And to make things even clearer, take note that registry operators could, if they wanted to, accomplish the system I described in my prior message (elimination of sunrise) by simply setting the price of sunrise registrations to $1 million (i.e. a high enough price to make the actual number of registrations equal to zero). They don't do so, because they actually can set a profit-maximize sunrise price to make *more money* from sunrise compared to just a pure landrush period, effectively preying on the sunrise registrants (earning more from them than would be the case if the sunrise had been eliminated!). So, eliminating the sunrise period actually helps even those 130 or so odd sunrise registrants (on average per TLD), as their effective costs would be lower, given that registries wouldn't be given the opportunity to prey on them via selection of the sunrise price. [I just alienated every registry operator!] But, registrants and TM holders would be better off, and the incentives would all be in proper alignment for desirable behaviours. Sincerely, George Kirikos 416-588-0269 http://www.leap.com/ On Wed, Aug 9, 2017 at 10:02 AM, George Kirikos <icann@leap.com> wrote:
One additional comment, re: sunrise vs. landrush, to address some of the other points with respect to the claimed "exorbitant" costs of not registering in sunrise.
Perhaps someone can draw a flow chart, but let's describe exactly what would happen if sunrises were eliminated.
1. Those currently registering domains in sunrise would save money (no longer paying out sunrise fees).
2. Those currently registering domains in sunrise presumably still value the domain name, so their demand/desire would shift to the landrush period.
3. (a) Scenario A: No one else desires the domain name in landrush -- the TM holder then pays the landrush price, instead of the sunrise price.
3. (b) Scenario B: Others desire the domain name during landrush. Proceed to auction. The TM holder can, if they're paranoid, outbid everyone else in landrush, and still end up owning the domain name. It's their choice whether to outbid everyone. (i) TM holder (who would have bought the domain in sunrise) outbids everyone else for the domain name. All the claimed "damage to consumers" doesn't occur, since the TM holder owns the domain. They can "insure" against future risks by simply outbidding all comers. (ii) TM holder is outbid by someone else. Either that someone else is (a) a legitimate registrant, or (b) a cybersquatter.
So, the only "scenario" where we're concerned about, re: cybersquatting, is in point #3(b)(ii)(b). There, the markholder had a perfectly viable option to eliminate that cybersquatting, namely by outbidding all comers, to get to option #3(b)(i), but did their own risk assessment as to the costs of prevention (outbidding) vs. the costs of monitoring and curative rights (courts, UDRP/URS, etc.).
By eliminating sunrise, we've allowed other legitimate registrants equal and fair access to the domain names (i.e. point #3(b)(ii)(a)). We've also reduced the effect of "gaming", because those with gamed TMs don't get any advantage in their bidding against others (someone who values the domain name more will just outbid them, in #3(b)(ii)(a)). One can even use the usual scaremongering TMCH to try to scare away those potential other bidders in that landrush auction, by the way.
Most cybersquatting is on "cheap" domains, not domains won at auction, so the risk of #3(b)(ii)(b) is bad for a cybersquatter, in economic terms. They would have to outbid a Microsoft, Apple, Lego, Dell, etc. first, before even having a chance to inflict damage. And they'd be on the radar of those companies, presumably, by outbidding them. Cybersquatters aren't stupid --- they'll usually wait until the general availability, when the economics are more favourable (e.g. 99 cent domains, etc.).
Sincerely,
George Kirikos 416-588-0269 http://www.leap.com/