Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues, I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say. For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway? As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse. The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community. Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place. The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
Andrew, Is this the position of the IAB?
And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition.
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 01:02:10PM -0800, Eric (Maule) Brunner-Williams wrote:
Andrew,
Is this the position of the IAB?
I don't believe the IAB has a position on this; I know I haven't polled it. When speak for the IAB I send those remarks from the iab-chair account and note that I'm speaking for the IAB. So, no. Like the rest of my participation here, those remarks were solely my own opinion. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
Hi Andrew, My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package. It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs. Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Dear colleagues, I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say. For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway? As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse. The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community. Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place. The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
" It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs." A big question, especially when the silent chartering organization is the focus of the Recommendation. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Drazek, Keith Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 4:05 PM To: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Hi Andrew, My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package. It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs. Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Dear colleagues, I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say. For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway? As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse. The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community. Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place. The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community ----- No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2016.0.7227 / Virus Database: 4489/11316 - Release Date: 01/03/16 Internal Virus Database is out of date.
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 09:04:36PM +0000, Drazek, Keith wrote:
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
This is formally true, but as you note there are some other scenarios that are less obviously good. But I think the practical consequences of having obvious opposition or less-than-obvious general support go deeper. After all, we still have to get the unified proposal through the USG, and we're very late. The more uncertainty there is, the more likely there is to be additional scrutiny, requests for more information, attempts to seek additional compromise, and so on. If we can't line up behind something and say, "Yep, ok," we will have to face more questions. That means more delay and more risk. We simply cannot afford risk any more. We need to hammer out a compromise people can live with and move on. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it. Thanks! Regards, Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 -----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Hi Andrew, My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package. It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs. Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Dear colleagues, I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say. For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway? As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse. The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community. Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place. The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either. https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977 Regards On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" < pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br> wrote:
Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is: "SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s) Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible. Submission Board Report After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum: a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations. In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible." So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations. I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112 E: ceo@auda.org.au <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> | W: www.auda.org.au <http://www.auda.org.au/> auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977 <https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977> Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br <mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 <tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 <tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com <mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Thanks for this conversation on process. After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC. This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process. Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community. thanks for any guidance Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>: Hello All, I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either. That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is: "SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s) Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible. Submission Board Report After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum: a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations. In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible." So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations. I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112 E: ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> | W: www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au/> auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email. On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either. https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977 Regards On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it. Thanks! Regards, Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609> Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609> -----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Hi Andrew, My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package. It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs. Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Dear colleagues, I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say. For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway? As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse. The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community. Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place. The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear All It pecc t is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> | W: www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au/>
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear Steve As the Architect of Rec. 11 and ST18, may I request you to include the third option ( as new point 7) in the doc. With the opposition of one SO on the emerged consensus it would leave no option to me and likely to many GAC to ask for NO CHANGE to the current Bylaws and deletion of ST 18 Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 09:07, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear All It is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> | W: www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au/>
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear all The public comment period record -which is what should be our working basis- shows 35 pro, 19 neutral and 11 against Rec 11. Of those 11 against (out of 65 inputs) I would surmise that some were against because of the 2/3 were "too much" while others were against because 2/3 still was "too little". Hence I feel it would only be fair to have all the options on the table. regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 09:56 schrieb Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:
Dear Steve As the Architect of Rec. 11 and ST18, may I request you to include the third option ( as new point 7) in the doc. With the opposition of one SO on the emerged consensus it would leave no option to me and likely to many GAC to ask for NO CHANGE to the current Bylaws and deletion of ST 18 Regards Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 09:07, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear All It is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> | W: www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au/>
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini 4
On 29 Jan 2016, at 11:20, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear all
The public comment period record -which is what should be our working basis- shows 35 pro, 19 neutral and 11 against Rec 11.
Of those 11 against (out of 65 inputs) I would surmise that some were against because of the 2/3 were "too much" while others were against because 2/3 still was "too little".
Hence I feel it would only be fair to have all the options on the table.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 09:56 schrieb Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:
Dear Steve As the Architect of Rec. 11 and ST18, may I request you to include the third option ( as new point 7) in the doc. With the opposition of one SO on the emerged consensus it would leave no option to me and likely to many GAC to ask for NO CHANGE to the current Bylaws and deletion of ST 18 Regards Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 09:07, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear All It is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> | W: www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au/>
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>> wrote: Dear Keith,
> "My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
So there is no Consensus. Technically I did not comment but minority reported but I also think 2/3 is too much. el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini 4
On 29 Jan 2016, at 11:20, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear all
The public comment period record -which is what should be our working basis- shows 35 pro, 19 neutral and 11 against Rec 11.
Of those 11 against (out of 65 inputs) I would surmise that some were against because of the 2/3 were "too much" while others were against because 2/3 still was "too little".
Hence I feel it would only be fair to have all the options on the table.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 09:56 schrieb Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>:
Dear Steve As the Architect of Rec. 11 and ST18, may I request you to include the third option ( as new point 7) in the doc. With the opposition of one SO on the emerged consensus it would leave no option to me and likely to many GAC to ask for NO CHANGE to the current Bylaws and deletion of ST 18 Regards Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 09:07, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear All It is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> | W: www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au/>
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>> wrote: Dear Keith,
> "My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Dear co-Chairs, CCWG-colleagues, We fully support Kavouss' suggestion to include the "status quo" (no changes to current bylaws) as an additional option to the existing options 5 and 6 in the CCWG document. Kind regards, Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 -----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Em nome de Kavouss Arasteh Enviada em: sexta-feira, 29 de janeiro de 2016 06:56 Para: <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>; Steve DelBianco Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear Steve As the Architect of Rec. 11 and ST18, may I request you to include the third option ( as new point 7) in the doc. With the opposition of one SO on the emerged consensus it would leave no option to me and likely to many GAC to ask for NO CHANGE to the current Bylaws and deletion of ST 18 Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 09:07, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear All It is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> | W: www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au/>
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountabilit y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accou ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross- community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountabilit y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accou ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross- community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Dear all, +1 to Brazil´s comments. Best regards Olga 2016-01-29 8:55 GMT-03:00 Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva < pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>:
Dear co-Chairs, CCWG-colleagues,
We fully support Kavouss' suggestion to include the "status quo" (no changes to current bylaws) as an additional option to the existing options 5 and 6 in the CCWG document.
Kind regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Em nome de Kavouss Arasteh Enviada em: sexta-feira, 29 de janeiro de 2016 06:56 Para: <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>; Steve DelBianco Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings
Dear Steve As the Architect of Rec. 11 and ST18, may I request you to include the third option ( as new point 7) in the doc. With the opposition of one SO on the emerged consensus it would leave no option to me and likely to many GAC to ask for NO CHANGE to the current Bylaws and deletion of ST 18 Regards Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 09:07, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear All It is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> < Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto: ceo@auda.org.au>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> | W: www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au/>
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto: seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" < pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountabilit y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accou ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross- community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountabilit y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accou ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross- community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Unfortunately “NOC” is not an option. The NTIA has stated that Bylaws have to change to address ST18: “Specifically, ICANN should amend its Bylaws to clarify that the Board is required to enter into a formal consultation process with the GAC only where it receives GAC advice that is consensus advice based on the current definition within the GAC's Operating Principles, that is, advice to which no GAC member has raised a formal objection.” From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Olga Cavalli Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 7:10 AM To: Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear all, +1 to Brazil´s comments. Best regards Olga 2016-01-29 8:55 GMT-03:00 Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>>: Dear co-Chairs, CCWG-colleagues, We fully support Kavouss' suggestion to include the "status quo" (no changes to current bylaws) as an additional option to the existing options 5 and 6 in the CCWG document. Kind regards, Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 -----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Em nome de Kavouss Arasteh Enviada em: sexta-feira, 29 de janeiro de 2016 06:56 Para: <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>; Steve DelBianco Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear Steve As the Architect of Rec. 11 and ST18, may I request you to include the third option ( as new point 7) in the doc. With the opposition of one SO on the emerged consensus it would leave no option to me and likely to many GAC to ask for NO CHANGE to the current Bylaws and deletion of ST 18 Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 09:07, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote:
Dear All It is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au><mailto:ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au><mailto:ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> | W: www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au><http://www.auda.org.au/>
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com><mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br><mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accountabilit<mailto:accountabilit> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accou<mailto:accou> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-<mailto:accountability-cross-> community@icann.org<mailto:community@icann.org>> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accountabilit<mailto:accountabilit> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accou<mailto:accou> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-<mailto:accountability-cross-> community@icann.org<mailto:community@icann.org>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com><mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
I am sorry to disagree with you totally Always and always NO CHANGE was an option This gas been expressed by many people including US at every gathering. One can not deny that. You may not like it but that is your choice and can NOT be imposed to any body. Your views is fully respected Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 13:27, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> wrote:
Unfortunately “NOC” is not an option. The NTIA has stated that Bylaws have to change to address ST18: “Specifically, ICANN should amend its Bylaws to clarify that the Board is required to enter into a formal consultation process with the GAC only where it receives GAC advice that is consensus advice based on the current definition within the GAC's Operating Principles, that is, advice to which no GAC member has raised a formal objection.”
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Olga Cavalli Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 7:10 AM To: Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings
Dear all,
+1 to Brazil´s comments.
Best regards
Olga
2016-01-29 8:55 GMT-03:00 Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>: Dear co-Chairs, CCWG-colleagues,
We fully support Kavouss' suggestion to include the "status quo" (no changes to current bylaws) as an additional option to the existing options 5 and 6 in the CCWG document.
Kind regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] Em nome de Kavouss Arasteh Enviada em: sexta-feira, 29 de janeiro de 2016 06:56 Para: <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>; Steve DelBianco Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings
Dear Steve As the Architect of Rec. 11 and ST18, may I request you to include the third option ( as new point 7) in the doc. With the opposition of one SO on the emerged consensus it would leave no option to me and likely to many GAC to ask for NO CHANGE to the current Bylaws and deletion of ST 18 Regards Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 09:07, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear All It is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> | W: www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au/>
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountabilit y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accou ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross- community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountabilit y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accou ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross- community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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I am sorry, but no. There must be a change to the bylaws. Below is the full statement. [CCWG-ACCT] NTIA Statement on ST 18 Radell, Suzanne SRadell at ntia.doc.gov <mailto:accountability-cross-community%40icann.org?Subject=Re:%20Re%3A%20%5BCCWG-ACCT%5D%20NTIA%20Statement%20on%20ST%2018&In-Reply-To=%3CBLUPR05MB337E8F9F2934812052B9B2C9F050%40BLUPR05MB337.namprd05.prod.outlook.com%3E> Wed Nov 25 22:33:08 UTC 2015 * Previous message: [CCWG-ACCT] AGENDA - Call #70 - 26 Nov @ 14:00 UTC <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-November/0...> * Next message: [CCWG-ACCT] NTIA Statement on ST 18 <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-November/0...> * Messages sorted by: [ date ]<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-November/d...> [ thread ]<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-November/t...> [ subject ]<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-November/s...> [ author ]<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-November/a...> ________________________________ Hello everyone, Assistant Secretary Strickling has asked that I share this with the CCWG. Best regards, Suz NTIA Statement on Stress Test 18 November 25, 2015 NTIA has been closely following the discussions in the CCWG-Accountability, including the recently concluded small group on stress test 18. As has been the case throughout the work of the CCWG, we are impressed by the time and dedication so many of you are putting into these important discussions. We thank everyone for their efforts as the group works to finalize the proposal for publication on November 30. NTIA has long believed that governments, like all stakeholders, have an important role to play within multistakeholder processes, including ICANN. Our position on that has not changed. As the CCWG finalizes its proposals for enhancing ICANN's accountability, we feel we should reiterate our view, as we stated last July, that ICANN preserve and clarify the current practice of the Board in responding to advice it receives from the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). Specifically, ICANN should amend its Bylaws to clarify that the Board is required to enter into a formal consultation process with the GAC only where it receives GAC advice that is consensus advice based on the current definition within the GAC's Operating Principles, that is, advice to which no GAC member has raised a formal objection. We want to make clear that nothing about this proposal is intended to limit how the GAC determines what advice it submits to the Board. As the Bylaws make clear, the Board is obligated to duly take all GAC advice into account. However, it is not practicable for the Board to give GAC advice special consideration unless it is consensus advice as currently defined in the GAC Operating Principles. Anything less than consensus places the Board in the awkward, if not impossible, position of trying to choose between governments with conflicting opinions. NTIA sees any deviation from the current standard of consensus as introducing instability into the system while also inadvertently diminishing the important role of governments. Accordingly, every time the GAC provides consensus advice that it expects to trigger the special Bylaws consideration from the Board, it must be unambiguous and consistent with the current definition in the Operating Principles. Asking the Board to interpret any other threshold of support seems counter to the spirit of the CCWG's efforts to empower the community in a clear and consistent manner. It also undermines the work done to implement the relevant recommendations of ATRT1 to fix what the community diagnosed as a dysfunctional Board-GAC relationship. We are aware that some countries are concerned that the current GAC Operating Principles could lead to a single-country veto of GAC advice to the detriment of other countries. We too share that concern. But the right place to deal with that issue is not at the last minute in the CCWG but in a more reasoned and full discussion of this issue within the GAC. NTIA stands ready to participate in and contribute to such a discussion to resolve that concern at the appropriate time and place. Suzanne Murray Radell Senior Policy Advisor, NTIA/OIA sradell at ntia.doc.gov<https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> 202-482-3167[skypec2c://r/204]202-482-3167 From: Kavouss Arasteh [mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com] Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 10:58 AM To: Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com> Cc: Olga Cavalli <olgacavalli@gmail.com>; Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings I am sorry to disagree with you totally Always and always NO CHANGE was an option This gas been expressed by many people including US at every gathering. One can not deny that. You may not like it but that is your choice and can NOT be imposed to any body. Your views is fully respected Kavouss Sent from my iPhone On 29 Jan 2016, at 13:27, Chartier, Mike S <mike.s.chartier@intel.com<mailto:mike.s.chartier@intel.com>> wrote: Unfortunately “NOC” is not an option. The NTIA has stated that Bylaws have to change to address ST18: “Specifically, ICANN should amend its Bylaws to clarify that the Board is required to enter into a formal consultation process with the GAC only where it receives GAC advice that is consensus advice based on the current definition within the GAC's Operating Principles, that is, advice to which no GAC member has raised a formal objection.” From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Olga Cavalli Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 7:10 AM To: Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear all, +1 to Brazil´s comments. Best regards Olga 2016-01-29 8:55 GMT-03:00 Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>>: Dear co-Chairs, CCWG-colleagues, We fully support Kavouss' suggestion to include the "status quo" (no changes to current bylaws) as an additional option to the existing options 5 and 6 in the CCWG document. Kind regards, Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 -----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Em nome de Kavouss Arasteh Enviada em: sexta-feira, 29 de janeiro de 2016 06:56 Para: <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>; Steve DelBianco Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear Steve As the Architect of Rec. 11 and ST18, may I request you to include the third option ( as new point 7) in the doc. With the opposition of one SO on the emerged consensus it would leave no option to me and likely to many GAC to ask for NO CHANGE to the current Bylaws and deletion of ST 18 Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 09:07, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote:
Dear All It is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au><mailto:ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au><mailto:ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> | W: www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au><http://www.auda.org.au/>
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com><mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br><mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accountabilit<mailto:accountabilit> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accou<mailto:accou> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-<mailto:accountability-cross-> community@icann.org<mailto:community@icann.org>> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accountabilit<mailto:accountabilit> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accou<mailto:accou> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-<mailto:accountability-cross-> community@icann.org<mailto:community@icann.org>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com><mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Dear all May I kindly remind you that our job now is only to deal with the comments received to our 3rd draft proposal in the public comment period in order to finalize the report? The text in that proposal was the outcome of hard negotiations within this group, which rendered a carefully crafted language that emerged on Thanksgiving Day as a "deal" among participants. Now, it amazes me that some people have opened up the discussion again via repetition of the same arguments already expressed in the previous months. The other part could as well repeat their counter-arguments and we could end up re-discussing the whole issue some more months (or years). But again, that is not what we have to do now. Our only task is to review comments received by the Community and assess whether a change is needed on the 3rd proposal text, or not. And according to the figures mentioned in the staff presentation, out of 65 inputs 35 are in support, 19 are neutral and 11 are against. Hence, in conclusion, those figures show clearly that the text put forward by the CCWG in its 3rd draft proposal should be maintained without change and make it to the final report, as it has support from the majority of commenters. In any other case, if the text is again modified, Governments should be given the chance to comment again in a new public comment period. Best Rafael De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] En nombre de Olga Cavalli Enviado el: viernes, 29 de enero de 2016 13:10 Para: Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva CC: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Asunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear all, +1 to Brazil´s comments. Best regards Olga 2016-01-29 8:55 GMT-03:00 Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>>: Dear co-Chairs, CCWG-colleagues, We fully support Kavouss' suggestion to include the "status quo" (no changes to current bylaws) as an additional option to the existing options 5 and 6 in the CCWG document. Kind regards, Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 -----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Em nome de Kavouss Arasteh Enviada em: sexta-feira, 29 de janeiro de 2016 06:56 Para: <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>; Steve DelBianco Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear Steve As the Architect of Rec. 11 and ST18, may I request you to include the third option ( as new point 7) in the doc. With the opposition of one SO on the emerged consensus it would leave no option to me and likely to many GAC to ask for NO CHANGE to the current Bylaws and deletion of ST 18 Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 09:07, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote:
Dear All It is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au><mailto:ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au><mailto:ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>> | W: www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au><http://www.auda.org.au/>
auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator
Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email.
On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com><mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br><mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accountabilit<mailto:accountabilit> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accou<mailto:accou> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-<mailto:accountability-cross-> community@icann.org<mailto:community@icann.org>> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accountabilit<mailto:accountabilit> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accou<mailto:accou> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-<mailto:accountability-cross-> community@icann.org<mailto:community@icann.org>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com><mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Could you please circulate the source for these numbers? They do not match the numbers on Recommendation 11 provided in the excel sheet circulated by ICANN staff after the close of the comment period on the third draft. Also, reverting to the existing text on GAC advice would fail to address the requirements of NTIA on ST18 as expressed in November. Regards, Brett ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> On Jan 29, 2016, at 7:38 AM, Perez Galindo, Rafael <RPEREZGA@minetur.es<mailto:RPEREZGA@minetur.es>> wrote: Dear all May I kindly remind you that our job now is only to deal with the comments received to our 3rd draft proposal in the public comment period in order to finalize the report? The text in that proposal was the outcome of hard negotiations within this group, which rendered a carefully crafted language that emerged on Thanksgiving Day as a "deal" among participants. Now, it amazes me that some people have opened up the discussion again via repetition of the same arguments already expressed in the previous months. The other part could as well repeat their counter-arguments and we could end up re-discussing the whole issue some more months (or years). But again, that is not what we have to do now. Our only task is to review comments received by the Community and assess whether a change is needed on the 3rd proposal text, or not. And according to the figures mentioned in the staff presentation, out of 65 inputs 35 are in support, 19 are neutral and 11 are against. Hence, in conclusion, those figures show clearly that the text put forward by the CCWG in its 3rd draft proposal should be maintained without change and make it to the final report, as it has support from the majority of commenters. In any other case, if the text is again modified, Governments should be given the chance to comment again in a new public comment period. Best Rafael De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] En nombre de Olga Cavalli Enviado el: viernes, 29 de enero de 2016 13:10 Para: Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva CC: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Asunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear all, +1 to Brazil´s comments. Best regards Olga 2016-01-29 8:55 GMT-03:00 Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>>: Dear co-Chairs, CCWG-colleagues, We fully support Kavouss' suggestion to include the "status quo" (no changes to current bylaws) as an additional option to the existing options 5 and 6 in the CCWG document. Kind regards, Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 -----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Em nome de Kavouss Arasteh Enviada em: sexta-feira, 29 de janeiro de 2016 06:56 Para: <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>; Steve DelBianco Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear Steve As the Architect of Rec. 11 and ST18, may I request you to include the third option ( as new point 7) in the doc. With the opposition of one SO on the emerged consensus it would leave no option to me and likely to many GAC to ask for NO CHANGE to the current Bylaws and deletion of ST 18 Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 09:07, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote:
Dear All It is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au><mailto:ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
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On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com><mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br><mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accountabilit<mailto:accountabilit> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accou<mailto:accou> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-<mailto:accountability-cross-> community@icann.org<mailto:community@icann.org>> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accountabilit<mailto:accountabilit> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accou<mailto:accou> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-<mailto:accountability-cross-> community@icann.org<mailto:community@icann.org>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com><mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<mailto:Accountability-Cross-> Community@icann.org<mailto:Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community<https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
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Dear Brett Please find attached the source as prepared by staff. Please also note that a number of "against" are based on "no need to change how the GAC currently works", hence advocating for the statu quo. Best Sent from a mobile device. Please excuse any typos. -------- Original message -------- From: "Schaefer, Brett" Date:29/01/2016 13:55 (GMT+01:00) To: "Perez Galindo, Rafael" Cc: Olga Cavalli , Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva , accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Could you please circulate the source for these numbers? They do not match the numbers on Recommendation 11 provided in the excel sheet circulated by ICANN staff after the close of the comment period on the third draft. Also, reverting to the existing text on GAC advice would fail to address the requirements of NTIA on ST18 as expressed in November. Regards, Brett ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> On Jan 29, 2016, at 7:38 AM, Perez Galindo, Rafael <RPEREZGA@minetur.es<mailto:RPEREZGA@minetur.es>> wrote: Dear all May I kindly remind you that our job now is only to deal with the comments received to our 3rd draft proposal in the public comment period in order to finalize the report? The text in that proposal was the outcome of hard negotiations within this group, which rendered a carefully crafted language that emerged on Thanksgiving Day as a "deal" among participants. Now, it amazes me that some people have opened up the discussion again via repetition of the same arguments already expressed in the previous months. The other part could as well repeat their counter-arguments and we could end up re-discussing the whole issue some more months (or years). But again, that is not what we have to do now. Our only task is to review comments received by the Community and assess whether a change is needed on the 3rd proposal text, or not. And according to the figures mentioned in the staff presentation, out of 65 inputs 35 are in support, 19 are neutral and 11 are against. Hence, in conclusion, those figures show clearly that the text put forward by the CCWG in its 3rd draft proposal should be maintained without change and make it to the final report, as it has support from the majority of commenters. In any other case, if the text is again modified, Governments should be given the chance to comment again in a new public comment period. Best Rafael De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] En nombre de Olga Cavalli Enviado el: viernes, 29 de enero de 2016 13:10 Para: Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva CC: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Asunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear all, +1 to Brazil´s comments. Best regards Olga 2016-01-29 8:55 GMT-03:00 Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>>: Dear co-Chairs, CCWG-colleagues, We fully support Kavouss' suggestion to include the "status quo" (no changes to current bylaws) as an additional option to the existing options 5 and 6 in the CCWG document. Kind regards, Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 -----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] Em nome de Kavouss Arasteh Enviada em: sexta-feira, 29 de janeiro de 2016 06:56 Para: <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>; Steve DelBianco Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear Steve As the Architect of Rec. 11 and ST18, may I request you to include the third option ( as new point 7) in the doc. With the opposition of one SO on the emerged consensus it would leave no option to me and likely to many GAC to ask for NO CHANGE to the current Bylaws and deletion of ST 18 Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 09:07, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote:
Dear All It is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au><mailto:ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
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On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com><mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br><mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accountabilit<mailto:accountabilit> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accou<mailto:accou> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-<mailto:accountability-cross-> community@icann.org<mailto:community@icann.org>> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accountabilit<mailto:accountabilit> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accou<mailto:accou> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-<mailto:accountability-cross-> community@icann.org<mailto:community@icann.org>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
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Rafael, Thank you for bringing this to my attention. It led me to reexamine the staff summaries of the comments. The Rec 11 summary totals in your overview match the totals at the bottom of the Rec 11 summary sheet in the Excel file sent around by Alice on January 6 (attached). But, according to my math using the column C markers, the actual tally should be: 13 opposed, 29 supportive, 9 neutral, and 39 non-responding. However, there are quite a few matters that lead me to question even those totals. it is interesting is that the Rec 11 analysis totals add up to 15 opposed, 6 supportive, 7 neutral, and 3 non-responding. If you look at the numbers, there are more opposed in the analysis than in the overall summary, which is odd. Looking at the comments, it is unclear tome why some responses were classified the way that they were. · Avri, for instance, was reported as N/A while the accompanying comment clearly stated “I support the compromise reached in Recommendation #11.” · The IPC was also reported as N/A, while the accompanying statement indicated otherwise: “The IPC has significant concerns with the current Recommendation #11 and cannot support it in its current form.” · Denmark – which is listed twice -- expresses support for ST18 (at least in one of its entries), but is also marked as N/A (in both listings). I would normally assume that the N/A mark despite clear comments indicating support or opposition was because they did not indicate support or opposition on the survey. But Heritage did not fill out a survey at all, but is marked as opposed to Rec 11. What does all this mean? I think it is clear that the staff summaries are of questionable rigor and I, for one, will no longer be referring to them definitive. Regardless, even if they are accurate, I’m not sure how informative these totals are because Rec 11 is presented as a composite, not as individual discrete elements. It would have been more informative to see how many respondents opposed or supported specific parts of Rec 11, such as the consensus requirement for Board consideration of GAC advice or the increase from majority rejection to 2/3rds. The fact that many respondents failed to provide a reason for their support or opposition makes this determination even more difficult. As others have noted, when presented in isolation, the community overwhelmingly rejected the proposal to increase the threshold for Board rejection of GAC advice to a 2/3rds majority (https://www.icann.org/public-comments/bylaws-amend-gac-advice-2014-08-15-en)<https://www.icann.org/public-comments/bylaws-amend-gac-advice-2014-08-15-en)>. Unfortunately, we don’t have similar samples (that I am aware of) for the other parts of Rec 11. Regards, Brett ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> From: Perez Galindo, Rafael [mailto:RPEREZGA@minetur.es] Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 11:55 AM To: Schaefer, Brett Cc: Olga Cavalli; Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear Brett Please find attached the source as prepared by staff. Please also note that a number of "against" are based on "no need to change how the GAC currently works", hence advocating for the statu quo. Best Sent from a mobile device. Please excuse any typos. -------- Original message -------- From: "Schaefer, Brett" Date:29/01/2016 13:55 (GMT+01:00) To: "Perez Galindo, Rafael" Cc: Olga Cavalli , Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva , accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Could you please circulate the source for these numbers? They do not match the numbers on Recommendation 11 provided in the excel sheet circulated by ICANN staff after the close of the comment period on the third draft. Also, reverting to the existing text on GAC advice would fail to address the requirements of NTIA on ST18 as expressed in November. Regards, Brett ________________________________ Brett Schaefer Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 202-608-6097 heritage.org<http://heritage.org/> On Jan 29, 2016, at 7:38 AM, Perez Galindo, Rafael <RPEREZGA@minetur.es<mailto:RPEREZGA@minetur.es<mailto:RPEREZGA@minetur.es%3cmailto:RPEREZGA@minetur.es>>> wrote: Dear all May I kindly remind you that our job now is only to deal with the comments received to our 3rd draft proposal in the public comment period in order to finalize the report? The text in that proposal was the outcome of hard negotiations within this group, which rendered a carefully crafted language that emerged on Thanksgiving Day as a "deal" among participants. Now, it amazes me that some people have opened up the discussion again via repetition of the same arguments already expressed in the previous months. The other part could as well repeat their counter-arguments and we could end up re-discussing the whole issue some more months (or years). But again, that is not what we have to do now. Our only task is to review comments received by the Community and assess whether a change is needed on the 3rd proposal text, or not. And according to the figures mentioned in the staff presentation, out of 65 inputs 35 are in support, 19 are neutral and 11 are against. Hence, in conclusion, those figures show clearly that the text put forward by the CCWG in its 3rd draft proposal should be maintained without change and make it to the final report, as it has support from the majority of commenters. In any other case, if the text is again modified, Governments should be given the chance to comment again in a new public comment period. Best Rafael De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3cmailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] En nombre de Olga Cavalli Enviado el: viernes, 29 de enero de 2016 13:10 Para: Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva CC: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org%3cmailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Asunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear all, +1 to Brazil´s comments. Best regards Olga 2016-01-29 8:55 GMT-03:00 Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br%3cmailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>>>: Dear co-Chairs, CCWG-colleagues, We fully support Kavouss' suggestion to include the "status quo" (no changes to current bylaws) as an additional option to the existing options 5 and 6 in the CCWG document. Kind regards, Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 -----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3cmailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3cmailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>] Em nome de Kavouss Arasteh Enviada em: sexta-feira, 29 de janeiro de 2016 06:56 Para: <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch%3cmailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>>; Steve DelBianco Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org%3cmailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear Steve As the Architect of Rec. 11 and ST18, may I request you to include the third option ( as new point 7) in the doc. With the opposition of one SO on the emerged consensus it would leave no option to me and likely to many GAC to ask for NO CHANGE to the current Bylaws and deletion of ST 18 Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 09:07, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com%3cmailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>> wrote:
Dear All It is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch%3cmailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch%3cmailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au%3cmailto:ceo@auda.org.au>><mailto:ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au<mailto:ceo@auda.org.au%3cmailto:ceo@auda.org.au>>>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
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On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com%3cmailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>><mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com%3cmailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>>>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br%3cmailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>><mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br%3cmailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br>>>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accountabilit<mailto:accountabilit<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3cmailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3e%3cmailto:accountabilit%3cmailto:accountabilit>> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3cmailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accou<mailto:accou<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3cmailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3e%3cmailto:accou%3cmailto:accou>> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-<mailto:accountability-cross-<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org%3cmailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org%3e%3cmailto:accountability-cross-%3cmailto:accountability-cross->> community@icann.org<mailto:community@icann.org>> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accountabilit<mailto:accountabilit<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3cmailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3e%3cmailto:accountabilit%3cmailto:accountabilit>> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3cmailto:y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org><mailto:accou<mailto:accou<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3cmailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org%3e%3cmailto:accou%3cmailto:accou>> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-<mailto:accountability-cross-<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org%3cmailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org%3e%3cmailto:accountability-cross-%3cmailto:accountability-cross->> community@icann.org<mailto:community@icann.org>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
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On 29/01/2016 12:34, Perez Galindo, Rafael wrote:
May I kindly remind you that our job now is only to deal with the comments received to our 3rd draft proposal in the public comment period in order to finalize the report?
