May 2026 - Gnso-dnsabuse-pdp

REMINDER | Meeting Invitation / DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP1 WG | Monday, 01 June 2026
by Terri Agnew May 29, 2026

May 29, 2026

Dear all, The next DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP1 WG call will take place on Monday, 01 June 2026 at 12:30 UTC for 90 minutes. Join from PC, Mac, iPad, or Android - Zoom Webinar: https://icann.zoom.us/j/91807711636?pwd=q6XCt8cWQU9m3fGgSojQ5X07pbnX6a.1 Passcode:+X8RaawVrW Phone one-tap: +13126266799,,91807711636#,,,,*0006343077# US (Chicago) +13462487799,,91807711636#,,,,*0006343077# US (Houston) Webinar ID: 918 0771 1636 Passcode: 0006343077 International numbers available: https://icann.zoom.us/u/a9jfXWLB8 * 2026 Meetings wiki: https://icann-community.atlassian.net/wiki/x/B4CWLQ ALL: Before joining the call * Please send apologies to gnso-secs(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-secs@icann.org> only (members: please include if an alternate is joining on your behalf) * Please be sure you have read the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.icann.org/resources/pages/expected-s…>, the ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy<https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/community-anti-harassment-policy-2017…>, and the ICANN Community Participant Code of Conduct<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/adopted-icann-community-partici…>. * Staff will promote members, participants, and alternates to panelist once joined. OBSERVERS: * Observers will have ability to view member chat and information shared in the zoom webinar room. * Observers will not be able to use chat or raise hands. Thank you. Kind regards, Julie -- Julie Bisland Policy Operations Analyst (GNSO) Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Find out more about the GNSO by visiting: https://learn.icann.org/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__learn.icann.org_&d=DwM…> Follow @GNSO on Twitter: https://twitter.com/ICANN_GNSO<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_ICANN-5FGN…> Transcripts and recordings of GNSO Working Group and Council events are located on the GNSO Master Calendar <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__gnso.icann.org_en_grou…>

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Proposed Agenda and important documents DNSAM PDP1
by Feodora Hamza May 29, 2026

May 29, 2026

Dear DNSAM PDP1, Please fine below the proposed agenda for our meeting on Monday, 1 June at 12:30 UTC. 1. Welcome (5min) 2. ICANN86 Prep (10min) 3. Start Deliberations on CQ8 (35min) 4. Start Deliberations on CQ9 (35min) 5. AOB (5min) For your preparation, please see below: * Slides for 1 June session: https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/policy/2026/presentation/slides-… * Collaboration document with Early input from SG/C: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1GxM-Yrgv6sZPEYU8ikW4cRM5YqWsJuWGiQyO39p… For your reference and benefit, please see below a link to the ICANN Compliance webinar: * Webinar for EMEA: What Makes a DNS Abuse Complaint to ICANN Actionable: Insights and Common Challenges: https://www.icann.org/en/engagement-calendar/details/webinar-for-emea-what-… Please also find below two documents for your review: * Prelim Recommendation Review Doc – provide feedback before 8 June: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1udLt1o9rwCc4xNRsuw6B-5onjpI63VDA/edit?u… * Scoped Impact Assessment – provide feedback before 10 June: https://docs.google.com/document/d/18xVFX-IXfEgPnIj2UaXmwiXsWE8FY-Jo/edit?u… * The main discussion points for both docs will be added to the ICANN86 agendas. Thank you. Kind regards, Feodora on behalf of support staff:

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Examples and a note
by farzaneh badii May 28, 2026

