Dear All, As requested a couple of meetings ago, please find below some feedback received from our Security Stability Resiliency Team colleagues from the LE/Ops Sec community in relation to section 3.18 of the 2013 RAA which is being reviewed by the WG in the context of question D-2. Best regards, Marika ____________________________ For domains that are tied to malware or tied directly to brand mis-use associated with malicious or criminal activity, almost all registrars have no problem suspending the domains via Section 3.18 of the 2013 RAA. LE agencies have difficulty only with a handful of registrars. There are cases in which some registrars provide a standard response back to the agencies to the effect that they should contact the hosting provider since the registrar does "not have the ability to oversee what data are being transmitted through its site". If the hosting provider stops providing its services, the criminals can simply move to a new hosting provider. Suspending the domain itself has value for the LE agencies for several reasons, not least of which some providers unmask the private Whois information when the domain is suspended. Agencies encounter p/p domains used for malicious or criminal activity in ranges that go from small batches (i.e., associated with scams where fraudsters target hundreds or thousands of investors or phishing victims and generate millions in losses, however only a few domains are created) to large numbers where thousands of users are victimized in several countries. Making the privacy/proxy services accountable with a provision similar to 3.18 of the 2013 RAA would add another layer of protection to help contain and mitigate the harm caused to consumers on a global scale. It¹s a consumer protection issue, however any such new obligation to make p/p providers accountable with regards to abuse and reports of abuse, should not, in any way whatsoever, dilute contractually or in practice the registrars¹ obligations as they are currently provided by 3.18. If an agency presents to a registrar or p/p provider evidence that there is criminal or malicious activity that is harming users or has the potential to harm users (such as spamming, spreading malware or distributing child abuse material), the registrar or p/p provider should suspend that domain and unmask the Whois. The agencies are not requesting subscriber information. The agencies are reporting abuse of the DNS that implies violations of the registration agreement between the registrars and the registrants, and that also imply violations of the agreement between the p/p providers and their customers (including all cases of criminal and malicious activity as well as those cases in which the LE agencies¹ own brands are used by criminals in association with criminal or malicious activity). The burden should not be higher on the agencies than it was on the registrant to register the domain (e.g., obtaining a court order to have a domain suspended). Since the victims are located in several different countries, it is *very* difficult to obtain any kind of legal process to effect takedown. Both registrars and p/p providers must have adequate provisions in their agreements with their customers that allow them to take action - on a contractual basis - and suspend domain names when there is malicious or criminal activity. Additionally, for those cases in which registrars and p/p providers can verify the evidence provided by the LE agencies that there is indeed criminal or malicious activity involving domain names that they sponsor, there should be no territorial restrictions for LE agencies to submit reports to them, regardless of whether they are in the same or in a different country as the registrar or p/p provider. In these cases, registrars and p/p providers should simply enforce their own agreements with their registrants/customers and suspend the domain names accordingly and unmask the Whois information.