The text in that proposal was the outcome of hard negotiations within this group, which rendered a carefully crafted language that emerged on Thanksgiving Day as a "deal" among participants.
Now, it amazes me that some people have opened up the discussion again
Dear Rafael, The rushed proposal on Thanksgiving was arrived at in the expectation that this would win the endorsement of the GAC for our report, and that it would be acceptable to other parts of the community. The comments received to the Third Draft Report show that it has not achieved either of those things. Surely the proper thing to do, when public comment shows that you have made a mistake, is to correct it. Kind Regards, Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
Dear Malcolm Pls be kind with the people and respect their views bad never ever make any judgement on that. You might have been disappointed of the GAC comment but you should kindly avoid to accuse them that they have made a mistake even though you might have dislike their views. I have always respected you and your views and continue to do it in future Kavouss With my best renfards Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 14:06, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 29/01/2016 12:34, Perez Galindo, Rafael wrote:
May I kindly remind you that our job now is only to deal with the comments received to our 3rd draft proposal in the public comment period in order to finalize the report?
The text in that proposal was the outcome of hard negotiations within this group, which rendered a carefully crafted language that emerged on Thanksgiving Day as a "deal" among participants.
Now, it amazes me that some people have opened up the discussion again
Dear Rafael,
The rushed proposal on Thanksgiving was arrived at in the expectation that this would win the endorsement of the GAC for our report, and that it would be acceptable to other parts of the community.
The comments received to the Third Draft Report show that it has not achieved either of those things.
Surely the proper thing to do, when public comment shows that you have made a mistake, is to correct it.
Kind Regards,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
On 29/01/2016 15:34, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
Dear Malcolm Pls be kind with the people and respect their views bad never ever make any judgement on that. You might have been disappointed of the GAC comment but you should kindly avoid to accuse them that they have made a mistake even though you might have dislike their views. I have always respected you and your views and continue to do it in future Kavouss With my best renfards
Dear Kavouss and Rafael, When I mentioned correcting a mistake, I was referring to a collective mistake by the CCWG, for which I share my part of the responsibility; I did not mean to accuse Raphael. If you understood any lack of courtesy by my comment, please accept my apology. Kind Regards, Malcolm.
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 14:06, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 29/01/2016 12:34, Perez Galindo, Rafael wrote:
May I kindly remind you that our job now is only to deal with the comments received to our 3rd draft proposal in the public comment period in order to finalize the report?
The text in that proposal was the outcome of hard negotiations within this group, which rendered a carefully crafted language that emerged on Thanksgiving Day as a "deal" among participants.
Now, it amazes me that some people have opened up the discussion again
Dear Rafael,
The rushed proposal on Thanksgiving was arrived at in the expectation that this would win the endorsement of the GAC for our report, and that it would be acceptable to other parts of the community.
The comments received to the Third Draft Report show that it has not achieved either of those things.
Surely the proper thing to do, when public comment shows that you have made a mistake, is to correct it.
Kind Regards,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
Dear Malcolm No offence taken, you are a gentleman :-) On the substance, my only aim was to avoid again polarizing views and start all over again from scratch... I was personally happy to have found some agreement or deal within the CCWG, in which everyone made some concession. I believe that Thanksgiving deal is the best this CCWG can offer as something everybody can live with. That is why I am very reluctant to again repeat the process and go through a duplication of last year's discussions. Best Rafael Sent from a mobile device. Please excuse any typos. -------- Original message -------- From: Malcolm Hutty Date:29/01/2016 17:10 (GMT+01:00) To: Kavouss Arasteh Cc: "Perez Galindo, Rafael" , Olga Cavalli , Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva , accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings On 29/01/2016 15:34, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
Dear Malcolm Pls be kind with the people and respect their views bad never ever make any judgement on that. You might have been disappointed of the GAC comment but you should kindly avoid to accuse them that they have made a mistake even though you might have dislike their views. I have always respected you and your views and continue to do it in future Kavouss With my best renfards
Dear Kavouss and Rafael, When I mentioned correcting a mistake, I was referring to a collective mistake by the CCWG, for which I share my part of the responsibility; I did not mean to accuse Raphael. If you understood any lack of courtesy by my comment, please accept my apology. Kind Regards, Malcolm.
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 14:06, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 29/01/2016 12:34, Perez Galindo, Rafael wrote:
May I kindly remind you that our job now is only to deal with the comments received to our 3rd draft proposal in the public comment period in order to finalize the report?
The text in that proposal was the outcome of hard negotiations within this group, which rendered a carefully crafted language that emerged on Thanksgiving Day as a "deal" among participants.
Now, it amazes me that some people have opened up the discussion again
Dear Rafael,
The rushed proposal on Thanksgiving was arrived at in the expectation that this would win the endorsement of the GAC for our report, and that it would be acceptable to other parts of the community.
The comments received to the Third Draft Report show that it has not achieved either of those things.
Surely the proper thing to do, when public comment shows that you have made a mistake, is to correct it.
Kind Regards,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
Dear Malcolm There is no need to sppologize.I am grateful to your kindness and courtesy Rest assure that Many of us appreciate your positive contribution Regards Kavousd Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:10, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 29/01/2016 15:34, Kavouss Arasteh wrote: Dear Malcolm Pls be kind with the people and respect their views bad never ever make any judgement on that. You might have been disappointed of the GAC comment but you should kindly avoid to accuse them that they have made a mistake even though you might have dislike their views. I have always respected you and your views and continue to do it in future Kavouss With my best renfards
Dear Kavouss and Rafael,
When I mentioned correcting a mistake, I was referring to a collective mistake by the CCWG, for which I share my part of the responsibility; I did not mean to accuse Raphael. If you understood any lack of courtesy by my comment, please accept my apology.
Kind Regards,
Malcolm.
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 14:06, Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 29/01/2016 12:34, Perez Galindo, Rafael wrote:
May I kindly remind you that our job now is only to deal with the comments received to our 3rd draft proposal in the public comment period in order to finalize the report?
The text in that proposal was the outcome of hard negotiations within this group, which rendered a carefully crafted language that emerged on Thanksgiving Day as a "deal" among participants.
Now, it amazes me that some people have opened up the discussion again
Dear Rafael,
The rushed proposal on Thanksgiving was arrived at in the expectation that this would win the endorsement of the GAC for our report, and that it would be acceptable to other parts of the community.
The comments received to the Third Draft Report show that it has not achieved either of those things.
Surely the proper thing to do, when public comment shows that you have made a mistake, is to correct it.
Kind Regards,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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Dear Rafael, With respect, that is not correct. As you may recall, the Third Draft Proposal was also submitted to the chartering organizations for their approval or feedback, simultaneous with the Public Comment period. Our primary task at this point is to deal with that feedback, as we are doing. Further, we are not now nor have we ever been constrained to dealing only with the material in public comments; if that were the case, the 2/3 proposal could not have been introduced in the first place. Best regards, Greg On Friday, January 29, 2016, Perez Galindo, Rafael <RPEREZGA@minetur.es> wrote:
Dear all
May I kindly remind you that our job now is only to deal with the comments received to our 3rd draft proposal in the public comment period in order to finalize the report?
The text in that proposal was the outcome of hard negotiations within this group, which rendered a carefully crafted language that emerged on Thanksgiving Day as a "deal" among participants.
Now, it amazes me that some people have opened up the discussion again via repetition of the same arguments already expressed in the previous months. The other part could as well repeat their counter-arguments and we could end up re-discussing the whole issue some more months (or years).
But again, that is not what we have to do now. Our only task is to review comments received by the Community and assess whether a change is needed on the 3rd proposal text, or not. And according to the figures mentioned in the staff presentation, out of 65 inputs 35 are in support, 19 are neutral and 11 are against.
Hence, in conclusion, those figures show clearly that the text put forward by the CCWG in its 3rd draft proposal should be maintained without change and make it to the final report, as it has support from the majority of commenters.
In any other case, if the text is again modified, Governments should be given the chance to comment again in a new public comment period.
Best
Rafael
*De:* accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>] *En nombre de *Olga Cavalli *Enviado el:* viernes, 29 de enero de 2016 13:10 *Para:* Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva *CC:* accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');> *Asunto:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings
Dear all,
+1 to Brazil´s comments.
Best regards
Olga
2016-01-29 8:55 GMT-03:00 Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva < pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br');>>:
Dear co-Chairs, CCWG-colleagues,
We fully support Kavouss' suggestion to include the "status quo" (no changes to current bylaws) as an additional option to the existing options 5 and 6 in the CCWG document.
Kind regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>] Em nome de Kavouss Arasteh Enviada em: sexta-feira, 29 de janeiro de 2016 06:56 Para: <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch');>>; Steve DelBianco Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings
Dear Steve As the Architect of Rec. 11 and ST18, may I request you to include the third option ( as new point 7) in the doc. With the opposition of one SO on the emerged consensus it would leave no option to me and likely to many GAC to ask for NO CHANGE to the current Bylaws and deletion of ST 18 Regards Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 09:07, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com');>> wrote:
Dear All It is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch');>> < Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch');>> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');><mailto:ceo@auda.org.au <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');>>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');> <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');>> | W: www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au/>
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On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','seun.ojedeji@gmail.com');><mailto: seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','seun.ojedeji@gmail.com');>>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" < pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br');><mailto: pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br');>>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609 <%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609 <%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');> <mailto:accountabilit <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountabilit');> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');> <mailto:accou <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accou');> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');> <mailto:accountability-cross- <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-');> community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','community@icann.org');>> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');> <mailto:accountabilit <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountabilit');> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');> <mailto:accou <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accou');> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');> <mailto:accountability-cross- <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-');> community@icann.org <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','community@icann.org');>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
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If I may chime in, I guess it is certainly not our task to renegotiate issues which were subject to compromise out of own initiative. The only exception would need to be based on the public comment record, where the numbers speak for themselves. As to the chartering orgs specifically we got a partial objection from one (GNSO said something like limited support with strong opposition, right?) and the rest of chartering orgs have not objected or rejected or been negative about rec 11, right? regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet Am 29.01.2016 um 14:57 schrieb Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>: Dear Rafael, With respect, that is not correct. As you may recall, the Third Draft Proposal was also submitted to the chartering organizations for their approval or feedback, simultaneous with the Public Comment period. Our primary task at this point is to deal with that feedback, as we are doing. Further, we are not now nor have we ever been constrained to dealing only with the material in public comments; if that were the case, the 2/3 proposal could not have been introduced in the first place. Best regards, Greg On Friday, January 29, 2016, Perez Galindo, Rafael <RPEREZGA@minetur.es<mailto:RPEREZGA@minetur.es>> wrote: Dear all May I kindly remind you that our job now is only to deal with the comments received to our 3rd draft proposal in the public comment period in order to finalize the report? The text in that proposal was the outcome of hard negotiations within this group, which rendered a carefully crafted language that emerged on Thanksgiving Day as a "deal" among participants. Now, it amazes me that some people have opened up the discussion again via repetition of the same arguments already expressed in the previous months. The other part could as well repeat their counter-arguments and we could end up re-discussing the whole issue some more months (or years). But again, that is not what we have to do now. Our only task is to review comments received by the Community and assess whether a change is needed on the 3rd proposal text, or not. And according to the figures mentioned in the staff presentation, out of 65 inputs 35 are in support, 19 are neutral and 11 are against. Hence, in conclusion, those figures show clearly that the text put forward by the CCWG in its 3rd draft proposal should be maintained without change and make it to the final report, as it has support from the majority of commenters. In any other case, if the text is again modified, Governments should be given the chance to comment again in a new public comment period. Best Rafael De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>] En nombre de Olga Cavalli Enviado el: viernes, 29 de enero de 2016 13:10 Para: Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva CC: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');> Asunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear all, +1 to Brazil´s comments. Best regards Olga 2016-01-29 8:55 GMT-03:00 Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br');>>: Dear co-Chairs, CCWG-colleagues, We fully support Kavouss' suggestion to include the "status quo" (no changes to current bylaws) as an additional option to the existing options 5 and 6 in the CCWG document. Kind regards, Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 -----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>] Em nome de Kavouss Arasteh Enviada em: sexta-feira, 29 de janeiro de 2016 06:56 Para: <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch');>>; Steve DelBianco Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishings Dear Steve As the Architect of Rec. 11 and ST18, may I request you to include the third option ( as new point 7) in the doc. With the opposition of one SO on the emerged consensus it would leave no option to me and likely to many GAC to ask for NO CHANGE to the current Bylaws and deletion of ST 18 Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 09:07, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com');>> wrote:
Dear All It is disappointing that one SO openly acts against the very interest of an AC which is vitally important for the smooth transition process. I therefore encourage everybody to opt for option contained in No. 5 even if with that option there is not yet consensus in GAC Failure to accept that I propose alternative 7 Drop 5&6 And take new alternative (7) Status Quo 1.Existing Bylaws text unchanged 2. Suppression of ST 18 for which many GAC opposed since April 2015 Regards Kavousd
Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:56, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch');>> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch');>> wrote:
Thanks for this conversation on process.
After yesterdays discussion it seems clear that the eventual change of key parts of the Rec 11 and the CCWG compromise underlying it, would have an important impact, both for those who are proposing it, and for the globality of Governments participating in the GAC.
This would surely require an inclusive discussion and process.
Hence I would kindly ask the Co-Chairs how they would intend to proceed in socializing such a changed proposal with the wider community.
thanks for any guidance
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 07:41 schrieb Chris Disspain <ceo@auda.org.au<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');><mailto:ceo@auda.org.au<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');>>>:
Hello All,
I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is:
"SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s)
Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible.
Submission Board Report
After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum:
a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and
b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations
c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations.
In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible."
So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations.
I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal.
Cheers,
Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer
.au Domain Administration Ltd
T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
E: ceo@auda.org.au<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');><mailto:ceo@auda.org.au<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ceo@auda.org.au');>> | W: www.auda.org.au<http://www.auda.org.au><http://www.auda.org.au/>
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On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','seun.ojedeji@gmail.com');><mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','seun.ojedeji@gmail.com');>>> wrote:
Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either.
https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977
Regards
On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br');><mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br');>>> wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it.
Thanks!
Regards,
Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609<tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609>
-----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');><mailto:accountabilit<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountabilit');> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');><mailto:accou<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accou');> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>>] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');><mailto:accountability-cross-<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-');> community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','community@icann.org');>> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Hi Andrew,
My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package.
It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');><mailto:accountabilit<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountabilit');> y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');><mailto:accou<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accou');> ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ntability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org');>>] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-community@icann.org');><mailto:accountability-cross-<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','accountability-cross-');> community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','community@icann.org');>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ajs@anvilwalrusden.com');><mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','ajs@anvilwalrusden.com');>> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org');><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-');> Community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Community@icann.org');>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org');><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-');> Community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Community@icann.org');>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org');><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-');> Community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Community@icann.org');>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org');><mailto:Accountability-Cross-<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Accountability-Cross-');> Community@icann.org<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','Community@icann.org');>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Chris is right … nothing in the Charter requires unanimity. On the other hand, the NTIA has insisted that this be a consensus proposal and that if there were “objections” to it by a chartering organization then the NTIA would not consider this to be consensus. While the NTIA’s reaction to a non-consensus proposal transmitted by the Board is to be determined, I think it near certain that the Board would not transmit a non-consensus proposal in the first place. It might choose to transmit a proposal with, say, 4 concurrences and 1 “neutral” or “non-vote” (I would recommend it do so), but the Board will quite likely choose not to submit a proposal with a component to which one of the chartering SO/ACs has registered a formal objection. And if it did, my prediction is that NTIA would reject such a submission. Paul Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article...> Link to my PGP Key <http://www.rsaconference.com/events/us16?utm_source=signature&utm_medium=ema...> From: Chris Disspain [mailto:ceo@auda.org.au] Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 1:40 AM To: Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] RES: Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Hello All, I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either. That is indeed correct. The relevant part of the charter (excising the supplementary proposal bit) is: "SO and AC support for the Draft Proposal(s) Following submission of the Draft Proposal(s), each of the chartering organizations shall, in accordance with their own rules and procedures, review and discuss the Draft Proposal(s) and decide whether to adopt the recommendations contained in it. The chairs of the chartering organizations shall notify the co-chairs of the WG of the result of the deliberations as soon as feasible. Submission Board Report After receiving the notifications from all chartering organizations as described above, the Co-Chairs of the CCWG-Accountability shall, within 10 working days after receiving the last notification, submit to the Chair of the ICANN Board of Directors and Chairs of all the chartering organizations the CCWG-Accountability Board Report, which shall include at a minimum: a) The (Supplemental) Proposal as adopted by the CCWG-Accountability; and b) The notifications of the decisions from the chartering organizations c) Documentation of the process that was followed, including, but not limited to documenting the process of building consensus within the CCWG-Accountability and public consultations. In the event one or more of the chartering organizations do(es) not support (parts of) the (Supplemental) Proposal(s), the Board Report shall also clearly indicate the part(s) of the (Supplemental) Final Proposal(s) which are fully supported and the parts which not, and which of the chartering organizations dissents, to the extent this is feasible." So technically there is nothing to prevent the CCWG from submitting The Proposal adopted only by 3 or 2 or 1 of the Chartering Organisations. I think the only reference to the requirement for adoption by at least most if not all chartering organisations has been Larry Strickling’s various comments about expecting to receive a consensus proposal and that a proposal with ‘objections’ or ‘expressions of concern’ would not be likely to be be deemed a consensus proposal. Cheers, Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112 E: <mailto:ceo@auda.org.au> ceo@auda.org.au | W: <http://www.auda.org.au/> www.auda.org.au auDA – Australia’s Domain Name Administrator Important Notice - This email may contain information which is confidential and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the named addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use, disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately. Please consider the environment before printing this email. On 29 Jan 2016, at 17:25 , Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> > wrote: Good question, actually for some reason I also thought there was something like that in the charter but I have just gone to look at it again and could not find it either. https://community.icann.org/m/mobile.action#page/50823977 Regards On 28 Jan 2016 10:33 p.m., "Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva" <pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br <mailto:pedro.ivo@itamaraty.gov.br> > wrote: Dear Keith,
"My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. "
Thanks for sharing your understanding. However, could you point to the specific text in the CCWG Charter where this threshold (4 out of 5) is defined? I couldn't find it. Thanks! Regards, Secretário Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Divisão da Sociedade da Informação (DI) Ministério das Relações Exteriores - Brasil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 <tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609> Secretary Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva Division of Information Society (DI) Ministry of External Relations - Brazil T: + 55 61 2030-6609 <tel:%2B%2055%2061%202030-6609> -----Mensagem original----- De: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> ] Em nome de Drazek, Keith Enviada em: quinta-feira, 28 de janeiro de 2016 19:05 Para: Andrew Sullivan; accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Assunto: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Hi Andrew, My understanding is that the CCWG proposal can be finalized and approved with 4 of 5 chartering organizations in support. So, a single organization in opposition *should* not scuttle the package. It's unclear to me what happens if one chartering organization is silent and another opposed, leaving only 3 in support. Probably a question for the Co-Chairs. Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> ] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 3:58 PM To: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Dear colleagues, I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say. For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway? As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse. The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community. Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place. The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com <mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
All, Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there. The only "official" documentation from the GAC states that there is no consensus in support or against recommendation 11. Can someone point me to the place where the GAC has formally stated otherwise? Jeff Neuman Jeff Neuman
On Jan 28, 2016, at 8:57 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> wrote:
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote:
Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong. I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss 2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote:
Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Kavouss, I am a pretty simple person. I am not saying it should be win lose or lose lose. I just would like to see the GAC (or any group) clearly state what a win win situation would be in their minds. The GAC as a group has not stated clearly what that would be. We shouldn't be in a position of having to guess. The GNSO statements have been clear. The Board statements have been clear. The ALAC statements have been clear. I would love for the GAC statement to be just as clear and state something like what I think some GAC members on this list is stating, namely, "we support the definition of consensus as stated in the draft, but only if the 2/3 threshold is adopted." (If that is what they mean). I just have never seen that stated. Thanks. Sent from my iPad On Jan 28, 2016, at 10:54 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote: GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss 2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>>: On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote:
Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong. I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
I'd like to ask a simple question. Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization? I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support. Greg [cross-posts to GAC list removed] On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss
2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote:
Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
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Great question Greg. Especially since the answer is both obvious and compelling. -- Paul Rosenzweig Sent from myMail app for Android Thursday, 28 January 2016, 06:24PM -05:00 from Greg Shatan < gregshatanipc@gmail.com> :
I'd like to ask a simple question.
Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support.
Greg
[cross-posts to GAC list removed]
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com > wrote:
GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss
2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan < ajs@anvilwalrusden.com > :
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote:
Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Greg, This participant has felt that several of the BC's "stress tests" were brought in bad faith, and despite the time spent on the rat hole of the GAC's internal process, no amount of lipstick on this pig (ST18) will make it "a good idea" or "enhance accountability" or fix something now broken in the Bylaws, and it isn't what the NTIA asked us to improve.
In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon
Does this participant have a scintilla of evidence for his assertion? Or is this another of those instances where one offers mere opinion as fact? More to the point, since the NTIA explicitly said that ST 18 was required for the IANA transition at least part of the assertion is demonstrably false. Paul -- Paul Rosenzweig Sent from myMail app for Android Thursday, 28 January 2016, 07:51PM -05:00 from "Eric (Maule) Brunner-Williams" < ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net> :
Greg,
This participant has felt that several of the BC's "stress tests" were brought in bad faith, and despite the time spent on the rat hole of the GAC's internal process, no amount of lipstick on this pig (ST18) will make it "a good idea" or "enhance accountability" or fix something now broken in the Bylaws, and it isn't what the NTIA asked us to improve.
In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
There are 4 or 5 opponents to 2/3 . Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 29 Jan 2016, at 02:09, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:
Does this participant have a scintilla of evidence for his assertion? Or is this another of those instances where one offers mere opinion as fact? More to the point, since the NTIA explicitly said that ST 18 was required for the IANA transition at least part of the assertion is demonstrably false.
Paul
-- Paul Rosenzweig Sent from myMail app for Android
Thursday, 28 January 2016, 07:51PM -05:00 from "Eric (Maule) Brunner-Williams" <ebw@abenaki.wabanaki.net>:
Greg,
This participant has felt that several of the BC's "stress tests" were brought in bad faith, and despite the time spent on the rat hole of the GAC's internal process, no amount of lipstick on this pig (ST18) will make it "a good idea" or "enhance accountability" or fix something now broken in the Bylaws, and it isn't what the NTIA asked us to improve.
In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
Eric Brunner-Williams Eugene, Oregon _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
An exceptional question Greg. I'll take it further: given the lack of transparency within the GAC we have no way of knowing what level of support the 2/3 threshold has within the GAC itself. It could be lots, it could be a few very loud GAC members. We don't know. I see people saying we need to accept it as part of a compromise. With whom? The community rejected this identical proposal a little over a year ago ( https://www.icann.org/public-comments/bylaws-amend-gac-advice-2014-08-15-en). So now we're compromising. Is it a compromise with a few GAC members, most GAC members, it appears to be not all GAC members. Have other community groups changed their negative views on this idea since late 2014? If so, why? Let's not forget that in addition to being arguably the least transparent SOAC, recommendation 10 as proposed in the third draft report exempts the GAC from the same accountability reviews the other SOACs will undergo. The Board has agreed to tremendous changes in their transparency. I salute them. The GAC? I'm Catholic, so I'm use to waiting for white smoke to appear from the chimney of the Sistine Chapel. I'm just not sure that's a good model to be used by a central component of the bottom up multi-stakeholder governance model we're trying to create. Of course the GAC does have something to say about their accountability: . "In this context, the GAC underlines that its members are representatives of governments of sovereign states that are accountable to their citizens," Wish that were true. I can think of many countries where the citizens would like to hold their governments accountable but their authoritarian rulers have other ideas. Even within countries where the rulers are bit more considerate towards their citizens the opaqueness of the GAC makes it impossible for their citizens to know what is really going on. Who actually supports these ideas outside of a few very vocal, very valued members of the GAC? I don't mean willing to go along with it because it quiets some folks down, but actually thinks these are good ideas? This recommendation was adopted in a straw poll in a call of some CCWG members and participants, a pool of voters that was not in my view representative of the CCWG or of the community as a whole. Any chance of a vote of members? The combination of recommendations 1, 10 and 11 is just too much of a concession to the GAC, or some members thereof, for many of us in the GNSO to support them as a package. Finally, as a citizen of both the United States of America and of Ireland I respectfully and publicly request the views of my governments and their representatives on recommendations 1, 10 and 11. If, as the GAC has stated, "its members are representatives of governments of sovereign states that are accountable to their citizens" I'm sure you would be happy to share your views on these recommendations with me so that I can hold you accountable said views, whatever they may be. Thank you, Edward Morris ---------------------------------------- From: "Greg Shatan" <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 11:26 PM To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing I'd like to ask a simple question. Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization? I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support. Greg [cross-posts to GAC list removed] On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss 2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>: On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote:
Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong. I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Hi, Aside from the fact that this has been hyped unnecessarily, it perhaps would not have mattered since board hardly rejects GAC advice and perhaps 2/3 would still be achieved for an advice worthy of reject.(will be good to know what the count was when board rejected GAC advice in the past) However, considering the current state of discussion, I will say what this communicates to those who don't know how ICANN board operates(which includes Washington) is most important. So to specifically answer your question; with a focus on just the 2/3, it does not enhance ICANN accountability to the entire community, I see no problem it corrects, neither do I see it as requirement for transition and I am neutral on whether it's a good idea as I believe the board should be the main decider of that. My comments are my personal opinion as an end-user(AtLarge member) who happens to wish that advisory committees are given equal attention. Regards On 29 Jan 2016 12:24 a.m., "Greg Shatan" <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I'd like to ask a simple question.
Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support.
Greg
[cross-posts to GAC list removed]
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss
2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote:
Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Greg, all, Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I’ll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where –if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks. I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it’s dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs. What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries. Best, Roelof From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing I'd like to ask a simple question. Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization? I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support. Greg [cross-posts to GAC list removed] On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote: GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss 2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>>: On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote:
Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong. I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Roelof, You answered the question I expressly said I wasn't asking -- "I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with." I think you *almost* answered the question I did ask, when you said " Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either." So it seems you do not affirmatively support the concept as such. I asked the question I asked not because I am immune to the value of compromise or ignorant of the many ways that consensus is achieved. Rather, I asked it because I feel that the "base of support" for this proposal is unclear and it is relevant to our ability to move forward, one way or the other. Greg On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 9:20 AM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl> wrote:
Greg, all,
Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I’ll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where –if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks.
