Ron Balone: Bizzarre …. CW On 07 Oct 2015, at 16:01, Ron Baione <ron.baione@yahoo.com> wrote:
An idea I had was to include in the process some sort of mandatory monthly collaboration with a secure external whistleblower process. It is perceived that ICANN members would be somewhat more suceptible to unlawful pressure by governments or inter-governmental entities post-transition.
Having an external process might help gain public and U.S. government trust in the transition and accountability process. Whistle-blower websites and reporters exist around the globe, and have been the subject of much controversy, but in a multistakeholder controlled external whistleblower process, you could have:
1) A monthly process where a conjunction of 60 legit and diverse privacy groups are placed in a pool of availability
2) 5 privacy organizations would then be chosen at random each month, by algorithm or out of a hat to act as possible external whistleblowers for the ICANN community
3) Each of the 60 privacy groups must sign a non-disclosure contract with ICANN regarding the provision of their services at any given time
4) The names of the 60 privacy groups would be publicly known, published on January 1st each year,
5) It would not be lawful for those groups to reveal if they are that monthly representative, or risk losing their incentive to participate in the process, an jncentive which would be non-monetary.
6) The incentive would be, i suppose, the credibility gained for their organization by being considered worthy of external whistleblower stewardship
7) An ICANN led review process of which privacy groups are chosen and retained year over year would be conducted by the CCWG.
8) Since the model is for the creation of a a random selection process, groups could theoretically serve 12 times a year, therefore a limit on number of months a single organization could serve a whistleblower function would be capped at 8 months of service.
9) There would be a code-of-conduct signed by each organization allowing for automatic vote by CCWG on removal from the pool of organizations of an organization or retinment, for example, if an organization for failed to renew or delayed its renewal of its local registration or enacted or amended their bylaws, failed to submit requested information in a timely fashion, or acted in a way that was contrary to supporting a free and open internet.
Ron
From: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com>; To: Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org>; Cc: avri@acm.org <avri@acm.org>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org <accountability-cross-community@icann.org>; Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials Sent: Wed, Oct 7, 2015 12:45:53 PM
Malcolm and Avri,
Both very concise and right on target. Sadly.
Greg
On Wednesday, October 7, 2015, Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org> wrote: + 1 Avri.
On 07/10/2015 12:29, Avri Doria wrote: Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote: On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote: You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls. Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN’s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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