Fwd: Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials
Dear colleagues, During the call yesterday I mentioned that we would be providing updates on our progress in two different calls : - the transition facilitation program call, which was attended by ntia (Larry Strickling), ICANN (Fadi, Steve Crocker amongst others) and leaders of the various transition related groups (numbering, ietf, cwg, ...) - a community leader call, attended by so/ac and constituency leaders. You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls. I have insisted in our group's strong commitment and involvement, and introduced the potential timelines we have started discussing. A couple of key points from these calls are : - the status of the transition program as a whole is qualified as "solid orange bordering red "(based on the 30 sept 2016 deadline) - the community leader call will reconvene on Monday to assess whether extra time could be devoted in Dublin to advancing our work effectively, given the very high priority. Best, Mathieu Weill --------------- Depuis mon mobile, désolé pour le style Début du message transféré :
Objet: Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials
Dear SO, AC, SG, C, RALO Chairs, Chairs of the CCWG, CWG, ICG, ICANN Board Members:
Thank you again for your participation on today's call.
As requested, attached are the slides presented today and the chat history for your reference.
In a separate note, I will suggest a call early next week for us to continue a discussion on the Dublin schedule.
Best regards, David
David A. Olive Vice President, Policy Development Support General Manager, ICANN Regional Headquarters –Istanbul Hakki Yeten Cad. Selenium Plaza No:10/C K:10 34349 Fulya, Besiktas, Istanbul Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
Direct Line: +90.212.999.6212 Mobile: + 1. 202.341.3611 Mobile: +90.533.341.6550 Email: david.olive@icann.org www.icann.org
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls.
Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one! Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting. Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either. Here is my assessment. Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?" A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement. Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?" A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability. Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?" A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement. [* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.] Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN’s accountability and evolve its governance structure? A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either. Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year. One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter. Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action. That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4. Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd 21-27 St Thomas Street, London SE1 9RY Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
Hi, My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it. I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making. avri On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls.
Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN’s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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+ 1 Avri. On 07/10/2015 12:29, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls. Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN’s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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Malcolm and Avri, Both very concise and right on target. Sadly. Greg On Wednesday, October 7, 2015, Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org> wrote:
+ 1 Avri.
On 07/10/2015 12:29, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls.
Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN’s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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An idea I had was to include in the process some sort of mandatory monthly collaboration with a secure external whistleblower process. It is perceived that ICANN members would be somewhat more suceptible to unlawful pressure by governments or inter-governmental entities post-transition. Having an external process might help gain public and U.S. government trust in the transition and accountability process. Whistle-blower websites and reporters exist around the globe, and have been the subject of much controversy, but in a multistakeholder controlled external whistleblower process, you could have: 1) A monthly process where a conjunction of 60 legit and diverse privacy groups are placed in a pool of availability 2) 5 privacy organizations would then be chosen at random each month, by algorithm or out of a hat to act as possible external whistleblowers for the ICANN community 3) Each of the 60 privacy groups must sign a non-disclosure contract with ICANN regarding the provision of their services at any given time 4) The names of the 60 privacy groups would be publicly known, published on January 1st each year, 5) It would not be lawful for those groups to reveal if they are that monthly representative, or risk losing their incentive to participate in the process, an jncentive which would be non-monetary. 6) The incentive would be, i suppose, the credibility gained for their organization by being considered worthy of external whistleblower stewardship 7) An ICANN led review process of which privacy groups are chosen and retained year over year would be conducted by the CCWG. 8) Since the model is for the creation of a a random selection process, groups could theoretically serve 12 times a year, therefore a limit on number of months a single organization could serve a whistleblower function would be capped at 8 months of service. 9) There would be a code-of-conduct signed by each organization allowing for automatic vote by CCWG on removal from the pool of organizations of an organization or retinment, for example, if an organization for failed to renew or delayed its renewal of its local registration or enacted or amended their bylaws, failed to submit requested information in a timely fashion, or acted in a way that was contrary to supporting a free and open internet. Ron
What's the point of a whistleblowing process if there's no one with a big stick to listen to the whistle? On 07/10/15 15:01, Ron Baione wrote:
An idea I had was to include in the process some sort of mandatory monthly collaboration with a secure external whistleblower process. It is perceived that ICANN members would be somewhat more suceptible to unlawful pressure by governments or inter-governmental entities post-transition.
Having an external process might help gain public and U.S. government trust in the transition and accountability process. Whistle-blower websites and reporters exist around the globe, and have been the subject of much controversy, but in a multistakeholder controlled external whistleblower process, you could have:
1) A monthly process where a conjunction of 60 legit and diverse privacy groups are placed in a pool of availability
2) 5 privacy organizations would then be chosen at random each month, by algorithm or out of a hat to act as possible external whistleblowers for the ICANN community
3) Each of the 60 privacy groups must sign a non-disclosure contract with ICANN regarding the provision of their services at any given time
4) The names of the 60 privacy groups would be publicly known, published on January 1st each year,
5) It would not be lawful for those groups to reveal if they are that monthly representative, or risk losing their incentive to participate in the process, an jncentive which would be non-monetary.
6) The incentive would be, i suppose, the credibility gained for their organization by being considered worthy of external whistleblower stewardship
7) An ICANN led review process of which privacy groups are chosen and retained year over year would be conducted by the CCWG.
8) Since the model is for the creation of a a random selection process, groups could theoretically serve 12 times a year, therefore a limit on number of months a single organization could serve a whistleblower function would be capped at 8 months of service.
9) There would be a code-of-conduct signed by each organization allowing for automatic vote by CCWG on removal from the pool of organizations of an organization or retinment, for example, if an organization for failed to renew or delayed its renewal of its local registration or enacted or amended their bylaws, failed to submit requested information in a timely fashion, or acted in a way that was contrary to supporting a free and open internet.
Ron
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The external whistleblower organizations can go directly to the public after the crime of governmental entities pressuring individual ICANN members was substantiated by federal law enforcement. The resulting public outcry, congressional hearings etc. would therefore be a deterrant to unlawful occurrences ever happening in the first place. And whistleblower processes already exist as part of many governments, therefore it is not a bizarre suggestion in my opinion, actually it is a good mechanism for adding an additional outlet for ICANN members post-transition. Bad actors would think twice therefore about trying to pressure either the ICANN board or anyone else, with more than just internal processes available. Ron
The current whistleblower process is far worse than that. For one, the entire process is a hotline to a company that reports directly back to ICANN. That company receives a complaint and then takes it straight to ICANN and asks ICANN for what to do next. This is not hearsay, it is what happened to one person that actually used the process (and it wasn't me). The company's first question was to ask what their name was. They asked that I'd they gave it, would it be given to ICANN. The answer was yes. The individual heard nothing about their complaint for a while. Then the company got back: ICANN had decided not to progress with it, so it was considered closed. In other words, the whistleblower program is a complete fraud completely determined and run by ICANN's legal team. ICANN refuses to provides any details of this program (and no wonder) and that even extends to basic stats. The only other person that I know used the program was fired shortly afterwards. I understand they gave their name to the company believing it would be confidential. When ICANN was quizzed on the program, it had the audacity to argue that the low level of use of the whistleblower program showed that there weren't any concerns internally. It's doesn't take a genius to realize that keeping your mouth shut is preferable to being fired and having the issue you were complaining about brushed under the carpet. Kieren On Wed, Oct 7, 2015 at 7:21 AM Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:
What's the point of a whistleblowing process if there's no one with a big stick to listen to the whistle?
On 07/10/15 15:01, Ron Baione wrote:
An idea I had was to include in the process some sort of mandatory monthly collaboration with a secure external whistleblower process. It is perceived that ICANN members would be somewhat more suceptible to unlawful pressure by governments or inter-governmental entities post-transition.
Having an external process might help gain public and U.S. government trust in the transition and accountability process. Whistle-blower websites and reporters exist around the globe, and have been the subject of much controversy, but in a multistakeholder controlled external whistleblower process, you could have:
1) A monthly process where a conjunction of 60 legit and diverse privacy groups are placed in a pool of availability
2) 5 privacy organizations would then be chosen at random each month, by algorithm or out of a hat to act as possible external whistleblowers for the ICANN community
3) Each of the 60 privacy groups must sign a non-disclosure contract with ICANN regarding the provision of their services at any given time
4) The names of the 60 privacy groups would be publicly known, published on January 1st each year,
5) It would not be lawful for those groups to reveal if they are that monthly representative, or risk losing their incentive to participate in the process, an jncentive which would be non-monetary.
6) The incentive would be, i suppose, the credibility gained for their organization by being considered worthy of external whistleblower stewardship
7) An ICANN led review process of which privacy groups are chosen and retained year over year would be conducted by the CCWG.
8) Since the model is for the creation of a a random selection process, groups could theoretically serve 12 times a year, therefore a limit on number of months a single organization could serve a whistleblower function would be capped at 8 months of service.