I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it’s dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs.
What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries.
Best,
Roelof
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
I'd like to ask a simple question.
Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support.
Greg
[cross-posts to GAC list removed]
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss
2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote:
Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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The logical problem is to pick and chose parts of a package deal and ask whether such discrete parts are acceptable or not. This just ignores that the deal is composed by its different parts - and logically some please and displease differently different parts of the community. And as said before, from the chartering orgs there is just one partially objecting to this. And the numbers of the public comment period speak for themselves in accepting this as a workable compromise. regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet Am 29.01.2016 um 18:46 schrieb Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>: Roelof, You answered the question I expressly said I wasn't asking -- "I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with." I think you *almost* answered the question I did ask, when you said " Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either." So it seems you do not affirmatively support the concept as such. I asked the question I asked not because I am immune to the value of compromise or ignorant of the many ways that consensus is achieved. Rather, I asked it because I feel that the "base of support" for this proposal is unclear and it is relevant to our ability to move forward, one way or the other. Greg On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 9:20 AM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl>> wrote: Greg, all, Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I’ll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where –if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks. I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it’s dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs. What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries. Best, Roelof From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing I'd like to ask a simple question. Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization? I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support. Greg [cross-posts to GAC list removed] On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote: GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss 2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>>: On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote:
Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong. I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
All, to reiterate what I said during yesterday's CCWG call (reporting on the GNSO's deliberations), and to respond to Jorge's characterization of the GNSO "partially objecting" to Recommendation 11: The GNSO comments (and the individual comments submitted by the GNSO's constituent parts) make clear there is majority opposition to the inclusion of the 2/3 threshold, particularly in the context of the GAC participating as decisional in the community mechanism. The GNSO supports incorporating the definition of GAC consensus for Board obligations (absence of formal objection) as required by NTIA, but does not support the increase of Board obligation to 2/3. If the 2/3 threshold were removed and returned to simple majority, the GNSO would support Recommendation 11. So, any "partial objection" should be read as, "opposition to 2/3 but support of consensus definition." Per its procedures, the GNSO will vote on and require a simple majority of EACH house (contracted and non-contracted), and there is not majority support in EITHER house to agree to Recommendation 11 with the 2/3 threshold. It appears we have one Chartering Organization (GNSO) that will oppose Recommendation 11 if it includes the 2/3 threshold. We have another Chartering Organization (GAC) that will, by all signals, remain silent. It seems we all have a better chance of the CCWG proposal being accepted by the Board, NTIA and the US Congress if there are no objections to any of the 12 recommendations. Removing the 2/3 threshold accomplishes that. Also, as pointed out correctly today by Mike and Paul, NTIA has made it clear that the GAC consensus definition language must be included in the bylaws for the IANA transition to proceed. There are no chartering organizations opposing this inclusion. Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 1:23 PM To: gregshatanipc@gmail.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing The logical problem is to pick and chose parts of a package deal and ask whether such discrete parts are acceptable or not. This just ignores that the deal is composed by its different parts - and logically some please and displease differently different parts of the community. And as said before, from the chartering orgs there is just one partially objecting to this. And the numbers of the public comment period speak for themselves in accepting this as a workable compromise. regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet Am 29.01.2016 um 18:46 schrieb Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>>: Roelof, You answered the question I expressly said I wasn't asking -- "I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with." I think you *almost* answered the question I did ask, when you said " Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either." So it seems you do not affirmatively support the concept as such. I asked the question I asked not because I am immune to the value of compromise or ignorant of the many ways that consensus is achieved. Rather, I asked it because I feel that the "base of support" for this proposal is unclear and it is relevant to our ability to move forward, one way or the other. Greg On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 9:20 AM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl>>> wrote: Greg, all, Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I'll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where -if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks. I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it's dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs. What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries. Best, Roelof From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing I'd like to ask a simple question. Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization? I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support. Greg [cross-posts to GAC list removed] On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>> wrote: GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss 2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>>>: On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote:
Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong. I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear Keith if course you would support rec 11 if you strip it of the 2/3, as that would equal 100% of your starting position and would not give nothing in exchange. I feel that the intelligence of colleagues should be treated with due respect. regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet Am 29.01.2016 um 21:14 schrieb Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>>: All, to reiterate what I said during yesterday's CCWG call (reporting on the GNSO’s deliberations), and to respond to Jorge's characterization of the GNSO "partially objecting" to Recommendation 11: The GNSO comments (and the individual comments submitted by the GNSO’s constituent parts) make clear there is majority opposition to the inclusion of the 2/3 threshold, particularly in the context of the GAC participating as decisional in the community mechanism. The GNSO supports incorporating the definition of GAC consensus for Board obligations (absence of formal objection) as required by NTIA, but does not support the increase of Board obligation to 2/3. If the 2/3 threshold were removed and returned to simple majority, the GNSO would support Recommendation 11. So, any "partial objection" should be read as, "opposition to 2/3 but support of consensus definition." Per its procedures, the GNSO will vote on and require a simple majority of EACH house (contracted and non-contracted), and there is not majority support in EITHER house to agree to Recommendation 11 with the 2/3 threshold. It appears we have one Chartering Organization (GNSO) that will oppose Recommendation 11 if it includes the 2/3 threshold. We have another Chartering Organization (GAC) that will, by all signals, remain silent. It seems we all have a better chance of the CCWG proposal being accepted by the Board, NTIA and the US Congress if there are no objections to any of the 12 recommendations. Removing the 2/3 threshold accomplishes that. Also, as pointed out correctly today by Mike and Paul, NTIA has made it clear that the GAC consensus definition language must be included in the bylaws for the IANA transition to proceed. There are no chartering organizations opposing this inclusion. Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 1:23 PM To: gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing The logical problem is to pick and chose parts of a package deal and ask whether such discrete parts are acceptable or not. This just ignores that the deal is composed by its different parts - and logically some please and displease differently different parts of the community. And as said before, from the chartering orgs there is just one partially objecting to this. And the numbers of the public comment period speak for themselves in accepting this as a workable compromise. regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet Am 29.01.2016 um 18:46 schrieb Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>>: Roelof, You answered the question I expressly said I wasn't asking -- "I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with." I think you *almost* answered the question I did ask, when you said " Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either." So it seems you do not affirmatively support the concept as such. I asked the question I asked not because I am immune to the value of compromise or ignorant of the many ways that consensus is achieved. Rather, I asked it because I feel that the "base of support" for this proposal is unclear and it is relevant to our ability to move forward, one way or the other. Greg On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 9:20 AM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl>>> wrote: Greg, all, Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I’ll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where –if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks. I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it’s dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs. What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries. Best, Roelof From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing I'd like to ask a simple question. Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization? I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support. Greg [cross-posts to GAC list removed] On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>> wrote: GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss 2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>>>: On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote:
Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong. I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
With all due respect, Jorge, I was simply updating the group on the position of the GNSO as a whole. It is not *my* position, nor is it the current position of my SG. Please do not personalize this. Best, Keith
On Jan 29, 2016, at 3:59 PM, "Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch" <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Keith
if course you would support rec 11 if you strip it of the 2/3, as that would equal 100% of your starting position and would not give nothing in exchange.
I feel that the intelligence of colleagues should be treated with due respect.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 21:14 schrieb Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>>:
All, to reiterate what I said during yesterday's CCWG call (reporting on the GNSO’s deliberations), and to respond to Jorge's characterization of the GNSO "partially objecting" to Recommendation 11:
The GNSO comments (and the individual comments submitted by the GNSO’s constituent parts) make clear there is majority opposition to the inclusion of the 2/3 threshold, particularly in the context of the GAC participating as decisional in the community mechanism. The GNSO supports incorporating the definition of GAC consensus for Board obligations (absence of formal objection) as required by NTIA, but does not support the increase of Board obligation to 2/3. If the 2/3 threshold were removed and returned to simple majority, the GNSO would support Recommendation 11. So, any "partial objection" should be read as, "opposition to 2/3 but support of consensus definition."
Per its procedures, the GNSO will vote on and require a simple majority of EACH house (contracted and non-contracted), and there is not majority support in EITHER house to agree to Recommendation 11 with the 2/3 threshold.
It appears we have one Chartering Organization (GNSO) that will oppose Recommendation 11 if it includes the 2/3 threshold. We have another Chartering Organization (GAC) that will, by all signals, remain silent. It seems we all have a better chance of the CCWG proposal being accepted by the Board, NTIA and the US Congress if there are no objections to any of the 12 recommendations. Removing the 2/3 threshold accomplishes that.
Also, as pointed out correctly today by Mike and Paul, NTIA has made it clear that the GAC consensus definition language must be included in the bylaws for the IANA transition to proceed. There are no chartering organizations opposing this inclusion.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 1:23 PM To: gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
The logical problem is to pick and chose parts of a package deal and ask whether such discrete parts are acceptable or not. This just ignores that the deal is composed by its different parts - and logically some please and displease differently different parts of the community.
And as said before, from the chartering orgs there is just one partially objecting to this. And the numbers of the public comment period speak for themselves in accepting this as a workable compromise.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 18:46 schrieb Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>>:
Roelof,
You answered the question I expressly said I wasn't asking -- "I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with."
I think you *almost* answered the question I did ask, when you said " Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either." So it seems you do not affirmatively support the concept as such.
I asked the question I asked not because I am immune to the value of compromise or ignorant of the many ways that consensus is achieved. Rather, I asked it because I feel that the "base of support" for this proposal is unclear and it is relevant to our ability to move forward, one way or the other.
Greg
On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 9:20 AM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl>>> wrote: Greg, all,
Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I’ll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where –if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks.
I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it’s dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs.
What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries.
Best,
Roelof
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
I'd like to ask a simple question.
Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support.
Greg
[cross-posts to GAC list removed]
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>> wrote: GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss
2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>>>:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote: Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear Keith it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted". Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO. I feel during the last week all participating GAC members have been constructive, open for the needs expressed by the GNSO, and willing to accept all the further clarifications and assurances required by the GNSO in order to dissipate any concerns on the agreed drafting for Rec 11. We just have to look at the record and see how reasonable, rational and open for improvements we all have been. That is why I'm really surprised by thia u-turn, which would strip Rec 11 of one of the elements which were part of the GAC Dublin consensus and had helped to de-escalate this issue within the GAC and within the community at large. A 100% win for one party is no good compromise for a community which is obliged to work together and has very sensitive substantial work ahead. Hope you will understand these well-intentioned arguments and reasonings regards and with kind regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 22:13 schrieb Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com>:
With all due respect, Jorge, I was simply updating the group on the position of the GNSO as a whole. It is not *my* position, nor is it the current position of my SG. Please do not personalize this.
Best, Keith
On Jan 29, 2016, at 3:59 PM, "Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch" <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Keith
if course you would support rec 11 if you strip it of the 2/3, as that would equal 100% of your starting position and would not give nothing in exchange.
I feel that the intelligence of colleagues should be treated with due respect.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 21:14 schrieb Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>>:
All, to reiterate what I said during yesterday's CCWG call (reporting on the GNSO’s deliberations), and to respond to Jorge's characterization of the GNSO "partially objecting" to Recommendation 11:
The GNSO comments (and the individual comments submitted by the GNSO’s constituent parts) make clear there is majority opposition to the inclusion of the 2/3 threshold, particularly in the context of the GAC participating as decisional in the community mechanism. The GNSO supports incorporating the definition of GAC consensus for Board obligations (absence of formal objection) as required by NTIA, but does not support the increase of Board obligation to 2/3. If the 2/3 threshold were removed and returned to simple majority, the GNSO would support Recommendation 11. So, any "partial objection" should be read as, "opposition to 2/3 but support of consensus definition."
Per its procedures, the GNSO will vote on and require a simple majority of EACH house (contracted and non-contracted), and there is not majority support in EITHER house to agree to Recommendation 11 with the 2/3 threshold.
It appears we have one Chartering Organization (GNSO) that will oppose Recommendation 11 if it includes the 2/3 threshold. We have another Chartering Organization (GAC) that will, by all signals, remain silent. It seems we all have a better chance of the CCWG proposal being accepted by the Board, NTIA and the US Congress if there are no objections to any of the 12 recommendations. Removing the 2/3 threshold accomplishes that.
Also, as pointed out correctly today by Mike and Paul, NTIA has made it clear that the GAC consensus definition language must be included in the bylaws for the IANA transition to proceed. There are no chartering organizations opposing this inclusion.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 1:23 PM To: gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
The logical problem is to pick and chose parts of a package deal and ask whether such discrete parts are acceptable or not. This just ignores that the deal is composed by its different parts - and logically some please and displease differently different parts of the community.
And as said before, from the chartering orgs there is just one partially objecting to this. And the numbers of the public comment period speak for themselves in accepting this as a workable compromise.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 18:46 schrieb Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>>:
Roelof,
You answered the question I expressly said I wasn't asking -- "I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with."
I think you *almost* answered the question I did ask, when you said " Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either." So it seems you do not affirmatively support the concept as such.
I asked the question I asked not because I am immune to the value of compromise or ignorant of the many ways that consensus is achieved. Rather, I asked it because I feel that the "base of support" for this proposal is unclear and it is relevant to our ability to move forward, one way or the other.
Greg
On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 9:20 AM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl>>> wrote: Greg, all,
Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I’ll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where –if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks.
I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it’s dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs.
What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries.
Best,
Roelof
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>>> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
I'd like to ask a simple question.
Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support.
Greg
[cross-posts to GAC list removed]
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>> wrote: GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss
2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>>>:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote: Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Thanks Jorge. The GNSO was not in a position to take any position prior to the publication of the Version 3 proposal. It has now considered and assessed the proposal in its entirety, and has determined there is insufficient support across its constituent groups (BC, IPC, ISPCP, NCUC, NPOC, RySG, RrSG) for Recommendation 11 as written with the 2/3 threshold. I understand your frustration, but these are the facts. My email was intended to ensure everyone understands the state of play in the GNSO on this key point. As I said separately in another email, the RySG (my SG) has said it can accept the 2/3 with the additional criteria, but that is currently a minority position in the GNSO. Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 4:25 PM To: Drazek, Keith Cc: gregshatanipc@gmail.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Dear Keith it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted". Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO. I feel during the last week all participating GAC members have been constructive, open for the needs expressed by the GNSO, and willing to accept all the further clarifications and assurances required by the GNSO in order to dissipate any concerns on the agreed drafting for Rec 11. We just have to look at the record and see how reasonable, rational and open for improvements we all have been. That is why I'm really surprised by thia u-turn, which would strip Rec 11 of one of the elements which were part of the GAC Dublin consensus and had helped to de-escalate this issue within the GAC and within the community at large. A 100% win for one party is no good compromise for a community which is obliged to work together and has very sensitive substantial work ahead. Hope you will understand these well-intentioned arguments and reasonings regards and with kind regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 22:13 schrieb Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com>:
With all due respect, Jorge, I was simply updating the group on the position of the GNSO as a whole. It is not *my* position, nor is it the current position of my SG. Please do not personalize this.
Best, Keith
On Jan 29, 2016, at 3:59 PM, "Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch" <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Keith
if course you would support rec 11 if you strip it of the 2/3, as that would equal 100% of your starting position and would not give nothing in exchange.
I feel that the intelligence of colleagues should be treated with due respect.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 21:14 schrieb Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>>:
All, to reiterate what I said during yesterday's CCWG call (reporting on the GNSO's deliberations), and to respond to Jorge's characterization of the GNSO "partially objecting" to Recommendation 11:
The GNSO comments (and the individual comments submitted by the GNSO's constituent parts) make clear there is majority opposition to the inclusion of the 2/3 threshold, particularly in the context of the GAC participating as decisional in the community mechanism. The GNSO supports incorporating the definition of GAC consensus for Board obligations (absence of formal objection) as required by NTIA, but does not support the increase of Board obligation to 2/3. If the 2/3 threshold were removed and returned to simple majority, the GNSO would support Recommendation 11. So, any "partial objection" should be read as, "opposition to 2/3 but support of consensus definition."
Per its procedures, the GNSO will vote on and require a simple majority of EACH house (contracted and non-contracted), and there is not majority support in EITHER house to agree to Recommendation 11 with the 2/3 threshold.
It appears we have one Chartering Organization (GNSO) that will oppose Recommendation 11 if it includes the 2/3 threshold. We have another Chartering Organization (GAC) that will, by all signals, remain silent. It seems we all have a better chance of the CCWG proposal being accepted by the Board, NTIA and the US Congress if there are no objections to any of the 12 recommendations. Removing the 2/3 threshold accomplishes that.
Also, as pointed out correctly today by Mike and Paul, NTIA has made it clear that the GAC consensus definition language must be included in the bylaws for the IANA transition to proceed. There are no chartering organizations opposing this inclusion.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountabilit y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 1:23 PM To: gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross- community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
The logical problem is to pick and chose parts of a package deal and ask whether such discrete parts are acceptable or not. This just ignores that the deal is composed by its different parts - and logically some please and displease differently different parts of the community.
And as said before, from the chartering orgs there is just one partially objecting to this. And the numbers of the public comment period speak for themselves in accepting this as a workable compromise.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 18:46 schrieb Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>>:
Roelof,
You answered the question I expressly said I wasn't asking -- "I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with."
I think you *almost* answered the question I did ask, when you said " Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either." So it seems you do not affirmatively support the concept as such.
I asked the question I asked not because I am immune to the value of compromise or ignorant of the many ways that consensus is achieved. Rather, I asked it because I feel that the "base of support" for this proposal is unclear and it is relevant to our ability to move forward, one way or the other.
Greg
On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 9:20 AM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl>>> wrote: Greg, all,
Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I'll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where -if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks.
I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it's dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs.
What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries.
Best,
Roelof
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountabili ty-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-comm unity-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces @icann.org>>> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregsh atanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross -community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross -community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org< mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
I'd like to ask a simple question.
Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support.
Greg
[cross-posts to GAC list removed]
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>> wrote: GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss
2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>>>:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote: Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
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Dear Keith Thanks for your kind words. I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole. And such acceptable solutions require a give and take, like the hard-won compromise of Rec 11. I hope that this may be communicated to the constituencies with concerns and that also the improvements achieved on Rec 11 during the last weeks may be properly explained. regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 22:54 schrieb Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com>:
Thanks Jorge.
The GNSO was not in a position to take any position prior to the publication of the Version 3 proposal. It has now considered and assessed the proposal in its entirety, and has determined there is insufficient support across its constituent groups (BC, IPC, ISPCP, NCUC, NPOC, RySG, RrSG) for Recommendation 11 as written with the 2/3 threshold. I understand your frustration, but these are the facts. My email was intended to ensure everyone understands the state of play in the GNSO on this key point. As I said separately in another email, the RySG (my SG) has said it can accept the 2/3 with the additional criteria, but that is currently a minority position in the GNSO.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 4:25 PM To: Drazek, Keith Cc: gregshatanipc@gmail.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear Keith
it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
I feel during the last week all participating GAC members have been constructive, open for the needs expressed by the GNSO, and willing to accept all the further clarifications and assurances required by the GNSO in order to dissipate any concerns on the agreed drafting for Rec 11.
We just have to look at the record and see how reasonable, rational and open for improvements we all have been.
That is why I'm really surprised by thia u-turn, which would strip Rec 11 of one of the elements which were part of the GAC Dublin consensus and had helped to de-escalate this issue within the GAC and within the community at large.
A 100% win for one party is no good compromise for a community which is obliged to work together and has very sensitive substantial work ahead.
Hope you will understand these well-intentioned arguments and reasonings
regards and with kind regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 22:13 schrieb Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com>:
With all due respect, Jorge, I was simply updating the group on the position of the GNSO as a whole. It is not *my* position, nor is it the current position of my SG. Please do not personalize this.
Best, Keith
On Jan 29, 2016, at 3:59 PM, "Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch" <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Keith
if course you would support rec 11 if you strip it of the 2/3, as that would equal 100% of your starting position and would not give nothing in exchange.
I feel that the intelligence of colleagues should be treated with due respect.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 21:14 schrieb Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>>:
All, to reiterate what I said during yesterday's CCWG call (reporting on the GNSO's deliberations), and to respond to Jorge's characterization of the GNSO "partially objecting" to Recommendation 11:
The GNSO comments (and the individual comments submitted by the GNSO's constituent parts) make clear there is majority opposition to the inclusion of the 2/3 threshold, particularly in the context of the GAC participating as decisional in the community mechanism. The GNSO supports incorporating the definition of GAC consensus for Board obligations (absence of formal objection) as required by NTIA, but does not support the increase of Board obligation to 2/3. If the 2/3 threshold were removed and returned to simple majority, the GNSO would support Recommendation 11. So, any "partial objection" should be read as, "opposition to 2/3 but support of consensus definition."
Per its procedures, the GNSO will vote on and require a simple majority of EACH house (contracted and non-contracted), and there is not majority support in EITHER house to agree to Recommendation 11 with the 2/3 threshold.
It appears we have one Chartering Organization (GNSO) that will oppose Recommendation 11 if it includes the 2/3 threshold. We have another Chartering Organization (GAC) that will, by all signals, remain silent. It seems we all have a better chance of the CCWG proposal being accepted by the Board, NTIA and the US Congress if there are no objections to any of the 12 recommendations. Removing the 2/3 threshold accomplishes that.
Also, as pointed out correctly today by Mike and Paul, NTIA has made it clear that the GAC consensus definition language must be included in the bylaws for the IANA transition to proceed. There are no chartering organizations opposing this inclusion.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountabilit y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 1:23 PM To: gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross- community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
The logical problem is to pick and chose parts of a package deal and ask whether such discrete parts are acceptable or not. This just ignores that the deal is composed by its different parts - and logically some please and displease differently different parts of the community.
And as said before, from the chartering orgs there is just one partially objecting to this. And the numbers of the public comment period speak for themselves in accepting this as a workable compromise.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 18:46 schrieb Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>>:
Roelof,
You answered the question I expressly said I wasn't asking -- "I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with."
I think you *almost* answered the question I did ask, when you said " Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either." So it seems you do not affirmatively support the concept as such.
I asked the question I asked not because I am immune to the value of compromise or ignorant of the many ways that consensus is achieved. Rather, I asked it because I feel that the "base of support" for this proposal is unclear and it is relevant to our ability to move forward, one way or the other.
Greg
On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 9:20 AM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl>>> wrote: Greg, all,
Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I'll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where -if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks.
I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it's dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs.
What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries.
Best,
Roelof
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountabili ty-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-comm unity-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces @icann.org>>> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregsh atanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross -community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross -community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org< mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
I'd like to ask a simple question.
Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support.
Greg
[cross-posts to GAC list removed]
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>> wrote: GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss
2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>>>:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote: Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvil walrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<m ailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO. Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics. However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution. Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts: - from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them. - from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them. With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes. I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does. I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own: * Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith). The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows: - By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present. - By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority. - By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation. Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution. I look forward to your thoughts, Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
I would have added a +1~ to this mainly because it removes the 2/3 from the discussion, even though it technically have no impact on ICANN accountability but i have remained concerned about major impact it could cause politically(especially when it is read "wrongly/rightly" as an increase in govt control). However, this assumes that GNSO was not supportive of the 2/3 on the fear of GAC's advice interfering on its policies? but GAC's advice may not always have to do with GNSO related issues. Personally, I have always wondered why GAC advice relating to names policies does not get feed directly to the process, but I concluded its perhaps by design since AC (in this context) are meant to provide advice. The question then would be to determine if indeed the PDP would ensure to give recognition to such an advice in the same way it does for its constituencies. That said, I think other than the bylaw change, a number of other documents relating to GNSO PDP/decision making processes may need to be updated in other to make your proposal become a reality and I wonder if that won't be a tall order. Cheers! On 30 Jan 2016 10:50 a.m., "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Malcolm What you said is "* *Remove the 2/3 rule; and* *Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith)."* *are you serious?* *DO YOU WANT TO sUBORDINATE ONE community ( GAC) to another Community ( GNSO) ?* *I am sorry that is totally out of question and discusion.* *It is a dangerous round of discussion and totally with no legal , procedural and validity * *I categorically reject that* *Kavouss * 2016-01-30 11:48 GMT+01:00 Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>:
I would have added a +1~ to this mainly because it removes the 2/3 from the discussion, even though it technically have no impact on ICANN accountability but i have remained concerned about major impact it could cause politically(especially when it is read "wrongly/rightly" as an increase in govt control). However, this assumes that GNSO was not supportive of the 2/3 on the fear of GAC's advice interfering on its policies? but GAC's advice may not always have to do with GNSO related issues.
Personally, I have always wondered why GAC advice relating to names policies does not get feed directly to the process, but I concluded its perhaps by design since AC (in this context) are meant to provide advice. The question then would be to determine if indeed the PDP would ensure to give recognition to such an advice in the same way it does for its constituencies.
That said, I think other than the bylaw change, a number of other documents relating to GNSO PDP/decision making processes may need to be updated in other to make your proposal become a reality and I wonder if that won't be a tall order.
Cheers! On 30 Jan 2016 10:50 a.m., "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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GAC is an ADVISORY Committe. gNSO is a SUPPORTING ORGANIZATION. Of course AC's can never be the same as SOs. el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPhone 6s On 30 Jan 2016, 14:34 +0200, Kavouss Arasteh<kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>, wrote:
Malcolm What you said is
"*Remove the 2/3 rule; and Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy,GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board,(after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith)." are you serious? DO YOU WANT TO sUBORDINATE ONE community ( GAC) to another Community ( GNSO) ? I am sorry that is totally out of question and discusion. It is a dangerous round of discussion and totally with no legal , procedural and validity I categorically reject that Kavouss
2016-01-30 11:48 GMT+01:00 Seun Ojedeji<seun.ojedeji@gmail.com(mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com)>:
I would have added a +1~ to this mainly because it removes the 2/3 from the discussion, even though it technically have no impact on ICANN accountability but i have remained concerned about major impact it could cause politically(especially when it is read "wrongly/rightly" as an increase in govt control). However, this assumes that GNSO was not supportive of the 2/3 on the fear of GAC's advice interfering on its policies? but GAC's advice may not always have to do with GNSO related issues.
Personally, I have always wondered why GAC advice relating to names policies does not get feed directly to the process, but I concluded its perhaps by design since AC (in this context) are meant to provide advice. The question then would be to determine if indeed the PDP would ensure to give recognition to such an advice in the same way it does for its constituencies.
That said, I think other than the bylaw change, a number of other documents relating to GNSO PDP/decision making processes may need to be updated in other to make your proposal become a reality and I wonder if that won't be a tall order.
Cheers!
On 30 Jan 2016 10:50 a.m., "Malcolm Hutty"<malcolm@linx.net(mailto:malcolm@linx.net)>wrote:
On 29/01/2016 21:24,Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch(mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch)wrote:
it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01,Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch(mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch)wrote:
I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel:+44 20 7645 3523(tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523) Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange |http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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Hi Kavouss, On Sat, Jan 30, 2016 at 01:33:06PM +0100, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
*DO YOU WANT TO sUBORDINATE ONE community ( GAC) to another Community ( GNSO) ?*
I didn't read Malcolm's proposal that way. Instead, it seems to me that his proposal offers a way to acknowledge the special role of the GAC (its advice needs to be treated separately in the process) while increasing the importance of the multi-stakeholder process overall (the advice becomes a formal part of the PDP instead of something that happens outside it). The real force of his suggetion is not to subordinate one community to another. Instead, it de-emphasises the role of the board in arbitrating among different stakeholders in the ICANN community. I think it's a really constructive suggestion, and I'd urge us all to consider that line of thinking. We are up against a very serious deadline. We need to find a creative way out of the impasse, and I think that anything that strengthens the multi-stakeholder approach (in line with the NTIA's guidance) ought to be considered seriously. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com
My Dear esteemed Friend Andrew, Dear esteemed Friend Malcolm, Dear All, Thank you very much and thank Malcolm very much for his wishful thinking. Such approach while may enforce the subject matter and at the same time may serve to find a solution .However, the GAC advise which is ,once made, would be sent to the Board for its consideration within the specified course of actions mentioned in the Bylaws, then, according to Malcolm proposal, no matter how effective it would be ,create another Step ,PDP, AND GOES THROUGH ANOTHER COMMUNITY, GNSO, would create a) One additional Step b) Dependency to another entity, c) Inestimable delay d) Need to drastically modify Bylaws e) Inhomogeneity in the process e) Several legal consequences, intended, unintended, unforeseen complex gearing Believe me, I cannot buy it and I strongly recommend GAC Members NOT TO BUY IT MANY THANK AGAIN Let us search for other solutions, including the one that I have suggested and supported by several GAC Members Kavouss 2016-01-30 18:05 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>:
Hi Kavouss,
On Sat, Jan 30, 2016 at 01:33:06PM +0100, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
*DO YOU WANT TO sUBORDINATE ONE community ( GAC) to another Community ( GNSO) ?*
I didn't read Malcolm's proposal that way. Instead, it seems to me that his proposal offers a way to acknowledge the special role of the GAC (its advice needs to be treated separately in the process) while increasing the importance of the multi-stakeholder process overall (the advice becomes a formal part of the PDP instead of something that happens outside it). The real force of his suggetion is not to subordinate one community to another. Instead, it de-emphasises the role of the board in arbitrating among different stakeholders in the ICANN community. I think it's a really constructive suggestion, and I'd urge us all to consider that line of thinking.