May 28, 2026

Hello everyone, You have asked us for examples of the potential impact of Associated Domain Checks (ADC) on domain name registrants. We are providing two examples below.One is about investigation scope and another is about surveillance and data protection. . Before doing so, however, I want to make one point clear. Examples involving real people and real-world contexts will always be imperfect. They can be dismissed as unlikely, as “not how we work,” or as edge cases. But that is exactly why risk analysis and safeguards are necessary. Our society should not assess the legitimacy of a mechanism only by how it treats ordinary or low-risk cases. It should also consider how the mechanism affects vulnerable communities, politically sensitive users, minority groups, and others who are more likely to experience harm. You can read this incredible report by Afsaneh Rigot <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/pantheon_files/files/publi…>on how to design and govern from the margins across digital products and services. Another point is, the distinction between malicious and compromised domains is not, by itself, a sufficient safeguard. Nor is it enough to say that investigation is not mitigation, or that an ADC will not necessarily lead to suspension. It can lead to suspension and we need to have safeguards in place and remedy for when things go wrong. The safeguards we are proposing are simple: investigations should be proportionate, their scope should be narrow and tied to the context, and there should be a meaningful remedy when things go wrong. We cannot predict every potential harm to registrants or end users, but we can design processes that reduce foreseeable risks. *Example 1: 2019 Hong Kong Protests* In 2019, protesters in Hong Kong took to the streets in response to a controversial government bill, leading to the largest series of demonstrations in the city’s history. Hong Kong police arrested hundreds of people, including prominent activists. During this period, protesters relied on apps that helped them track police locations. Some of those apps were later removed from Apple’s App Store, cutting off a critical channel of access. This created demand for alternative distribution channels, including proxy registrations or mirror domains that could help users access tools no longer available through traditional app stores. In contexts of political unrest, messaging apps such as Telegram can become critical tools for coordination and access to information. At the same time, these moments can create opportunities for malicious actors to register domains impersonating services like Telegram, for example “ telegram-login.app,” in order to conduct targeted phishing or distribute malware. A well-evidenced report about an impersonating domain, timed to coincide with a period of protest or heightened repression, can be a valid contextual indicator for triggering an ADC. The timing, target, and surrounding circumstances may reveal something that the domain name alone cannot. However, a registrant or reseller may also have a history of registering domains on behalf of others in their community, including people who lack access to financial institutions, whose prepaid cards are not accepted by registrars, or who face legal or political risk if they register a domain directly. In the Hong Kong context, this might include mirror or access-support domains such as “protest-hongkong.app” or “ wherearethepolice-hongkong.app,” intended to help protesters access apps or information no longer available through official channels. If an ADC is triggered and the investigation sweeps across the registrant’s entire portfolio, those domains become visible to the registrar. That creates a serious problem. Once the registrar has knowledge of those domains, it may lose plausible deniability. Depending on the jurisdiction, that knowledge may create legal obligations to act or expose the registrar to political pressure from governments or other actors seeking to have those domains suspended. The investigation itself may therefore generate liability that would not otherwise have existed and could lead to suspension of those domains. The risk is not only to the registrant or reseller. It can also create risk for the registrar. *Example 2: Reproductive Health Provider * Consider a small web developer or community organization that helps several local groups register and maintain domain names. Some of these groups may not have the technical capacity to manage their own registrations. Others may lack access to accepted payment methods. Others may avoid registering