9) There would be a code-of-conduct signed by each organization allowing for automatic vote by CCWG on removal from the pool of organizations of an organization or retinment, for example, if an organization for failed to renew or delayed its renewal of its local registration or enacted or amended their bylaws, failed to submit requested information in a timely fashion, or acted in a way that was contrary to supporting a free and open internet.
Ron
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While I won’t comment on the internal side of things I just want to note that an external compliance/whistleblower/reporting hotline which runs through a questionnaire and then gives the report back to the company is pretty industry standard and considered best practise across high risk industries. Whats important is what happens once the report is given over to the company. But given the work that we have ahead of us on fundamental issues I worry that spending cycles on such a small targeted issue might be time better spent on other matters, just my 2c. -jg From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Kieren McCarthy Date: Wednesday 7 October 2015 at 5:27 p.m. To: Nigel Roberts, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials The current whistleblower process is far worse than that. For one, the entire process is a hotline to a company that reports directly back to ICANN. That company receives a complaint and then takes it straight to ICANN and asks ICANN for what to do next. This is not hearsay, it is what happened to one person that actually used the process (and it wasn't me). The company's first question was to ask what their name was. They asked that I'd they gave it, would it be given to ICANN. The answer was yes. The individual heard nothing about their complaint for a while. Then the company got back: ICANN had decided not to progress with it, so it was considered closed. In other words, the whistleblower program is a complete fraud completely determined and run by ICANN's legal team. ICANN refuses to provides any details of this program (and no wonder) and that even extends to basic stats. The only other person that I know used the program was fired shortly afterwards. I understand they gave their name to the company believing it would be confidential. When ICANN was quizzed on the program, it had the audacity to argue that the low level of use of the whistleblower program showed that there weren't any concerns internally. It's doesn't take a genius to realize that keeping your mouth shut is preferable to being fired and having the issue you were complaining about brushed under the carpet. Kieren On Wed, Oct 7, 2015 at 7:21 AM Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net<mailto:nigel@channelisles.net>> wrote: What's the point of a whistleblowing process if there's no one with a big stick to listen to the whistle? On 07/10/15 15:01, Ron Baione wrote:
An idea I had was to include in the process some sort of mandatory monthly collaboration with a secure external whistleblower process. It is perceived that ICANN members would be somewhat more suceptible to unlawful pressure by governments or inter-governmental entities post-transition.
Having an external process might help gain public and U.S. government trust in the transition and accountability process. Whistle-blower websites and reporters exist around the globe, and have been the subject of much controversy, but in a multistakeholder controlled external whistleblower process, you could have:
1) A monthly process where a conjunction of 60 legit and diverse privacy groups are placed in a pool of availability
2) 5 privacy organizations would then be chosen at random each month, by algorithm or out of a hat to act as possible external whistleblowers for the ICANN community
3) Each of the 60 privacy groups must sign a non-disclosure contract with ICANN regarding the provision of their services at any given time
4) The names of the 60 privacy groups would be publicly known, published on January 1st each year,
5) It would not be lawful for those groups to reveal if they are that monthly representative, or risk losing their incentive to participate in the process, an jncentive which would be non-monetary.
6) The incentive would be, i suppose, the credibility gained for their organization by being considered worthy of external whistleblower stewardship
7) An ICANN led review process of which privacy groups are chosen and retained year over year would be conducted by the CCWG.
8) Since the model is for the creation of a a random selection process, groups could theoretically serve 12 times a year, therefore a limit on number of months a single organization could serve a whistleblower function would be capped at 8 months of service.
9) There would be a code-of-conduct signed by each organization allowing for automatic vote by CCWG on removal from the pool of organizations of an organization or retinment, for example, if an organization for failed to renew or delayed its renewal of its local registration or enacted or amended their bylaws, failed to submit requested information in a timely fashion, or acted in a way that was contrary to supporting a free and open internet.
Ron
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Again, That whistleblower process is internal, not external, the company is involved directly in the decision process you described. And remember, what you described is the Industry standard across high risk companies that are not multistakeholder and with different responsibilities. Spending time developing my proposed external process is in fact fulfilling a solution to stated US Government NTIA post-transition security mandates as stated by the NTIA's requirments to their accepting the transition. Basically, They want to know if ICANN is going to have the processes in place for this sort of thing, and its usually the first question Congress asks. "What about foreign governments, is the process secure?". The US Government will never approve the transition without knowing ICANN has every tool necessary to prevent foreign government pressure, and it should be a top issue, with an external whistleblower process officially drafted asap, or at least have the idea proposed in some facet. Ron
I’m sorry but Im going to reiterate, a new whistleblower program is not an NTIA defined criteria, is not a community power and we have enough on our plate for our current discussions. Is this a great potential idea for WS2 and the staff/so/ac/accountability piece? For sure and I would think that WP3 (I think that’s the staff so/ac/accountability one) would be very open to hearing these ideas. But for the moment, before Dublin we have an immense amount of work to do on fundamental issues and conflicts and I don’t think that we can spare time for additional work. -jg From: Ron Baione Date: Wednesday 7 October 2015 at 6:03 p.m. To: James Gannon, "kieren@kierenmccarthy.com<mailto:kieren@kierenmccarthy.com>", "nigel@channelisles.net<mailto:nigel@channelisles.net>", "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials Again, That whistleblower process is internal, not external, the company is involved directly in the decision process you described. And remember, what you described is the Industry standard across high risk companies that are not multistakeholder and with different responsibilities. Spending time developing my proposed external process is in fact fulfilling a solution to stated US Government NTIA post-transition security mandates as stated by the NTIA's requirments to their accepting the transition. Basically, They want to know if ICANN is going to have the processes in place for this sort of thing, and its usually the first question Congress asks. "What about foreign governments, is the process secure?". The US Government will never approve the transition without knowing ICANN has every tool necessary to prevent foreign government pressure, and it should be a top issue, with an external whistleblower process officially drafted asap, or at least have the idea proposed in some facet. Ron ________________________________ From: James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net<mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net>>; To: Kieren McCarthy <kieren@kierenmccarthy.com<mailto:kieren@kierenmccarthy.com>>; Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net<mailto:nigel@channelisles.net>>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>; Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials Sent: Wed, Oct 7, 2015 4:33:04 PM While I won’t comment on the internal side of things I just want to note that an external compliance/whistleblower/reporting hotline which runs through a questionnaire and then gives the report back to the company is pretty industry standard and considered best practise across high risk industries. Whats important is what happens once the report is given over to the company. But given the work that we have ahead of us on fundamental issues I worry that spending cycles on such a small targeted issue might be time better spent on other matters, just my 2c. -jg From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<javascript:return>> on behalf of Kieren McCarthy Date: Wednesday 7 October 2015 at 5:27 p.m. To: Nigel Roberts, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<javascript:return>" Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials The current whistleblower process is far worse than that. For one, the entire process is a hotline to a company that reports directly back to ICANN. That company receives a complaint and then takes it straight to ICANN and asks ICANN for what to do next. This is not hearsay, it is what happened to one person that actually used the process (and it wasn't me). The company's first question was to ask what their name was. They asked that I'd they gave it, would it be given to ICANN. The answer was yes. The individual heard nothing about their complaint for a while. Then the company got back: ICANN had decided not to progress with it, so it was considered closed. In other words, the whistleblower program is a complete fraud completely determined and run by ICANN's legal team. ICANN refuses to provides any details of this program (and no wonder) and that even extends to basic stats. The only other person that I know used the program was fired shortly afterwards. I understand they gave their name to the company believing it would be confidential. When ICANN was quizzed on the program, it had the audacity to argue that the low level of use of the whistleblower program showed that there weren't any concerns internally. It's doesn't take a genius to realize that keeping your mouth shut is preferable to being fired and having the issue you were complaining about brushed under the carpet. Kieren On Wed, Oct 7, 2015 at 7:21 AM Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net<javascript:return>> wrote: What's the point of a whistleblowing process if there's no one with a big stick to listen to the whistle? On 07/10/15 15:01, Ron Baione wrote:
An idea I had was to include in the process some sort of mandatory monthly collaboration with a secure external whistleblower process. It is perceived that ICANN members would be somewhat more suceptible to unlawful pressure by governments or inter-governmental entities post-transition.
Having an external process might help gain public and U.S. government trust in the transition and accountability process. Whistle-blower websites and reporters exist around the globe, and have been the subject of much controversy, but in a multistakeholder controlled external whistleblower process, you could have:
1) A monthly process where a conjunction of 60 legit and diverse privacy groups are placed in a pool of availability
2) 5 privacy organizations would then be chosen at random each month, by algorithm or out of a hat to act as possible external whistleblowers for the ICANN community
3) Each of the 60 privacy groups must sign a non-disclosure contract with ICANN regarding the provision of their services at any given time
4) The names of the 60 privacy groups would be publicly known, published on January 1st each year,
5) It would not be lawful for those groups to reveal if they are that monthly representative, or risk losing their incentive to participate in the process, an jncentive which would be non-monetary.