We are up against a very serious deadline. We need to find a creative way out of the impasse, and I think that anything that strengthens the multi-stakeholder approach (in line with the NTIA's guidance) ought to be considered seriously.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Kavouss: While I don’t support it, I don’t understand your categorical rejection of Malcolm’s idea. You do not seem to understand that under the current regime, GNSO is subordinated to GAC, and Malcolm is proposing a more equal arrangement. GNSO is currently subordinated because the GAC can basically disregard whatever the GNSO comes up with and offer a different policy directly to the board, effectively bypassing the GNSO. The discussions of the alternative GAC policy then take place between the GAC and the Board, with GNSO sidelined. Imagine: what if GAC issued a communique, and the GNSO could then offer “advice” about the GAC statement. That GNSO advice about GAC then had to be considered by the board, and the whole conversation about GAC advice took place between the GNSO and the board, with GAC excluded. That would be subordination – but that is very close to the position of GNSO with respect to GAC advice right now. From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Kavouss Arasteh Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 7:33 AM To: Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 Malcolm What you said is "* Remove the 2/3 rule; and Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith)." are you serious? DO YOU WANT TO sUBORDINATE ONE community ( GAC) to another Community ( GNSO) ? I am sorry that is totally out of question and discusion. It is a dangerous round of discussion and totally with no legal , procedural and validity I categorically reject that Kavouss 2016-01-30 11:48 GMT+01:00 Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>>: I would have added a +1~ to this mainly because it removes the 2/3 from the discussion, even though it technically have no impact on ICANN accountability but i have remained concerned about major impact it could cause politically(especially when it is read "wrongly/rightly" as an increase in govt control). However, this assumes that GNSO was not supportive of the 2/3 on the fear of GAC's advice interfering on its policies? but GAC's advice may not always have to do with GNSO related issues. Personally, I have always wondered why GAC advice relating to names policies does not get feed directly to the process, but I concluded its perhaps by design since AC (in this context) are meant to provide advice. The question then would be to determine if indeed the PDP would ensure to give recognition to such an advice in the same way it does for its constituencies. That said, I think other than the bylaw change, a number of other documents relating to GNSO PDP/decision making processes may need to be updated in other to make your proposal become a reality and I wonder if that won't be a tall order. Cheers! On 30 Jan 2016 10:50 a.m., "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm@linx.net<mailto:malcolm@linx.net>> wrote: On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO. Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics. However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution. Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts: - from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them. - from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them. With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes. I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does. I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own: * Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith). The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows: - By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present. - By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority. - By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation. Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution. I look forward to your thoughts, Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523<tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523> Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
On 30/01/2016 12:33, Kavouss Arasteh wrote:
/*are you serious?*/ */DO YOU WANT TO sUBORDINATE ONE community ( GAC) to another Community ( GNSO) ?/* */I am sorry that is totally out of question and discusion./*
Dear Kavouss, Your reaction saddens me. I set out what I was trying to do quite plainly: to find some alternative offer to the GAC that would strengthen their role without unbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does. I don't believe that what I suggested would subordinate the GAC to the GNSO, but enable it to influence GNSO policy more effectively. Nor would it change the GAC's role at all on other matters. If this suggestion does not meet with your approval, I hope you might come up with an alternative. Because the division over the 2/3 rule is quite destructive. As I see it, if the vote tomorrow overrides the GNSO objection and imposes the 2/3 rule I see two alternatives: 1. The NTIA recognises the lack of support on this from the community most affected by the main focus of ICANN's work, and kills it, and transition with it; or 2. The rule is imposed despite GNSO objections, and ICANN begins its post-transition life constituted on a basis opposed by GNSO. Far from being seen as "more accountable", the perception will be that an opaque process (this CCWG) overrode the community objections expressed a year ago, and reiterated this winter. This will seed in the GNSO lasting distrust of both the GAC and the ICANN structure as a whole. Maybe governments do not see a serious problem in imposing a new settlement without consent: they are after all used to exercising their sovereign authority. But in a multistakeholder organisation like ICANN, this is a poisonous beginning to the new era. I can only pray that other Members, even those who do not worry too greatly about the 2/3 rule for its own sake, have the wisdom not to vote to impose it over the heads of the GNSO objection. Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
Why wouldn't this happen? It's exactly what happened in 1998 . . why would ICANN abandon a plan that's worked for it before.
2. The rule is imposed despite GNSO objections, and ICANN begins its post-transition life constituted on a basis opposed by GNSO. Far from being seen as "more accountable", the perception will be that an opaque process (this CCWG) overrode the community objections expressed a year ago, and reiterated this winter. This will seed in the GNSO lasting distrust of both the GAC and the ICANN structure as a whole.
Seun Do you agree that GAC become sub- ordinate of GNSO????!!!! Strange agreement. I am categorically against such dependency Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 11:48, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
I would have added a +1~ to this mainly because it removes the 2/3 from the discussion, even though it technically have no impact on ICANN accountability but i have remained concerned about major impact it could cause politically(especially when it is read "wrongly/rightly" as an increase in govt control). However, this assumes that GNSO was not supportive of the 2/3 on the fear of GAC's advice interfering on its policies? but GAC's advice may not always have to do with GNSO related issues.
Personally, I have always wondered why GAC advice relating to names policies does not get feed directly to the process, but I concluded its perhaps by design since AC (in this context) are meant to provide advice. The question then would be to determine if indeed the PDP would ensure to give recognition to such an advice in the same way it does for its constituencies.
That said, I think other than the bylaw change, a number of other documents relating to GNSO PDP/decision making processes may need to be updated in other to make your proposal become a reality and I wonder if that won't be a tall order.
Cheers!
On 30 Jan 2016 10:50 a.m., "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm@linx.net> wrote: On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Hello Kavous, I don't think my mail implied that GAC be subordinate to any community, and if it does please note that it's not my intention to communicate such. I was however saying that it would have been a good thing to find a way of receiving all the community input and make attempt to address them as much as possible during the policy development phase, so that a more wholesome document/proposal can get to the board. What Malcolm proposed may address such wish of mine but I have stated my reservation about how difficult and perhaps unrealistic this could be, owning to the current structure of SO/AC with respect to policy development. Regards On 30 Jan 2016 15:33, "Kavouss Arasteh" <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Seun Do you agree that GAC become sub- ordinate of GNSO????!!!! Strange agreement. I am categorically against such dependency Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 11:48, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com> wrote:
I would have added a +1~ to this mainly because it removes the 2/3 from the discussion, even though it technically have no impact on ICANN accountability but i have remained concerned about major impact it could cause politically(especially when it is read "wrongly/rightly" as an increase in govt control). However, this assumes that GNSO was not supportive of the 2/3 on the fear of GAC's advice interfering on its policies? but GAC's advice may not always have to do with GNSO related issues.
Personally, I have always wondered why GAC advice relating to names policies does not get feed directly to the process, but I concluded its perhaps by design since AC (in this context) are meant to provide advice. The question then would be to determine if indeed the PDP would ensure to give recognition to such an advice in the same way it does for its constituencies.
That said, I think other than the bylaw change, a number of other documents relating to GNSO PDP/decision making processes may need to be updated in other to make your proposal become a reality and I wonder if that won't be a tall order.
Cheers! On 30 Jan 2016 10:50 a.m., "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm@linx.net> wrote:
On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear all GNSO and GAC work on mutual cooperation improvements in PDPs. That's already work in progress. What has to be clarified is whether GNSO is able to accept the key elements of the compromise found by CCWG in the 3rd draft report, including the 2/3 threshold, bearing in mind all the changes made in the last days to Rec 11 at their behest, which have counted with constructive reaction by GAC members. If additional reasonable and non-discriminatory clarifications are needed and explained I would suppose that this constructive spirit would continue. regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet Am 30.01.2016 um 16:06 schrieb Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>>: Hello Kavous, I don't think my mail implied that GAC be subordinate to any community, and if it does please note that it's not my intention to communicate such. I was however saying that it would have been a good thing to find a way of receiving all the community input and make attempt to address them as much as possible during the policy development phase, so that a more wholesome document/proposal can get to the board. What Malcolm proposed may address such wish of mine but I have stated my reservation about how difficult and perhaps unrealistic this could be, owning to the current structure of SO/AC with respect to policy development. Regards On 30 Jan 2016 15:33, "Kavouss Arasteh" <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote: Seun Do you agree that GAC become sub- ordinate of GNSO????!!!! Strange agreement. I am categorically against such dependency Kavouss Sent from my iPhone On 30 Jan 2016, at 11:48, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote: I would have added a +1~ to this mainly because it removes the 2/3 from the discussion, even though it technically have no impact on ICANN accountability but i have remained concerned about major impact it could cause politically(especially when it is read "wrongly/rightly" as an increase in govt control). However, this assumes that GNSO was not supportive of the 2/3 on the fear of GAC's advice interfering on its policies? but GAC's advice may not always have to do with GNSO related issues. Personally, I have always wondered why GAC advice relating to names policies does not get feed directly to the process, but I concluded its perhaps by design since AC (in this context) are meant to provide advice. The question then would be to determine if indeed the PDP would ensure to give recognition to such an advice in the same way it does for its constituencies. That said, I think other than the bylaw change, a number of other documents relating to GNSO PDP/decision making processes may need to be updated in other to make your proposal become a reality and I wonder if that won't be a tall order. Cheers! On 30 Jan 2016 10:50 a.m., "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm@linx.net<mailto:malcolm@linx.net>> wrote: On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO. Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics. However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution. Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts: - from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them. - from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them. With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes. I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does. I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own: * Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith). The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows: - By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present. - By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority. - By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation. Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution. I look forward to your thoughts, Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523<tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523> Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
2016-01-30 16:56 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>:
Dear all
GNSO and GAC work on mutual cooperation improvements in PDPs. That's already work in progress.
What has to be clarified is whether GNSO is able to accept the key elements of the compromise found by CCWG in the 3rd draft report, including the 2/3 threshold, bearing in mind all the changes made in the last days to Rec 11 at their behest, which have counted with constructive reaction by GAC members. If additional reasonable and non-discriminatory clarifications are needed and explained I would suppose that this constructive spirit would continue.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 16:06 schrieb Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com <mailto:seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>>:
Hello Kavous,
I don't think my mail implied that GAC be subordinate to any community, and if it does please note that it's not my intention to communicate such. I was however saying that it would have been a good thing to find a way of receiving all the community input and make attempt to address them as much as possible during the policy development phase, so that a more wholesome document/proposal can get to the board.
What Malcolm proposed may address such wish of mine but I have stated my reservation about how difficult and perhaps unrealistic this could be, owning to the current structure of SO/AC with respect to policy development.
Regards
On 30 Jan 2016 15:33, "Kavouss Arasteh" <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto: kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote: Seun Do you agree that GAC become sub- ordinate of GNSO????!!!! Strange agreement. I am categorically against such dependency Kavouss
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 11:48, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji@gmail.com<mailto: seun.ojedeji@gmail.com>> wrote:
I would have added a +1~ to this mainly because it removes the 2/3 from the discussion, even though it technically have no impact on ICANN accountability but i have remained concerned about major impact it could cause politically(especially when it is read "wrongly/rightly" as an increase in govt control). However, this assumes that GNSO was not supportive of the 2/3 on the fear of GAC's advice interfering on its policies? but GAC's advice may not always have to do with GNSO related issues.
Personally, I have always wondered why GAC advice relating to names policies does not get feed directly to the process, but I concluded its perhaps by design since AC (in this context) are meant to provide advice. The question then would be to determine if indeed the PDP would ensure to give recognition to such an advice in the same way it does for its constituencies.
That said, I think other than the bylaw change, a number of other documents relating to GNSO PDP/decision making processes may need to be updated in other to make your proposal become a reality and I wonder if that won't be a tall order.
Cheers!
On 30 Jan 2016 10:50 a.m., "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm@linx.net<mailto: malcolm@linx.net>> wrote: On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 <tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523> Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto: Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto: Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto: Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear All, I encourage all of you ,including those who have some sort specific feeling about some AC to kindly review and reconsider your position and apply the golden rule of cooperation, coolboration, mutual understanding, need of unity, avoidance of continueous objection to any issue relating to a specific community and make your utmost effort to find solution in order to make evry body happy, or every body equally unhappy . It is not possible that one or more community get what it /they wishes on the expense of other community. The world is changing, nothing would come up from intolerance nor from hostility. WE ARE ALL MEMBER OF ONE INTERNET. We must work together, we must share the burden with each other .pushing one community to a disadvantage position does not bring unity itwould contribute to further division. In reality ,consensus means that while someone may lnot like something but as a partt of a compromise it agree with that BECAUSE IT COULD LIVE WITH THAT. The real tife is to establish a fair balance between something that we have and something that we also would like to have but can not acheived. Living together in a freindly and healthy enviroment brings joy and satisfaction to everybody. It is incoment to all of us to show some degree of flexibility . We have been working together very hard for more than 14 months. The Internet world counting on our wisdon, concious,mindfullness ,logic and collaboration. We are almost at the end of the WS1 let us walk these few steps together, let us put our hand into the hand of each other and bring this very hard work to the end. I suggest the the THREE " C" ,Compromise, cooperation ,confidence be at the top of our further work I turn to those perfectionist ,idealist ,over scrupolous colleagues to kindly reconsider your actions and responses . Awaiting to see who come as the first join me to Foster collaboration, compromise and confidence building . Kavouss
On 30/01/2016 10:48, Seun Ojedeji wrote:
I would have added a +1~ to this mainly because it removes the 2/3 from the discussion, even though it technically have no impact on ICANN accountability but i have remained concerned about major impact it could cause politically(especially when it is read "wrongly/rightly" as an increase in govt control). However, this assumes that GNSO was not supportive of the 2/3 on the fear of GAC's advice interfering on its policies? but GAC's advice may not always have to do with GNSO related issues.
Dear Seun, I am not entitled to speak on behalf of the GNSO, of course, but I do not believe it "was not supportive of the 2/3 on the fear of GAC's advice interfering on its policies". On the contrary, I believe it would welcome the GAC providing its advice at an earlier stage in policy design, when it is easier to accomodate it fully. In my view the real reason for opposition to the 2/3 rule is that it signals to each individual Board member that they are expected to comply with GAC "advice", rather than uphold the collective view of the entire community. This unbalances the entire multistakeholder model. My suggestion may go nowhere. But since it provided a chance to explain that opposition to 2/3 is not based on any idea of excluding the GAC from "interfering" in GNSO policy, it was not time wasted. Kind Regards, Malcolm.
Personally, I have always wondered why GAC advice relating to names policies does not get feed directly to the process, but I concluded its perhaps by design since AC (in this context) are meant to provide advice. The question then would be to determine if indeed the PDP would ensure to give recognition to such an advice in the same way it does for its constituencies.
That said, I think other than the bylaw change, a number of other documents relating to GNSO PDP/decision making processes may need to be updated in other to make your proposal become a reality and I wonder if that won't be a tall order.
Cheers!
On 30 Jan 2016 10:50 a.m., "Malcolm Hutty" <malcolm@linx.net <mailto:malcolm@linx.net>> wrote:
On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote: > it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that > without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. > > It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain > anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 > (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. > > So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be > accepted". > > Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote: > I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole > picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look > for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a > whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative." You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN. I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism. I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue. I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice. I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process. --MM
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11? The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws). One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion. I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case. Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto? Paul Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key -----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative." You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN. I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism. I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue. I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice. I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process. --MM
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote:
I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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+1. This is a very important consideration in my calculations as well. Some of the GAC members I speak with have expressed opinions closer to, for example, the GNSO position on 11 and the NCSG position on 1 than that expressed by the more vocal GAC members on the CCWG. I don't mean to be critical of anyone - the fact I don't exactly know where the GAC actually stands is not only problematic here but also in terms of being able to see my way to support their inclusion as a participant in the CM. To have a transparent and accountable Board subject to the advice, unless overridden by a 2/3 vote, of an opaque GAC makes little sense for the type of governance scheme we seem to want: one that is open, responsive and accountable to the global internet community. I should not have to guess to understand the processes and reasonings behind the decisions made and / or proposed by any unit that is part of our community decision making mechanism. Sadly today I am and will continue to be if the recommendations currently on offer are approved as is. Best, Ed Morris Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:22, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Dear Paul I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique. The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin. This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments. I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3. Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something. regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Hi Jorge, Thanks for this. I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As you've gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments and what percentage of GAC membership that represents? Thanks, Ed Morris Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Paul
I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique.
The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin.
This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments.
I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3.
Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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Hi Ed I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts). But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all over again: that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation. In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a consensus. regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net>:
Hi Jorge,
Thanks for this.
I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As you've gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments and what percentage of GAC membership that represents?
Thanks,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Paul
I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique.
The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin.
This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments.
I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3.
Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Jorge I took you up on the implicit challenge and have just spent an hour happily reading all of the government comments on CCWG-A Third Draft. I may have missed a comment, but I don't think so. I can happily report the following to the community: 15 governments commented on the Third Draft report. Of those 14 addressed Rec 11 and 7 also addressed Rec 1. One government (Italy) addressed only Rec 2. Of the 7 who addressed Rec 1: 4 governments supported GAC voting in the EC (Brazil, Argentina, Japan, and NZ) though two (Japan and NZ) expressed caution about this. Two governments said GAC should be advisory only (Ireland/Denmark) and one (UK) said that the decision should be up to the GAC. Of the 14 who addressed Rec 11: -- All who spoke to the issue supported the 2/3rd vote rejection rule. Some were silent -- Eight governments supported the current full consensus rule (Australia, NZ, UK, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Canada, and Denmark); five opposed it (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, India); one (Norway) noted lack of GAC consensus. So my assessment is that a very small sample of 6 governments splits 2-1 in favor of a GAC voting role in the EC and a somewhat larger sample of 13 governments splits 8-5 in favor of ST18 and full consensus. To be honest, I think that doesn't tell us much. There are 153 governments in the GAC. A sample of 10% probably says nothing about sentiment in that body. Nonetheless the data speak for themselves at least as far as they go. Paul Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key -----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 3:04 PM To: egmorris1@toast.net Cc: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 Hi Ed I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts). But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all over again: that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation. In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a consensus. regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net>:
Hi Jorge,
Thanks for this.
I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As you've gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments and what percentage of GAC membership that represents?
Thanks,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Paul
I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique.
The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin.
This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments.
I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3.
Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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Dear Paul As I said I cannot and would not dare to speak for the GAC. But in any group where expressing one's opinion is not compulsory, normally a majority does remain silent and those with a strong sentiment speak out, factually "representing" in some way the main currents of thought in such a group. I guess this happens all across the board and in all constituencies, as it happens in our CCWG, where some of us (to varying degrees) cope a lot of the conversations while the majority of the +150 (?) members and participants are normally silent. So, I guess that based on this "voluntary" principle the data you mention on the 2/3 element is significant, at least in showing that there seems not to be any government considering that threshold as something they should object (quite to the contrary it seems). And of the governments which participated there is quite an interesting variety in regional terms. best regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 22:14 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
Jorge
I took you up on the implicit challenge and have just spent an hour happily reading all of the government comments on CCWG-A Third Draft. I may have missed a comment, but I don't think so.
I can happily report the following to the community:
15 governments commented on the Third Draft report. Of those 14 addressed Rec 11 and 7 also addressed Rec 1. One government (Italy) addressed only Rec 2.
Of the 7 who addressed Rec 1: 4 governments supported GAC voting in the EC (Brazil, Argentina, Japan, and NZ) though two (Japan and NZ) expressed caution about this. Two governments said GAC should be advisory only (Ireland/Denmark) and one (UK) said that the decision should be up to the GAC.
Of the 14 who addressed Rec 11: -- All who spoke to the issue supported the 2/3rd vote rejection rule. Some were silent -- Eight governments supported the current full consensus rule (Australia, NZ, UK, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Canada, and Denmark); five opposed it (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, India); one (Norway) noted lack of GAC consensus.
So my assessment is that a very small sample of 6 governments splits 2-1 in favor of a GAC voting role in the EC and a somewhat larger sample of 13 governments splits 8-5 in favor of ST18 and full consensus.
To be honest, I think that doesn't tell us much. There are 153 governments in the GAC. A sample of 10% probably says nothing about sentiment in that body. Nonetheless the data speak for themselves at least as far as they go.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 3:04 PM To: egmorris1@toast.net Cc: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Hi Ed
I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts).
But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all over again: that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation.
In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a consensus.
regards Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net>:
Hi Jorge,
Thanks for this.
I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As you've gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments and what percentage of GAC membership that represents?
Thanks,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Paul
I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique.
The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin.
This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments.
I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3.
Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communit y
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Sure Jorge I'll happily agree with you that everyone who spoke to the issue of the 2/3rd vote that was a government (as opposed to the rest of the community) supported it. In return, ought you not to acknowledge that the entire opposition to the full consensus/ST18 proposal is exactly 5 countries? Nobody outside the GAC affirmatively supports less than full consensus and many (most notably the gNSO) actively opposes it. Ought you not to acknowledge that the tiny minority of 5 dissenters is who is blocking consensus on that aspect of the issue? And, since we are asking questions -- why didn't the government of Switzerland submit comments? Paul Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key -----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:40 PM To: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com Cc: egmorris1@toast.net; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 Dear Paul As I said I cannot and would not dare to speak for the GAC. But in any group where expressing one's opinion is not compulsory, normally a majority does remain silent and those with a strong sentiment speak out, factually "representing" in some way the main currents of thought in such a group. I guess this happens all across the board and in all constituencies, as it happens in our CCWG, where some of us (to varying degrees) cope a lot of the conversations while the majority of the +150 (?) members and participants are normally silent. So, I guess that based on this "voluntary" principle the data you mention on the 2/3 element is significant, at least in showing that there seems not to be any government considering that threshold as something they should object (quite to the contrary it seems). And of the governments which participated there is quite an interesting variety in regional terms. best regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 22:14 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
Jorge
I took you up on the implicit challenge and have just spent an hour happily reading all of the government comments on CCWG-A Third Draft. I may have missed a comment, but I don't think so.
I can happily report the following to the community:
15 governments commented on the Third Draft report. Of those 14 addressed Rec 11 and 7 also addressed Rec 1. One government (Italy) addressed only Rec 2.
Of the 7 who addressed Rec 1: 4 governments supported GAC voting in the EC (Brazil, Argentina, Japan, and NZ) though two (Japan and NZ) expressed caution about this. Two governments said GAC should be advisory only (Ireland/Denmark) and one (UK) said that the decision should be up to the GAC.
Of the 14 who addressed Rec 11: -- All who spoke to the issue supported the 2/3rd vote rejection rule. Some were silent -- Eight governments supported the current full consensus rule (Australia, NZ, UK, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Canada, and Denmark); five opposed it (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, India); one (Norway) noted lack of GAC consensus.
So my assessment is that a very small sample of 6 governments splits 2-1 in favor of a GAC voting role in the EC and a somewhat larger sample of 13 governments splits 8-5 in favor of ST18 and full consensus.
To be honest, I think that doesn't tell us much. There are 153 governments in the GAC. A sample of 10% probably says nothing about sentiment in that body. Nonetheless the data speak for themselves at least as far as they go.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 3:04 PM To: egmorris1@toast.net Cc: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Hi Ed
I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts).
But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all over again: that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation.
In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a consensus.
regards Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net>:
Hi Jorge,
Thanks for this.
I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As you've gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments and what percentage of GAC membership that represents?
Thanks,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Paul
I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique.
The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin.
This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments.
I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3.
Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
_______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi t y
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I would expect most governments to make their comments in the GAC itself. Only exceptionally to respond to public comments periods. CW On 30 Jan 2016, at 23:15, "Paul Rosenzweig" <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:
Sure Jorge
I'll happily agree with you that everyone who spoke to the issue of the 2/3rd vote that was a government (as opposed to the rest of the community) supported it.
In return, ought you not to acknowledge that the entire opposition to the full consensus/ST18 proposal is exactly 5 countries? Nobody outside the GAC affirmatively supports less than full consensus and many (most notably the gNSO) actively opposes it. Ought you not to acknowledge that the tiny minority of 5 dissenters is who is blocking consensus on that aspect of the issue?
And, since we are asking questions -- why didn't the government of Switzerland submit comments?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:40 PM To: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com Cc: egmorris1@toast.net; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Dear Paul
As I said I cannot and would not dare to speak for the GAC.
But in any group where expressing one's opinion is not compulsory, normally a majority does remain silent and those with a strong sentiment speak out, factually "representing" in some way the main currents of thought in such a group.
I guess this happens all across the board and in all constituencies, as it happens in our CCWG, where some of us (to varying degrees) cope a lot of the conversations while the majority of the +150 (?) members and participants are normally silent.
So, I guess that based on this "voluntary" principle the data you mention on the 2/3 element is significant, at least in showing that there seems not to be any government considering that threshold as something they should object (quite to the contrary it seems). And of the governments which participated there is quite an interesting variety in regional terms.
best regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 22:14 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
Jorge
I took you up on the implicit challenge and have just spent an hour happily reading all of the government comments on CCWG-A Third Draft. I may have missed a comment, but I don't think so.
I can happily report the following to the community:
15 governments commented on the Third Draft report. Of those 14 addressed Rec 11 and 7 also addressed Rec 1. One government (Italy) addressed only Rec 2.
Of the 7 who addressed Rec 1: 4 governments supported GAC voting in the EC (Brazil, Argentina, Japan, and NZ) though two (Japan and NZ) expressed caution about this. Two governments said GAC should be advisory only (Ireland/Denmark) and one (UK) said that the decision should be up to the GAC.
Of the 14 who addressed Rec 11: -- All who spoke to the issue supported the 2/3rd vote rejection rule. Some were silent -- Eight governments supported the current full consensus rule (Australia, NZ, UK, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Canada, and Denmark); five opposed it (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, India); one (Norway) noted lack of GAC consensus.
So my assessment is that a very small sample of 6 governments splits 2-1 in favor of a GAC voting role in the EC and a somewhat larger sample of 13 governments splits 8-5 in favor of ST18 and full consensus.
To be honest, I think that doesn't tell us much. There are 153 governments in the GAC. A sample of 10% probably says nothing about sentiment in that body. Nonetheless the data speak for themselves at least as far as they go.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 3:04 PM To: egmorris1@toast.net Cc: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Hi Ed
I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts).
But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all over again: that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation.
In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a consensus.
regards Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net>:
Hi Jorge,
Thanks for this.
I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As you've gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments and what percentage of GAC membership that represents?
Thanks,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Paul
I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique.
The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin.
This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments.
I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3.
Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
> On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: > it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that > without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. > > It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain > anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know > Rec > 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. > > So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted". > > Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
> On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: > I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the > whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) > and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the > community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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Which of course reverts to my original question: what are the governments saying and what is the nature and degree of their disagreements, if any. -- Paul Sent from myMail app for Android Saturday, 30 January 2016, 04:31PM -06:00 from CW Mail < mail@christopherwilkinson.eu> :
I would expect most governments to make their comments in the GAC itself. Only exceptionally to respond to public comments periods.
