Dear Jonathan, I have listened to this week's OFB-WG ( https://icann-community.atlassian.net/wiki/x/NIHSQQ ) call recording since I was unable to make it, as I was in transit at the time. This message serves as the comments I would have made, had I attended the call in person. I would like to put it on record at the OFB WG and that it be noted at the next OFB-WG meeting. *Presentation: Update on “Transition Article on Reviews” - Approved Resolutions | Regular Meeting of the ICANN Board | 3 May 2026 <https://www.icann.org/en/board-activities-and-meetings/materials/approved-re...> - Justine Chew - (15 mins) * In summary: * cognisant that ICANN is knowingly acting in contravention of its Bylaws by suspending its Bylaw-mandated Reviews, the ICANN Board proposed a "Bylaws Transition Article" in an attempt to retroactively legitimise this suspension. * In the Public Consultation, the ALAC commented on this proposal and raised significant concerns. * Prior to this, the ALAC had filed an Empowered Community Reconsideration Petition (June 2025) calling for reinstatement of ATRT4. * This Petition was summarily dismissed by the other members of the Empowered Community without explanation. * The ALAC has since participated in the ongoing Review of Reviews process. After consulting the Community, the Board approved a new Transition Article on 3 May 2026 (to be inserted as Article 27.6), triggering the Standard Bylaws Amendment process and therefore the Empowered Community procedures.*In proceeding with this approval, the ICANN Board has also ignored most, if not all of the ALAC Advice the ALAC provided during the Public Consultation.* Listening to the OFB-WG call recording, several points explained by Justine, have stood out that really shocked me. *Timelines and Consequences* The timelines adopted by the Board are deeply troubling: * The 12‑month suspension period begins only once the Bylaws amendment is formally approved. * This suspension can be extended by up to another year if the Board accepts Review of Reviews recommendations, or if 4 of 7 SOACs request further delay. * Only after this period would the ATR (formerly ATRT) begin - within 90 days. * The Consumer Trust Review (CCTR) would not begin until two years after 500 strings are delegated or two years (if >2000 applications are received) after 25% of them are delegated. The practical effect is stark: * ATRT3 delivered its Final Report in May 2020* - six years ago*. * The Pilot Holistic Review began in May 2024 and was halted in May 2025* - one year ago*. * One might have to wait up to another 2 years + 3 months for another ATR to take place, a process that will take 1 year to complete once it starts - thus the next recommendations from an ATR might not come before *September 2029* - a *nine‑year gap* between ATRT3 and ATR4. * With the Board unwilling to launch another Consumer Trust (CCTR) review at the same time as ATR4, we'd need to wait until ATR4 is finished for the CCTR to start. Thus the next CCTR could be delayed until *2031*, creating a *13‑year gap* since the last CCT Review (2018). This is an *unacceptable *erosion of ICANN’s accountability mechanisms. Review of Reviews CCG Discussion *ROR Review - Avri Doria and Jonathan Zuck- ALAC representatives on the Reviews of Reviews CCG - (10 mins)* In this Agenda Item of the call, both you and Avri drew attention to a critical issue: ICANN ORG has still not implemented Board‑approved CCT recommendations from *12 years ago*, and none of the proposed reforms to the review system address this failure. You said: "/none of the things that we're doing to reform the review system, which is changing the scope, changing the makeup of the teams, all these suggestions that have been put in there, none of them apply in any way to the recommendations that came out of the CCT review/". You then added: "/Nor are any of the… has there been any explanation as to why those things have not yet been implemented. So to me, that's still… there's still a hole, somehow/." [...] "/And we've talked about trying to review this in the future, as one of our reviews. How do we review ORG and their role in these things? But, I think that we need to do that as part of this review. / / And I don't know how to go about making that happen./" and Avri replied: "/And that's difficult. You know, there's constant pushback on the notion of reviewing ORG. / /Constantly./" *This should alarm everyone*. A system in which ICANN ORG fails to execute reviews, the Board wilfully suspends Bylaw‑mandated accountability mechanisms, and community advice is ignored, is not functioning as intended. *_Does this not immediately raise a red flag? _* We have a Board that wilfully ignores ICANN Bylaws and is unilaterally rewriting Bylaws "on the fly" to something that suits them - and disregards formal ALAC advice, preferring options that are further distancing ICANN from its key accountability mechanisms and pushing the whole concept of Reviews restarting further and further into the future. It is increasingly evident that ICANN’s resources (both ORG and significant parts of the