Dear Paul I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique. The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin. This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments. I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3. Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something. regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community