CW
On 30 Jan 2016, at 23:15, "Paul Rosenzweig" < paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com > wrote:
Sure Jorge
I'll happily agree with you that everyone who spoke to the issue of the 2/3rd vote that was a government (as opposed to the rest of the community) supported it.
In return, ought you not to acknowledge that the entire opposition to the full consensus/ST18 proposal is exactly 5 countries? Nobody outside the GAC affirmatively supports less than full consensus and many (most notably the gNSO) actively opposes it. Ought you not to acknowledge that the tiny minority of 5 dissenters is who is blocking consensus on that aspect of the issue?
And, since we are asking questions -- why didn't the government of Switzerland submit comments?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:40 PM To: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com Cc: egmorris1@toast.net; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Dear Paul
As I said I cannot and would not dare to speak for the GAC.
But in any group where expressing one's opinion is not compulsory, normally a majority does remain silent and those with a strong sentiment speak out, factually "representing" in some way the main currents of thought in such a group.
I guess this happens all across the board and in all constituencies, as it happens in our CCWG, where some of us (to varying degrees) cope a lot of the conversations while the majority of the +150 (?) members and participants are normally silent.
So, I guess that based on this "voluntary" principle the data you mention on the 2/3 element is significant, at least in showing that there seems not to be any government considering that threshold as something they should object (quite to the contrary it seems). And of the governments which participated there is quite an interesting variety in regional terms.
best regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 22:14 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig < paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com >:
Jorge
I took you up on the implicit challenge and have just spent an hour happily reading all of the government comments on CCWG-A Third Draft. I may have missed a comment, but I don't think so.
I can happily report the following to the community:
15 governments commented on the Third Draft report. Of those 14 addressed Rec 11 and 7 also addressed Rec 1. One government (Italy) addressed only Rec 2.
Of the 7 who addressed Rec 1: 4 governments supported GAC voting in the EC (Brazil, Argentina, Japan, and NZ) though two (Japan and NZ) expressed caution about this. Two governments said GAC should be advisory only (Ireland/Denmark) and one (UK) said that the decision should be up to the GAC.
Of the 14 who addressed Rec 11: -- All who spoke to the issue supported the 2/3rd vote rejection rule. Some were silent -- Eight governments supported the current full consensus rule (Australia, NZ, UK, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Canada, and Denmark); five opposed it (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, India); one (Norway) noted lack of GAC consensus.
So my assessment is that a very small sample of 6 governments splits 2-1 in favor of a GAC voting role in the EC and a somewhat larger sample of 13 governments splits 8-5 in favor of ST18 and full consensus.
To be honest, I think that doesn't tell us much. There are 153 governments in the GAC. A sample of 10% probably says nothing about sentiment in that body. Nonetheless the data speak for themselves at least as far as they go.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 3:04 PM To: egmorris1@toast.net Cc: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Hi Ed
I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts).
But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all over again: that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation.
In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a consensus.
regards Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris < egmorris1@toast.net >:
Hi Jorge,
Thanks for this.
I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As you've gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments and what percentage of GAC membership that represents?
Thanks,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, < Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch > < Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch > wrote:
Dear Paul
I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique.
The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin.
This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments.
I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3.
Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig < paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com >:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty < malcolm@linx.net >; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
> -----Original Message----- > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org > [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On > Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty > Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM > To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com > Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 > >> On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: >> it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that >> without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. >> >> It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain >> anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know >> Rec >> 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. >> >> So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted". >> >> Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO. > > >> On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: >> I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the >> whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) >> and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the >> community as a whole. > > The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO. > > Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. > Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a > 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic > of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a > more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it > really wanted. > Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics. > > However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need > for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. > I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" > in an attempt to find a solution. > > Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts: > > - from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that > GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance > of government input. > Such an assurance is necessary to them. > > - from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will > automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual > circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by > government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them. > > With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule > is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not > with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its > place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, > without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes. > > I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for > strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the > decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does. > > I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own: > > * Remove the 2/3 rule; and > * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is > given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the > Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and > ready to be ratified). > Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting > a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith). > > The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows: > > - By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it > will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, > rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore > be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect > GAC expectations than at present. > > - By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community > proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is > expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and > can only reject them by > 2/3 supermajority. > > - By including the GAC in the policy-development process we > strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" > tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full > respect at every level of the organisation. > > Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's > role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder > policy development process, rather than standing in tension with > it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a > true win-win solution. > > I look forward to your thoughts, > > Malcolm. > > -- > Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public > Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet > Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ > > London Internet Exchange Ltd > Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ > > Company Registered in England No. 3137929 > Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- > Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi > t > y _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communit y
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Well, Paul, the normal déontology of public officials in an international context, would not give rise to the information that you are seeking. Except perhaps after a conclusion had been reached, if then. CW On 31 Jan 2016, at 02:54, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:
Which of course reverts to my original question: what are the governments saying and what is the nature and degree of their disagreements, if any.
-- Paul Sent from myMail app for Android
Saturday, 30 January 2016, 04:31PM -06:00 from CW Mail <mail@christopherwilkinson.eu>:
I would expect most governments to make their comments in the GAC itself. Only exceptionally to respond to public comments periods.
CW
On 30 Jan 2016, at 23:15, "Paul Rosenzweig" <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:
Sure Jorge
I'll happily agree with you that everyone who spoke to the issue of the 2/3rd vote that was a government (as opposed to the rest of the community) supported it.
In return, ought you not to acknowledge that the entire opposition to the full consensus/ST18 proposal is exactly 5 countries? Nobody outside the GAC affirmatively supports less than full consensus and many (most notably the gNSO) actively opposes it. Ought you not to acknowledge that the tiny minority of 5 dissenters is who is blocking consensus on that aspect of the issue?
And, since we are asking questions -- why didn't the government of Switzerland submit comments?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:40 PM To: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com Cc: egmorris1@toast.net; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Dear Paul
As I said I cannot and would not dare to speak for the GAC.
But in any group where expressing one's opinion is not compulsory, normally a majority does remain silent and those with a strong sentiment speak out, factually "representing" in some way the main currents of thought in such a group.
I guess this happens all across the board and in all constituencies, as it happens in our CCWG, where some of us (to varying degrees) cope a lot of the conversations while the majority of the +150 (?) members and participants are normally silent.
So, I guess that based on this "voluntary" principle the data you mention on the 2/3 element is significant, at least in showing that there seems not to be any government considering that threshold as something they should object (quite to the contrary it seems). And of the governments which participated there is quite an interesting variety in regional terms.
best regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 22:14 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
Jorge
I took you up on the implicit challenge and have just spent an hour happily reading all of the government comments on CCWG-A Third Draft. I may have missed a comment, but I don't think so.
I can happily report the following to the community:
15 governments commented on the Third Draft report. Of those 14 addressed Rec 11 and 7 also addressed Rec 1. One government (Italy) addressed only Rec 2.
Of the 7 who addressed Rec 1: 4 governments supported GAC voting in the EC (Brazil, Argentina, Japan, and NZ) though two (Japan and NZ) expressed caution about this. Two governments said GAC should be advisory only (Ireland/Denmark) and one (UK) said that the decision should be up to the GAC.
Of the 14 who addressed Rec 11: -- All who spoke to the issue supported the 2/3rd vote rejection rule. Some were silent -- Eight governments supported the current full consensus rule (Australia, NZ, UK, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Canada, and Denmark); five opposed it (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, India); one (Norway) noted lack of GAC consensus.
So my assessment is that a very small sample of 6 governments splits 2-1 in favor of a GAC voting role in the EC and a somewhat larger sample of 13 governments splits 8-5 in favor of ST18 and full consensus.
To be honest, I think that doesn't tell us much. There are 153 governments in the GAC. A sample of 10% probably says nothing about sentiment in that body. Nonetheless the data speak for themselves at least as far as they go.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 3:04 PM To: egmorris1@toast.net Cc: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Hi Ed
I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts).
But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all over again: that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation.
In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a consensus.
regards Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net>:
Hi Jorge,
Thanks for this.
I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As you've gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments and what percentage of GAC membership that represents?
Thanks,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Paul
I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique.
The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin.
This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments.
I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3.
Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
> -----Original Message----- > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org > [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On > Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty > Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM > To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com > Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 > >> On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: >> it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that >> without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. >> >> It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain >> anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know >> Rec >> 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. >> >> So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted". >> >> Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO. > > >> On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: >> I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the >> whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) >> and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the >> community as a whole. > > The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO. > > Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. > Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a > 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic > of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a > more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it > really wanted. > Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics. > > However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need > for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. > I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" > in an attempt to find a solution. > > Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts: > > - from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that > GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance > of government input. > Such an assurance is necessary to them. > > - from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will > automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual > circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by > government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them. > > With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule > is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not > with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its > place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, > without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes. > > I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for > strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the > decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does. > > I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own: > > * Remove the 2/3 rule; and > * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is > given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the > Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and > ready to be ratified). > Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting > a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith). > > The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows: > > - By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it > will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, > rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore > be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect > GAC expectations than at present. > > - By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community > proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is > expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and > can only reject them by > 2/3 supermajority. > > - By including the GAC in the policy-development process we > strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" > tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full > respect at every level of the organisation. > > Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's > role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder > policy development process, rather than standing in tension with > it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a > true win-win solution. > > I look forward to your thoughts, > > Malcolm. > > -- > Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public > Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet > Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ > > London Internet Exchange Ltd > Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ > > Company Registered in England No. 3137929 > Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- > Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi > t > y _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communit y
Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Indeed and that, of course, is also the point. The normal deontology (love that phrase!) of governments is far different from all the other stakeholders (or at least their representative organizations) in ICANN. Cheers Paul Paul Rosenzweig <mailto:paul.rosenzweigesq@redbranchconsulting.com> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 <http://www.redbranchconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl e&id=19&Itemid=9> Link to my PGP Key <http://www.rsaconference.com/events/us16?utm_source=signature&utm_medium=em ail&utm_campaign=speakers-us2016> From: CW Mail [mailto:mail@christopherwilkinson.eu] Sent: Sunday, January 31, 2016 10:11 AM To: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 Well, Paul, the normal déontology of public officials in an international context, would not give rise to the information that you are seeking. Except perhaps after a conclusion had been reached, if then. CW On 31 Jan 2016, at 02:54, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> > wrote: Which of course reverts to my original question: what are the governments saying and what is the nature and degree of their disagreements, if any. -- Paul Sent from myMail app for Android Saturday, 30 January 2016, 04:31PM -06:00 from CW Mail <mail@christopherwilkinson.eu <mailto:mail@christopherwilkinson.eu> >: I would expect most governments to make their comments in the GAC itself. Only exceptionally to respond to public comments periods. CW On 30 Jan 2016, at 23:15, "Paul Rosenzweig" <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <x-msg://7/compose?To=paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> > wrote:
Sure Jorge
I'll happily agree with you that everyone who spoke to the issue of the 2/3rd vote that was a government (as opposed to the rest of the community) supported it.
In return, ought you not to acknowledge that the entire opposition to the full consensus/ST18 proposal is exactly 5 countries? Nobody outside the GAC affirmatively supports less than full consensus and many (most notably the gNSO) actively opposes it. Ought you not to acknowledge that the tiny minority of 5 dissenters is who is blocking consensus on that aspect of the issue?
And, since we are asking questions -- why didn't the government of Switzerland submit comments?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <x-msg://7/compose?To=paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <x-msg://7/compose?To=Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <http://bakom.admin.ch> ] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:40 PM To: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <x-msg://7/compose?To=paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> Cc: egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net> ; accountability-cross-community@icann.org <x-msg://7/compose?To=accountability%2dcross%2dcommunity@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Dear Paul
As I said I cannot and would not dare to speak for the GAC.
But in any group where expressing one's opinion is not compulsory, normally a majority does remain silent and those with a strong sentiment speak out, factually "representing" in some way the main currents of thought in such a group.
I guess this happens all across the board and in all constituencies, as it happens in our CCWG, where some of us (to varying degrees) cope a lot of the conversations while the majority of the +150 (?) members and participants are normally silent.
So, I guess that based on this "voluntary" principle the data you mention on the 2/3 element is significant, at least in showing that there seems not to be any government considering that threshold as something they should object (quite to the contrary it seems). And of the governments which participated there is quite an interesting variety in regional terms.
best regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 22:14 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <x-msg://7/compose?To=paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> >:
Jorge
I took you up on the implicit challenge and have just spent an hour happily reading all of the government comments on CCWG-A Third Draft. I may have missed a comment, but I don't think so.
I can happily report the following to the community:
15 governments commented on the Third Draft report. Of those 14 addressed Rec 11 and 7 also addressed Rec 1. One government (Italy) addressed only Rec 2.
Of the 7 who addressed Rec 1: 4 governments supported GAC voting in the EC (Brazil, Argentina, Japan, and NZ) though two (Japan and NZ) expressed caution about this. Two governments said GAC should be advisory only (Ireland/Denmark) and one (UK) said that the decision should be up to the GAC.
Of the 14 who addressed Rec 11: -- All who spoke to the issue supported the 2/3rd vote rejection rule. Some were silent -- Eight governments supported the current full consensus rule (Australia, NZ, UK, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Canada, and Denmark); five opposed it (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, India); one (Norway) noted lack of GAC consensus.
So my assessment is that a very small sample of 6 governments splits 2-1 in favor of a GAC voting role in the EC and a somewhat larger sample of 13 governments splits 8-5 in favor of ST18 and full consensus.
To be honest, I think that doesn't tell us much. There are 153 governments in the GAC. A sample of 10% probably says nothing about sentiment in that body. Nonetheless the data speak for themselves at least as far as they go.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <x-msg://7/compose?To=paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <x-msg://7/compose?To=Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <http://bakom.admin.ch> ] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 3:04 PM To: egmorris1@toast.net <x-msg://7/compose?To=egmorris1@toast.net> Cc: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> ; accountability-cross-community@icann.org <x-msg://7/compose?To=accountability%2dcross%2dcommunity@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Hi Ed
I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts).
But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all over again: that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation.
In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a consensus.
regards Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net <x-msg://7/compose?To=egmorris1@toast.net> >:
Hi Jorge,
Thanks for this.
I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As you've gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments and what percentage of GAC membership that represents?
Thanks,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <x-msg://7/compose?To=Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> > <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <x-msg://7/compose?To=Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> > wrote:
Dear Paul
I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique.
The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin.
This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments.
I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3.
Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <x-msg://7/compose?To=paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> >:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <x-msg://7/compose?To=paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu <http://gatech.edu> ] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net <x-msg://7/compose?To=malcolm@linx.net> >; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> ; kdrazek@verisign.com <x-msg://7/compose?To=kdrazek@verisign.com> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <x-msg://7/compose?To=accountability%2dcross%2dcommunity@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <x-msg://7/compose?To=accountability%2dcross%2dcommunity%2dbounces@icann.org
[mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:cross-community-bounces@icann.org> ] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> ; kdrazek@verisign.com <x-msg://7/compose?To=kdrazek@verisign.com> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <x-msg://7/compose?To=accountability%2dcross%2dcommunity@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
> On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <x-msg://7/compose?To=Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote: > it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that > without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. > > It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain > anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know > Rec > 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. > > So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted". > > Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
> On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <x-msg://7/compose?To=Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote: > I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the > whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) > and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the > community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ
Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
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The normal deontology (love that phrase!)
I agree. CW PS: deontology: The science of duty or moral obligation: ethics. OED, V. I, p. 647 On 31 Jan 2016, at 17:04, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:
Indeed … and that, of course, is also the point. The normal deontology (love that phrase!) of governments is far different from all the other stakeholders (or at least their representative organizations) in ICANN.
Cheers Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key <image001.png>
From: CW Mail [mailto:mail@christopherwilkinson.eu] Sent: Sunday, January 31, 2016 10:11 AM To: Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Well, Paul, the normal déontology of public officials in an international context, would not give rise to the information that you are seeking. Except perhaps after a conclusion had been reached, if then.
CW
On 31 Jan 2016, at 02:54, Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:
Which of course reverts to my original question: what are the governments saying and what is the nature and degree of their disagreements, if any.
-- Paul Sent from myMail app for Android
Saturday, 30 January 2016, 04:31PM -06:00 from CW Mail <mail@christopherwilkinson.eu>:
I would expect most governments to make their comments in the GAC itself. Only exceptionally to respond to public comments periods.
CW
On 30 Jan 2016, at 23:15, "Paul Rosenzweig" <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> wrote:
Sure Jorge
I'll happily agree with you that everyone who spoke to the issue of the 2/3rd vote that was a government (as opposed to the rest of the community) supported it.
In return, ought you not to acknowledge that the entire opposition to the full consensus/ST18 proposal is exactly 5 countries? Nobody outside the GAC affirmatively supports less than full consensus and many (most notably the gNSO) actively opposes it. Ought you not to acknowledge that the tiny minority of 5 dissenters is who is blocking consensus on that aspect of the issue?
And, since we are asking questions -- why didn't the government of Switzerland submit comments?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:40 PM To: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com Cc: egmorris1@toast.net; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Dear Paul
As I said I cannot and would not dare to speak for the GAC.
But in any group where expressing one's opinion is not compulsory, normally a majority does remain silent and those with a strong sentiment speak out, factually "representing" in some way the main currents of thought in such a group.
I guess this happens all across the board and in all constituencies, as it happens in our CCWG, where some of us (to varying degrees) cope a lot of the conversations while the majority of the +150 (?) members and participants are normally silent.
So, I guess that based on this "voluntary" principle the data you mention on the 2/3 element is significant, at least in showing that there seems not to be any government considering that threshold as something they should object (quite to the contrary it seems). And of the governments which participated there is quite an interesting variety in regional terms.
best regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 22:14 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
Jorge
I took you up on the implicit challenge and have just spent an hour happily reading all of the government comments on CCWG-A Third Draft. I may have missed a comment, but I don't think so.
I can happily report the following to the community:
15 governments commented on the Third Draft report. Of those 14 addressed Rec 11 and 7 also addressed Rec 1. One government (Italy) addressed only Rec 2.
Of the 7 who addressed Rec 1: 4 governments supported GAC voting in the EC (Brazil, Argentina, Japan, and NZ) though two (Japan and NZ) expressed caution about this. Two governments said GAC should be advisory only (Ireland/Denmark) and one (UK) said that the decision should be up to the GAC.
Of the 14 who addressed Rec 11: -- All who spoke to the issue supported the 2/3rd vote rejection rule. Some were silent -- Eight governments supported the current full consensus rule (Australia, NZ, UK, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Canada, and Denmark); five opposed it (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, India); one (Norway) noted lack of GAC consensus.
So my assessment is that a very small sample of 6 governments splits 2-1 in favor of a GAC voting role in the EC and a somewhat larger sample of 13 governments splits 8-5 in favor of ST18 and full consensus.
To be honest, I think that doesn't tell us much. There are 153 governments in the GAC. A sample of 10% probably says nothing about sentiment in that body. Nonetheless the data speak for themselves at least as far as they go.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 3:04 PM To: egmorris1@toast.net Cc: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Hi Ed
I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts).
But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all over again: that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation.
In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a consensus.
regards Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net>:
Hi Jorge,
Thanks for this.
I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As you've gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments and what percentage of GAC membership that represents?
Thanks,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Paul
I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique.
The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin.
This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments.
I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3.
Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
> -----Original Message----- > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org > [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On > Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty > Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM > To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com > Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 > >> On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: >> it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that >> without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. >> >> It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain >> anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know >> Rec >> 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. >> >> So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted". >> >> Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO. > > >> On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: >> I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the >> whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) >> and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the >> community as a whole. > > The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO. > > Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. > Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a > 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic > of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a > more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it > really wanted. > Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics. > > However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need > for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. > I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" > in an attempt to find a solution. > > Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts: > > - from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that > GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance > of government input. > Such an assurance is necessary to them. > > - from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will > automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual > circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by > government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them. > > With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule > is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not > with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its > place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, > without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes. > > I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for > strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the > decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does. > > I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own: > > * Remove the 2/3 rule; and > * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is > given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the > Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and > ready to be ratified). > Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting > a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith). > > The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows: > > - By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it > will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, > rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore > be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect > GAC expectations than at present. > > - By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community > proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is > expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and > can only reject them by > 2/3 supermajority. > > - By including the GAC in the policy-development process we > strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" > tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full > respect at every level of the organisation. > > Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's > role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder > policy development process, rather than standing in tension with > it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a > true win-win solution. > > I look forward to your thoughts, > > Malcolm. > > -- > Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public > Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet > Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ > > London Internet Exchange Ltd > Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ > > Company Registered in England No. 3137929 > Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- > Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi > t > y _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communit y
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Dear Paul I feel that the consensus requirement was accepted in Dublin as another element of the GAC position agreed then (together with the 2/3 and other elements). And as you know we actively participate in discussions and contribute to common ground proposals as much as wecan. regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 23:15 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
Sure Jorge
I'll happily agree with you that everyone who spoke to the issue of the 2/3rd vote that was a government (as opposed to the rest of the community) supported it.
In return, ought you not to acknowledge that the entire opposition to the full consensus/ST18 proposal is exactly 5 countries? Nobody outside the GAC affirmatively supports less than full consensus and many (most notably the gNSO) actively opposes it. Ought you not to acknowledge that the tiny minority of 5 dissenters is who is blocking consensus on that aspect of the issue?
And, since we are asking questions -- why didn't the government of Switzerland submit comments?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:40 PM To: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com Cc: egmorris1@toast.net; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Dear Paul
As I said I cannot and would not dare to speak for the GAC.
But in any group where expressing one's opinion is not compulsory, normally a majority does remain silent and those with a strong sentiment speak out, factually "representing" in some way the main currents of thought in such a group.
I guess this happens all across the board and in all constituencies, as it happens in our CCWG, where some of us (to varying degrees) cope a lot of the conversations while the majority of the +150 (?) members and participants are normally silent.
So, I guess that based on this "voluntary" principle the data you mention on the 2/3 element is significant, at least in showing that there seems not to be any government considering that threshold as something they should object (quite to the contrary it seems). And of the governments which participated there is quite an interesting variety in regional terms.
best regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 22:14 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
Jorge
I took you up on the implicit challenge and have just spent an hour happily reading all of the government comments on CCWG-A Third Draft. I may have missed a comment, but I don't think so.
I can happily report the following to the community:
15 governments commented on the Third Draft report. Of those 14 addressed Rec 11 and 7 also addressed Rec 1. One government (Italy) addressed only Rec 2.
Of the 7 who addressed Rec 1: 4 governments supported GAC voting in the EC (Brazil, Argentina, Japan, and NZ) though two (Japan and NZ) expressed caution about this. Two governments said GAC should be advisory only (Ireland/Denmark) and one (UK) said that the decision should be up to the GAC.
Of the 14 who addressed Rec 11: -- All who spoke to the issue supported the 2/3rd vote rejection rule. Some were silent -- Eight governments supported the current full consensus rule (Australia, NZ, UK, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Canada, and Denmark); five opposed it (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, India); one (Norway) noted lack of GAC consensus.
So my assessment is that a very small sample of 6 governments splits 2-1 in favor of a GAC voting role in the EC and a somewhat larger sample of 13 governments splits 8-5 in favor of ST18 and full consensus.
To be honest, I think that doesn't tell us much. There are 153 governments in the GAC. A sample of 10% probably says nothing about sentiment in that body. Nonetheless the data speak for themselves at least as far as they go.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 3:04 PM To: egmorris1@toast.net Cc: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Hi Ed
I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts).
But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all over again: that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation.
In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a consensus.
regards Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net>:
Hi Jorge,
Thanks for this.
I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As you've gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments and what percentage of GAC membership that represents?
Thanks,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Paul
I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique.
The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin.
This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments.
I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3.
Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
> On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: > it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that > without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. > > It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain > anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know > Rec > 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. > > So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted". > > Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
> On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: > I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the > whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) > and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the > community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
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Milton Pls kindly do not judge other of not understanding the issue. I fulléy understand the case. Malcolm wants to modify the current structure and functions of ICANN whether in your views GNSO is or is not sub ordinate of GAC ( WHICH i DO NOT BELIEVE SO ) . What I said was the proposal of Malcolm ,while quite positive was irelevant to the work we are doing ( accountability ) as it dioes propose restructuring with which I categorically object since it is outside of our mandate. Pls respect others Tks BEST REGARDS MY DEAR PROFESSOR 2016-01-30 23:56 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>:
Dear Paul
I feel that the consensus requirement was accepted in Dublin as another element of the GAC position agreed then (together with the 2/3 and other elements).
And as you know we actively participate in discussions and contribute to common ground proposals as much as wecan.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 23:15 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig < paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
Sure Jorge
I'll happily agree with you that everyone who spoke to the issue of the 2/3rd vote that was a government (as opposed to the rest of the community) supported it.
In return, ought you not to acknowledge that the entire opposition to the full consensus/ST18 proposal is exactly 5 countries? Nobody outside the GAC affirmatively supports less than full consensus and many (most notably the gNSO) actively opposes it. Ought you not to acknowledge that the tiny minority of 5 dissenters is who is blocking consensus on that aspect of the issue?
And, since we are asking questions -- why didn't the government of Switzerland submit comments?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:40 PM To: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com Cc: egmorris1@toast.net; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Dear Paul
As I said I cannot and would not dare to speak for the GAC.
But in any group where expressing one's opinion is not compulsory, normally a majority does remain silent and those with a strong sentiment speak out, factually "representing" in some way the main currents of thought in such a group.
I guess this happens all across the board and in all constituencies, as it happens in our CCWG, where some of us (to varying degrees) cope a lot of the conversations while the majority of the +150 (?) members and participants are normally silent.
So, I guess that based on this "voluntary" principle the data you mention on the 2/3 element is significant, at least in showing that there seems not to be any government considering that threshold as something they should object (quite to the contrary it seems). And of the governments which participated there is quite an interesting variety in regional terms.
best regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 22:14 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
Jorge
I took you up on the implicit challenge and have just spent an hour happily reading all of the government comments on CCWG-A Third Draft. I may have missed a comment, but I don't think so.
I can happily report the following to the community:
15 governments commented on the Third Draft report. Of those 14 addressed Rec 11 and 7 also addressed Rec 1. One government (Italy) addressed only Rec 2.
Of the 7 who addressed Rec 1: 4 governments supported GAC voting in the EC (Brazil, Argentina, Japan, and NZ) though two (Japan and NZ) expressed caution about this. Two governments said GAC should be advisory only (Ireland/Denmark) and one (UK) said that the decision should be up to the GAC.
Of the 14 who addressed Rec 11: -- All who spoke to the issue supported the 2/3rd vote rejection rule. Some were silent -- Eight governments supported the current full consensus rule (Australia, NZ, UK, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Canada, and Denmark); five opposed it (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, India); one (Norway) noted lack of GAC consensus.
So my assessment is that a very small sample of 6 governments splits 2-1 in favor of a GAC voting role in the EC and a somewhat larger sample of 13 governments splits 8-5 in favor of ST18 and full consensus.
To be honest, I think that doesn't tell us much. There are 153 governments in the GAC. A sample of 10% probably says nothing about sentiment in that body. Nonetheless the data speak for themselves at least as far as they go.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 3:04 PM To: egmorris1@toast.net Cc: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Hi Ed
I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts).
But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all over again: that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation.
In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a consensus.
regards Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net>:
Hi Jorge,
Thanks for this.
I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As you've gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments and what percentage of GAC membership that represents?
Thanks,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Paul
I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique.
The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin.
This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments.
I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3.
Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
> -----Original Message----- > From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org > [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On > Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty > Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM > To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com > Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 > >> On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: >> it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that >> without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. >> >> It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain >> anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know >> Rec >> 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. >> >> So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted". >> >> Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO. > > >> On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: >> I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the >> whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) >> and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the >> community as a whole. > > The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO. > > Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. > Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a > 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic > of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a > more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it > really wanted. > Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics. > > However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need > for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. > I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" > in an attempt to find a solution. > > Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts: > > - from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that > GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance > of government input. > Such an assurance is necessary to them. > > - from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will > automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual > circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by > government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them. > > With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule > is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not > with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its > place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, > without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes. > > I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for > strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the > decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does. > > I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own: > > * Remove the 2/3 rule; and > * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is > given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the > Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and > ready to be ratified). > Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting > a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith). > > The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows: > > - By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it > will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, > rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore > be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect > GAC expectations than at present. > > - By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community > proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is > expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and > can only reject them by > 2/3 supermajority. > > - By including the GAC in the policy-development process we > strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" > tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full > respect at every level of the organisation. > > Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's > role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder > policy development process, rather than standing in tension with > it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a > true win-win solution. > > I look forward to your thoughts, > > Malcolm. > > -- > Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public > Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet > Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ > > London Internet Exchange Ltd > Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ > > Company Registered in England No. 3137929 > Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA > > > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- > Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi > t > y _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communit y
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I think a reason the GNSO is (or appears to be) subordinate to the GAC is that the GAC comes to the Board with its advice on GNSO recommendations after the GNSO has gone through months (or more likely, years) of work on its recommendations. The GAC then advises the Board on how the GNSO recommendations should be modified. If the Board doesn't agree, it then communes with the GAC to work things out, a discussion that the GNSO is rarely invited to. In a sense, the GAC gets to be the "editor" of the GNSO, but not vice versa. If GAC advice becomes harder to reject, the corollary is that it becomes easier for the GAC to edit (or even "overrule") the GNSO. The improvements in cooperation between the GAC and the GNSO, and the increase in GAC member participation in both CCWGs and gTLD policy recommendation processes, are likely to result in less advice by the GAC that modifies GNSO or cross-community policy recommendations. Of course, there is always the danger of the "second bite"; if the GAC is not aligned with the consensus position in a policy recommendation outcome, it can turn its viewpoint into "GAC advice" and achieve its result that way. The more GAC participates in the process of developing recommendations, including the building of consensus, the more glaring second bite attempts will be. The GAC is alone in this power. No other SO/AC has quite this ability. An SO (or part thereof) and ALAC would need to resort to RfR/IRP or Empowered Community mechanisms to get a second bite. Arguably, SSAC and RSSAC would have this ability, but it is constrained by each AC's narrow technical mission. I think this is all part of the undercurrent of these discussions. Terms like "subordinate" are probably too crude and pejorative to be of much use in discussing these issues. But the issues exist. Greg On Sat, Jan 30, 2016 at 6:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
Milton Pls kindly do not judge other of not understanding the issue. I fulléy understand the case. Malcolm wants to modify the current structure and functions of ICANN whether in your views GNSO is or is not sub ordinate of GAC ( WHICH i DO NOT BELIEVE SO ) . What I said was the proposal of Malcolm ,while quite positive was irelevant to the work we are doing ( accountability ) as it dioes propose restructuring with which I categorically object since it is outside of our mandate. Pls respect others Tks BEST REGARDS MY DEAR PROFESSOR
2016-01-30 23:56 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>:
Dear Paul
I feel that the consensus requirement was accepted in Dublin as another element of the GAC position agreed then (together with the 2/3 and other elements).
And as you know we actively participate in discussions and contribute to common ground proposals as much as wecan.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 23:15 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig < paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
Sure Jorge
I'll happily agree with you that everyone who spoke to the issue of the 2/3rd vote that was a government (as opposed to the rest of the community) supported it.
In return, ought you not to acknowledge that the entire opposition to the full consensus/ST18 proposal is exactly 5 countries? Nobody outside the GAC affirmatively supports less than full consensus and many (most notably the gNSO) actively opposes it. Ought you not to acknowledge that the tiny minority of 5 dissenters is who is blocking consensus on that aspect of the issue?
And, since we are asking questions -- why didn't the government of Switzerland submit comments?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:40 PM To: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com Cc: egmorris1@toast.net; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Dear Paul
As I said I cannot and would not dare to speak for the GAC.
But in any group where expressing one's opinion is not compulsory, normally a majority does remain silent and those with a strong sentiment speak out, factually "representing" in some way the main currents of thought in such a group.
I guess this happens all across the board and in all constituencies, as it happens in our CCWG, where some of us (to varying degrees) cope a lot of the conversations while the majority of the +150 (?) members and participants are normally silent.
So, I guess that based on this "voluntary" principle the data you mention on the 2/3 element is significant, at least in showing that there seems not to be any government considering that threshold as something they should object (quite to the contrary it seems). And of the governments which participated there is quite an interesting variety in regional terms.
best regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 22:14 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
Jorge
I took you up on the implicit challenge and have just spent an hour happily reading all of the government comments on CCWG-A Third Draft. I may have missed a comment, but I don't think so.
I can happily report the following to the community:
15 governments commented on the Third Draft report. Of those 14 addressed Rec 11 and 7 also addressed Rec 1. One government (Italy) addressed only Rec 2.
Of the 7 who addressed Rec 1: 4 governments supported GAC voting in the EC (Brazil, Argentina, Japan, and NZ) though two (Japan and NZ) expressed caution about this. Two governments said GAC should be advisory only (Ireland/Denmark) and one (UK) said that the decision should be up to the GAC.
Of the 14 who addressed Rec 11: -- All who spoke to the issue supported the 2/3rd vote rejection rule. Some were silent -- Eight governments supported the current full consensus rule (Australia, NZ, UK, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Canada, and Denmark); five opposed it (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, India); one (Norway) noted lack of GAC consensus.
So my assessment is that a very small sample of 6 governments splits 2-1 in favor of a GAC voting role in the EC and a somewhat larger sample of 13 governments splits 8-5 in favor of ST18 and full consensus.
To be honest, I think that doesn't tell us much. There are 153 governments in the GAC. A sample of 10% probably says nothing about sentiment in that body. Nonetheless the data speak for themselves at least as far as they go.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 3:04 PM To: egmorris1@toast.net Cc: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Hi Ed
I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts).
But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all over again: that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation.
In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a consensus.
regards Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net>:
Hi Jorge,
Thanks for this.
I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As you've gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments and what percentage of GAC membership that represents?
Thanks,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Paul
I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique.
The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin.
This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments.
I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3.
Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
> Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>: > > May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current > split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11? > > The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the > question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word > but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some > members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One > also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC > members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want > Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus > language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too > far (they would be content with a majority requirement and > enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws). > > One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other > SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices > in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to > represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some > of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem > much less strident and committed than do the more frequent > participants in our discussion. > > I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the > GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual > split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it > were the case that every country in the world save my own were > supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my > objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case. > > Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the > GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are > radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached > consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack > of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment > of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto? > > Paul > > Paul Rosenzweig > paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 > VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 > Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 > Link to my PGP Key > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] > Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM > To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; > kdrazek@verisign.com > Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 > > I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative." > > You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process > and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between > GNSO and the GAC. > There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural > reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability > mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to > alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN. > > I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that > points the way toward a solution. > The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is > that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in > combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly > expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and > strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its > role by making it a part of the community mechanism. > > I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, > and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, > then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue. > > I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from > the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board > follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the > threshold for board rejection of GAC advice. > > I think we need to start from those propositions, not start > redesigning the policy process. > > --MM > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org >> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On >> Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty >> Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM >> To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com >> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org >> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 >> >>> On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: >>> it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that >>> without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. >>> >>> It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain >>> anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know >>> Rec >>> 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. >>> >>> So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted". >>> >>> Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO. >> >> >>> On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: >>> I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the >>> whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) >>> and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the >>> community as a whole. >> >> The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO. >> >> Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. >> Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a >> 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic >> of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a >> more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it >> really wanted. >> Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics. >> >> However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need >> for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. >> I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" >> in an attempt to find a solution. >> >> Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts: >> >> - from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that >> GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance >> of > government input. >> Such an assurance is necessary to them. >> >> - from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will >> automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual >> circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by >> government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them. >> >> With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule >> is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not >> with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its >> place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, >> without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes. >> >> I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for >> strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the >> decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does. >> >> I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own: >> >> * Remove the 2/3 rule; and >> * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is >> given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the >> Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and >> ready to be > ratified). >> Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting >> a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith). >> >> The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows: >> >> - By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it >> will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, >> rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore >> be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect >> GAC > expectations than at present. >> >> - By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community >> proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is >> expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and >> can only reject them by >> 2/3 supermajority. >> >> - By including the GAC in the policy-development process we >> strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" >> tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full >> respect at every level of the organisation. >> >> Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's >> role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder >> policy development process, rather than standing in tension with >> it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a >> true win-win > solution. >> >> I look forward to your thoughts, >> >> Malcolm. >> >> -- >> Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public >> Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet >> Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ >> >> London Internet Exchange Ltd >> Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ >> >> Company Registered in England No. 3137929 >> Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- >> Community@icann.org >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >> t >> y > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communit > y _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Hi, One thing to note on this is that the Board has lately been coming back to the GNSO while doing its advice considerations. While the process long allowed for it, until recently the Board did not consult with the GNSO while going through its negotiations with the GAC, or anyone else for that matter. Now it does. The GNSO has even initiated new recommendation and advice procedures for dealing with such requests for clarification and possibly change from the Board. So while very true in the past, it should no longer be the case that the GNSO recommendations are subordinated to the GAC advice. As currently practiced, the GNSO will have a voice in those discussions. Add to that the beginnings of the GAC and GAC members' increasing participation in the PDP working groups and we should have an improved situation that removes the feeling of the GNSO being subordinate to the GAC. avri On 31-Jan-16 15:52, Greg Shatan wrote:
I think a reason the GNSO is (or appears to be) subordinate to the GAC is that the GAC comes to the Board with its advice on GNSO recommendations after the GNSO has gone through months (or more likely, years) of work on its recommendations. The GAC then advises the Board on how the GNSO recommendations should be modified. If the Board doesn't agree, it then communes with the GAC to work things out, a discussion that the GNSO is rarely invited to.
In a sense, the GAC gets to be the "editor" of the GNSO, but not vice versa. If GAC advice becomes harder to reject, the corollary is that it becomes easier for the GAC to edit (or even "overrule") the GNSO.
The improvements in cooperation between the GAC and the GNSO, and the increase in GAC member participation in both CCWGs and gTLD policy recommendation processes, are likely to result in less advice by the GAC that modifies GNSO or cross-community policy recommendations.
Of course, there is always the danger of the "second bite"; if the GAC is not aligned with the consensus position in a policy recommendation outcome, it can turn its viewpoint into "GAC advice" and achieve its result that way. The more GAC participates in the process of developing recommendations, including the building of consensus, the more glaring second bite attempts will be. The GAC is alone in this power. No other SO/AC has quite this ability. An SO (or part thereof) and ALAC would need to resort to RfR/IRP or Empowered Community mechanisms to get a second bite. Arguably, SSAC and RSSAC would have this ability, but it is constrained by each AC's narrow technical mission.
I think this is all part of the undercurrent of these discussions. Terms like "subordinate" are probably too crude and pejorative to be of much use in discussing these issues. But the issues exist.
Greg
On Sat, Jan 30, 2016 at 6:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote:
Milton Pls kindly do not judge other of not understanding the issue. I fulléy understand the case. Malcolm wants to modify the current structure and functions of ICANN whether in your views GNSO is or is not sub ordinate of GAC ( WHICH i DO NOT BELIEVE SO ) . What I said was the proposal of Malcolm ,while quite positive was irelevant to the work we are doing ( accountability ) as it dioes propose restructuring with which I categorically object since it is outside of our mandate. Pls respect others Tks BEST REGARDS MY DEAR PROFESSOR
2016-01-30 23:56 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>:
Dear Paul
I feel that the consensus requirement was accepted in Dublin as another element of the GAC position agreed then (together with the 2/3 and other elements).
And as you know we actively participate in discussions and contribute to common ground proposals as much as wecan.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
> Am 30.01.2016 um 23:15 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>>: > > Sure Jorge > > I'll happily agree with you that everyone who spoke to the issue of the > 2/3rd vote that was a government (as opposed to the rest of the community) > supported it. > > In return, ought you not to acknowledge that the entire opposition to the > full consensus/ST18 proposal is exactly 5 countries? Nobody outside the GAC > affirmatively supports less than full consensus and many (most notably the > gNSO) actively opposes it. Ought you not to acknowledge that the tiny > minority of 5 dissenters is who is blocking consensus on that aspect of the > issue? > > And, since we are asking questions -- why didn't the government of > Switzerland submit comments? > > Paul > > Paul Rosenzweig > paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20547-0660> > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20329-9650> > VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20738-1739> > Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 > Link to my PGP Key > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>] > Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:40 PM > To: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> > Cc: egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 > > Dear Paul > > As I said I cannot and would not dare to speak for the GAC. > > But in any group where expressing one's opinion is not compulsory, normally > a majority does remain silent and those with a strong sentiment speak out, > factually "representing" in some way the main currents of thought in such a > group. > > I guess this happens all across the board and in all constituencies, as it > happens in our CCWG, where some of us (to varying degrees) cope a lot of the > conversations while the majority of the +150 (?) members and participants > are normally silent. > > So, I guess that based on this "voluntary" principle the data you mention on > the 2/3 element is significant, at least in showing that there seems not to > be any government considering that threshold as something they should object > (quite to the contrary it seems). And of the governments which participated > there is quite an interesting variety in regional terms. > > best regards > > Jorge > > Von meinem iPhone gesendet > >>> Am 30.01.2016 um 22:14 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig >> <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>>: >> >> Jorge >> >> I took you up on the implicit challenge and have just spent an hour > happily >> reading all of the government comments on CCWG-A Third Draft. I may > have >> missed a comment, but I don't think so. >> >> I can happily report the following to the community: >> >> 15 governments commented on the Third Draft report. Of those 14 >> addressed Rec 11 and 7 also addressed Rec 1. One government (Italy) >> addressed only Rec 2. >> >> Of the 7 who addressed Rec 1: 4 governments supported GAC voting in >> the EC (Brazil, Argentina, Japan, and NZ) though two (Japan and NZ) >> expressed caution about this. Two governments said GAC should be >> advisory only >> (Ireland/Denmark) and one (UK) said that the decision should be up to >> the GAC. >> >> Of the 14 who addressed Rec 11: >> -- All who spoke to the issue supported the 2/3rd vote >> rejection rule. Some were silent >> -- Eight governments supported the current full consensus rule >> (Australia, NZ, UK, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Canada, and Denmark); five >> opposed it (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, India); one (Norway) >> noted lack of GAC consensus. >> >> So my assessment is that a very small sample of 6 governments splits >> 2-1 in favor of a GAC voting role in the EC and a somewhat larger >> sample of 13 governments splits 8-5 in favor of ST18 and full consensus. >> >> To be honest, I think that doesn't tell us much. There are 153 >> governments in the GAC. A sample of 10% probably says nothing about >> sentiment in that body. Nonetheless the data speak for themselves at > least as far as they go. >> >> Paul >> >> Paul Rosenzweig >> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> >> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20547-0660> >> M: +1 (202) 329-9650 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20329-9650> >> VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20738-1739> >> Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 >> Link to my PGP Key >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>] >> Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 3:04 PM >> To: egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net> >> Cc: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>; >> accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> >> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 >> >> Hi Ed >> >> I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the >> public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their >> ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts). >> >> But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and >> extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all > over again: >> that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation. >> >> In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus >> threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a > consensus. >> >> regards >> Jorge >> >> Von meinem iPhone gesendet >> >>> Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>>: >>> >>> Hi Jorge, >>> >>> Thanks for this. >>> >>> I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As >>> you've >> gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so >> kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments >> and what percentage of GAC membership that represents? >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Ed Morris >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>>> On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> >> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Dear Paul >>>> >>>> I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input >>>> on >> ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique. >>>> >>>> The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they >>>> basically >> thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining >> consensus"-element agreed in Dublin. >>>> >>>> This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public >>>> comment >> period on the third draft report by governments. >>>> >>>> I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments >>>> and >> I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because >> it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would >> actively disagree with the 2/3. >>>> >>>> Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I >>>> have >> missed something. >>>> >>>> regards >>>> >>>> Jorge >>>> >>>> Von meinem iPhone gesendet >>>> >>>>> Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig >> <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>>: >>>>> >>>>> May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current >>>>> split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11? >>>>> >>>>> The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the >>>>> question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word >>>>> but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some >>>>> members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One >>>>> also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC >>>>> members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want >>>>> Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus >>>>> language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too >>>>> far (they would be content with a majority requirement and >>>>> enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws). >>>>> >>>>> One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other >>>>> SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices >>>>> in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to >>>>> represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some >>>>> of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem >>>>> much less strident and committed than do the more frequent >>>>> participants >> in our discussion. >>>>> >>>>> I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the >>>>> GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual >>>>> split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it >>>>> were the case that every country in the world save my own were >>>>> supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my >>>>> objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case. >>>>> >>>>> Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the >>>>> GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are >>>>> radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached >>>>> consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack >>>>> of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment >>>>> of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for > objections thereto? >>>>> >>>>> Paul >>>>> >>>>> Paul Rosenzweig >>>>> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> >>>>> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20547-0660> >>>>> M: +1 (202) 329-9650 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20329-9650> >>>>> VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20738-1739> >>>>> Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 >>>>> Link to my PGP Key >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu <mailto:milton@gatech.edu>] >>>>> Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM >>>>> To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net <mailto:malcolm@linx.net>>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>; >>>>> kdrazek@verisign.com <mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com> >>>>> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> >>>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 >>>>> >>>>> I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative." >>>>> >>>>> You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process >>>>> and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between >>>>> GNSO and >> the GAC. >>>>> There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural >>>>> reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability >>>>> mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to >>>>> alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN. >>>>> >>>>> I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that >>>>> points the way toward a solution. >>>>> The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is >>>>> that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in >>>>> combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly >>>>> expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and >>>>> strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its >>>>> role by making it a part of the community mechanism. >>>>> >>>>> I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, >>>>> and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, >>>>> then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue. >>>>> >>>>> I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from >>>>> the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board >>>>> follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the >>>>> threshold for board rejection of GAC advice. >>>>> >>>>> I think we need to start from those propositions, not start >>>>> redesigning the policy process. >>>>> >>>>> --MM >>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> >>>>>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On >>>>>> Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty >>>>>> Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM >>>>>> To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>; kdrazek@verisign.com <mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com> >>>>>> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> >>>>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote: >>>>>>> it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that >>>>>>> without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain >>>>>>> anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know >>>>>>> Rec >>>>>>> 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote: >>>>>>> I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the >>>>>>> whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) >>>>>>> and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the >>>>>>> community >> as a whole. >>>>>> >>>>>> The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO. >>>>>> >>>>>> Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. >>>>>> Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a >>>>>> 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic >>>>>> of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a >>>>>> more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it >>>>>> really >> wanted. >>>>>> Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics. >>>>>> >>>>>> However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need >>>>>> for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. >>>>>> I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" >>>>>> in an attempt to find a solution. >>>>>> >>>>>> Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts: >>>>>> >>>>>> - from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that >>>>>> GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance >>>>>> of >>>>> government input. >>>>>> Such an assurance is necessary to them. >>>>>> >>>>>> - from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will >>>>>> automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual >>>>>> circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by >>>>>> government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them. >>>>>> >>>>>> With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule >>>>>> is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not >>>>>> with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its >>>>>> place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, >>>>>> without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for >>>>>> strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the >>>>>> decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does. >>>>>> >>>>>> I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own: >>>>>> >>>>>> * Remove the 2/3 rule; and >>>>>> * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is >>>>>> given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the >>>>>> Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and >>>>>> ready to be >>>>> ratified). >>>>>> Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting >>>>>> a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith). >>>>>> >>>>>> The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows: >>>>>> >>>>>> - By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it >>>>>> will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, >>>>>> rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore >>>>>> be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect >>>>>> GAC >>>>> expectations than at present. >>>>>> >>>>>> - By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community >>>>>> proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is >>>>>> expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and >>>>>> can only reject them by >>>>>> 2/3 supermajority. >>>>>> >>>>>> - By including the GAC in the policy-development process we >>>>>> strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the >> "them and us" >>>>>> tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full >>>>>> respect at every level of the organisation. >>>>>> >>>>>> Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's >>>>>> role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder >>>>>> policy development process, rather than standing in tension with >>>>>> it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a >>>>>> true win-win >>>>> solution. >>>>>> >>>>>> I look forward to your thoughts, >>>>>> >>>>>> Malcolm. >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 <tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523> Head of Public >>>>>> Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet >>>>>> Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ >>>>>> >>>>>> London Internet Exchange Ltd >>>>>> Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ >>>>>> >>>>>> Company Registered in England No. 3137929 >>>>>> Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- >>>>>> Community@icann.org <mailto:Community@icann.org> >>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >>>>>> t >>>>>> y >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> >>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communit >>>>> y >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community > _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Dear Grec, Dear Milton Dear All, Your analysis is an exageration of the situation. I do not share your views that GAC is editor of GNSO.This type of analysis is provocative and helpless. What I said and repeating now is ,any such discussion is outside the mandate and terms of refernce of CCWG. Regards Kavouss 2016-01-31 22:26 GMT+01:00 Avri Doria <avri@acm.org>:
Hi,
One thing to note on this is that the Board has lately been coming back to the GNSO while doing its advice considerations. While the process long allowed for it, until recently the Board did not consult with the GNSO while going through its negotiations with the GAC, or anyone else for that matter. Now it does. The GNSO has even initiated new recommendation and advice procedures for dealing with such requests for clarification and possibly change from the Board.
So while very true in the past, it should no longer be the case that the GNSO recommendations are subordinated to the GAC advice. As currently practiced, the GNSO will have a voice in those discussions. Add to that the beginnings of the GAC and GAC members' increasing participation in the PDP working groups and we should have an improved situation that removes the feeling of the GNSO being subordinate to the GAC.
avri
On 31-Jan-16 15:52, Greg Shatan wrote:
I think a reason the GNSO is (or appears to be) subordinate to the GAC is that the GAC comes to the Board with its advice on GNSO recommendations after the GNSO has gone through months (or more likely, years) of work on its recommendations. The GAC then advises the Board on how the GNSO recommendations should be modified. If the Board doesn't agree, it then communes with the GAC to work things out, a discussion that the GNSO is rarely invited to.
In a sense, the GAC gets to be the "editor" of the GNSO, but not vice versa. If GAC advice becomes harder to reject, the corollary is that it becomes easier for the GAC to edit (or even "overrule") the GNSO.
The improvements in cooperation between the GAC and the GNSO, and the increase in GAC member participation in both CCWGs and gTLD policy recommendation processes, are likely to result in less advice by the GAC that modifies GNSO or cross-community policy recommendations.
Of course, there is always the danger of the "second bite"; if the GAC is not aligned with the consensus position in a policy recommendation outcome, it can turn its viewpoint into "GAC advice" and achieve its result that way. The more GAC participates in the process of developing recommendations, including the building of consensus, the more glaring second bite attempts will be. The GAC is alone in this power. No other SO/AC has quite this ability. An SO (or part thereof) and ALAC would need to resort to RfR/IRP or Empowered Community mechanisms to get a second bite. Arguably, SSAC and RSSAC would have this ability, but it is constrained by each AC's narrow technical mission.
I think this is all part of the undercurrent of these discussions. Terms like "subordinate" are probably too crude and pejorative to be of much use in discussing these issues. But the issues exist.
Greg
On Sat, Jan 30, 2016 at 6:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote:
Milton Pls kindly do not judge other of not understanding the issue. I fulléy understand the case. Malcolm wants to modify the current structure and functions of ICANN whether in your views GNSO is or is not sub ordinate of GAC ( WHICH i DO NOT BELIEVE SO ) . What I said was the proposal of Malcolm ,while quite positive was irelevant to the work we are doing ( accountability ) as it dioes propose restructuring with which I categorically object since it is outside of our mandate. Pls respect others Tks BEST REGARDS MY DEAR PROFESSOR
2016-01-30 23:56 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>:
Dear Paul
I feel that the consensus requirement was accepted in Dublin as another element of the GAC position agreed then (together with the 2/3 and other elements).
