Hi folks, In yesterday's email to this mailing (below), I used the metaphor of a "software bug". It prompted further analysis of one of the options of a few months ago that had been abandoned as infeasible previously, namely Option #5 from Paul Keating, see: http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/gnso-igo-ingo-crp/2017-July/000784.html http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/gnso-igo-ingo-crp/2017-July/000785.html http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/gnso-igo-ingo-crp/2017-July/000786.html As you'll recall, Paul Keating identified an asymmetric certification requirement under the UDRP rules by the parties. That was a very keen observation. As he suggested, if indeed that asymmetry existed, then a domain name registrant (respondent in a UDRP) could name the ADR provider (WIPO, NAF, etc.) in a court action, because the UDRP certification requirement didn't actually shield the ADR provider properly (unlike the complainant's certification). In my followup emails (the 2 latter links above), I noted that the UDRP providers prevented that scenario, because they "fixed the bugs" so to speak, eliminated that vulnerability, via their own supplemental rules. So, my question is, why should those supplemental rules be permitted at all? Advocates of Option C clearly do not believe that this PDP should actually eliminate bugs in the UDRP (i.e. they oppose Option A, which would eliminate the bug in the policy). If we're not allowed to fix that bug (even though that should be our mission, and the GNSO is the proper policymaking body for ICANN), then why should UDRP providers be allowed to fix bugs that they identify and impact them? It would be hypocritical to apply one standard to certain "bugs" in the UDRP, and a different one to other bugs. ADR providers should be forced to live by the strict application of the UDRP rules as written, warts and all, and not deviate from them by imposing their own supplemental rules that completely fix the problems for themselves. So, WIPO's paragraph #15: http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/supplemental/eudrp/newrules.html "15. Exclusion of Liability Except in respect of deliberate wrongdoing, an Administrative Panel, the World Intellectual Property Organization and the Center shall not be liable to a party, a concerned registrar or ICANN for any act or omission in connection with the administrative proceeding." which they used to fix the "bug" in the UDRP that exposed them to liability from the Respondent of a UDRP should be deemed invalid, and similarly for other UDRP/URS providers. By doing so, this fully revives Option #5, and puts it back on the table. As an aside, WIPO might believe that their immunity as an IGO might still shield them from a lawsuit from a domain name registrant involved in a UDRP, if we required strict adherence to the UDRP rules (and disallow those supplemental rules fixes). However, I believe this would not be the case, because when they're acting as an ADR provider it should fall under the "commercial exception." (the fact that they added the language to the supplemental rules supports that view; if they believed they were fully immune, they wouldn't need to have added it) Sincerely, George Kirikos 416-588-0269 http://www.leap.com/ On Fri, Nov 17, 2017 at 7:36 PM, George Kirikos <icann@leap.com> wrote:
Hi Petter,
On Fri, Nov 17, 2017 at 6:22 PM, Petter Rindforth <petter.rindforth@fenixlegal.eu> wrote:
And all WG members had (and have) their freedom to further explain and argue their support for a specific solution/option. As you say George, sometimes a support for one specified option needs more detailed explanation, where other options may be more clear, "fair and balanced".
Those are not valid arguments, just to say they're "fair and balanced", without explanation (with reference to facts and law).
Let me abstract away from domains and ICANN for a moment. Imagine we're tasked to look over software for an airplane, a purely technical/engineering endeavour. In our review, looking at something else entirely, we come across a critical vulnerability that could cause the plane to crash under some rare circumstances. What would we do? Logically, we'd fix the code so that the plane would never crash under that circumstance, period.
This is what our job was in this PDP. We were to look at the all the law, facts around IGOs, immunity and the UDRP, and thoroughly research the topic. During that review, we discovered there was a "critical vulnerability" in the UDRP itself. Rather than being an airplane crash, this vulnerability is that some domain name registrants would be denied the ability to have their day in court, to have their case decided on the merits "de novo" (if an IGO successfully asserted an immunity defense after winning a UDRP).
That's all it is --- a "software bug" under some scenarios. The designers of the UDRP hadn't ever contemplated that scenario in 1999. Because we did such a thorough job in our research, far better than what happened in 1999, we're in the best position to decide how to fix the "software bug."