6) The incentive would be, i suppose, the credibility gained for their organization by being considered worthy of external whistleblower stewardship
7) An ICANN led review process of which privacy groups are chosen and retained year over year would be conducted by the CCWG.
8) Since the model is for the creation of a a random selection process, groups could theoretically serve 12 times a year, therefore a limit on number of months a single organization could serve a whistleblower function would be capped at 8 months of service.
9) There would be a code-of-conduct signed by each organization allowing for automatic vote by CCWG on removal from the pool of organizations of an organization or retinment, for example, if an organization for failed to renew or delayed its renewal of its local registration or enacted or amended their bylaws, failed to submit requested information in a timely fashion, or acted in a way that was contrary to supporting a free and open internet.
Ron
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hi, I agree, the whistleblower issue in on the ATRT2 list of recommendations and the next step is a outside audit of ICANN processes for this. Followed by remediation as required. From ATRT2 Final Report:
9.5. The Board should arrange an audit to determine the viability of the ICANN Anonymous Hotline as a whistleblowing mechanism and implement any necessary improvements.
I do not see this as a WS1 requirement in any way. avri (with atrt hat on.) On 07-Oct-15 13:16, James Gannon wrote:
I’m sorry but Im going to reiterate, a new whistleblower program is not an NTIA defined criteria, is not a community power and we have enough on our plate for our current discussions.
Is this a great potential idea for WS2 and the staff/so/ac/accountability piece? For sure and I would think that WP3 (I think that’s the staff so/ac/accountability one) would be very open to hearing these ideas.
But for the moment, before Dublin we have an immense amount of work to do on fundamental issues and conflicts and I don’t think that we can spare time for additional work.
-jg
From: Ron Baione Date: Wednesday 7 October 2015 at 6:03 p.m. To: James Gannon, "kieren@kierenmccarthy.com <mailto:kieren@kierenmccarthy.com>", "nigel@channelisles.net <mailto:nigel@channelisles.net>", "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials
Again, That whistleblower process is internal, not external, the company is involved directly in the decision process you described.
And remember, what you described is the Industry standard across high risk companies that are not multistakeholder and with different responsibilities.
Spending time developing my proposed external process is in fact fulfilling a solution to stated US Government NTIA post-transition security mandates as stated by the NTIA's requirments to their accepting the transition. Basically, They want to know if ICANN is going to have the processes in place for this sort of thing, and its usually the first question Congress asks. "What about foreign governments, is the process secure?".
The US Government will never approve the transition without knowing ICANN has every tool necessary to prevent foreign government pressure, and it should be a top issue, with an external whistleblower process officially drafted asap, or at least have the idea proposed in some facet.
Ron
------------------------------------------------------------------------ *From: *James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net <mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net>>; *To: *Kieren McCarthy <kieren@kierenmccarthy.com <mailto:kieren@kierenmccarthy.com>>; Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net <mailto:nigel@channelisles.net>>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>; *Subject: *Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials *Sent: *Wed, Oct 7, 2015 4:33:04 PM
While I won’t comment on the internal side of things I just want to note that an external compliance/whistleblower/reporting hotline which runs through a questionnaire and then gives the report back to the company is pretty industry standard and considered best practise across high risk industries.
Whats important is what happens once the report is given over to the company.
But given the work that we have ahead of us on fundamental issues I worry that spending cycles on such a small targeted issue might be time better spent on other matters, just my 2c.
-jg
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:return>> on behalf of Kieren McCarthy Date: Wednesday 7 October 2015 at 5:27 p.m. To: Nigel Roberts, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:return>" Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials
The current whistleblower process is far worse than that. For one, the entire process is a hotline to a company that reports directly back to ICANN. That company receives a complaint and then takes it straight to ICANN and asks ICANN for what to do next. This is not hearsay, it is what happened to one person that actually used the process (and it wasn't me). The company's first question was to ask what their name was. They asked that I'd they gave it, would it be given to ICANN. The answer was yes. The individual heard nothing about their complaint for a while. Then the company got back: ICANN had decided not to progress with it, so it was considered closed. In other words, the whistleblower program is a complete fraud completely determined and run by ICANN's legal team. ICANN refuses to provides any details of this program (and no wonder) and that even extends to basic stats. The only other person that I know used the program was fired shortly afterwards. I understand they gave their name to the company believing it would be confidential. When ICANN was quizzed on the program, it had the audacity to argue that the low level of use of the whistleblower program showed that there weren't any concerns internally. It's doesn't take a genius to realize that keeping your mouth shut is preferable to being fired and having the issue you were complaining about brushed under the carpet. Kieren
On Wed, Oct 7, 2015 at 7:21 AM Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net <javascript:return>> wrote:
What's the point of a whistleblowing process if there's no one with a big stick to listen to the whistle?
On 07/10/15 15:01, Ron Baione wrote: > An idea I had was to include in the process some sort of mandatory monthly collaboration with a secure external whistleblower process. It is perceived that ICANN members would be somewhat more suceptible to unlawful pressure by governments or inter-governmental entities post-transition. > > Having an external process might help gain public and U.S. government trust in the transition and accountability process. Whistle-blower websites and reporters exist around the globe, and have been the subject of much controversy, but in a multistakeholder controlled external whistleblower process, you could have: > > 1) A monthly process where a conjunction of 60 legit and diverse privacy groups are placed in a pool of availability > > 2) 5 privacy organizations would then be chosen at random each month, by algorithm or out of a hat to act as possible external whistleblowers for the ICANN community > > 3) Each of the 60 privacy groups must sign a non-disclosure contract with ICANN regarding the provision of their services at any given time > > 4) The names of the 60 privacy groups would be publicly known, published on January 1st each year, > > 5) It would not be lawful for those groups to reveal if they are that monthly representative, or risk losing their incentive to participate in the process, an jncentive which would be non-monetary. > > 6) The incentive would be, i suppose, the credibility gained for their organization by being considered worthy of external whistleblower stewardship > > 7) An ICANN led review process of which privacy groups are chosen and retained year over year would be conducted by the CCWG. > > 8) Since the model is for the creation of a a random selection process, groups could theoretically serve 12 times a year, therefore a limit on number of months a single organization could serve a whistleblower function would be capped at 8 months of service. > > 9) There would be a code-of-conduct signed by each organization allowing for automatic vote by CCWG on removal from the pool of organizations of an organization or retinment, for example, if an organization for failed to renew or delayed its renewal of its local registration or enacted or amended their bylaws, failed to submit requested information in a timely fashion, or acted in a way that was contrary to supporting a free and open internet. > > Ron > > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <javascript:return> > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <javascript:return> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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While addressing ICANN's whistle blower policy is important to our work, I thought we had put this issue in Work Stream 2 quite awhile ago. I would like to know, however, what kind of board oversight there has been of ICANN's whistleblower program to date. Best, Robin On Oct 7, 2015, at 10:32 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
hi,
I agree, the whistleblower issue in on the ATRT2 list of recommendations and the next step is a outside audit of ICANN processes for this. Followed by remediation as required. From ATRT2 Final Report:
9.5. The Board should arrange an audit to determine the viability of the ICANN Anonymous Hotline as a whistleblowing mechanism and implement any necessary improvements.
I do not see this as a WS1 requirement in any way.
avri (with atrt hat on.)
On 07-Oct-15 13:16, James Gannon wrote:
I’m sorry but Im going to reiterate, a new whistleblower program is not an NTIA defined criteria, is not a community power and we have enough on our plate for our current discussions.
Is this a great potential idea for WS2 and the staff/so/ac/accountability piece? For sure and I would think that WP3 (I think that’s the staff so/ac/accountability one) would be very open to hearing these ideas.
But for the moment, before Dublin we have an immense amount of work to do on fundamental issues and conflicts and I don’t think that we can spare time for additional work.
-jg
From: Ron Baione Date: Wednesday 7 October 2015 at 6:03 p.m. To: James Gannon, "kieren@kierenmccarthy.com <mailto:kieren@kierenmccarthy.com>", "nigel@channelisles.net <mailto:nigel@channelisles.net>", "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials
Again, That whistleblower process is internal, not external, the company is involved directly in the decision process you described.
And remember, what you described is the Industry standard across high risk companies that are not multistakeholder and with different responsibilities.
Spending time developing my proposed external process is in fact fulfilling a solution to stated US Government NTIA post-transition security mandates as stated by the NTIA's requirments to their accepting the transition. Basically, They want to know if ICANN is going to have the processes in place for this sort of thing, and its usually the first question Congress asks. "What about foreign governments, is the process secure?".
The US Government will never approve the transition without knowing ICANN has every tool necessary to prevent foreign government pressure, and it should be a top issue, with an external whistleblower process officially drafted asap, or at least have the idea proposed in some facet.