And as you know we actively participate in discussions and contribute to common ground proposals as much as wecan.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
> Am 30.01.2016 um 23:15 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>>: > > Sure Jorge > > I'll happily agree with you that everyone who spoke to the issue of the > 2/3rd vote that was a government (as opposed to the rest of the community) > supported it. > > In return, ought you not to acknowledge that the entire opposition to the > full consensus/ST18 proposal is exactly 5 countries? Nobody outside the GAC > affirmatively supports less than full consensus and many (most notably the > gNSO) actively opposes it. Ought you not to acknowledge that the tiny > minority of 5 dissenters is who is blocking consensus on that aspect of the > issue? > > And, since we are asking questions -- why didn't the government of > Switzerland submit comments? > > Paul > > Paul Rosenzweig > paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20547-0660> > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20329-9650> > VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20738-1739> > Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 > Link to my PGP Key > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>] > Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:40 PM > To: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> > Cc: egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 > > Dear Paul > > As I said I cannot and would not dare to speak for the GAC. > > But in any group where expressing one's opinion is not compulsory, normally > a majority does remain silent and those with a strong sentiment speak out, > factually "representing" in some way the main currents of thought in such a > group. > > I guess this happens all across the board and in all constituencies, as it > happens in our CCWG, where some of us (to varying degrees) cope a lot of the > conversations while the majority of the +150 (?) members and participants > are normally silent. > > So, I guess that based on this "voluntary" principle the data you mention on > the 2/3 element is significant, at least in showing that there seems not to > be any government considering that threshold as something they should object > (quite to the contrary it seems). And of the governments which participated > there is quite an interesting variety in regional terms. > > best regards > > Jorge > > Von meinem iPhone gesendet > >>> Am 30.01.2016 um 22:14 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig >> <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>>: >> >> Jorge >> >> I took you up on the implicit challenge and have just spent an hour > happily >> reading all of the government comments on CCWG-A Third Draft. I may > have >> missed a comment, but I don't think so. >> >> I can happily report the following to the community: >> >> 15 governments commented on the Third Draft report. Of those 14 >> addressed Rec 11 and 7 also addressed Rec 1. One government (Italy) >> addressed only Rec 2. >> >> Of the 7 who addressed Rec 1: 4 governments supported GAC voting in >> the EC (Brazil, Argentina, Japan, and NZ) though two (Japan and NZ) >> expressed caution about this. Two governments said GAC should be >> advisory only >> (Ireland/Denmark) and one (UK) said that the decision should be up to >> the GAC. >> >> Of the 14 who addressed Rec 11: >> -- All who spoke to the issue supported the 2/3rd vote >> rejection rule. Some were silent >> -- Eight governments supported the current full consensus rule >> (Australia, NZ, UK, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Canada, and Denmark); five >> opposed it (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, India); one (Norway) >> noted lack of GAC consensus. >> >> So my assessment is that a very small sample of 6 governments splits >> 2-1 in favor of a GAC voting role in the EC and a somewhat larger >> sample of 13 governments splits 8-5 in favor of ST18 and full consensus. >> >> To be honest, I think that doesn't tell us much. There are 153 >> governments in the GAC. A sample of 10% probably says nothing about >> sentiment in that body. Nonetheless the data speak for themselves at > least as far as they go. >> >> Paul >> >> Paul Rosenzweig >> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> >> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20547-0660> >> M: +1 (202) 329-9650 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20329-9650> >> VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20738-1739> >> Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 >> Link to my PGP Key >> >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>] >> Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 3:04 PM >> To: egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net> >> Cc: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>; >> accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> >> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 >> >> Hi Ed >> >> I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the >> public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their >> ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts). >> >> But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and >> extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all > over again: >> that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation. >> >> In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus >> threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a > consensus. >> >> regards >> Jorge >> >> Von meinem iPhone gesendet >> >>> Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>>: >>> >>> Hi Jorge, >>> >>> Thanks for this. >>> >>> I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As >>> you've >> gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so >> kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments >> and what percentage of GAC membership that represents? >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Ed Morris >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>>> On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> >> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Dear Paul >>>> >>>> I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input >>>> on >> ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique. >>>> >>>> The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they >>>> basically >> thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining >> consensus"-element agreed in Dublin. >>>> >>>> This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public >>>> comment >> period on the third draft report by governments. >>>> >>>> I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments >>>> and >> I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because >> it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would >> actively disagree with the 2/3. >>>> >>>> Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I >>>> have >> missed something. >>>> >>>> regards >>>> >>>> Jorge >>>> >>>> Von meinem iPhone gesendet >>>> >>>>> Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig >> <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>>: >>>>> >>>>> May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current >>>>> split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11? >>>>> >>>>> The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the >>>>> question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word >>>>> but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some >>>>> members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One >>>>> also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC >>>>> members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want >>>>> Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus >>>>> language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too >>>>> far (they would be content with a majority requirement and >>>>> enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws). >>>>> >>>>> One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other >>>>> SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices >>>>> in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to >>>>> represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some >>>>> of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem >>>>> much less strident and committed than do the more frequent >>>>> participants >> in our discussion. >>>>> >>>>> I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the >>>>> GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual >>>>> split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it >>>>> were the case that every country in the world save my own were >>>>> supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my >>>>> objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case. >>>>> >>>>> Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the >>>>> GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are >>>>> radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached >>>>> consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack >>>>> of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment >>>>> of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for > objections thereto? >>>>> >>>>> Paul >>>>> >>>>> Paul Rosenzweig >>>>> paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> >>>>> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20547-0660> >>>>> M: +1 (202) 329-9650 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20329-9650> >>>>> VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20738-1739> >>>>> Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 >>>>> Link to my PGP Key >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu <mailto:milton@gatech.edu>] >>>>> Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM >>>>> To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net <mailto:malcolm@linx.net>>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>; >>>>> kdrazek@verisign.com <mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com> >>>>> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> >>>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 >>>>> >>>>> I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative." >>>>> >>>>> You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process >>>>> and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between >>>>> GNSO and >> the GAC. >>>>> There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural >>>>> reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability >>>>> mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to >>>>> alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN. >>>>> >>>>> I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that >>>>> points the way toward a solution. >>>>> The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is >>>>> that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in >>>>> combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly >>>>> expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and >>>>> strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its >>>>> role by making it a part of the community mechanism. >>>>> >>>>> I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, >>>>> and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, >>>>> then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue. >>>>> >>>>> I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from >>>>> the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board >>>>> follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the >>>>> threshold for board rejection of GAC advice. >>>>> >>>>> I think we need to start from those propositions, not start >>>>> redesigning the policy process. >>>>> >>>>> --MM >>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> >>>>>> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On >>>>>> Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty >>>>>> Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM >>>>>> To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>; kdrazek@verisign.com <mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com> >>>>>> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> >>>>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote: >>>>>>> it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that >>>>>>> without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain >>>>>>> anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know >>>>>>> Rec >>>>>>> 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote: >>>>>>> I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the >>>>>>> whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) >>>>>>> and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the >>>>>>> community >> as a whole. >>>>>> >>>>>> The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO. >>>>>> >>>>>> Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. >>>>>> Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a >>>>>> 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic >>>>>> of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a >>>>>> more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it >>>>>> really >> wanted. >>>>>> Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics. >>>>>> >>>>>> However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need >>>>>> for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. >>>>>> I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" >>>>>> in an attempt to find a solution. >>>>>> >>>>>> Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts: >>>>>> >>>>>> - from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that >>>>>> GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance >>>>>> of >>>>> government input. >>>>>> Such an assurance is necessary to them. >>>>>> >>>>>> - from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will >>>>>> automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual >>>>>> circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by >>>>>> government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them. >>>>>> >>>>>> With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule >>>>>> is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not >>>>>> with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its >>>>>> place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, >>>>>> without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for >>>>>> strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the >>>>>> decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does. >>>>>> >>>>>> I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own: >>>>>> >>>>>> * Remove the 2/3 rule; and >>>>>> * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is >>>>>> given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the >>>>>> Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and >>>>>> ready to be >>>>> ratified). >>>>>> Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting >>>>>> a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith). >>>>>> >>>>>> The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows: >>>>>> >>>>>> - By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it >>>>>> will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, >>>>>> rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore >>>>>> be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect >>>>>> GAC >>>>> expectations than at present. >>>>>> >>>>>> - By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community >>>>>> proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is >>>>>> expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and >>>>>> can only reject them by >>>>>> 2/3 supermajority. >>>>>> >>>>>> - By including the GAC in the policy-development process we >>>>>> strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the >> "them and us" >>>>>> tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full >>>>>> respect at every level of the organisation. >>>>>> >>>>>> Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's >>>>>> role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder >>>>>> policy development process, rather than standing in tension with >>>>>> it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a >>>>>> true win-win >>>>> solution. >>>>>> >>>>>> I look forward to your thoughts, >>>>>> >>>>>> Malcolm. >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 <tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523> Head of Public >>>>>> Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet >>>>>> Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ >>>>>> >>>>>> London Internet Exchange Ltd >>>>>> Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ >>>>>> >>>>>> Company Registered in England No. 3137929 >>>>>> Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- >>>>>> Community@icann.org <mailto:Community@icann.org> >>>>>>
https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi
>>>>>> t >>>>>> y >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list >>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> >>>>>
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Dear Avri Thanks for analysis of the matter Two persons went too far in exaggerating the case. On the other hand CCWG must remained within and respects its mandate Regards Kavouss Sent from my iPhone
On 31 Jan 2016, at 22:26, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
Hi,
One thing to note on this is that the Board has lately been coming back to the GNSO while doing its advice considerations. While the process long allowed for it, until recently the Board did not consult with the GNSO while going through its negotiations with the GAC, or anyone else for that matter. Now it does. The GNSO has even initiated new recommendation and advice procedures for dealing with such requests for clarification and possibly change from the Board.
So while very true in the past, it should no longer be the case that the GNSO recommendations are subordinated to the GAC advice. As currently practiced, the GNSO will have a voice in those discussions. Add to that the beginnings of the GAC and GAC members' increasing participation in the PDP working groups and we should have an improved situation that removes the feeling of the GNSO being subordinate to the GAC.
avri
On 31-Jan-16 15:52, Greg Shatan wrote: I think a reason the GNSO is (or appears to be) subordinate to the GAC is that the GAC comes to the Board with its advice on GNSO recommendations after the GNSO has gone through months (or more likely, years) of work on its recommendations. The GAC then advises the Board on how the GNSO recommendations should be modified. If the Board doesn't agree, it then communes with the GAC to work things out, a discussion that the GNSO is rarely invited to.
In a sense, the GAC gets to be the "editor" of the GNSO, but not vice versa. If GAC advice becomes harder to reject, the corollary is that it becomes easier for the GAC to edit (or even "overrule") the GNSO.
The improvements in cooperation between the GAC and the GNSO, and the increase in GAC member participation in both CCWGs and gTLD policy recommendation processes, are likely to result in less advice by the GAC that modifies GNSO or cross-community policy recommendations.
Of course, there is always the danger of the "second bite"; if the GAC is not aligned with the consensus position in a policy recommendation outcome, it can turn its viewpoint into "GAC advice" and achieve its result that way. The more GAC participates in the process of developing recommendations, including the building of consensus, the more glaring second bite attempts will be. The GAC is alone in this power. No other SO/AC has quite this ability. An SO (or part thereof) and ALAC would need to resort to RfR/IRP or Empowered Community mechanisms to get a second bite. Arguably, SSAC and RSSAC would have this ability, but it is constrained by each AC's narrow technical mission.
I think this is all part of the undercurrent of these discussions. Terms like "subordinate" are probably too crude and pejorative to be of much use in discussing these issues. But the issues exist.
Greg
On Sat, Jan 30, 2016 at 6:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote:
Milton Pls kindly do not judge other of not understanding the issue. I fulléy understand the case. Malcolm wants to modify the current structure and functions of ICANN whether in your views GNSO is or is not sub ordinate of GAC ( WHICH i DO NOT BELIEVE SO ) . What I said was the proposal of Malcolm ,while quite positive was irelevant to the work we are doing ( accountability ) as it dioes propose restructuring with which I categorically object since it is outside of our mandate. Pls respect others Tks BEST REGARDS MY DEAR PROFESSOR
2016-01-30 23:56 GMT+01:00 <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>>:
Dear Paul
I feel that the consensus requirement was accepted in Dublin as another element of the GAC position agreed then (together with the 2/3 and other elements).
And as you know we actively participate in discussions and contribute to common ground proposals as much as wecan.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 23:15 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>>:
Sure Jorge
I'll happily agree with you that everyone who spoke to the issue of the 2/3rd vote that was a government (as opposed to the rest of the community) supported it.
In return, ought you not to acknowledge that the entire opposition to the full consensus/ST18 proposal is exactly 5 countries? Nobody outside the GAC affirmatively supports less than full consensus and many (most notably the gNSO) actively opposes it. Ought you not to acknowledge that the tiny minority of 5 dissenters is who is blocking consensus on that aspect of the issue?
And, since we are asking questions -- why didn't the government of Switzerland submit comments?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20547-0660> M: +1 (202) 329-9650 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20329-9650> VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20738-1739> Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:40 PM To: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> Cc: egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Dear Paul
As I said I cannot and would not dare to speak for the GAC.
But in any group where expressing one's opinion is not compulsory, normally a majority does remain silent and those with a strong sentiment speak out, factually "representing" in some way the main currents of thought in such a group.
I guess this happens all across the board and in all constituencies, as it happens in our CCWG, where some of us (to varying degrees) cope a lot of the conversations while the majority of the +150 (?) members and participants are normally silent.
So, I guess that based on this "voluntary" principle the data you mention on the 2/3 element is significant, at least in showing that there seems not to be any government considering that threshold as something they should object (quite to the contrary it seems). And of the governments which participated there is quite an interesting variety in regional terms.
best regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 22:14 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>>:
Jorge
I took you up on the implicit challenge and have just spent an hour happily reading all of the government comments on CCWG-A Third Draft. I may have missed a comment, but I don't think so.
I can happily report the following to the community:
15 governments commented on the Third Draft report. Of those 14 addressed Rec 11 and 7 also addressed Rec 1. One government (Italy) addressed only Rec 2.
Of the 7 who addressed Rec 1: 4 governments supported GAC voting in the EC (Brazil, Argentina, Japan, and NZ) though two (Japan and NZ) expressed caution about this. Two governments said GAC should be advisory only (Ireland/Denmark) and one (UK) said that the decision should be up to the GAC.
Of the 14 who addressed Rec 11: -- All who spoke to the issue supported the 2/3rd vote rejection rule. Some were silent -- Eight governments supported the current full consensus rule (Australia, NZ, UK, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Canada, and Denmark); five opposed it (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, India); one (Norway) noted lack of GAC consensus.
So my assessment is that a very small sample of 6 governments splits 2-1 in favor of a GAC voting role in the EC and a somewhat larger sample of 13 governments splits 8-5 in favor of ST18 and full consensus.
To be honest, I think that doesn't tell us much. There are 153 governments in the GAC. A sample of 10% probably says nothing about sentiment in that body. Nonetheless the data speak for themselves at least as far as they go.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> O: +1 (202) 547-0660 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20547-0660> M: +1 (202) 329-9650 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20329-9650> VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20738-1739> Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 3:04 PM To: egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net> Cc: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>; accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Hi Ed
I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts).
But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all over again: that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation.
In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a consensus.
regards Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net <mailto:egmorris1@toast.net>>:
Hi Jorge,
Thanks for this.
I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As you've gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments and what percentage of GAC membership that represents?
Thanks,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>> wrote:
Dear Paul
I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique.
The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin.
This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments.
I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3.
Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
> Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>>: > > May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current > split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11? > > The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the > question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word > but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some > members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One > also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC > members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want > Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus > language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too > far (they would be content with a majority requirement and > enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws). > > One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other > SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices > in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to > represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some > of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem > much less strident and committed than do the more frequent > participants in our discussion. > > I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the > GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual > split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it > were the case that every country in the world save my own were > supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my > objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case. > > Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the > GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are > radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached > consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack > of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment > of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto? > > Paul > > Paul Rosenzweig > paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com <mailto:paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com> > O: +1 (202) 547-0660 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20547-0660> > M: +1 (202) 329-9650 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20329-9650> > VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 <tel:%2B1%20%28202%29%20738-1739> > Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 > Link to my PGP Key > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu <mailto:milton@gatech.edu>] > Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM > To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net <mailto:malcolm@linx.net>>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>; > kdrazek@verisign.com <mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com> > Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> > Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 > > I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative." > > You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process > and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between > GNSO and the GAC. > There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural > reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability > mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to > alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN. > > I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that > points the way toward a solution. > The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is > that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in > combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly > expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and > strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its > role by making it a part of the community mechanism. > > I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, > and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, > then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue. > > I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from > the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board > follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the > threshold for board rejection of GAC advice. > > I think we need to start from those propositions, not start > redesigning the policy process. > > --MM > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>] On >> Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty >> Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM >> To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch>; kdrazek@verisign.com <mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com> >> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org> >> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11 >> >>> On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote: >>> it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that >>> without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. >>> >>> It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain >>> anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know >>> Rec >>> 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. >>> >>> So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted". >>> >>> Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO. >> >> >>> On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch <mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote: >>> I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the >>> whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) >>> and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the >>> community as a whole. >> >> The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO. >> >> Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. >> Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a >> 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic >> of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a >> more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it >> really wanted. >> Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics. >> >> However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need >> for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. >> I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" >> in an attempt to find a solution. >> >> Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts: >> >> - from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that >> GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance >> of > government input. >> Such an assurance is necessary to them. >> >> - from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will >> automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual >> circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by >> government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them. >> >> With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule >> is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not >> with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its >> place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, >> without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes. >> >> I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for >> strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the >> decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does. >> >> I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own: >> >> * Remove the 2/3 rule; and >> * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is >> given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the >> Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and >> ready to be > ratified). >> Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting >> a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith). >> >> The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows: >> >> - By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it >> will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, >> rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore >> be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect >> GAC > expectations than at present. >> >> - By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community >> proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is >> expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and >> can only reject them by >> 2/3 supermajority. >> >> - By including the GAC in the policy-development process we >> strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" >> tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full >> respect at every level of the organisation. >> >> Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's >> role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder >> policy development process, rather than standing in tension with >> it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a >> true win-win > solution. >> >> I look forward to your thoughts, >> >> Malcolm. >> >> -- >> Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 <tel:%2B44%2020%207645%203523> Head of Public >> Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet >> Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ >> >> London Internet Exchange Ltd >> Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ >> >> Company Registered in England No. 3137929 >> Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross- >> Community@icann.org <mailto:Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communi >> t >> y > _______________________________________________ > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list > Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-communit > y _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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Dear Paul Tks for yr survey But ,,,,,?!!! I will tell you off list provided you take it as a private and personal message Kavousd Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 22:40, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Paul
As I said I cannot and would not dare to speak for the GAC.
But in any group where expressing one's opinion is not compulsory, normally a majority does remain silent and those with a strong sentiment speak out, factually "representing" in some way the main currents of thought in such a group.
I guess this happens all across the board and in all constituencies, as it happens in our CCWG, where some of us (to varying degrees) cope a lot of the conversations while the majority of the +150 (?) members and participants are normally silent.
So, I guess that based on this "voluntary" principle the data you mention on the 2/3 element is significant, at least in showing that there seems not to be any government considering that threshold as something they should object (quite to the contrary it seems). And of the governments which participated there is quite an interesting variety in regional terms.
best regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 22:14 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
Jorge
I took you up on the implicit challenge and have just spent an hour happily reading all of the government comments on CCWG-A Third Draft. I may have missed a comment, but I don't think so.
I can happily report the following to the community:
15 governments commented on the Third Draft report. Of those 14 addressed Rec 11 and 7 also addressed Rec 1. One government (Italy) addressed only Rec 2.
Of the 7 who addressed Rec 1: 4 governments supported GAC voting in the EC (Brazil, Argentina, Japan, and NZ) though two (Japan and NZ) expressed caution about this. Two governments said GAC should be advisory only (Ireland/Denmark) and one (UK) said that the decision should be up to the GAC.
Of the 14 who addressed Rec 11: -- All who spoke to the issue supported the 2/3rd vote rejection rule. Some were silent -- Eight governments supported the current full consensus rule (Australia, NZ, UK, Japan, Sweden, Ireland, Canada, and Denmark); five opposed it (Brazil, France, Argentina, Portugal, India); one (Norway) noted lack of GAC consensus.
So my assessment is that a very small sample of 6 governments splits 2-1 in favor of a GAC voting role in the EC and a somewhat larger sample of 13 governments splits 8-5 in favor of ST18 and full consensus.
To be honest, I think that doesn't tell us much. There are 153 governments in the GAC. A sample of 10% probably says nothing about sentiment in that body. Nonetheless the data speak for themselves at least as far as they go.
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 3:04 PM To: egmorris1@toast.net Cc: paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
Hi Ed
I don't know the numbers by heart, but I'll guess they are on the public comment sheet produced by staff (actually I just saw in their ppt that out of 90 comments 17% come from govts).
But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all over again: that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation.
In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a consensus.
regards Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:54 schrieb Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net>:
Hi Jorge,
Thanks for this.
I believe the GAC has around 140 members, give or take a few. As you've gone through all the public comments filed by governments would be so kind as to us know how many governments actually filed public comments and what percentage of GAC membership that represents?
Thanks,
Ed Morris
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:46, <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Paul
I cannot speak for the GAC of course, but the last consensus input on ST18 we had was the Dublin Communique.
The subsequent Rec 11 did not satisfy some governments, as they basically thought that it did not comply with the "autonomy in defining consensus"-element agreed in Dublin.
This may be checked with the comments filed in the third public comment period on the third draft report by governments.
I think I have gone through all public comments filed by governments and I'm not aware of any position rejecting or objecting to Rec 11 because it would consider that it went "too far" i.e. because they would actively disagree with the 2/3.
Other colleagues may of course correct and/or complement me if I have missed something.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 30.01.2016 um 20:19 schrieb Paul Rosenzweig <paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com>:
May I ask a question -- is the GAC willing to disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec 11?
The last we heard was that the GAC had not reached consensus on the question. One infers (I think infer is actually too soft a word but I use it to be certain I am not overstating the case) that some members of the GAC support Rec 11 as written and some do not. One also suspects (though here I am less certain) that some of the GAC members oppose Rec 11 because it does not go far enough (they want Rec 11 plus more (e.g. removal of the consensus language)) while others do not support Rec 11 because it goes too far (they would be content with a majority requirement and enshrining the status quo consensus rule in the bylaws).
One of the issues we have with the GAC is that unlike the other SO/ACs it is uniquely non-transparent. That means that the voices in our discussion that are the most frequent can be thought to represent the GAC majority. Perhaps they are. Yet every time some of the less frequent voices from GAC speak in this forum they seem much less strident and committed than do the more frequent participants in our discussion.
I fear that the result of this is that we are misperceiving the GAC's true intentions, or more accurately, misperceiving the actual split of opinion within the GAC. To be honest, if, in fact, it were the case that every country in the world save my own were supporting Rec 11, I would be more inclined to relinquish my objection. But my strong suspicion is that this is not the case.
Put another way, some have recently said we are "disrespecting" the GAC or ignoring its wishes. But, as of now its wishes are radically unclear -- all it says is "we have not reached consensus." In the interests of clarifying the nature of that lack of consensus, would the GAC be willing to disclose its assessment of the relative support for Rec 11 and the relative support for objections thereto?
Paul
Paul Rosenzweig paul.rosenzweig@redbranchconsulting.com O: +1 (202) 547-0660 M: +1 (202) 329-9650 VOIP: +1 (202) 738-1739 Skype: paul.rosenzweig1066 Link to my PGP Key
-----Original Message----- From: Mueller, Milton L [mailto:milton@gatech.edu] Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 1:50 PM To: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm@linx.net>; Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
I'm sorry, Malcolm, but this is a bit too "creative."
You are proposing to restructure the entire ICANN policy process and to alter in a fairly fundamental way the relationship between GNSO and the GAC. There is a lot of merit in your idea as a general procedural reform, but the point of this exercise is to create accountability mechanisms that substitute for the oversight of the USG, not to alter the policy development process or to redesign all of ICANN.
I think Ed Morris's message was a more positive contribution that points the way toward a solution. The problem is not the 2/3 threshold in isolation, the problem is that certain aspects of the CCWG 3rd draft, when looked at in combination, are changing the role of the GAC in ways greatly expand its power over the policy process, because they retain and strengthen the privileges of its old role while also changing its role by making it a part of the community mechanism.
I agree with Ed: if GAC is not part of the community mechanism, and/or is not exempted from the same reviews as other ACs and SOs, then the 2/3 threshold becomes much less of an issue.
I agree with Becky's more modest proposal: if GAC is removed from the community mechanism appeals that pertain to whether the board follows GAC advice, then there is less worry about raising the threshold for board rejection of GAC advice.
I think we need to start from those propositions, not start redesigning the policy process.
--MM
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Malcolm Hutty Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:50 AM To: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch; kdrazek@verisign.com Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Creative solutions for Rec.11
> On 29/01/2016 21:24, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: > it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that > without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. > > It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain > anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec > 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. > > So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted". > > Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
> On 29/01/2016 22:01, Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch wrote: > I feel that at this critical juncture we all have to keep the > whole picture in our heads, be creative (as Becky for instance) > and look for a solution which may be acceptable across the community as a whole.
The 2/3 rule is evidently unacceptable to the GNSO.
Without that rule, Rec.11 would (it seems) be acceptable to them. Jorge says "But this is their starting position, it would mean a 100% win-situation for the GNSO". I might observe that the logic of that seems to be that GNSO ought to have come to CCWG with a more extreme initial position, so that it could settle on what it really wanted. Perhaps it will learn to adapt its negotiating tactics.
However, I do agree with Jorge: we need to try to respect the need for all parties to be seen to gain improvements from our changes. I would therefore like us to take up his challenge to "be creative" in an attempt to find a solution.
Let us consider what the 2/3 rule attempts:
- from a government point of view, it provides an assurance that GAC advice will be given greater weight, affirming the importance of government input. Such an assurance is necessary to them.
- from a GNSO point of view, it ensures that the Board will automatically follow GAC advice (except in very unusual circumstances) transforming ICANN into a body which is led by government policy. Such a transformation is unacceptable to them.
With GNSO opposition, I believe we must accept that the 2/3 rule is dead. But taking up Jorge's challenge, we must replace it not with nothing, but with something creative that would offer in its place the assurance to governments the 2/3 rule seeks to achieve, without creating the transformation that the GNSO opposes.
I think it would be useful if people come forward with ideas for strengthening the input of governments without overbalancing the decision-making process as the 2/3 rule does.
I would therefore like to make the following suggestion of my own:
* Remove the 2/3 rule; and * Provide that when providing advice on GNSO policy, GAC advice is given directly to the GNSO (during the PDP) instead of to the Board, (after the community consensus policy is finalised and ready to be ratified). Require that the GNSO consider any such GAC advice before adopting a PDP policy. (This is conceptual: lawyers can wordsmith).
The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, are as follows:
- By accepting GAC advice into an earlier stage of the process, it will be possible to incorporate it into the design of the policy, rather than tacking it on as an adjunct. GAC advice will therefore be more effective and the ultimate outcome more likely to reflect GAC expectations than at present.
- By incorporating the fruits of GAC advice into the community proposal, it will also benefit from the rule that the Board is expected to accept GNSO community consensus policy proposals, and can only reject them by 2/3 supermajority.
- By including the GAC in the policy-development process we strengthen the GAC's role as a part of our community, reducing the "them and us" tensions and helping to ensure that GAC concerns are given full respect at every level of the organisation.
Most importantly, this suggestions aims to strengthen the GAC's role in a manner that also strengthens the multi-stakeholder policy development process, rather than standing in tension with it. It can therefore be seen not as a zero-sum compromise but a true win-win solution.
I look forward to your thoughts,
Malcolm.
-- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/
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Hi Jorge, Thanks for your response and the conversation. -But let's not go down that road: if we count who participates and extend it to other constituencies we will also see the "same faces" all over again: that is a consequence of the principle of voluntary participation. Agreed. But here's the difference: I'm a member of the NCUC, the NCSG, I'm on the GNSO Council and a participant on the CCWG. If you want to know how the NCUC developed its policies and learn about the positions taken by our individual members as we did so you can access the NCUC Discuss archive here: http://lists.ncuc.org/pipermail/ncuc-discuss/ and view the deliberations of the NCUC Executive Committee here: http://lists.ncuc.org/pipermail/ncuc-ec/ . If you would like to see how these discussion then move and take place at the SG level you can view the NCSG Discuss list here: http://listserv.syr.edu/scripts/wa.exe?A0=NCSG-DISCUSS , and the deliberations of the NCSG Policy Committee here ( http://mailman.ipjustice.org/listinfo/pc-ncsg ). The NCSG also includes the NPOC and as I represent them on the GNSO Council I also regularly read their public discussion to learn the views of their individual members. I can do that here: http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/npoc-discuss/ . Things then move onto the GNSO Council and you can view our Council discussions here: https://gnso.icann.org/mailing-lists/archives/council/. ?Not only that but EVERY one of these groups have monthly calls that are recorded and archived in both audio and written transcript form. I don't have to guess when I need to determine how and why a policy position developed, who was in favour of the policy and who was against it and what compromises, if necessary, were made to get consensus approval and what the degree of that consensus was, in de facto as well as de jure terms. In the NCUC, NPOC, NCSG and GNSO this is all public record. Why can't I get the same information from the GAC? I submit that if the GAC is to become more than an advisory body it needs to start playing by the same rules as the rest of us. Not because of any institutional rivalry but because the global public deserves no less. In the GAC this is "compensated" with our voluntary high consensus threshold which requires to include any interested delegation into a consensus. All of the groups mentioned above operate on variations of consensus. Yet unlike the GAC with these groups I'm able to see how consensus is formed. Without transparency there is no accountability, and IMHO we can not afford to give oversight of Board decisions at a higher level, or more than an advisory role, to a body so opaque we have to "trust" members to tell us what is going on. ?That leads to situations as now where I have some GAC members telling me one thing, you something quite different, and I have no idea who to believe. It may be just a case of perception because the people involved I know to have a very high level of personal integrity. In the interest of moving things forward in the spirit of cooperation and mutual respect I once again weigh in to support Paul's request that the GAC "disclose the current split of opinion within the GAC regarding Rec. 11". Respectfully, Ed Morris
Thanks for your work here. Keith. I'm not sure folks truly understand how strong the opposition does seem to be to 11 within the GNSO. One aspect of the GNSO comment I feel compelled to highlight is our perceived connection between recommendations 1, 10 and 11. I think many of us could grudgingly accept the 2/3 threshold override if the GAC agreed to remain advisory rather than participatory per recommendation 1, yet a special sort of participatory as it also will increase its advisory role per 11 while being exempt from the same accountability review processes as other SOACs per recommendation 10. Personally, and I do have a vote on the GNSO Council, if we were to reconfigure the proposal so that the GAC does not participate in the Community Mechanism per recommendation 1, I would have little trouble finding a way in the spirit of compromise to accepting recommendation 10 and 11 as written. Similarly, if the GAC were to keep things status quo in terms of Bard consideration of its advice and agree to the same accountability reviews as are applied to the other SOACs I could, after a few drinks, accept recommendation 1 as written. It's the whole package. A transition where the GAC's advisory status is emboldened while it is given new participatory powers, including heretofore nonexistent powers relative to Board composition, while at the same time exempting the GAC from the accountability requirements of all other SOACs...I'm not sure that will ever be a transition I'm going to be able to sign off on. I do hope the linkage, however, between 1, 10, 11 might increase the possibility of some sort of mutually acceptable compromise that will allow us to go forward on this project. Best, Edward Morris ---------------------------------------- From: "Drazek, Keith" <kdrazek@verisign.com> Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 9:57 PM To: "Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch" <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> Cc: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Thanks Jorge. The GNSO was not in a position to take any position prior to the publication of the Version 3 proposal. It has now considered and assessed the proposal in its entirety, and has determined there is insufficient support across its constituent groups (BC, IPC, ISPCP, NCUC, NPOC, RySG, RrSG) for Recommendation 11 as written with the 2/3 threshold. I understand your frustration, but these are the facts. My email was intended to ensure everyone understands the state of play in the GNSO on this key point. As I said separately in another email, the RySG (my SG) has said it can accept the 2/3 with the additional criteria, but that is currently a minority position in the GNSO. Regards, Keith -----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 4:25 PM To: Drazek, Keith Cc: gregshatanipc@gmail.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Dear Keith it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11. It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position. So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted". Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO. I feel during the last week all participating GAC members have been constructive, open for the needs expressed by the GNSO, and willing to accept all the further clarifications and assurances required by the GNSO in order to dissipate any concerns on the agreed drafting for Rec 11. We just have to look at the record and see how reasonable, rational and open for improvements we all have been. That is why I'm really surprised by thia u-turn, which would strip Rec 11 of one of the elements which were part of the GAC Dublin consensus and had helped to de-escalate this issue within the GAC and within the community at large. A 100% win for one party is no good compromise for a community which is obliged to work together and has very sensitive substantial work ahead. Hope you will understand these well-intentioned arguments and reasonings regards and with kind regards Jorge Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 22:13 schrieb Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com>:
With all due respect, Jorge, I was simply updating the group on the position of the GNSO as a whole. It is not *my* position, nor is it the current position of my SG. Please do not personalize this.