directly because the nature of their work creates legal, social, or personal risk. Among the domains managed through this account is a website for a reproductive health provider operating in a legally contested jurisdiction. The provider is lawful, but its work is politically sensitive. The domain is not abusive and has not been reported for DNS abuse. Now assume that a different domain in the same account is reported for phishing. The report is credible. The registrar therefore has a legitimate reason to investigate the reported domain and closely related indicators, such as a distinctive naming pattern, shared malware infrastructure, or repeated registration behavior connected to the abusive activity. The problem arises if the ADC expands beyond those indicators and becomes a broader portfolio review. The registrar may rely only on data already available to it, such as account information, billing records, login history, payment details, registration history, support tickets, reseller identifiers, or nameserver data. But when those data points are combined, they can reveal more than the registrar needed to know for the original abuse investigation. For example, the ADC may show that the same account, payment method, or support contact is connected to the reproductive health provider’s domain. It may reveal that the provider relies on a particular community organization, web developer, or intermediary. It may also expose other domains connected to the same network, such as legal aid, counseling, travel support, medication information, or patient-resource websites. None of these domains were the subject of the abuse report. Yet the ADC has now linked them together in an investigative context. This creates a data protection problem even if the registrar takes no mitigation action. The harm is not limited to suspension. The harm may occur through excessive processing, linkage, inference, and retention. Data collected for registration, billing, account security, or customer support has been repurposed into an investigative graph. That graph can reveal relationships among unrelated domains, expose sensitive activity, and create new knowledge that did not need to be generated to address the original phishing report. The argument that the registrar is using only “available data” does not resolve the issue. Availability is not the same as necessity or proportionality. A registrar may possess data for operational reasons, but that does not automatically justify using it to examine unrelated domains or infer relationships among registrants. The relevant question is whether each category of data used in the ADC is necessary, relevant, and proportionate to the specific abuse indicators that triggered the investigation. *NCSG Position and Recommendations* The NCSG is not arguing that an ADC triggered by a single reported instance of DNS abuse is always disproportionate. A domain mimicking a popular communications platform like Telegram during a period of protest could signal a systematic effort to target a specific population, and that may be a valid contextual indicator. The context of reported abuse must always be carefully analyzed. What the NCSG emphasizes is that proportionality applies not only to the decision to trigger an ADC, but also to how the ADC is conducted. First, ADC investigations should be contextual. The triggering evidence should be assessed against the broader circumstances, including the nature of the abuse, the target, the timing, and the surrounding political or social context. Second, ADC investigations should be narrow. The scope should be limited to the specific patterns, keywords, registration characteristics, or other indicators associated with the malicious domain. It should not become a general audit of the registrant’s broader portfolio. I also want to address directly the argument that a broad sweep is acceptable as long as the registrar carefully distinguishes between malicious and compromised domains, or that harm only arises if the investigation leads to suspension. Harm can occur at the point of investigation, not only at the point of mitigation. A registrar that conducts a wide sweep and acquires knowledge of sensitive domains may already have created legal and political exposure for itself and potential harm for the registrant, regardless of whether any domains are ultimately suspended. Limiting mitigation does not undo the consequences of an overbroad investigation. This is why scope limitation must be built into the investigation itself, there should be remedy and there should be safeguards in place. Best regards, Farzaneh

