Re: [NA-Discuss] ICANN Fellowships program
There are a bunch of questions below; I'll have a go at answering them: On 05/05/07, Evan Leibovitch <evan@telly.org> wrote:
Nick Ashton-Hart wrote:
Jean, I think you've mixed up descriptors here and the result is likely to give people an incorrect understanding as a consequence.
Well, you've both confused me. :-P
Sorry to hear that :(
I was under the impression that the RALO structure was supposed to allow _the_ means for participation of the at-large community. It (supposedly) includes provisions for structures, and for individuals who don't belong to any such structures.
Those are both true statements.
(Haven't we just been blowing our collective brains out trying to derive the best way to do this?)
At-Large and ALAC are not interchangeable. At-Large and ICANN Staff are not interchangeable, either.
This of course begs the question of how and why there is an at-large infrastructure in ICANN separate from ALAC. How can this _not_ be seen a utterly redundant? If the "ICANN At-large" mechanism offers a process through which individuals may have a consultative voice, what the heck is the reason for all of _our_ thrashing around on this issue?
Let me put it a different way, as I think you've misunderstood what I was saying. The RALOS and the ALAC are, combined, the At-Large community. ICANN has staff, and a budget line, to provide services and support as a secretariat basically to the community as a whole. Each RALO may define most aspects of its structure and operation as it pleases.
Why are these separate budget and structural items? If the RALOs select
They aren't really - see above.
the members of ALAC, why isn't this integrated? And why do ICANN staff have the authority to veto an explicit democraticly-made requests from ALAC? If the ALAC is supposed to serve the interests of the At-Large
The thing to remember is that the funds of ICANN are ICANN's funds, and good organisational governance requires that staff exercise ultimate control over the expenditures of the organisation. ICANN's directors have actual legal liability in certain circumstances if funds of the organisation were not administered properly, so this will always mean that staff exercise ultimate control over spending money. That said, there is a procedure in place for the allocation of funds to projects which RALOs, or the ALAC, or both - or even individual ALSes - wish to request and the decisions on whether ICANN should fund these projects are driven very largely by the community. I've attached it below so you can see it if you haven't already.
community, I can understand it making advice to the Board that may be considered and rejected -- but I don't understand why staff have the ability to reject ALAC's mandate.
They don't have the ability to reject ALAC's mandate - but see above vis a vis spending money.
Or maybe the answer is dead simple and I've just read it wrong. This comes across to me like one of those areas in which the long-time participants here and ICANN staff seem to know some sort of secret handshake that the newcomers need to learn over time.
Hopefully things are clearer now :)
- Evan
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Hello Nick, Thanks for your working to help me through this. :-)
The RALOS and the ALAC are, combined, the At-Large community. ICANN has staff, and a budget line, to provide services and support as a secretariat basically to the community as a whole. OK, then. Do ALAC and the RALOs have any specific say over the allocation of these budgets?
Do ALAC and the RALOs -- jointly or separately -- have any specific authority to determine - how much funds exist to serve the at-large community - the budgets that determine how these funds are spent
Each RALO may define most aspects of its structure and operation as it pleases. I understand this -- but it makes life much easier if I have an idea of what resources are available to our RALO, and our ability to direct staff to utilize such resources.
(I suppose it actually helps to _have_ a formal RALO first...) :-)
The thing to remember is that the funds of ICANN are ICANN's funds, and good organisational governance requires that staff exercise ultimate control over the expenditures of the organisation. ICANN's directors have actual legal liability in certain circumstances if funds of the organisation were not administered properly, so this will always mean that staff exercise ultimate control over spending money.
I've been in enough non-profit and for-profit organizations to understand fiscal prudence, and I would surmise that most of my colleagues here do as well. If, as John has suggested, staff's "ultimate control" extends to the rejection of a RALO's request for a specific person or travel allocation (for which budget funds are available), then this is unacceptable interference. Outside of "we've already spent the allocated funds" or "doing this would get us sued" or "this is outside the ICANN mandate", there is _no_ reason for ICANN staff to reject a procedurally-correct request from _any_ of its contituent advisory bodies. And even issues of "what is within the mandate" can be contentious -- some leeway should be allowed. In your response to Jean you said:
ICANN's At-Large staff and infrastructure is not inclusive of ALAC or RALOS or anyone else: ICANN's At-Large staff is the staff, and that is all. OK -- but who directs them? In whose interests do they serve? Do At-Large staff serve the At-Large community, or just some bureacratic assumption, on the behalf of the at-large community but without its direct participation?
Of course, the decision to make the RALO process had to come from somewhere external to the At-Large structures it was designed to attract. But at a certain point, the RALOs and ALAC should be trusted to be able to direct the resources allocated to the service of their constituencies. The only limits on that direction should be legal exposure, fiscal prudence, and alignment with ICANN's mandate and bylaws. Nick, I don't know you or ICANN staff, but it's been my experience with most organizations that staff is resistent to change, all that differs is in the level of resistance. There is a delicate balance between the need for continuity and the need to adapt to meet the evolving needs of stakeholders. It's vital that safeguards exist -- if the advisory process is to work properly and effectively -- to ensure that staff oversight does not inhibit creativity or flexibility, while being sufficient to ensure maintenance of the mandate and sane use of resources. What policies currently exist to describe the limits of ICANN staff ability to overrule its advisory bodies? If, indeed, staff authority is _absolute_, I find this worrisome since it goes against the most basic principles of good corporate governance. At a macro level the stakeholders must instruct the staff, not vice versa.
They don't have the ability to reject ALAC's mandate - but see above vis a vis spending money. It's critical, then, that there are known budgets ahead of time so that money is not arbitrarily added or taken away, to fund pet projects or deny funding to contentious ones. We can't spend money we don't have -- so let's know how much we have to work with. That way, we can determine the bounds and allocate appropriately. Without a budget, everything is arbitrary and _any_ request can be met with "we don't have the funds for that".
Hopefully things are clearer now :) Yes, to the extent of answering some questions while raising many others :-).
- Evan
participants (2)
-
Evan Leibovitch -
Nick Ashton-Hart