Ron
------------------------------------------------------------------------ *From: *James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net <mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net>>; *To: *Kieren McCarthy <kieren@kierenmccarthy.com <mailto:kieren@kierenmccarthy.com>>; Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net <mailto:nigel@channelisles.net>>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>; *Subject: *Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials *Sent: *Wed, Oct 7, 2015 4:33:04 PM
While I won’t comment on the internal side of things I just want to note that an external compliance/whistleblower/reporting hotline which runs through a questionnaire and then gives the report back to the company is pretty industry standard and considered best practise across high risk industries.
Whats important is what happens once the report is given over to the company.
But given the work that we have ahead of us on fundamental issues I worry that spending cycles on such a small targeted issue might be time better spent on other matters, just my 2c.
-jg
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:return>> on behalf of Kieren McCarthy Date: Wednesday 7 October 2015 at 5:27 p.m. To: Nigel Roberts, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:return>" Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials
The current whistleblower process is far worse than that. For one, the entire process is a hotline to a company that reports directly back to ICANN. That company receives a complaint and then takes it straight to ICANN and asks ICANN for what to do next. This is not hearsay, it is what happened to one person that actually used the process (and it wasn't me). The company's first question was to ask what their name was. They asked that I'd they gave it, would it be given to ICANN. The answer was yes. The individual heard nothing about their complaint for a while. Then the company got back: ICANN had decided not to progress with it, so it was considered closed. In other words, the whistleblower program is a complete fraud completely determined and run by ICANN's legal team. ICANN refuses to provides any details of this program (and no wonder) and that even extends to basic stats. The only other person that I know used the program was fired shortly afterwards. I understand they gave their name to the company believing it would be confidential. When ICANN was quizzed on the program, it had the audacity to argue that the low level of use of the whistleblower program showed that there weren't any concerns internally. It's doesn't take a genius to realize that keeping your mouth shut is preferable to being fired and having the issue you were complaining about brushed under the carpet. Kieren
On Wed, Oct 7, 2015 at 7:21 AM Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net <javascript:return>> wrote:
What's the point of a whistleblowing process if there's no one with a big stick to listen to the whistle?
On 07/10/15 15:01, Ron Baione wrote:
An idea I had was to include in the process some sort of mandatory monthly collaboration with a secure external whistleblower process. It is perceived that ICANN members would be somewhat more suceptible to unlawful pressure by governments or inter-governmental entities post-transition.
Having an external process might help gain public and U.S. government trust in the transition and accountability process. Whistle-blower websites and reporters exist around the globe, and have been the subject of much controversy, but in a multistakeholder controlled external whistleblower process, you could have:
1) A monthly process where a conjunction of 60 legit and diverse privacy groups are placed in a pool of availability
2) 5 privacy organizations would then be chosen at random each month, by algorithm or out of a hat to act as possible external whistleblowers for the ICANN community
3) Each of the 60 privacy groups must sign a non-disclosure contract with ICANN regarding the provision of their services at any given time
4) The names of the 60 privacy groups would be publicly known, published on January 1st each year,
5) It would not be lawful for those groups to reveal if they are that monthly representative, or risk losing their incentive to participate in the process, an jncentive which would be non-monetary.
6) The incentive would be, i suppose, the credibility gained for their organization by being considered worthy of external whistleblower stewardship
7) An ICANN led review process of which privacy groups are chosen and retained year over year would be conducted by the CCWG.
8) Since the model is for the creation of a a random selection process, groups could theoretically serve 12 times a year, therefore a limit on number of months a single organization could serve a whistleblower function would be capped at 8 months of service.
9) There would be a code-of-conduct signed by each organization allowing for automatic vote by CCWG on removal from the pool of organizations of an organization or retinment, for example, if an organization for failed to renew or delayed its renewal of its local registration or enacted or amended their bylaws, failed to submit requested information in a timely fashion, or acted in a way that was contrary to supporting a free and open internet.
Ron
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I think the value of raising issues that are outside the current "workstream" - for me at least - is to remind ourselves that this is an organization that not only has numerous, significant flaws but one that, for whatever reason, refuses to tackle its numerous, significant flaws, even when special groups are created to identify them in detail, do so, and provide clear recommendations for improvement that are then pushed away. When this group starts its inevitable decline into deciding what it can do without in order to appease the board and to be seen as being responsible / reaching a workable compromise, it should do so in the full knowledge that it is giving away the community's ability to change that dynamic and so tackle the many problems that ICANN continually fails to address, possibly forever. Kieren On Wed, Oct 7, 2015 at 10:40 AM, Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org> wrote:
While addressing ICANN's whistle blower policy is important to our work, I thought we had put this issue in Work Stream 2 quite awhile ago.
I would like to know, however, what kind of board oversight there has been of ICANN's whistleblower program to date.
Best, Robin
On Oct 7, 2015, at 10:32 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
hi,
I agree, the whistleblower issue in on the ATRT2 list of recommendations and the next step is a outside audit of ICANN processes for this. Followed by remediation as required. From ATRT2 Final Report:
9.5. The Board should arrange an audit to determine the viability of the ICANN Anonymous Hotline as a whistleblowing mechanism and implement any necessary improvements.
I do not see this as a WS1 requirement in any way.
avri (with atrt hat on.)
On 07-Oct-15 13:16, James Gannon wrote:
I’m sorry but Im going to reiterate, a new whistleblower program is not an NTIA defined criteria, is not a community power and we have enough on our plate for our current discussions.
Is this a great potential idea for WS2 and the staff/so/ac/accountability piece? For sure and I would think that WP3 (I think that’s the staff so/ac/accountability one) would be very open to hearing these ideas.
But for the moment, before Dublin we have an immense amount of work to do on fundamental issues and conflicts and I don’t think that we can spare time for additional work.
-jg
From: Ron Baione Date: Wednesday 7 October 2015 at 6:03 p.m. To: James Gannon, "kieren@kierenmccarthy.com <mailto:kieren@kierenmccarthy.com>", "nigel@channelisles.net <mailto:nigel@channelisles.net>", "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials
Again, That whistleblower process is internal, not external, the company is involved directly in the decision process you described.
And remember, what you described is the Industry standard across high risk companies that are not multistakeholder and with different responsibilities.
Spending time developing my proposed external process is in fact fulfilling a solution to stated US Government NTIA post-transition security mandates as stated by the NTIA's requirments to their accepting the transition. Basically, They want to know if ICANN is going to have the processes in place for this sort of thing, and its usually the first question Congress asks. "What about foreign governments, is the process secure?".
The US Government will never approve the transition without knowing ICANN has every tool necessary to prevent foreign government pressure, and it should be a top issue, with an external whistleblower process officially drafted asap, or at least have the idea proposed in some facet.
Ron
------------------------------------------------------------------------ *From: *James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net <mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net>>; *To: *Kieren McCarthy <kieren@kierenmccarthy.com <mailto:kieren@kierenmccarthy.com>>; Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net <mailto:nigel@channelisles.net>>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>; *Subject: *Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials *Sent: *Wed, Oct 7, 2015 4:33:04 PM
While I won’t comment on the internal side of things I just want to note that an external compliance/whistleblower/reporting hotline which runs through a questionnaire and then gives the report back to the company is pretty industry standard and considered best practise across high risk industries.
Whats important is what happens once the report is given over to the company.
But given the work that we have ahead of us on fundamental issues I worry that spending cycles on such a small targeted issue might be time better spent on other matters, just my 2c.
-jg
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:return>> on behalf of Kieren McCarthy Date: Wednesday 7 October 2015 at 5:27 p.m. To: Nigel Roberts, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:return>" Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials
The current whistleblower process is far worse than that. For one, the entire process is a hotline to a company that reports directly back to ICANN. That company receives a complaint and then takes it straight to ICANN and asks ICANN for what to do next. This is not hearsay, it is what happened to one person that actually used the process (and it wasn't me). The company's first question was to ask what their name was. They asked that I'd they gave it, would it be given to ICANN. The answer was yes. The individual heard nothing about their complaint for a while. Then the company got back: ICANN had decided not to progress with it, so it was considered closed. In other words, the whistleblower program is a complete fraud completely determined and run by ICANN's legal team. ICANN refuses to provides any details of this program (and no wonder) and that even extends to basic stats. The only other person that I know used the program was fired shortly afterwards. I understand they gave their name to the company believing it would be confidential. When ICANN was quizzed on the program, it had the audacity to argue that the low level of use of the whistleblower program showed that there weren't any concerns internally. It's doesn't take a genius to realize that keeping your mouth shut is preferable to being fired and having the issue you were complaining about brushed under the carpet. Kieren
On Wed, Oct 7, 2015 at 7:21 AM Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net <javascript:return>> wrote:
What's the point of a whistleblowing process if there's no one with a big stick to listen to the whistle?
