance and any policy or other concerns. It should also be convened on an ad hoc basis to address policy or performance issues as they arise or are escalated. * Should the CSC assume the responsibilities of the current NTIA Contracting Officer? I would have through that this should reside with the PRT. (we may need further elaboration on this particular role at NTIA, etc., and where it would best sit.) * The draft has some contract duties assumed by both the PRT and CSC - is this deliberate? C.5.1., C.5.2 and C.5.3. for example. * Do we believe that the role described in the current contract (sections C.3. and C.5.3.) related to the audit of security provisions can be undertaken by CSC or the PRT? * It still remains unclear how the Contract Co could "take action" per the request of the PRT if the contracting Co. is not staffed, etc. And, does it need to be a corporation? We advice on this asap. otherwise we will have to consider another model. * Is the IANA function to have independent legal counsel (per the proposal)? And will that legal counsel role need to have a more expanded role than delegation and re-delegation issues? * Annex 3 already points to a model for contract options including up to two options to extend. I do not recall there being any consensus or agreement on the structuring of the contract or extension options and this section should be reworded accordingly - for example to state that all contract details such as length, options to extend, etc., are TBD. (I do recall that there was some sense of the room that the amended contract should remain with the current operator after the transition for a limited period of time again TDB.) * In Annex 3 there needs to be a careful reread - see below for examples: * It reads "ICANN to Provide Qualified Program Manager" and should read "Contractor....." * Why does the CSC approve contractor personnel changes? Surely it should the PRT as responsible for contracting issues? * Shouldn't the Final Report and Acceptance and Inspection be for the PRT? There seems to be some lack of clarity in the Annex as to what roles/functions are CSC or PRT? * Again C.6 and C.7 should be PRT, not CSC, issues and are identified as such in the section 3 text. Same issue with C.8 and E. Finally, I share a number of the concerns voiced on the list over the past couple of days. In particular there are many critical details yet unresolved. We may rue not addressing these now. On the issue of accountability, I am pleased to see that the Co-chairs of the two WGs are meeting and believe that we need to quickly align as best possible these two work streams. If, as is likely, the amended contract remains with ICANN for some period of time after the transition the recommendations from work stream 1 (and 2) of the Accountability WG are and remain critically important no matter what happens after the initial contract period. Matthew -- Matthew Shears Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) mshears@cdt.org<mailto:mshears@cdt.org> + 44 771 247 2987 _______________________________________________ CWG-Stewardship mailing list CWG-Stewardship@icann.org<mailto:CWG-Stewardship@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mm.icann.org_mailman_listinfo_cwg-2Dstewardship&d=AwMFAg&c=MOptNlVtIETeDALC_lULrw&r=62cJFOifzm6X_GRlaq8Mo8TjDmrxdYahOP8WDDkMr4k&m=zgLVBAx7hu36yYnNEis-A7Z16oGvxcC6FzRevSrAuY8&s=jMn5VXQt0-uxcJaYBGSKPoSZ_bU8Bg9rMlSfgYBm_hk&e=>
participants (4)
-
Burr, Becky -
Christopher Wilkinson -
Gomes, Chuck -
Matthew Shears