hi, i would personally sign this letter. And I would be willing to present it to the NCSG for signature/endorsement if there is an interest in turning it into a wider petition. I think at this point that it is unlikely that the ALAC approves this letter given its Executive Committee has crafted another letter. But that does not mean it is a dead letter. Whether it was a signature or an endorsement would depend on the wording of the second paragraph. Of course not having presented it yet, I do not know what the response would be. a. On 1 Feb 2011, at 11:17, Thompson, Darlene wrote:
Both texts are good but I think I prefer this one. I approve of the plain language wording below and a specific call to action.
This, of course, is just my personal opinion.
D
Darlene A. Thompson CAP Administrator N-CAP/Department of Education P.O. Box 1000, Station 910 Iqaluit, NU X0A 0H0 Phone: (867) 975-5631 Fax: (867) 979-5610 dthompson@gov.nu.ca ________________________________________ From: na-discuss-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org [na-discuss-bounces@atlarge-lists.icann.org] on behalf of Marc Rotenberg [rotenberg@epic.org] Sent: Monday, January 31, 2011 9:22 PM To: Eric Brunner-Williams Cc: na-discuss@atlarge-lists.icann.org Subject: Re: [NA-Discuss] A draft text (was: Re: Forward motion on the Egyptian Internet shutdown)
Another possibility. Also, is there any reason this could not be open for signature to all ALAC members?
Marc.
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Dear Chairman Dengate-Thrush and CEO Beckstrom,
We are writing to you regarding the recent developments in Egypt concerning the Internet. As of this evening, the Noor Group, the last ISP providing connectivity to Internet users in Egypt, has gone dark.
As members of the At Large Advisory Advisory Committee, whose mission is to provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users, we believe we have an obligation to call to your attention this recent development and to recommend specific actions.
As the Bylaws of the ICANN make clear, it is a core value that guides the decisions of actions of ICANN, to preserve and enhance "the operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability of the Internet."
The recent actions by the Egyptian government threaten this central mission of ICANN.
Moreover, the decision by a government to suspend the operation of a communications infrastructure implicates fundamental human rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human RIghts and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
It is also clear that significant economic activity is impacted by the decision to sever Internet connectivity
We therefore urge you to:
(1) Communicate ICANN's concerns to the Egyptian government insofar as the government has taken steps that limit access to the Internet;
(2) Remind all governments, through the GAC, of the obligations to uphold the Core Values of ICANN; and,
(3) Begin the development of technical methods to prevent such "outages" in the future, including the deployment of secondary servers to promote continuity of service as well as DNS stability
We recognize that ICANN has limited competence in the policy realm and also that the situation that arose in Egypt could arise elsewhere.
Nonetheless, it is our view that central to the mission of ICANN is to ensure the operational stability and reliability of the Internet. When parties take steps that threaten this interest, ICANN is obligated to respond.
Sincerely,
On Jan 31, 2011, at 7:54 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
a draft text
=== Text begins ===
Dear Chairman Dengate-Thrush and CEO Beckstrom,
Concerning the Egyptian Internet shutdown, as volunteers participating in the North American At Large Regional Organization who have studied network policy, we the undersigned believe you have a chance to move beyond rhetoric to support the security and stability of the Internet. As contributors to the ICANN community, we expect our Chairperson and CEO to uphold those values.
As the IESG and the IAB observed in draft-iab-raven, published as RFC 2804, accommodating the legal intercept requirements of states in network devices would make the system less secure, increase system complexity, and the risk of unintended security failure. The considered technical judgment was, and remains, that wiretapping, even when it is not being exercised, lowers the security of the system.
We believe this concern applies also to accommodating endpoint unreachable requirements of states in systems of network devices, as well as flow filter and other disruptive technology requirements.
We are also concerned by the possibility of error by national actors attempting to interrupt regional routing. The routing alternatives to the Alexandria - Suez corridor are simply inadequate to support the requirements for Europe - Asia data communications.
In addition to these systemic concerns, the proper concern of the entity tasked with the technical coordination of unique endpoint identifiers, we have the following further concerns.
Articles 12 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pertaining to privacy and freedom of expression, appear to be the specific targets of intentional violation by the Egyptian government. This should not pass without comment.
Significant regional economic activity relies upon the availability of CityNet (Ramadan City), ECC (6 October City), EgyptNetwork (Mansura), and ECC, MEIX, LINKdotNET (Cairo) data centers. The direct economic loss due to governmental action is easy to calculate. The greater loss of the reputation and competitive ability of these data centers, and their operators is harder to calculate, and likely to be much greater than N zero revenue days.
However, the economic consequence of abruptly transforming Egypt to a sparse 56kb and VSAT connectivity regime extends far beyond the data centers and access providers. It is profoundly disruptive of the information economy, and of ordinary transaction services. It will result in diminished stability and certainty of commodity prices and availablities. It will raise the price of bread. It will cause hardship, impoverishment, increased morbidity, and mortality, far beyond the social identities of "authority" and "counter-authority".
These concerns are not unique to the withdrawal of prefixes at 16:00 UTC on January 27, and 09:00 UTC on January 28 -- the "Egyptian Disconnection". Opportunistic and endemic network partition, rate limiting, and filtering are practiced by some governments. The practices which directly reduce the security and stability of the Internet must not be allowed to pass without comment because they are perpetrated by governments.
Sincerely,
the undersigned
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