On 07/10/15 15:01, Ron Baione wrote:
An idea I had was to include in the process some sort of mandatory monthly collaboration with a secure external whistleblower process. It is perceived that ICANN members would be somewhat more suceptible to unlawful pressure by governments or inter-governmental entities post-transition.
Having an external process might help gain public and U.S. government trust in the transition and accountability process. Whistle-blower websites and reporters exist around the globe, and have been the subject of much controversy, but in a multistakeholder controlled external whistleblower process, you could have:
1) A monthly process where a conjunction of 60 legit and diverse privacy groups are placed in a pool of availability
2) 5 privacy organizations would then be chosen at random each month, by algorithm or out of a hat to act as possible external whistleblowers for the ICANN community
3) Each of the 60 privacy groups must sign a non-disclosure contract with ICANN regarding the provision of their services at any given time
4) The names of the 60 privacy groups would be publicly known, published on January 1st each year,
5) It would not be lawful for those groups to reveal if they are that monthly representative, or risk losing their incentive to participate in the process, an jncentive which would be non-monetary.
6) The incentive would be, i suppose, the credibility gained for their organization by being considered worthy of external whistleblower stewardship
7) An ICANN led review process of which privacy groups are chosen and retained year over year would be conducted by the CCWG.
8) Since the model is for the creation of a a random selection process, groups could theoretically serve 12 times a year, therefore a limit on number of months a single organization could serve a whistleblower function would be capped at 8 months of service.
9) There would be a code-of-conduct signed by each organization allowing for automatic vote by CCWG on removal from the pool of organizations of an organization or retinment, for example, if an organization for failed to renew or delayed its renewal of its local registration or enacted or amended their bylaws, failed to submit requested information in a timely fashion, or acted in a way that was contrary to supporting a free and open internet.
Ron
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Nothing is inevitable, except death and taxes. And with cryogenics and a great accountant, maybe not even those. On Wed, Oct 7, 2015 at 4:20 PM, Kieren McCarthy <kieren@kierenmccarthy.com> wrote:
I think the value of raising issues that are outside the current "workstream" - for me at least - is to remind ourselves that this is an organization that not only has numerous, significant flaws but one that, for whatever reason, refuses to tackle its numerous, significant flaws, even when special groups are created to identify them in detail, do so, and provide clear recommendations for improvement that are then pushed away.
When this group starts its inevitable decline into deciding what it can do without in order to appease the board and to be seen as being responsible / reaching a workable compromise, it should do so in the full knowledge that it is giving away the community's ability to change that dynamic and so tackle the many problems that ICANN continually fails to address, possibly forever.
Kieren
On Wed, Oct 7, 2015 at 10:40 AM, Robin Gross <robin@ipjustice.org> wrote:
While addressing ICANN's whistle blower policy is important to our work, I thought we had put this issue in Work Stream 2 quite awhile ago.
I would like to know, however, what kind of board oversight there has been of ICANN's whistleblower program to date.
Best, Robin
On Oct 7, 2015, at 10:32 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
hi,
I agree, the whistleblower issue in on the ATRT2 list of recommendations and the next step is a outside audit of ICANN processes for this. Followed by remediation as required. From ATRT2 Final Report:
9.5. The Board should arrange an audit to determine the viability of the ICANN Anonymous Hotline as a whistleblowing mechanism and implement any necessary improvements.
I do not see this as a WS1 requirement in any way.
avri (with atrt hat on.)
On 07-Oct-15 13:16, James Gannon wrote:
I’m sorry but Im going to reiterate, a new whistleblower program is not an NTIA defined criteria, is not a community power and we have enough on our plate for our current discussions.
Is this a great potential idea for WS2 and the staff/so/ac/accountability piece? For sure and I would think that WP3 (I think that’s the staff so/ac/accountability one) would be very open to hearing these ideas.
But for the moment, before Dublin we have an immense amount of work to do on fundamental issues and conflicts and I don’t think that we can spare time for additional work.
-jg
From: Ron Baione Date: Wednesday 7 October 2015 at 6:03 p.m. To: James Gannon, "kieren@kierenmccarthy.com <mailto:kieren@kierenmccarthy.com>", "nigel@channelisles.net <mailto:nigel@channelisles.net>", "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials
Again, That whistleblower process is internal, not external, the company is involved directly in the decision process you described.
And remember, what you described is the Industry standard across high risk companies that are not multistakeholder and with different responsibilities.
Spending time developing my proposed external process is in fact fulfilling a solution to stated US Government NTIA post-transition security mandates as stated by the NTIA's requirments to their accepting the transition. Basically, They want to know if ICANN is going to have the processes in place for this sort of thing, and its usually the first question Congress asks. "What about foreign governments, is the process secure?".
The US Government will never approve the transition without knowing ICANN has every tool necessary to prevent foreign government pressure, and it should be a top issue, with an external whistleblower process officially drafted asap, or at least have the idea proposed in some facet.
Ron
*From: *James Gannon <james@cyberinvasion.net <mailto:james@cyberinvasion.net>>; *To: *Kieren McCarthy <kieren@kierenmccarthy.com <mailto:kieren@kierenmccarthy.com>>; Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net <mailto:nigel@channelisles.net>>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>; *Subject: *Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials *Sent: *Wed, Oct 7, 2015 4:33:04 PM
While I won’t comment on the internal side of things I just want to note that an external compliance/whistleblower/reporting hotline which runs through a questionnaire and then gives the report back to the company is pretty industry standard and considered best practise across high risk industries.
Whats important is what happens once the report is given over to the company.
But given the work that we have ahead of us on fundamental issues I worry that spending cycles on such a small targeted issue might be time better spent on other matters, just my 2c.
-jg
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:return>> on behalf of Kieren McCarthy Date: Wednesday 7 October 2015 at 5:27 p.m. To: Nigel Roberts, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:return>" Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials
The current whistleblower process is far worse than that. For one, the entire process is a hotline to a company that reports directly back to ICANN. That company receives a complaint and then takes it straight to ICANN and asks ICANN for what to do next. This is not hearsay, it is what happened to one person that actually used the process (and it wasn't me). The company's first question was to ask what their name was. They asked that I'd they gave it, would it be given to ICANN. The answer was yes. The individual heard nothing about their complaint for a while. Then the company got back: ICANN had decided not to progress with it, so it was considered closed. In other words, the whistleblower program is a complete fraud completely determined and run by ICANN's legal team. ICANN refuses to provides any details of this program (and no wonder) and that even extends to basic stats. The only other person that I know used the program was fired shortly afterwards. I understand they gave their name to the company believing it would be confidential. When ICANN was quizzed on the program, it had the audacity to argue that the low level of use of the whistleblower program showed that there weren't any concerns internally. It's doesn't take a genius to realize that keeping your mouth shut is preferable to being fired and having the issue you were complaining about brushed under the carpet. Kieren
On Wed, Oct 7, 2015 at 7:21 AM Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net <javascript:return>> wrote:
What's the point of a whistleblowing process if there's no one with a big stick to listen to the whistle?
On 07/10/15 15:01, Ron Baione wrote:
An idea I had was to include in the process some sort of mandatory monthly collaboration with a secure external whistleblower process. It is perceived that ICANN members would be somewhat more suceptible to unlawful pressure by governments or inter-governmental entities post-transition.
Having an external process might help gain public and U.S. government trust in the transition and accountability process. Whistle-blower websites and reporters exist around the globe, and have been the subject of much controversy, but in a multistakeholder controlled external whistleblower process, you could have:
1) A monthly process where a conjunction of 60 legit and diverse privacy groups are placed in a pool of availability
2) 5 privacy organizations would then be chosen at random each month, by algorithm or out of a hat to act as possible external whistleblowers for the ICANN community
3) Each of the 60 privacy groups must sign a non-disclosure contract with ICANN regarding the provision of their services at any given time
4) The names of the 60 privacy groups would be publicly known, published on January 1st each year,
5) It would not be lawful for those groups to reveal if they are that monthly representative, or risk losing their incentive to participate in the process, an jncentive which would be non-monetary.
6) The incentive would be, i suppose, the credibility gained for their organization by being considered worthy of external whistleblower stewardship
7) An ICANN led review process of which privacy groups are chosen and retained year over year would be conducted by the CCWG.
8) Since the model is for the creation of a a random selection process, groups could theoretically serve 12 times a year, therefore a limit on number of months a single organization could serve a whistleblower function would be capped at 8 months of service.
9) There would be a code-of-conduct signed by each organization allowing for automatic vote by CCWG on removal from the pool of organizations of an organization or retinment, for example, if an organization for failed to renew or delayed its renewal of its local registration or enacted or amended their bylaws, failed to submit requested information in a timely fashion, or acted in a way that was contrary to supporting a free and open internet.
