On 10/1/2014 4:20 PM, Jakob Schlyter wrote:
On 1 okt 2014, at 21:45, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:
It is my impression that having two (or more) KSK keys long term makes 5011 rollovers a bit less problematic, but I could be misunderstanding some of the subtleties of 5011 when mixed with draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-key-timing. Have two keys, and replacing one with another will keep the response sizes about the same over time (given that the key algorithm and size are the same), but other than that I haven't heard this.
Perhaps Mike can clarify?
The contents of the root DNSKEY RRSet do not have to include all the trust anchors. One of the things that struck me during the recent discussion is "why didn't they generate multiple trust anchor key pairs and provide that data during the initial bootstrap process (e.g. on the ICANN website) even if they only used one to sign"? A new trust anchor can be added simply by being present in the root DNSKEY RRSet (RDR!) signed by any existing trust anchor key for at least the Add Holddown time. Once present in the trust anchor key set, it need not be present in the RDR unless its actually being used to sign stuff. Having two keys - in the trust anchor set - should be the minimum steady state. It means that you can compromise one of them and still recover without needing to do a full trust reboot. It's not that the presence of multiple keys makes rollover less problematic exactly, but that it makes recovery from emergency revocations due to compromise possible as well as automated scheduled routine key changes. Of course, this all depends on assumptions and operating procedures. For example, If its possible compromise both keys by breaking into the same box once, you obviously don't gain the protection. Mike
jakob
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