Abstract ontent moderation is often associated with social media posts being blocked or taken down due to decisions by governments and social media companies. But government censorship tactics are increasingly moving into deeper layers of the internet stack. Beyond social media companies, infrastructure providers – such as those operating the Domain Name System (DNS), the ‘address book’ of the internet – also act as gatekeepers to content.1 When such tactics are applied to the DNS, the impact on freedom of expression can be devastating. Domain names are key for locating a particular webpage. The DNS translates website addresses (domain names, like ‘article19.org’) into internet protocol addresses (numerical labels that indicate where in the network a given website is located), so that the right page appears. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a multistakeholder organisation, maintains the DNS. ICANN policies are implemented by domain operators.2 Domain name operators include: Registries, which manage domain name databases for top-level domains (such as ‘.com’, ‘.uk’, or ‘.org’), and Registrars, which liaise between registries and domain owners, known as registrants. There are two types of registries: ccTLDs (those that operate country-code top-level domains, such as ‘.br’ for Brazil) gTLDs (generic top-level domains such as .com or .music) When a domain is suspended, all webpages using the same domain can no longer be accessed. This approach is equivalent to damming a river to catch a few fish. For example, if a domain operator were to block the ‘ article19.org’ domain, everything we published on it – from this report, to our coverage of the war in Ukraine, to our hate speech toolkit published 10 years ago – would become inaccessible. The DNS forms the backbone of the internet and it was not designed to evaluate or block content. Of particular concern for ARTICLE 19 is the weaponisation of domain suspension orders by state actors to censor critical voices and prevent access to information of public interest. www.article19.org | Interesting position by Article 18 on suspension of domain names Position *"Suspending a domain has an inherently high risk of blocking protected content, potentially violating international human rights standards." * attached PDF Glenn McKnight, MA Virtual School of Internet Governance Chief Information Officer www.virtualsig.org *YOUR SOURCE FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE EDUCATION * *Mobile 437-237-4655*