Ron
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One can always go back through the emails and rehash the whistleblower conversation using those previous statements if there is no eventual follow through. There is still plenty of time until the transition, I truly believe that we made real progress today, and got beyond complaining and "wondering why the board didn't do something yet". Solutions based conversations force responses that are applicable to the follow through on the policy, it puts real pressure on the process to proceed, like putting a bill on the presidents desk and forcing him to vero it, while complaining forces nothing. That is how to get things accomplished, with real solutions being proposed, even if they are not initially perfect. Ron
True, It is not specifically stated as critieria by NTIA with the exact wording "please add an external whistleblower process" but the idea certainly falls under the criteria of NTIA mandating that the post-transition process is secure. If there is no time to deal with the idea right now, that's up to leaders obviously, at least agreeing that the idea could be an good idea for the future is real progress, and could possibly begin an informal discussion in an unofficial setting. Ron
You seem to have described the internal ICANN whistleblower process, the external process i described can operate as a counter-weight to what you stated was a failed process, and it might even have the effect of causing the internal process to be restructured to compete with the probable effectiveness of the external process I described. If the monthly privacy/human rights advocate organizations wanted to go directly to the public with the claim rather than to law enforcement, after substantiating any claims of government pressure, it therfore could do so, and at least the public would see that the new whistleblower process worked rather than learning about some claim of government pressure of ICANN via independent media and concluding the entire post-transition process is broken. Ron
Ron Balone: Bizzarre …. CW On 07 Oct 2015, at 16:01, Ron Baione <ron.baione@yahoo.com> wrote:
An idea I had was to include in the process some sort of mandatory monthly collaboration with a secure external whistleblower process. It is perceived that ICANN members would be somewhat more suceptible to unlawful pressure by governments or inter-governmental entities post-transition.
Having an external process might help gain public and U.S. government trust in the transition and accountability process. Whistle-blower websites and reporters exist around the globe, and have been the subject of much controversy, but in a multistakeholder controlled external whistleblower process, you could have:
1) A monthly process where a conjunction of 60 legit and diverse privacy groups are placed in a pool of availability
2) 5 privacy organizations would then be chosen at random each month, by algorithm or out of a hat to act as possible external whistleblowers for the ICANN community
3) Each of the 60 privacy groups must sign a non-disclosure contract with ICANN regarding the provision of their services at any given time
4) The names of the 60 privacy groups would be publicly known, published on January 1st each year,
5) It would not be lawful for those groups to reveal if they are that monthly representative, or risk losing their incentive to participate in the process, an jncentive which would be non-monetary.
6) The incentive would be, i suppose, the credibility gained for their organization by being considered worthy of external whistleblower stewardship
7) An ICANN led review process of which privacy groups are chosen and retained year over year would be conducted by the CCWG.
8) Since the model is for the creation of a a random selection process, groups could theoretically serve 12 times a year, therefore a limit on number of months a single organization could serve a whistleblower function would be capped at 8 months of service.
9) There would be a code-of-conduct signed by each organization allowing for automatic vote by CCWG on removal from the pool of organizations of an organization or retinment, for example, if an organization for failed to renew or delayed its renewal of its local registration or enacted or amended their bylaws, failed to submit requested information in a timely fashion, or acted in a way that was contrary to supporting a free and open internet.
Ron
From: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com>; To: Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org>; Cc: avri@acm.org <avri@acm.org>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org <accountability-cross-community@icann.org>; Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials Sent: Wed, Oct 7, 2015 12:45:53 PM
Malcolm and Avri,
Both very concise and right on target. Sadly.
Greg
On Wednesday, October 7, 2015, Matthew Shears <mshears@cdt.org> wrote: + 1 Avri.
On 07/10/2015 12:29, Avri Doria wrote: Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote: On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote: You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls. Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN’s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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Bizarre would be continuing to have an external whistleblower process dominated by individual reporters and websites, where most people would not know where to begin in trying to contact them if they had the courage to speak up. Ron
+1 indeed. Well said both Avri and Malcolm P Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key -----Original Message----- From: Matthew Shears [mailto:mshears@cdt.org] Sent: Wednesday, October 7, 2015 8:12 AM To: avri@acm.org; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Fwd: Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials + 1 Avri. On 07/10/2015 12:29, Avri Doria wrote:
Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls. Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN’s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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-- Matthew Shears Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights Center for Democracy & Technology mshears@cdt.org + 44 771 247 2987 --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-1
"the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.²
Counterproductive, in my opinion. Let¹s not suggest that the community is in full agreement on the 2nd draft CCWG proposal, it is not. Let¹s not suggest that the board is (nothing but) working against us, it is not. We have agreement on the most important ingredients of the proposal: specific powers for the community that can be enforced. We do not have agreement on the mechanism to implement these. If we want that, and I assume we do, both the board AND we have to change the way we communicate and collaborate with each other. Let¹s stay focussed on our mission, our goals and bridging the gap. Enlarging it, will only help us fail. Best, Roelof Meijer On 07-10-15 13:29, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls.
Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN¹s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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+1~ focusing on the goals has been quick lacking in this process. Its definitely unhelpful to say board is in opposition of everything that has been produced in this process. The way i see it, the ONLY thing they are not in agreement with is the manner of implementing the collectively agreed community powers. Painting that as against the community is totally unhelpful because there are quite a number of community that is also not in support of the current CCWG approach as well. While some of them (like myself) can be "occasionally" quite vocal about this, others that are silent should not be assumed to be in support. Regards On Thu, Oct 8, 2015 at 1:47 AM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote:
-1
"the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.²
Counterproductive, in my opinion. Let¹s not suggest that the community is in full agreement on the 2nd draft CCWG proposal, it is not. Let¹s not suggest that the board is (nothing but) working against us, it is not. We have agreement on the most important ingredients of the proposal: specific powers for the community that can be enforced. We do not have agreement on the mechanism to implement these. If we want that, and I assume we do, both the board AND we have to change the way we communicate and collaborate with each other. Let¹s stay focussed on our mission, our goals and bridging the gap. Enlarging it, will only help us fail.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
On 07-10-15 13:29, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls.
Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN¹s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* Bringing another down does not take you up - think about your action!
+1 to Roelof’s -1 :-) Cheers, Chris
On 8 Oct 2015, at 19:47 , Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote:
-1
"the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.²
Counterproductive, in my opinion. Let¹s not suggest that the community is in full agreement on the 2nd draft CCWG proposal, it is not. Let¹s not suggest that the board is (nothing but) working against us, it is not. We have agreement on the most important ingredients of the proposal: specific powers for the community that can be enforced. We do not have agreement on the mechanism to implement these. If we want that, and I assume we do, both the board AND we have to change the way we communicate and collaborate with each other. Let¹s stay focussed on our mission, our goals and bridging the gap. Enlarging it, will only help us fail.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
On 07-10-15 13:29, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls.
Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN¹s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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Doesn't that add up to 0? On 08/10/15 11:19, Chris Disspain wrote:
+1 to Roelof’s -1 :-)
Cheers,
Chris
On 8 Oct 2015, at 19:47 , Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote:
-1
"the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.²
Counterproductive, in my opinion. Let¹s not suggest that the community is in full agreement on the 2nd draft CCWG proposal, it is not. Let¹s not suggest that the board is (nothing but) working against us, it is not. We have agreement on the most important ingredients of the proposal: specific powers for the community that can be enforced. We do not have agreement on the mechanism to implement these. If we want that, and I assume we do, both the board AND we have to change the way we communicate and collaborate with each other. Let¹s stay focussed on our mission, our goals and bridging the gap. Enlarging it, will only help us fail.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
On 07-10-15 13:29, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls.
Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN¹s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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I believe that mathematically speaking it adds up to -2. But then, what would I know…I’m a recovering lawyer... Cheers, Chris
On 8 Oct 2015, at 22:46 , Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:
Doesn't that add up to 0?
On 08/10/15 11:19, Chris Disspain wrote:
+1 to Roelof’s -1 :-)
Cheers,
Chris
On 8 Oct 2015, at 19:47 , Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote:
-1
"the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.²
Counterproductive, in my opinion. Let¹s not suggest that the community is in full agreement on the 2nd draft CCWG proposal, it is not. Let¹s not suggest that the board is (nothing but) working against us, it is not. We have agreement on the most important ingredients of the proposal: specific powers for the community that can be enforced. We do not have agreement on the mechanism to implement these. If we want that, and I assume we do, both the board AND we have to change the way we communicate and collaborate with each other. Let¹s stay focussed on our mission, our goals and bridging the gap. Enlarging it, will only help us fail.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
On 07-10-15 13:29, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls.
Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN¹s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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Actually Nigel is right if it were 1+(-1) but in this case it can be +1 x -1 which would always result to -1, I guess this should say something about the things we insert as mechanisms in this process; Make them complex (by changing its structure as is the case with bracket) and you will be amazed at the zero result. I prefer outcomes that are more predictable ;-) Cheers! On Thu, Oct 8, 2015 at 12:48 PM, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
I believe that mathematically speaking it adds up to -2. But then, what would I know…I’m a recovering lawyer...