Community) are *overwhelmingly *focused on launching the *next round of gTLDs*, which many expect to generate substantial revenue. This prioritisation is occurring at the expense of: * Policy development processes, * Implementation work, * Bylaw‑mandated Reviews, * Even At‑Large’s own rotation of RALO General Assemblies and Global At‑Large Summits. Meanwhile, the ICANN‑funded business-focussed Contracted Parties Summit continues uninterrupted. Had NTIA oversight still existed, *these governance failures would have triggered intervention long ago*. The Empowered Community was created precisely to replace that oversight and ensure the Board remains accountable to the Community - these changes being officially integrated into the ICANN Bylaws on 27 May 2016. One of these Rules is included in Article 25.1 of the ICANN Bylaws: Amendments to the Standard Bylaws This *requires *that the Empowered Community should give its green light for a standard Bylaw amendment to take place: /"25.1(d) Within seven days after the Board's approval of a Standard Bylaw Amendment ("*Standard Bylaw Amendment Approval*"), the Secretary shall (i) provide a Board Notice to the EC Administration and the Decisional Participants, which Board Notice shall contain the form of the approved amendment and the Board's rationale for adopting such amendment, and (ii) post the Board Notice, along with a copy of the notification(s) sent to the EC Administration and the Decisional Participants, on the Website. The steps contemplated in Article 2 of Annex D shall then be followed." /The Board approved the Standard Bylaw Amendment on 3 May 2026. Under Bylaws Article 25.1(d), the Board was required to notify the EC Administration and Decisional Participants within seven days of approving the Bylaws amendment—by 10 May 2026. I have seen no such notification, nor any posting on the EC website on https://www.icann.org/ec If this notice has not been issued, this constitutes yet another breach of the Bylaws, or at minimum an opaque process inconsistent with ICANN’s transparency obligations. *Next Steps* My proposed next step is clear: According to the ICANN Bylaws 25.1(e): /"(e) A Standard Bylaw Amendment shall become effective upon the earliest to occur of the following: [...] / /(iii) (A) An EC Rejection Notice is not timely delivered by the EC Administration to the Secretary pursuant to and in compliance with Section 2.4 of Annex D or (B) a Rejection Process Termination Notice is delivered by the EC Administration to the Secretary pursuant to and in compliance with Section 2.4(c) of Annex D, in which case the Standard Bylaw Amendment that is the subject of the Standard Bylaw Amendment Approval shall be in full force and effect as of the date immediately following the expiration of the Rejection Action Decision Period relating to such Standard Bylaw Amendment and the effectiveness of such Standard Bylaw Amendment shall not be subject to further challenge by the EC pursuant to the EC's rejection right as described in Article 2 of Annex D./ /(f) If an EC Rejection Notice is timely delivered by the EC Administration to the Secretary pursuant to and compliance with Section 2.4 of Annex D, the Standard Bylaw Amendment contained in the Board Notice shall be deemed to have been rejected by the EC. A Standard Bylaw Amendment that has been rejected by the EC shall be null and void and shall not become part of these Bylaws, notwithstanding its approval by the Board." /Under Article 25.1(e)–(f), the Empowered Community has the right to *reject a Standard Bylaws Amendment*. If the ALAC believes the Board’s action *undermines *ICANN’s accountability framework, then the ALAC *must *exercise this right. *In view of all of the above, I propose that the ALAC issue an EC Rejection Notice. **Rationale:* * The Board has wilfully ignored ALAC advice aimed at strengthening accountability. * The proposed changes unnecessarily prolong the suspension of Reviews. * The CCTR restart is pushed far into the future, despite Bylaw‑mandated implementation of the previous CCTR. * The Holistic Review - ICANN’s only comprehensive mandated review of ORG in over 20 years - has not been done. * The Board’s actions fail to comply with the requirements of the accountability mechanisms the Empowered Community was created to protect. The EC Powers were designed by the Community specifically to *make sure that the ICANN Board is subjected to Community Oversight* and the ALAC is only affirming this oversight. Rejecting the amendment is not confrontational; it is a legitimate, Bylaw‑mandated oversight function, a Right that the ALAC has - and if this Community feels that there is something *seriously wrong* with that is happening at the moment, then *it needs to act*. If the ALAC does not act when accountability is being eroded, then what purpose does the Empowered Community serve? What message does this send to the 6 billion Internet end users out there? In view of the serious consequences of inaction, the question before us is simple and unavoidable: *YES or NO. *Kindest regards, Olivier Crépin-Leblond (own views)