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Update: Document, Action Items and High Level Notes DNSAM PDP1 26 May 2028
by Feodora Hamza May 26, 2026

May 26, 2026

Dear DNSAM PDP1, Please see below the high-level notes and action item from today’s discussion. Our next meeting is scheduled for Monday, 1 June at 12:30 UTC. As discussed, please find below the Prelim Rec Review Document, which has been updated to reflect today’s discussion, the input provided in the collaboration document, and previous working group discussions, for your review by 8 June 2026. * Prelim Rec ReviewDoc: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1udLt1o9rwCc4xNRsuw6B-5onjpI63VDA/edit?u… Please note our apologies that the review document was not available in advance of today’s meeting. To accurately reflect the working group’s discussions, we needed the benefit of today’s deliberations before finalizing the draft. As noted by the Chair during the meeting, this is not intended to represent final language. Rather, it is a working draft for the Working Group to continue to review, edit, discuss, and refine with the aim of developing language that:  a) Can reach Working Group consensus.  b) Can receive support from the GNSO Council.  c) Can be approved by the ICANN Board.  d) Can be implemented by ICANN Org. Kind regards, Feodora on behalf of Support Staff 2026-05-26 DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP1 WG<https://icann-community.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/DAMP1/pages/935755817/202…> Action Items: * Support Staff to update and circulate the Review Doc on preliminary recommendation following the meeting discussion and consideration of all input received to date. Including: To refine language around minimum indicators. To refine language concerning “all means within its control.” To better align/harmonize Recommendations 2 to 4. Add prelim rec for CQ 5 and 6 based on today's and previous discussion * Working group members to review language and provide substantive comments with proposed alternatives by 8 JUNE 2026. * Staff to share Draft Scoped Impact Assessment with WG for their review by Thursday 4 June. Important documents/links: * Session Recording: https://icann.zoom.us/rec/play/_eLWI9LJE1KYofmW2peKWStBqsRTo2LzGk13b1dexMMX… * Wiki space/slides: https://icann-community.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/DAMP1/pages/935755817/202… * CollabDoc: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1GxM-Yrgv6sZPEYU8ikW4cRM5YqWsJuWGiQyO39p… * NEW Prelim Rec ReviewDoc: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1udLt1o9rwCc4xNRsuw6B-5onjpI63VDA/edit?u… High-level Notes: 1. Welcome (5min) 2. PDP Updates (10min) * The Chair reviewed overall PDP progress and upcoming milestones. * Support Staff introduced the Prelim Rec Review Doc (as part of CQ7 discussion) that will contain preliminary recommendation language, rationale, and implementation guidance for discussed charter questions and based on today’s discussion. * Support Staff noted that: * The collaboration document remained active and was not being retired. There are still CQs to be discussed. * WG Members are asked to review and provide comments on language they “cannot live with,” provide rationale, and propose alternative language. * WG members noted the phrase “cannot live with,” arguing that it implies a willingness to reject policy entirely rather than compromise. They cautioned against escalating positions prematurely. * The Chair clarified that the purpose of the exercise was to surface major objections early enough for resolution before consensus stages. * Chair noted important considerations from the Advisory: Compliance With DNS Abuse Obligations in the Registrar Accreditation Agreement and the Registry Agreement. <https://www.icann.org/en/contracted-parties/advisories/documents/advisory-c…> The focus was on “what makes an action prompt”. The advisory includes 2 scenarios for further illustration and clarification. 1. Flash Review of Prelim Recs from CQ1-CQ4 (30min) * The WG reviewed language requiring registrars (Prelim Rec 1) to perform ADCs when actionable evidence points to DNS abuse. * Key discussion points included: · Removal of earlier language attempting to define “malicious domains.” · Explicit exclusion of compromised domains from ADC requirements. · Clarification that ADC requirements define minimum obligations rather than the full universe of permissible registrar actions. · WG members inquired about whether past DNS Abuse should trigger ADC obligations. · Other members noted against extending requirements into speculative or predictive enforcement. · WG discussed prelim Rec on “association criteria”. The draft proposed that registrars review at least one account-related or technical indicator reasonably accessible to them. · Key discussion points included: · Whether requiring “at least one” indicator effectively creates a one-indicator minimum standard. · WG members asked whether one indicator would become the de facto ceiling rather than floor and how registrars could know in advance which indicators would be most useful. · The balance between flexibility and sufficient investigative steps. · Language requiring indicators “most likely to yield useful and actionable information.” · WG members noted that some language was becoming overly prescriptive. · The WG discussed Prelim Rec 3 on definition of “reasonable investigation” and use of reasonably available data. · The draft language proposed that investigations rely on information reasonably available to registrars through ordinary operations. · Key discussion points included: · The meaning of “all means within its control.” · Whether language created excessive obligations. · The relationship between reasonableness and operational burden. · WG members suggested replacing “all” with “reasonable” to avoid requiring exhaustive investigations. 4. Refine Strawpersons CQ5 and CQ6 (25min) * The WG reviewed a straw proposal on CQ5. * Some WG members noted that the current text did not directly answer the charter question. * WG members noted that existing recourse mechanisms should be identified and documented and WG members should evaluate whether gaps exist. * WG members noted some difficulty listing remedies when ADC processes themselves are not externally visible. * Other WG members noted potential burdens associated with documentation obligations. * Chair added that CQ9 will further get into the details of “demonstrating compliance”. * WG reviewed a straw proposal on CQ6 – timeline for ADC. * The WG reviewed multiple timing proposals, including: · “Promptly” with no fixed timeline. · Initiation within 24 hours. · Completion within 72 hours. · Flexible guidance using promptness plus presumptive timing expectations. · WG members noted the rationale for fixed timelines when existing contractual language already uses the term “promptly.” · Some WG members expressed their support for the current language. Others noted they would like to see a specific timeline here. 5. Next Steps on Impact Assessment(s) (10min) · The WG discussed Charter Questions 1–7, including questions that considered potential impacts on Human Rights (HR) and Data Protection (DP). · As suggested by WG members, Staff and LT is using the WG discussions and input to prepare an scoped assessment of potential HR and DP impacts. · This scoped assessment is intended to help document and stabilize the current preliminary recommendation language and is not intended to replace the final comprehensive impact assessments. · Once all CQs have been reviewed and the recommendation language further stabilizes, the WG will conduct the final impact assessments. · Staff to share Draft Scoped Impact Assessment with WG for their review by next Thursday. · WG members noted 2 examples shared via list on potential impact on legitimate registrants. WG is kindly asked to review and react. 6. AOB (5min)

