Hi Nigel, I took it to mean that it is a concern that we haven't discussed the current ("emergency") procedures at all, and further what happens if they remain in place for an extended period of time. We should look at whether these procedures - where the PTI acts the KSK operator without the presence of the trusted community representatives - are satisfactory, and at a future scenario where the current "corona" situation is extended for a long period of time. Cheers, /Liman Nigel.Cassimire@ctu.int 2020-05-07 20:58 [+0000]:
Thanks, Bart.
I couldn’t follow the sense of the heading and text under agenda item 5. (Also noticed a typo with Amy’s name in item 7)
bart.boswinkel@icann.org:
5. Long term PTI as operator of the Key Signing Key for the DNS Root Zone
At the April meeting the CSC expressed concern that not discussed what is happening as replacement of current process, in environment as currently faced to be further explored on call in May 2020.