Cheers,
Chris
On 8 Oct 2015, at 22:46 , Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:
Doesn't that add up to 0?
On 08/10/15 11:19, Chris Disspain wrote:
+1 to Roelof’s -1 :-)
Cheers,
Chris
On 8 Oct 2015, at 19:47 , Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote:
-1
"the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.²
Counterproductive, in my opinion. Let¹s not suggest that the community is in full agreement on the 2nd draft CCWG proposal, it is not. Let¹s not suggest that the board is (nothing but) working against us, it is not. We have agreement on the most important ingredients of the proposal: specific powers for the community that can be enforced. We do not have agreement on the mechanism to implement these. If we want that, and I assume we do, both the board AND we have to change the way we communicate and collaborate with each other. Let¹s stay focussed on our mission, our goals and bridging the gap. Enlarging it, will only help us fail.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
On 07-10-15 13:29, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls.
Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN¹s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb: http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng <seun.ojedeji@fuoye.edu.ng>* Bringing another down does not take you up - think about your action!
Divide by zero error. On 08/10/15 13:13, Seun Ojedeji wrote:
Actually Nigel is right if it were 1+(-1) but in this case it can be +1 x -1 which would always result to -1, I guess this should say something about the things we insert as mechanisms in this process; Make them complex (by changing its structure as is the case with bracket) and you will be amazed at the zero result. I prefer outcomes that are more predictable ;-)
Cheers!
On Thu, Oct 8, 2015 at 12:48 PM, Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au> wrote:
I believe that mathematically speaking it adds up to -2. But then, what would I know…I’m a recovering lawyer...
Cheers,
Chris
On 8 Oct 2015, at 22:46 , Nigel Roberts <nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:
Doesn't that add up to 0?
On 08/10/15 11:19, Chris Disspain wrote:
+1 to Roelof’s -1 :-)
Cheers,
Chris
On 8 Oct 2015, at 19:47 , Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote:
-1
"the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.²
Counterproductive, in my opinion. Let¹s not suggest that the community is in full agreement on the 2nd draft CCWG proposal, it is not. Let¹s not suggest that the board is (nothing but) working against us, it is not. We have agreement on the most important ingredients of the proposal: specific powers for the community that can be enforced. We do not have agreement on the mechanism to implement these. If we want that, and I assume we do, both the board AND we have to change the way we communicate and collaborate with each other. Let¹s stay focussed on our mission, our goals and bridging the gap. Enlarging it, will only help us fail.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
On 07-10-15 13:29, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls.
Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN¹s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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Nope, you a lawyer? It ads up to -2 (or better: it distracts to -2) ;) Cheers, Roelof On 08-10-15 13:46, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Nigel Roberts" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of nigel@channelisles.net> wrote:
Doesn't that add up to 0?
On 08/10/15 11:19, Chris Disspain wrote:
+1 to Roelof’s -1 :-)
Cheers,
Chris
On 8 Oct 2015, at 19:47 , Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote:
-1
"the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.²
Counterproductive, in my opinion. Let¹s not suggest that the community is in full agreement on the 2nd draft CCWG proposal, it is not. Let¹s not suggest that the board is (nothing but) working against us, it is not. We have agreement on the most important ingredients of the proposal: specific powers for the community that can be enforced. We do not have agreement on the mechanism to implement these. If we want that, and I assume we do, both the board AND we have to change the way we communicate and collaborate with each other. Let¹s stay focussed on our mission, our goals and bridging the gap. Enlarging it, will only help us fail.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
On 07-10-15 13:29, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls.
Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN¹s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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We do not have agreement on the essential elements. The Board keeps saying that and the lawyers keep saying they are wrong. The Board's offer is a chimera. -- Paul Sent from myMail app for Android Thursday, 08 October 2015, 09:47AM +01:00 from Roelof Meijer < Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> :
-1
"the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.²
Counterproductive, in my opinion. Let¹s not suggest that the community is in full agreement on the 2nd draft CCWG proposal, it is not. Let¹s not suggest that the board is (nothing but) working against us, it is not. We have agreement on the most important ingredients of the proposal: specific powers for the community that can be enforced. We do not have agreement on the mechanism to implement these. If we want that, and I assume we do, both the board AND we have to change the way we communicate and collaborate with each other. Let¹s stay focussed on our mission, our goals and bridging the gap. Enlarging it, will only help us fail.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
On 07-10-15 13:29, " accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Avri Doria" < accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of avri@acm.org > wrote:
Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls.
Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN¹s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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From wikipedia
The Chimera (/kɨˈmɪərə/ or /kaɪˈmɪərə/, also Chimaera (Chimæra); Greek: Χίμαιρα, Chímaira) was, according to Greek mythology, a monstrous fire-breathing hybrid creature of Lycia in Asia Minor, composed of the parts of more than one animal. Usually depicted as a lion, with the head of a goat arising from its back, and a tail that might end with a snake's head,[1] the Chimera was one of the offspring of Typhon and Echidna and a sibling of such monsters as Cerberus and the Lernaean Hydra. The term chimera has come to describe any mythical or fictional animal with parts taken from various animals, or to describe anything composed of very disparate parts, or perceived as wildly imaginative, implausible, or dazzling.
Paul, You give us more credit than we deserve. I dearly wish we had the powers to create something as powerful and exciting as a chimera. You may not like the Board’s proposal and you disagree with it, but please keep the dialog on a constructive plane. We’re all trying to solve the same problem. Thanks, Steve On Oct 8, 2015, at 6:34 AM, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:
We do not have agreement on the essential elements. The Board keeps saying that and the lawyers keep saying they are wrong. The Board's offer is a chimera.
-- Paul Sent from myMail app for Android
Thursday, 08 October 2015, 09:47AM +01:00 from Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl>:
-1
"the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.²
Counterproductive, in my opinion. Let¹s not suggest that the community is in full agreement on the 2nd draft CCWG proposal, it is not. Let¹s not suggest that the board is (nothing but) working against us, it is not. We have agreement on the most important ingredients of the proposal: specific powers for the community that can be enforced. We do not have agreement on the mechanism to implement these. If we want that, and I assume we do, both the board AND we have to change the way we communicate and collaborate with each other. Let¹s stay focussed on our mission, our goals and bridging the gap. Enlarging it, will only help us fail.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
On 07-10-15 13:29, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls.
Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN¹s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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A constructive plane would start with reality. Rolfe said there was agreement. That is demonstrably false. You may wish there was. You make think there should be. But insisting that we really all are in agreement is just incorrect. The lawyers say your plan does not work. It is implausible and imaginative and not real. Paul -- Paul Sent from myMail app for Android Thursday, 08 October 2015, 11:43AM +01:00 from Steve Crocker < steve@shinkuro.com> :
From wikipedia
The Chimera ( / k ɨ ˈ m ɪər ə / or / k aɪ ˈ m ɪər ə / , also Chimaera ( Chimæra ); Greek : Χίμαιρα , Chímaira ) was, according to Greek mythology , a monstrous fire-breathing hybrid creature of Lycia in Asia Minor , composed of the parts of more than one animal. Usually depicted as a lion , with the head of a goat arising from its back, and a tail that might end with a snake 's head, [1] the Chimera was one of the offspring of Typhon and Echidna and a sibling of such monsters as Cerberus and the Lernaean Hydra . The term chimera has come to describe any mythical or fictional animal with parts taken from various animals, or to describe anything composed of very disparate parts, or perceived as wildly imaginative, implausible, or dazzling.
Paul,
You give us more credit than we deserve. I dearly wish we had the powers to create something as powerful and exciting as a chimera.
You may not like the Board’s proposal and you disagree with it, but please keep the dialog on a constructive plane. We’re all trying to solve the same problem.
Thanks,
Steve
On Oct 8, 2015, at 6:34 AM, Paul Rosenzweig < paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com > wrote:
We do not have agreement on the essential elements. The Board keeps saying that and the lawyers keep saying they are wrong. The Board's offer is a chimera. -- Paul Sent from myMail app for Android Thursday, 08 October 2015, 09:47AM +01:00 from Roelof Meijer < Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl >:
-1
"the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.²
Counterproductive, in my opinion. Let¹s not suggest that the community is in full agreement on the 2nd draft CCWG proposal, it is not. Let¹s not suggest that the board is (nothing but) working against us, it is not. We have agreement on the most important ingredients of the proposal: specific powers for the community that can be enforced. We do not have agreement on the mechanism to implement these. If we want that, and I assume we do, both the board AND we have to change the way we communicate and collaborate with each other. Let¹s stay focussed on our mission, our goals and bridging the gap. Enlarging it, will only help us fail.
Best,
Roelof Meijer
On 07-10-15 13:29, " accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Avri Doria" < accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of avri@acm.org > wrote:
Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls.
Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN¹s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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Paul, (I assume you were referring to me with “Rolfe”) So much frustration… Reality lies in the eye of the beholder. For my version of “reality” in this case I prefer to take what the board puts in its (formal) statements, e.g. https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile . And not what other people think the board means or feel when they read or hear it. The first makes my statement (“we have agreement on the most important ingredients of the proposal: specific powers for the community that can be enforced”) demonstrably true. And yes, depending on who you are listening to, the second will make it appear demonstrably false. Cheers, Roelof From: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>> Reply-To: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com<mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>> Date: donderdag 8 oktober 2015 12:57 To: Steve Crocker <steve@shinkuro.com<mailto:steve@shinkuro.com>> Cc: Roelof Meijer <roelof.meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:roelof.meijer@sidn.nl>>, "avri@acm.org<mailto:avri@acm.org>" <avri@acm.org<mailto:avri@acm.org>>, "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re[2]: [CCWG-ACCT] Fwd: Special Community Leaders CAll - 6 October - Shared Materials A constructive plane would start with reality. Rolfe said there was agreement. That is demonstrably false. You may wish there was. You make think there should be. But insisting that we really all are in agreement is just incorrect. The lawyers say your plan does not work. It is implausible and imaginative and not real. Paul -- Paul Sent from myMail app for Android Thursday, 08 October 2015, 11:43AM +01:00 from Steve Crocker <steve@shinkuro.com<mailto:steve@shinkuro.com>>: From wikipedia The Chimera (/kɨˈmɪərə/<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:IPA_for_English> or /kaɪˈmɪərə/<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:IPA_for_English>, also Chimaera (Chimæra); Greek<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_language>: Χίμαιρα, Chímaira) was, according to Greek mythology<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_mythology>, a monstrous fire-breathing hybrid<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mythological_hybrid> creature of Lycia<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lycia> in Asia Minor<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatolia>, composed of the parts of more than one animal. Usually depicted as a lion<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lion>, with the head of a goat<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goat> arising from its back, and a tail that might end with a snake<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snake>'s head,[1]<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chimera_(mythology)#cite_note-1> the Chimera was one of the offspring of Typhon<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Typhon> and Echidna<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Echidna_(mythology)> and a sibling of such monsters as Cerberus<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cerberus> and the Lernaean Hydra<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lernaean_Hydra>. The term chimera has come to describe any mythical or fictional animal with parts taken from various animals, or to describe anything composed of very disparate parts, or perceived as wildly imaginative, implausible, or dazzling. Paul, You give us more credit than we deserve. I dearly wish we had the powers to create something as powerful and exciting as a chimera. You may not like the Board’s proposal and you disagree with it, but please keep the dialog on a constructive plane. We’re all trying to solve the same problem. Thanks, Steve On Oct 8, 2015, at 6:34 AM, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3apaul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>> wrote: We do not have agreement on the essential elements. The Board keeps saying that and the lawyers keep saying they are wrong. The Board's offer is a chimera. -- Paul Sent from myMail app for Android Thursday, 08 October 2015, 09:47AM +01:00 from Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<//e-aj.my.com/compose/?mailto=mailto%3aRoelof.Meijer@sidn.nl>>: -1
"the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.²
Counterproductive, in my opinion. Let¹s not suggest that the community is in full agreement on the 2nd draft CCWG proposal, it is not. Let¹s not suggest that the board is (nothing but) working against us, it is not. We have agreement on the most important ingredients of the proposal: specific powers for the community that can be enforced. We do not have agreement on the mechanism to implement these. If we want that, and I assume we do, both the board AND we have to change the way we communicate and collaborate with each other. Let¹s stay focussed on our mission, our goals and bridging the gap. Enlarging it, will only help us fail. Best, Roelof Meijer On 07-10-15 13:29, "accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org on behalf of avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
My reading of this is that if the Board is willing to accept the CCWG proposals, which do reflect broad agreement, then we can make the schedule. If, on the the hand the Board continues to go their own way and stands in opposition to the community, we may not. We need to complete our work quickly with the fixes and then, as always, it is in the Board's hands. We have already lost several weeks because of the spanner thrown when the Board produced their own proposal for accountability. Just imagine where we would have been had the Board met with us in LA with the attitude of working with the community instead of against it.
I also think the doomsday scenarios are just a bit exaggerated. We have to stop scaring people with the G77 boogeyman. And if the Protocols and Number no longer trust ICANN, they will go their own way, whether it is before transition or after, they have been crystal clear about those intentions - it could happen anytime - why would the status quo of continuing NTIA oversight convince them to leave ICANN? I do agree with point V, if the Board continues to overrule the multistakeholder process, it will become ever harder to convince people that this is a workable modality for decision making.
avri
On 07-Oct-15 06:11, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
On 2015-10-07 08:03, Mathieu Weill wrote:
You will find attached the set of slides that was prepared by ICANN and presented during the calls.
Wow, that slide on page 4 ("5 risks we face if the IANA Stewardship Transition is Delayed/Fails") is a contentious parade of horribles if ever I saw one!
Setting that aside as merely disputatious, page 5 ("4 Remaining Questions on The Road to Transition") is interesting.
Firstly, the framing - that these are indeed the questions, and the only gating questions, is certainly open to debate. But the answers don't currently point to swift completion either.
Here is my assessment.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on ALL the elements to address the CWG Dependencies?"
A. Within CCWG, using its proposal as the base: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: Not really. There is no agreement as to whether the power to challenge the Budget and Strategic Plan would be effectively available in the absence of the SMM, which the Board opposes. Our Counsel raises key concerns about this in their recent memo comparing the Board proposal with our own. And this power (or some variant) is noted as being a CWG requirement.
Q. "Do we have broad agreement on the requirements and enforceability of the five community powers?"
A. Within CCWG, on its proposal: yes. Between CCWG and Board, on the Board's counter-proposal: No. The enforceability of the five community powers in the absence of the SMM is a significant area of disagreement; there is no agreement within CCWG that the MEM is an effective alternative means to ensure enforceability.
Q "Are the above areas of broad agreement consistent with NTIA criteria and do they meet the requirements for a safe/secure transition of U.S. Government stewardship?"
A. Within CCWG, we are content that our proposal would achieve this. Between CCWG and Board, neither party accepts that the other's proposal would achieve satisfy the NTIA criteria. For the Board, the CCWG's reforms pose a risk to "safe and secure" stability of ICANN; for CCWG, the removal of NTIA oversight without its replacement by accountability mechanisms that it agrees to be effective and enforceable poses just as great a risk, and of like kind. Moreover, the Board's counter-proposal omits or reduces* safeguards the CCWG thought necessary to guarantee the openness of the Internet, another NTIA requirement.
[* Discussion on this hasn't yet concluded; the Board might argue that it offers adequate alternatives, and while some in CCWG may have arrived at a firm conclusion to the contrary; others may be yet to make up their minds. What cannot be contested is that the CCWG as a whole has not has not yet accepted the adequacy of the Board's counter in relation to this particular NTIA criterion, which stands independently and complementary to the "safe and secure" criterion. See also below for comments on the need for a systematic re-evaluation.]
Q. Do we have broad agreement on an assured process to continuously improve ICANN¹s accountability and evolve its governance structure?
A. Not really. CCWG has tasked itself with addressing in WS1 only those items that must be addressed before transition, and has chosen to leave everything else to a WS2 that it trusts will be continued. The Board seemingly proposes closing down CCWG upon transition, ending WS2 as a distinct programme and leaving those issues to be addressed by disparate parts of the community (although it is not clear that the SOs even have the capacity to initiate proposals on all WS2 issues). So there is no agreement between CCWG and the Board on the process for continuous improvement either.
Once again, an overview from ICANN that seems intended to force the pace actually shows how much still remains to be agreed. Perhaps this will persuade the Board to rethink its opposition to the considered view of the community, worked on by this group so intensively for almost a year.
One thing the slidedeck does usefully point up is that before agreeing to abandon its proposal in favour of the Board's counter, even if it were minded to do so, CCWG would need to do a full re-evaluation against the NTIA criteria and stress tests to determine its adequacy. Our assessment of how our proposal satisfies the stress tests is only an assessment of OUR proposal, not of the Board's counter.
Accordingly, if the Board remains unwilling to accept the cross-community proposal, this slidedeck suggests to me that expectations management, rather than "racing to the finish line", is the more prudent course of action.
That further demonstrates how unhelpful and counter-productive is the scaremongering on page 4.
Malcolm.
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participants (16)
-
Avri Doria -
Chris Disspain -
CW Mail -
Greg Shatan -
James Gannon -
Kieren McCarthy -
Malcolm Hutty -
Mathieu Weill -
Matthew Shears -
Nigel Roberts -
Paul Rosenzweig -
Robin Gross -
Roelof Meijer -
Ron Baione -
Seun Ojedeji -
Steve Crocker