While I agree that identifying use cases for Whois data is an interesting exercise, I respectfully suggest that it is beyond the remit of this Review Team. On Jan 31, 2011, at 6:44 PM, <lynn@goodsecurityconsulting.com<mailto:lynn@goodsecurityconsulting.com>> <lynn@goodsecurityconsulting.com<mailto:lynn@goodsecurityconsulting.com>> wrote: Dear All, To follow on Kathy's message, it is certainly a very serious situation in Egypt. When the government basically "unplugged" Internet access in that country, communication in general was disrupted. I wondered if they were still able to send fax messages over telephone lines? We actually had protesters here in Atlanta of sympathetic supporters last weekend who held a small demonstration. Overall, I agree that we need to think about the circumstances of political dissidents and human rights activists as we review the implementation of WHOIS. But in my experience, WHOIS data is helpful but not necessary to trace a communication on the Internet. When someone wants to hide the source of a communication, a common technique is to exploit open relay channels on someone else's server so that it appears to be the source (but is not). Sometimes, individuals who want to hide their location may relay through 5 or more servers making it extremely difficult to trace back. I am not suggesting that anyone should employ this type of technique, only that it is technically possible and that WHOIS data would not matter. Similarly, I am sure you are all aware of email spoofing used in spam. This technique hides the real identity and source of the spam sender. It displays an email address in the send field that is not the true sender. These points are why I am interested in Lutz's idea of identifying "use cases" for WHOIS data. Kind regards, Lynn -------- Original Message -------- Subject: [Rt4-whois] FW: [IP] Internet Security Savvy is Critical as Egyptian Government Blocks Websites, Arrests Activists in Response to Continued Protest | Electronic Frontier Foundation From: "Kathy Kleiman" <kKleiman@pir.org<mailto:kKleiman@pir.org>> Date: Fri, January 28, 2011 10:14 pm To: <rt4-whois@icann.org<mailto:rt4-whois@icann.org>> Dear All, I know we are all watching the stories from the Middle East with interest, and great concern. I remember the issue of privacy/anonymity came up in our London discussions. I thought the following posting to Professor Dave Farber’s Interesting People List might be of interest. Best, Kathy From: David Farber [mailto:dave@farber.net] Sent: Friday, January 28, 2011 3:50 PM To: ip Subject: [IP] Internet Security Savvy is Critical as Egyptian Government Blocks Websites, Arrests Activists in Response to Continued Protest | Electronic Frontier Foundation http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/01/egypt-blocks-websites-arrests-bloggers-... Internet Security Savvy is Critical as Egyptian Government Blocks Websites, Arrests Activists in Response to Continued Protest<http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/01/egypt-blocks-websites-arrests-bloggers-...> Commentary<http://www.eff.org/blog-categories/commentary> by Eva Galperin<http://www.eff.org/about/staff/eva-galperin> As we've seen in Iran and Tunisia, social networking tools have given activists in authoritarian regimes a powerful voice, which can be heard well beyond their own country. But the use of social networking tools has also given their governments ways to identify and retaliate against them. This week we are watching the same dynamic play out in Egypt. This is why it is critical that all activists —in Egypt and elsewhere—take precautions to protect their anonymity and freedom of expression. The protests in Egypt this week also highlight another important point: authoritarian governments can block access to social media websites, but determined, tech-savvy activists are likely to find ways to circumvent censorship to communicate with the rest of the world. In an attempt to clamp down on Egyptian protesters, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s government is intermittently blocking websites<http://www.herdict.org/web/explore/country/EG/32767> and arresting<https://cpj.org/2011/01/journalists-beaten-websites-blocked-amid-protests.ph...> bloggers, journalists, and dissidents. Like the Tunisians, Egyptian protesters have made heavy use of social media websites to share information about the protests with the outside world and with each other. In spite of the Egyptian government’s blocking of Twitter, tweets<https://twitter.com/#!/search/jan25> from the Egyptian protests in Suez and Cairo provided up-to-the-minute reports about protest activity, the movements of police, deaths and injuries, links to photos on Twitpic, and videos on YouTube. Cooperation amongst protesting citizens has kept communications resilient so far. When protestors in Cario's Tahir Square experienced an outage in cell phone data service, nearby residents reportedly<http://www.itp.net/583714-egypt-government-denies-twitter-block> opened their home Wi-Fii networks to allow protesters to get online. On the first day of protests, the Egyptian government blocked several websites, including Twitter and Bambuser<http://bambuser.com/>, a Swedish website which allows users to stream live video from their cell phones. By the second day, the government's blocking of Twitter was sparse and intermittent, but there were reports of blocking Facebook and YouTube. It is unclear whether or not the Egyptian government will continue to expand its list of blocked sites in the coming days. Even the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who was conspicuously silent during the protests leading up to the Tunisian revolution, has called on the Mubarak government to respect freedom of expression and urged them “not to…block communications, including on social media sites.” The other dangerous aspect of the Mubarak government’s shameful campaign of silence and censorship has been the arrest and detention of bloggers, journalists, and activists. The Committee to Protect Journalists has reported that the Egyptian government has shut down at least two independent news websites: Al-Dustour and El-Badil. Police beat Al-Jazeera correspondent Mustafa Kafifi and Guardian reporter Jack Shenker, who posted anaudio recording<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/audio/2011/jan/26/egypt-violence-jack-shenke...> of the incident. Policemen have attacked and arrested cameramen covering the protests and onlookers recording the protests with cell phones. Egypt is no stranger to the arrest of bloggers. Egyptian blogger Kareem Amer<http://boingboing.net/2007/02/24/egypt_blogger_kareem.html> was sentenced to four years in prison for “disparaging religion” and “defaming the president” in 2007. In 2009, web forum founder Karim Al-Bukheiri<http://rt.com/news/bloggers-egypt-arrest-torture/> was arrested, tortured, and subject to constant government surveillance. Just last year, the Islamic Human Rights Foundation reported that Egyptian Security Forces arrested “at least 29 activists, including bloggers, lawyers, and human rights activists.” The concern here is clear—if the street protests subside, the Mubarak government could initiate a campaign of retaliation and oppression, arresting and harassing the very bloggers and activists who have been chronicling the protests online. Some countries have gone even further. In Iran two opposition activists were hanged<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12272067> this week for taking pictures and video of the Green Revolution protests and posting them online. Given the potential dangers, it is absolutely critical that Egyptian protesters take precautions when communicating online. To reiterate, social networking tools have given activists a powerful voice, which can be heard well beyond Egypt, but activists should also remember that the Egyptian government could use these same tools to identify and retaliate against them. We recommend that political activists look at our Surveillance Self Defense International<http://www.eff.org/wp/surveillance-self-defense-international> report for information on how to use technology defensively to better protect their anonymity and freedom of expression in Egypt and other authoritarian regimes. 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