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Meeting Invitation / DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP1 WG | Monday, 01 June 2026
by Julie Bisland May 26, 2026

May 26, 2026

Dear all, The next DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP1 WG call will take place on Monday, 01 June 2026 at 12:30 UTC for 90 minutes. Join from PC, Mac, iPad, or Android - Zoom Webinar: https://icann.zoom.us/j/91807711636?pwd=q6XCt8cWQU9m3fGgSojQ5X07pbnX6a.1 Passcode:+X8RaawVrW Phone one-tap: +13126266799,,91807711636#,,,,*0006343077# US (Chicago) +13462487799,,91807711636#,,,,*0006343077# US (Houston) Webinar ID: 918 0771 1636 Passcode: 0006343077 International numbers available: https://icann.zoom.us/u/a9jfXWLB8 * 2026 Meetings wiki: https://icann-community.atlassian.net/wiki/x/B4CWLQ ALL: Before joining the call * Please send apologies to gnso-secs(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-secs@icann.org> only (members: please include if an alternate is joining on your behalf) * Please be sure you have read the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.icann.org/resources/pages/expected-s…>, the ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy<https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/community-anti-harassment-policy-2017…>, and the ICANN Community Participant Code of Conduct<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/adopted-icann-community-partici…>. * Staff will promote members, participants, and alternates to panelist once joined. OBSERVERS: * Observers will have ability to view member chat and information shared in the zoom webinar room. * Observers will not be able to use chat or raise hands. Thank you. Kind regards, Julie -- Julie Bisland Policy Operations Analyst (GNSO) Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Find out more about the GNSO by visiting: https://learn.icann.org/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__learn.icann.org_&d=DwM…> Follow @GNSO on Twitter: https://twitter.com/ICANN_GNSO<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_ICANN-5FGN…> Transcripts and recordings of GNSO Working Group and Council events are located on the GNSO Master Calendar <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__gnso.icann.org_en_grou…>

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Post Call / DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP1 WG / Tuesday, 26 May 2026
by Julie Bisland May 26, 2026

May 26, 2026

Dear all, All recordings for the DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP1 WG call held on Tuesday, 26 May 2026 at 12:30 UTC can be found on the agenda wiki page <https://icann-community.atlassian.net/wiki/x/KYDGNw> (attendance included), which can also be accessed via the GNSO Master calendar<https://gnso.icann.org/en/group-activities/calendar/2026>. These include: * Attendance * Audio recording * Zoom recording (including audio, visual, rough transcript, and chat) * Transcript * Agenda and Notes/Action Items For additional information, you may consult the mailing list archives<https://lists.icann.org/hyperkitty/list/gnso-dnsabuse-pdp@icann.org/> and the main wiki page<https://icann-community.atlassian.net/wiki/x/zoKmLQ>. Thank you. With kind regards, Julie -- Julie Bisland Policy Operations Analyst (GNSO) Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Find out more about the GNSO by visiting: https://learn.icann.org/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__learn.icann.org_&d=DwM…> Follow @GNSO on Twitter: https://twitter.com/ICANN_GNSO<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_ICANN-5FGN…> Transcripts and recordings of GNSO Working Group and Council events are located on the GNSO Master Calendar <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__gnso.icann.org_en_grou…>

