Any potential correlation between the roll over and the recent notice by the US Department of Homeland Security on DNS Cyber Attacks?
I wanted to make sure you were all aware of several notices issued which came just before and after the root key change over for DNS. Bad actors with access to the older private key root (if compromised) may have been motivated to strike before the key change over. https://www.cyberscoop.com/dhs-dns-directive-government-shutdown/ This alert went out the day before change over on January 10th, 2019. https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2019/01/10/DNS-Infrastructure-... This alert on January 22nd, 2019 https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/ This alert was issued yesterday https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA19-024A The timing of this change over taking place roughly 2+ weeks after the U.S. Government Shutdown is a little unfortunate, since the switch over date may have encouraged attacks before the old key was revoked. I do think the re-key is a good idea, and agree with Tony Finch on the concept of "[I favour annual rollovers, with keys generated and promulgated out of band a few years in advance, and at most two KSKs in the root zone at any time.]" I welcome any comments. Lee Neubecker, CISSP President & CEO GreatLakesForensics.com 65 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 101 Chicago, IL 60604 Toll Free/Fax: 888-503-0665 https://greatlakesforensics.com Computer Forensics · Cyber Security Readiness & Response · Online Identity Investigations Check out my security blog at https://leeneubecker.com
On Fri, Jan 25, 2019 at 2:31 PM Lee Neubecker < lee.neubecker@greatlakesforensics.com> wrote:
I wanted to make sure you were all aware of several notices issued which came just before and after the root key change over for DNS. Bad actors with access to the older private key root (if compromised) may have been motivated to strike before the key change over.
https://www.cyberscoop.com/dhs-dns-directive-government-shutdown/
This alert went out the day before change over on January 10th, 2019. https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2019/01/10/DNS-Infrastructure-...
Nope, these are unrelated -- the attacks above are simply attackers logging into registrar / DNS provider accounts using the victims credentials (either collected through phishing, brute-forcing, or, most likely because the registrants used the same credentials elsewhere) and changing the nameservers / address records to point at nameservers which they control. This isn't a DNSSEC related attack at all -- if attackers had the old key and could still use it they would use it inline, and not fiddle with other systems.
This alert on January 22nd, 2019 https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/
This alert was issued yesterday https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA19-024A
The timing of this change over taking place roughly 2+ weeks after the U.S. Government Shutdown is a little unfortunate, since the switch over date may have encouraged attacks before the old key was revoked. I do think the re-key is a good idea, and agree with Tony Finch on the concept of
"[I favour annual rollovers, with keys generated and promulgated out of band a few years in advance, and at most two KSKs in the root zone at any time.]"
I welcome any comments.
We (currently, and until proven otherwise) don't believe that the old key was compromised / factored -- rolling is simply good hygiene.
Lee Neubecker, CISSP President & CEO GreatLakesForensics.com
65 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 101 Chicago, IL 60604 Toll Free/Fax: 888-503-0665 https://greatlakesforensics.com
Computer Forensics · Cyber Security Readiness & Response · Online Identity Investigations Check out my security blog at https://leeneubecker.com _______________________________________________ ksk-rollover mailing list ksk-rollover@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/ksk-rollover
-- I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad idea in the first place. This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair of pants. ---maf
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