Option A is a complete technical fix to the "software bug". The domain name registrant can have their day in court. If the IGO wants to press the matter, they have to give up the immunity, importantly, ****just like they would have to do had the current UDRP not created the "bug" in the first place*****. (re-read that part between the asterisks -- that is critical) Or the IGO can use one of the workarounds we identified to completely insulate themselves from the immunity issue/risk (agent, assignee, licensee brings the action, thereby shielding the IGO). The IGO is in the best position to mitigate (if we did the proper Risk Analysis I've called for). The domain owner is in no position to mitigate.
So, suppose prior to Option A, the "plane crash" might happen 10 times in the next 100 years. Under Option A, it happens zero times. The problem is solved. The solution perfectly mirrors a world without the UDRP --- both parties are in the exact same legal position as if the UDRP hadn't happened. A level playing field is maintained, and any rights that exist in the real world are fully respected under Option A. No one's rights have been interfered with.
Now, those backing Option C say "Well, we'll implement a so-called "fair and balanced" solution that makes the plane crash happen just 5 times in the next 100 years. "Yippee" they say, we've made an improvement! Their frame of reference, their "starting point" isn't "zero crashes" -- their focus was a world *with* the bugs, a world of "10 crashes per 100 years" as the "status quo".
Yet, the plane still crashes under Option C, and supposedly we should be willing to "accept that". Under Option C, it is entirely possible for an arbitration panel to rule differently than the courts would have ruled in a dispute. That's undeniable, because they are by definition different. Option C is a poor facsimile of real court. The domain name owner is *entitled* to court access, the real thing. No one has the UDRP or arbitration as an "entitlement" -- it's a bonus that is entirely supposed to be negated if one goes to court. Going to court is supposed to "reset things" and have a level playing field where everything is supposed to be decided under real laws.
Option B, to continue the story, says "We'll fix the code completely for existing planes. New planes can get the "fair and balanced solution" pushed by Option C's partial fix. So, perhaps now, planes would crash only 2 times in the next 100 years (0 crashes for old planes, though, and all the crashes on the new planes). Those who fly on new planes have that choice, if they want to take the risk, they go into it with eyes wide open.
Option #6 would have been similar in nature, in that it tries to reduce the number of plane crashes (by making it harder to get to the "crash scenario" computer code, kind of filtering the scenarios somewhat). So, instead of crashing 5 times per 100 years under existing Option C, it'd be a lower number if Option #6 was integrated into a new Option C, maybe 3 times per 100 years.
I hope that helps folks look at things in a different way. Folks like myself who are convinced Option A is the correct solution cannot understand why those backing Option C are willing to accept those "plane crashes" at all! We're not here to play politics and say "well, we made an improvement, we did the best we could". We're supposed to be here to analyze all the facts, knowledge, law, and analysis to get to the correct decision (Option A).
I leave Option C backers with this question --- do you acknowledge that under Option C, arbitration panels might make different rulings than a court would??? Yes or no.
If the answer is "Yes", explain to us why that should be acceptable to domain name registrants?
A domain name registrant, who is entitled to the protection of their national courts, should not lose the right to that court access, simply because the UDRP was not coded properly in 1999 and contains software bugs. It should be our duty to fix the problem, eliminate the software bugs, rather than knowingly keeping a smaller or different bug still lurking in that code (a bug that might have further unintended consequences down the road that we haven't contemplated yet that others might exploit).
Notice, I'm asking very simple questions here that cut to the heart of the issues, yet instead of any answers, some are playing political games, saying "well, we made a potential small improvement, you should be happy, that's all you're going to get".
Sincerely,
George Kirikos 416-588-0269 http://www.leap.com/
P.S. This "immunity" issue isn't the only "software bug" in the UDRP. As some of you know from our RPM call on Wednesday, I talked about the other "bug" whereby some courts (e.g. in the UK) are refusing to hear de novo reviews/appeals of UDRP decisions at all, e.g. see the Yoyo.email case:
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2015/3509.html
"My conclusions on the application to strike out the Claim are:
1) adopting the reasoning of Ms Proudman in Patel drives me to hold that on a proper construction of the UDRP clause 4k does not give rise to a separate cause of action in favour of the claimant;
2) nor does it afford any jurisdiction to this Court to act as an appeal or review body from the Decision;"
This is clearly something the UDRP drafters in 1999 never contemplated, and is a software bug we'll have to deal with in the RPM PDP, as it strikes at the very bargain that was made when the UDRP was adopted, namely that it wouldn't interfere with legal rights on access to the real courts for a decision on the merits. For it to happen in some jurisdictions wasn't known by those drafting the UDRP. (also applies equally to URS)
I'll be writing more about that "software bug" in the RPM PDP's mailing list probably next week.