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Post Call / DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP1 WG / Monday, 18 May 2026
by Julie Bisland May 26, 2026

May 26, 2026

Dear all, All recordings for the DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP1 WG call held on Monday, 18 May 2026 at 12:30 UTC can be found on the agenda wiki page <https://icann-community.atlassian.net/wiki/x/FYDENw> (attendance included), which can also be accessed via the GNSO Master calendar<https://gnso.icann.org/en/group-activities/calendar/2026>. These include: * Attendance * Audio recording * Zoom recording (including audio, visual, rough transcript, and chat) * Transcript * Agenda and Notes/Action Items For additional information, you may consult the mailing list archives<https://lists.icann.org/hyperkitty/list/gnso-dnsabuse-pdp@icann.org/> and the main wiki page<https://icann-community.atlassian.net/wiki/x/zoKmLQ>. Thank you. With kind regards, Julie -- Julie Bisland Policy Operations Analyst (GNSO) Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Find out more about the GNSO by visiting: https://learn.icann.org/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__learn.icann.org_&d=DwM…> Follow @GNSO on Twitter: https://twitter.com/ICANN_GNSO<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_ICANN-5FGN…> Transcripts and recordings of GNSO Working Group and Council events are located on the GNSO Master Calendar <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__gnso.icann.org_en_grou…>

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Re: Threading the needle on `promptly`
by Nitin Walia May 26, 2026

May 26, 2026

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**15-MINUTE REMINDER** Meeting Invitation / DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP1 WG | Tuesday, 26 May 2026
by Julie Bisland May 26, 2026

May 26, 2026

**15-MINUTE REMINDER** Dear all, The next DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP1 WG call will take place on Tuesday, 26 May 2026 at 12:30 UTC for 90 minutes. Join from PC, Mac, iPad, or Android - Zoom Webinar: https://icann.zoom.us/j/91807711636?pwd=q6XCt8cWQU9m3fGgSojQ5X07pbnX6a.1 Passcode:+X8RaawVrW Phone one-tap: +13126266799,,91807711636#,,,,*0006343077# US (Chicago) +13462487799,,91807711636#,,,,*0006343077# US (Houston) Webinar ID: 918 0771 1636 Passcode: 0006343077 International numbers available: https://icann.zoom.us/u/a9jfXWLB8 * 2026 Meetings wiki: https://icann-community.atlassian.net/wiki/x/B4CWLQ ALL: Before joining the call * Please send apologies to gnso-secs(a)icann.org<mailto:gnso-secs@icann.org> only (members: please include if an alternate is joining on your behalf) * Please be sure you have read the ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.icann.org/resources/pages/expected-s…>, the ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy<https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/community-anti-harassment-policy-2017…>, and the ICANN Community Participant Code of Conduct<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/adopted-icann-community-partici…>. * Staff will promote members, participants, and alternates to panelist once joined. OBSERVERS: * Observers will have ability to view member chat and information shared in the zoom webinar room. * Observers will not be able to use chat or raise hands. Thank you. Kind regards, Julie -- Julie Bisland Policy Operations Analyst (GNSO) Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) Find out more about the GNSO by visiting: https://learn.icann.org/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__learn.icann.org_&d=DwM…> Follow @GNSO on Twitter: https://twitter.com/ICANN_GNSO<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__twitter.com_ICANN-5FGN…> Transcripts and recordings of GNSO Working Group and Council events are located on the GNSO Master Calendar <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__gnso.icann.org_en_grou…>

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Today's Call
by Eberhard W Lisse May 26, 2026

May 26, 2026

Looks like I might be a few minutes late... el -- Dr. Eberhard W. Lisse \ / Obstetrician & Gynaecologist (retired) el(a)lisse.NA / * | Telephone: +264 81 124 6733 (cell) PO Box 8421 Bachbrecht \ / If this email is signed with GPG/PGP 10007, Namibia ;____/ Sect 20 of Act No. 4 of 2019 may apply

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