Best, Keith
On Jan 29, 2016, at 3:59 PM, "Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch" <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Keith
if course you would support rec 11 if you strip it of the 2/3, as that would equal 100% of your starting position and would not give nothing in exchange.
I feel that the intelligence of colleagues should be treated with due respect.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 21:14 schrieb Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com<mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>>:
All, to reiterate what I said during yesterday's CCWG call (reporting on the GNSO's deliberations), and to respond to Jorge's characterization of the GNSO "partially objecting" to Recommendation 11:
The GNSO comments (and the individual comments submitted by the GNSO's constituent parts) make clear there is majority opposition to the inclusion of the 2/3 threshold, particularly in the context of the GAC participating as decisional in the community mechanism. The GNSO supports incorporating the definition of GAC consensus for Board obligations (absence of formal objection) as required by NTIA, but does not support the increase of Board obligation to 2/3. If the 2/3 threshold were removed and returned to simple majority, the GNSO would support Recommendation 11. So, any "partial objection" should be read as, "opposition to 2/3 but support of consensus definition."
Per its procedures, the GNSO will vote on and require a simple majority of EACH house (contracted and non-contracted), and there is not majority support in EITHER house to agree to Recommendation 11 with the 2/3 threshold.
It appears we have one Chartering Organization (GNSO) that will oppose Recommendation 11 if it includes the 2/3 threshold. We have another Chartering Organization (GAC) that will, by all signals, remain silent. It seems we all have a better chance of the CCWG proposal being accepted by the Board, NTIA and the US Congress if there are no objections to any of the 12 recommendations. Removing the 2/3 threshold accomplishes that.
Also, as pointed out correctly today by Mike and Paul, NTIA has made it clear that the GAC consensus definition language must be included in the bylaws for the IANA transition to proceed. There are no chartering organizations opposing this inclusion.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountabilit y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 1:23 PM To: gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross- community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
The logical problem is to pick and chose parts of a package deal and ask whether such discrete parts are acceptable or not. This just ignores that the deal is composed by its different parts - and logically some please and displease differently different parts of the community.
And as said before, from the chartering orgs there is just one partially objecting to this. And the numbers of the public comment period speak for themselves in accepting this as a workable compromise.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 18:46 schrieb Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>>:
Roelof,
You answered the question I expressly said I wasn't asking -- "I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with."
I think you *almost* answered the question I did ask, when you said " Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either." So it seems you do not affirmatively support the concept as such.
I asked the question I asked not because I am immune to the value of compromise or ignorant of the many ways that consensus is achieved. Rather, I asked it because I feel that the "base of support" for this proposal is unclear and it is relevant to our ability to move forward, one way or the other.
Greg
On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 9:20 AM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl>>> wrote: Greg, all,
Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I'll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where -if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks.
I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it's dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs.
What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries.
Best,
Roelof
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountabili ty-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-comm unity-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces @icann.org>>> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregsh atanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross -community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross -community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org< mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
I'd like to ask a simple question.
Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support.
Greg
[cross-posts to GAC list removed]
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>> wrote: GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss
2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>>>:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote: Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
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I am disappointed of hearing some people known positive, constructive, elsewehere now become so radical and pushing to marginalize GAC in defending other community rather than looking for solutions Regards Kavouss 2016-01-29 23:29 GMT+01:00 Edward Morris <egmorris1@toast.net>:
Thanks for your work here. Keith. I'm not sure folks truly understand how strong the opposition does seem to be to 11 within the GNSO.
One aspect of the GNSO comment I feel compelled to highlight is our perceived connection between recommendations 1, 10 and 11. I think many of us could grudgingly accept the 2/3 threshold override if the GAC agreed to remain advisory rather than participatory per recommendation 1, yet a special sort of participatory as it also will increase its advisory role per 11 while being exempt from the same accountability review processes as other SOACs per recommendation 10.
Personally, and I do have a vote on the GNSO Council, if we were to reconfigure the proposal so that the GAC does not participate in the Community Mechanism per recommendation 1, I would have little trouble finding a way in the spirit of compromise to accepting recommendation 10 and 11 as written. Similarly, if the GAC were to keep things status quo in terms of Bard consideration of its advice and agree to the same accountability reviews as are applied to the other SOACs I could, after a few drinks, accept recommendation 1 as written.
It's the whole package. A transition where the GAC's advisory status is emboldened while it is given new participatory powers, including heretofore nonexistent powers relative to Board composition, while at the same time exempting the GAC from the accountability requirements of all other SOACs...I'm not sure that will ever be a transition I'm going to be able to sign off on. I do hope the linkage, however, between 1, 10, 11 might increase the possibility of some sort of mutually acceptable compromise that will allow us to go forward on this project.
Best,
Edward Morris
------------------------------ *From*: "Drazek, Keith" <kdrazek@verisign.com> *Sent*: Friday, January 29, 2016 9:57 PM *To*: "Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch" <Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> *Cc*: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" < accountability-cross-community@icann.org>
*Subject*: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Thanks Jorge.
The GNSO was not in a position to take any position prior to the publication of the Version 3 proposal. It has now considered and assessed the proposal in its entirety, and has determined there is insufficient support across its constituent groups (BC, IPC, ISPCP, NCUC, NPOC, RySG, RrSG) for Recommendation 11 as written with the 2/3 threshold. I understand your frustration, but these are the facts. My email was intended to ensure everyone understands the state of play in the GNSO on this key point. As I said separately in another email, the RySG (my SG) has said it can accept the 2/3 with the additional criteria, but that is currently a minority position in the GNSO.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch [mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch] Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 4:25 PM To: Drazek, Keith Cc: gregshatanipc@gmail.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Dear Keith
it is a bit akward you would need to concede that you imply that without the 2/3 the GNSO would be able to support Rec 11.
It gives an impression as if Rec 11 (without 2/3) would contain anything "that would need to be accepted", when as we all know Rec 11 (without 2/3) corresponds to 100% of the GNSO starting position.
So there would be any concession. No aspect "in need to be accepted".
Just a 100% win-situation for the GNSO.
I feel during the last week all participating GAC members have been constructive, open for the needs expressed by the GNSO, and willing to accept all the further clarifications and assurances required by the GNSO in order to dissipate any concerns on the agreed drafting for Rec 11.
We just have to look at the record and see how reasonable, rational and open for improvements we all have been.
That is why I'm really surprised by thia u-turn, which would strip Rec 11 of one of the elements which were part of the GAC Dublin consensus and had helped to de-escalate this issue within the GAC and within the community at large.
A 100% win for one party is no good compromise for a community which is obliged to work together and has very sensitive substantial work ahead.
Hope you will understand these well-intentioned arguments and reasonings
regards and with kind regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 22:13 schrieb Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com>:
With all due respect, Jorge, I was simply updating the group on the position of the GNSO as a whole. It is not *my* position, nor is it the current position of my SG. Please do not personalize this.
Best, Keith
On Jan 29, 2016, at 3:59 PM, "Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch" < Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> wrote:
Dear Keith
if course you would support rec 11 if you strip it of the 2/3, as that would equal 100% of your starting position and would not give nothing in exchange.
I feel that the intelligence of colleagues should be treated with due respect.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 21:14 schrieb Drazek, Keith <kdrazek@verisign.com <mailto:kdrazek@verisign.com>>:
All, to reiterate what I said during yesterday's CCWG call (reporting on the GNSO's deliberations), and to respond to Jorge's characterization of the GNSO "partially objecting" to Recommendation 11:
The GNSO comments (and the individual comments submitted by the GNSO's constituent parts) make clear there is majority opposition to the inclusion of the 2/3 threshold, particularly in the context of the GAC participating as decisional in the community mechanism. The GNSO supports incorporating the definition of GAC consensus for Board obligations (absence of formal objection) as required by NTIA, but does not support the increase of Board obligation to 2/3. If the 2/3 threshold were removed and returned to simple majority, the GNSO would support Recommendation 11. So, any "partial objection" should be read as, "opposition to 2/3 but support of consensus definition."
Per its procedures, the GNSO will vote on and require a simple majority of EACH house (contracted and non-contracted), and there is not majority support in EITHER house to agree to Recommendation 11 with the 2/3 threshold.
It appears we have one Chartering Organization (GNSO) that will oppose Recommendation 11 if it includes the 2/3 threshold. We have another Chartering Organization (GAC) that will, by all signals, remain silent. It seems we all have a better chance of the CCWG proposal being accepted by the Board, NTIA and the US Congress if there are no objections to any of the 12 recommendations. Removing the 2/3 threshold accomplishes that.
Also, as pointed out correctly today by Mike and Paul, NTIA has made it clear that the GAC consensus definition language must be included in the bylaws for the IANA transition to proceed. There are no chartering organizations opposing this inclusion.
Regards, Keith
-----Original Message----- From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountabilit y-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch<mailto:Jorge.Cancio@bakom.admin.ch> Sent: Friday, January 29, 2016 1:23 PM To: gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Cc: accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross- community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
The logical problem is to pick and chose parts of a package deal and ask whether such discrete parts are acceptable or not. This just ignores that the deal is composed by its different parts - and logically some please and displease differently different parts of the community.
And as said before, from the chartering orgs there is just one partially objecting to this. And the numbers of the public comment period speak for themselves in accepting this as a workable compromise.
regards
Jorge
Von meinem iPhone gesendet
Am 29.01.2016 um 18:46 schrieb Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto: gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>>:
Roelof,
You answered the question I expressly said I wasn't asking -- "I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with."
I think you *almost* answered the question I did ask, when you said " Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either." So it seems you do not affirmatively support the concept as such.
I asked the question I asked not because I am immune to the value of compromise or ignorant of the many ways that consensus is achieved. Rather, I asked it because I feel that the "base of support" for this proposal is unclear and it is relevant to our ability to move forward, one way or the other.
Greg
On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 9:20 AM, Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl <mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto:Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl<mailto: Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl>>> wrote: Greg, all,
Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I'll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where -if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks.
I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it's dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs.
What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries.
Best,
Roelof
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountabili ty-cross-community-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-comm unity-bounces@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces @icann.org>>> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregsh atanipc@gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>>> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross -community@icann.org><mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross -community@icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org< mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
I'd like to ask a simple question.
Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support.
Greg
[cross-posts to GAC list removed]
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto: kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com<mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>>> wrote: GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss
2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com <mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto: ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>>>:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote: Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
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I agree with the sentiments in this note. I too support the compromise that was made. I do not see this compromise as heralding an increase in Government control and appreciate the irony of "So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? " avri On 29-Jan-16 09:20, Roelof Meijer wrote:
Greg, all,
Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I’ll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where –if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks.
I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it’s dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs.
What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries.
Best,
Roelof
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
I'd like to ask a simple question.
Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support.
Greg
[cross-posts to GAC list removed]
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote:
GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss
2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com <mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>>:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote: > Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
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I could support it to IF the GAC said they actually support it. To date, the GAC has NOT stated that it supports or even that they could live with it. That is all I would like to see right now.....an affirmative statement from the GAC that they could support the so-called compromise. Roelof - your note implies this is supported by the GAC. Where did you derive that from? Jeff Neuman
On Jan 29, 2016, at 7:38 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
I agree with the sentiments in this note. I too support the compromise that was made.
I do not see this compromise as heralding an increase in Government control and appreciate the irony of "So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? "
avri
On 29-Jan-16 09:20, Roelof Meijer wrote: Greg, all,
Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I’ll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where –if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks.
I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it’s dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs.
What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries.
Best,
Roelof
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
I'd like to ask a simple question.
Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support.
Greg
[cross-posts to GAC list removed]
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote:
GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss
2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com <mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>>:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote: Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the
accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
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I can not accept 2/3 as far as it relates to advice affecting ccTLDs. el -- Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini 4
On 29 Jan 2016, at 22:15, Jeff Neuman <jeff.neuman@comlaude.com> wrote:
I could support it to IF the GAC said they actually support it. To date, the GAC has NOT stated that it supports or even that they could live with it. That is all I would like to see right now.....an affirmative statement from the GAC that they could support the so-called compromise.
Roelof - your note implies this is supported by the GAC. Where did you derive that from?
Jeff Neuman
On Jan 29, 2016, at 7:38 PM, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org> wrote:
I agree with the sentiments in this note. I too support the compromise that was made.
I do not see this compromise as heralding an increase in Government control and appreciate the irony of "So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? "
avri
On 29-Jan-16 09:20, Roelof Meijer wrote: Greg, all,
Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I’ll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where –if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks.
I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it’s dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs.
What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries.
Best,
Roelof
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org>> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com <mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com>> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org <mailto:accountability-cross-community@icann.org>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
I'd like to ask a simple question.
Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support.
Greg
[cross-posts to GAC list removed]
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote:
GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss
2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com <mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>>:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote: Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the
accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
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-----Original Message----- What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail.
Roelof First of all, those of us seeking to limit GAC's role in the post-transition ICANN to its current role have _never_ rested our case on an appeal to the US government. We have made substantive arguments about ICANN's status as a private sector-based multistakeholder institution where policy is set by Internet users and suppliers, and we have contended that putting too much power in GAC's hands undermines that governance model. If you want an example, see this paper: http://www.ipjustice.org/internet-governance/ip-justice-journal-the-iana-tra... The other thing you overlook is that the concerns about U.S. govt not agreeing rest upon a well-known and pre-established criterion for the transition. It is a given that the proposal's accountability solutions not be based on an inter-governmental or government-dominated model. We also know that the U.S. congress is in some ways even more concerned about this than NTIA. So while we can have a vigorous debate about whether or not the new GAC arrangements reach the threshold of 'domination' or 'intergovernmental', we cannot ignore the fact that the transition could indeed fail if that criterion is not perceived as met. So if you want your argument for a compromise on 2/3 to be persuasive, you need to take seriously the contention that additional empowerment of the GAC in this way might fail to meet one of the NTIA criteria. --MM
I am merely a participant I want to applaud Roelof's comments. Let's not think, as some seem to be doing, that alienating a single government is less important than leaving aside all the governments who have come into the GAC at ICANN. Really. When I worked to bring forward an alternative to the GTLD MOU, it was so much that no single government could in the future be the 'guru'. All of us have made that so. I respect that many governments have come into the GAC and they made it so much more than it was, in its original days. I also note that we, as stakeholders, must also step up our game.ICANN is a critical player. It must be guided by all of us. the larger stage needs for us to succeed in our quite unique approach to MS. We are not a sole model.BUT we have work that is important. I live in awe of how the governments, technical community, contracted parties, and non contracted parties and business users are doing this work. Nothing has ever been this fully representative. I did play role in the original IFWP. that was so different [let's be real/less than 400 M users] and you are so much more than that could ever be. I find this work that you are doing a true role model. M From: Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl To: gregshatanipc@gmail.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2016 14:20:48 +0000 Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Greg, all, Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I’ll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where –if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks. I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it’s dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs. What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries. Best, Roelof From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" <accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing I'd like to ask a simple question. Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization? I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support. Greg [cross-posts to GAC list removed] On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote: GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss 2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>: On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote:
Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong. I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Dear Roelof, You said what many people wish to say but may be not as courrage as you are Quotation from your message "What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries". Unquote Will all respect to every and all governments, I fully endorse your statement. One of the ICANN Slogan is " Democratic " Then no one should be obliged to give up his or her views because of wishes of any one else Kavouss 2016-01-30 19:20 GMT+01:00 Marilyn Cade <marilynscade@hotmail.com>:
I am merely a participant
I want to applaud Roelof's comments.
Let's not think, as some seem to be doing, that alienating a single government is less important than leaving aside all the governments who have come into the GAC at ICANN.
Really.
When I worked to bring forward an alternative to the GTLD MOU, it was so much that no single government could in the future be the 'guru'.
All of us have made that so.
I respect that many governments have come into the GAC and they made it so much more than it was, in its original days. I also note that we, as stakeholders, must also step up our game. ICANN is a critical player. It must be guided by all of us.
the larger stage needs for us to succeed in our quite unique approach to MS. We are not a sole model. BUT we have work that is important.
I live in awe of how the governments, technical community, contracted parties, and non contracted parties and business users are doing this work.
Nothing has ever been this fully representative.
I did play role in the original IFWP. that was so different [let's be real/less than 400 M users] and you are so much more than that could ever be.
I find this work that you are doing a true role model.
M
------------------------------ From: Roelof.Meijer@sidn.nl To: gregshatanipc@gmail.com; accountability-cross-community@icann.org Date: Fri, 29 Jan 2016 14:20:48 +0000
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
Greg, all,
Although I agree with Alan that it is probably not the right question, I’ll answer it. And my answer is: Yes, I do support the 2/3 threshold. Not because I think it is a great idea, though I do not think it is a bad idea either. No, my affirmative support is based on the fact that this is part of a negotiation, a compromise, where –if we do not want to get stuck in our trenches for the remainder of time- parties will have to move, concede some to the other parties. So the problem it solves is the present deadlock, it is needed for a successful transition, supported by the GAC. And I do not believe in conspiracy thinking; the risk is minimal. We already have accepted similar and larger risks.
I have worked in many countries and have learnt both that it’s dangerous to alienate governments and that it can be very productive to work with them in a strategically clever way. When SIDN voluntarily signed a convenant with the Dutch government under my lead in 2008, many of my international peers told me I was crazy to allow government involvement. It would be the beginning of a process that would ultimately lead to government control/takeover. I can now easily prove them wrong. Self-regulation prevailed and .nl is one of the most successful, open, unregulated and safest ccTLDs.
What puzzles me (not intending to accuse anybody) is that is seems that many are saying that by agreeing to this, we would be ceding to governments, which we should not do. And one of the arguments they use, is that the US government would never agree to this and the transition would fail. So we can yield to one government (without protesting) as long as it is the US? It seems that this argument is mainly used by American nationals. Probably because the logic is less obvious to those from other countries.
Best,
Roelof
From: <accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org> on behalf of Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> Date: vrijdag 29 januari 2016 00:24 To: "accountability-cross-community@icann.org" < accountability-cross-community@icann.org> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing
I'd like to ask a simple question.
Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support.
Greg
[cross-posts to GAC list removed]
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh < kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com> wrote:
GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss
2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>:
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote:
Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
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I have been asking myself the same question, Greg, and I think it is an important one. Exactly who wants this 2/3 rule? The GAC hasn’t said that it wants it. The GNSO has said it is strongly opposed to it. Others don’t seem to care much one way or another. So where is the push to do this coming from? Which SO-AC has said this is a “die in a ditch” issue for it and so therefore we must march forward in "compromise”? How did this even get into our proposal in the first place? It isn’t too late to fix this, so let’s deal with it before we are put in the spotlight and asked to explain how did we let it happen? Robin
On Jan 28, 2016, at 3:24 PM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc@gmail.com> wrote:
I'd like to ask a simple question.
Aside from members of the GAC, is there any affirmative support for the 2/3 threshold? In other words, does any member or participant think that this is a good idea, or enhances ICANN's accountability, or corrects a problem/deficiency in the Bylaws, or is needed for the transition? How about any chartering organization or constituent part of a chartering organization?
I'm not asking about the value of compromise, or the effect (or lack thereof) of the change, or whether it's something you can live with. I'm asking about affirmative support.
Greg
[cross-posts to GAC list removed]
On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Kavouss Arasteh <kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com <mailto:kavouss.arasteh@gmail.com>> wrote: GAC did not formally reject the Rec 11 in announcing that " no consensus is reached " GNSO and its spokemen push for their objection, GAC must formally reject the Recommendation as currently GAC lost o-1 because of Stress Test 18 ,if such ST remains and 2/ 3 supermajority becomes Simple Majority then GAC would loose o-2 .That is not fair .There should not win loose against GAC, WIN-WIN YES, loose-loose yes ,for every body BUT NOT LOOSE FOR gac and win for the others . THAT IS NOT FAIR Kavouss
2016-01-28 23:45 GMT+01:00 Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com <mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>>: On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 10:26:54PM +0000, Jeff Neuman wrote:
Where in writing has the GAC stated that it will reject the accountability proposal of the 2/3 threshold is not in there.
I didn't intend to suggest that they'd stated that in writing, but rather to suggest that the GAC had consensus around the 2/3 number. But this'll teach me to go from memory, because I was relying on my recollection of the Dublin communiqé. In fact it does not exactly say that the GAC has consensus about the 2/3 threshold, so I'm wrong.
I still believe that the compromise position is an effective way forward that actually gives no additional real power to the GAC (because of the new Empowered Community) while yet granting the 2/3 number that many seem to think is important. But the claim in favour of 2/3 is indeed weaker given the GAC's stated positions.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com <mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community <https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community>
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Dear Andrew, all: I see the situation a little bit differently. It seems to me there is fairly broad agreement about these points: - the GAC's advice is advice, and does not bind the ICANN Board - the Bylaws set out how the Board should deal with GAC advice (attempt to come to an agreement - wrong language but you get the point) - GAC today generates advice by consensus - GAC today could change the way it generates advice - the ICANN Bylaws should clearly state that the way the Board has to respond to GAC advice should only apply to consensus GAC advice - the Board has the ability to not accept GAC advice even if it works through the "attempt to come to an agreement" process. The critical difference we were discussing with our two options today is whether, in deciding not to accept GAC advice, the Board can (point 5) make that decision by majority, or (point 6) whether it has to achieve 2/3 support to make that decision. We know that in practice the ICANN Board would generally made a decision like this *by consensus*, so there is very unlikely to be any practical difference whichever option we choose. We also know that when the ICANN community was consulted about the idea of raising the threshold in the bylaws to 2/3, it was overwhelmingly rejected. May I add two other points I think that we know, but which are probably controversial: - the GNSO is unlikely to be able to approve the proposal with the 2/3 rule in place - the GAC is unlikely to be able to come to a consensus to reject the proposal in the absence of the 2/3 rule. I've explained why I think there is no practical difference between the two alternatives. Either way the Board will operate by consensus if at all possible on such weighty matters. That said, I do recognise the importance of the symbolism here. So let me set out my view of this. I think that governments form an integral part of the ICANN community. In a context of private sector led multistakeholder governance of the Internet DNS, they have to be at the table in an appropriate way. That's why I support GAC as an advisory body only in dealing with ICANN's main business - its various policy development processes. It is also why I support it as a decisional participant in the exercise of the limited and narrow set of accountability powers our proposals deal with. There is certainly no disrespect of sovereign states or the role of governments on my part when I say that the symbolism of 1/2 v 2/3 is simply not a battle worth fighting, especially when the rest of the ICANN community has so clearly expressed its view - and when it is so clear that it will make no practical difference whatsoever. I'll close by appealing again to what we are trying to do here. We are trying to close out a proposal, sure - and that should lead to all the chartering organisations supporting it, or at least not opposing it. I see that happening most simply through the Point 6 proposal - simple majority rule for the Board. But besides closing out this proposal, we are all trying to build a stable and constructive post-transition ICANN. Acknowledging and respecting our respective roles and responsibilities in that is important. In my view the CCWG will likely decide to proceed with Point 6. If that is right, it is a responsibility of all of us to portray that for what it is: a decision made on logical grounds, taking the feedback of the ICANN community into account. It is not an insult, or a symbolic "win" or "loss" for anyone. I appeal to everyone who's got a deeply entrenched position on this argument either way to make sure that the discussion and decisions over the next few days are done with that spirit of coming to a sound conclusion, and that whichever way it goes, the good faith of all participants isn't in doubt. That's the best thing I can think of to help us get this work done in a durable and successful way. cheers Jordan On 29 January 2016 at 09:57, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> wrote:
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *
I got Points 5 and 6 wrong in my bullet points - oops. Point 5 was 2/3, Point 6 was majority. I was referring to the right one at the end of the email. Sorry! J On 29 January 2016 at 11:44, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz> wrote:
Dear Andrew, all:
I see the situation a little bit differently.
It seems to me there is fairly broad agreement about these points:
- the GAC's advice is advice, and does not bind the ICANN Board - the Bylaws set out how the Board should deal with GAC advice (attempt to come to an agreement - wrong language but you get the point) - GAC today generates advice by consensus - GAC today could change the way it generates advice - the ICANN Bylaws should clearly state that the way the Board has to respond to GAC advice should only apply to consensus GAC advice - the Board has the ability to not accept GAC advice even if it works through the "attempt to come to an agreement" process.
The critical difference we were discussing with our two options today is whether, in deciding not to accept GAC advice, the Board can
(point 5) make that decision by majority, or (point 6) whether it has to achieve 2/3 support to make that decision.
We know that in practice the ICANN Board would generally made a decision like this *by consensus*, so there is very unlikely to be any practical difference whichever option we choose.
We also know that when the ICANN community was consulted about the idea of raising the threshold in the bylaws to 2/3, it was overwhelmingly rejected.
May I add two other points I think that we know, but which are probably controversial:
- the GNSO is unlikely to be able to approve the proposal with the 2/3 rule in place - the GAC is unlikely to be able to come to a consensus to reject the proposal in the absence of the 2/3 rule.
I've explained why I think there is no practical difference between the two alternatives. Either way the Board will operate by consensus if at all possible on such weighty matters.
That said, I do recognise the importance of the symbolism here. So let me set out my view of this.
I think that governments form an integral part of the ICANN community. In a context of private sector led multistakeholder governance of the Internet DNS, they have to be at the table in an appropriate way.
That's why I support GAC as an advisory body only in dealing with ICANN's main business - its various policy development processes. It is also why I support it as a decisional participant in the exercise of the limited and narrow set of accountability powers our proposals deal with.
There is certainly no disrespect of sovereign states or the role of governments on my part when I say that the symbolism of 1/2 v 2/3 is simply not a battle worth fighting, especially when the rest of the ICANN community has so clearly expressed its view - and when it is so clear that it will make no practical difference whatsoever.
I'll close by appealing again to what we are trying to do here. We are trying to close out a proposal, sure - and that should lead to all the chartering organisations supporting it, or at least not opposing it. I see that happening most simply through the Point 6 proposal - simple majority rule for the Board.
But besides closing out this proposal, we are all trying to build a stable and constructive post-transition ICANN. Acknowledging and respecting our respective roles and responsibilities in that is important. In my view the CCWG will likely decide to proceed with Point 6. If that is right, it is a responsibility of all of us to portray that for what it is: a decision made on logical grounds, taking the feedback of the ICANN community into account. It is not an insult, or a symbolic "win" or "loss" for anyone.
I appeal to everyone who's got a deeply entrenched position on this argument either way to make sure that the discussion and decisions over the next few days are done with that spirit of coming to a sound conclusion, and that whichever way it goes, the good faith of all participants isn't in doubt. That's the best thing I can think of to help us get this work done in a durable and successful way.
cheers Jordan
On 29 January 2016 at 09:57, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> wrote:
Dear colleagues,
I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say.
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway?
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse.
The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
Best regards,
A
-- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
-- Jordan Carter
Chief Executive *InternetNZ*
+64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz
*A better world through a better Internet *
-- Jordan Carter Chief Executive *InternetNZ* +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz *A better world through a better Internet *
I agree fully with Jordan's assessment and views. Regards, Keith On Jan 28, 2016, at 5:52 PM, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote: I got Points 5 and 6 wrong in my bullet points - oops. Point 5 was 2/3, Point 6 was majority. I was referring to the right one at the end of the email. Sorry! J On 29 January 2016 at 11:44, Jordan Carter <jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz>> wrote: Dear Andrew, all: I see the situation a little bit differently. It seems to me there is fairly broad agreement about these points: - the GAC's advice is advice, and does not bind the ICANN Board - the Bylaws set out how the Board should deal with GAC advice (attempt to come to an agreement - wrong language but you get the point) - GAC today generates advice by consensus - GAC today could change the way it generates advice - the ICANN Bylaws should clearly state that the way the Board has to respond to GAC advice should only apply to consensus GAC advice - the Board has the ability to not accept GAC advice even if it works through the "attempt to come to an agreement" process. The critical difference we were discussing with our two options today is whether, in deciding not to accept GAC advice, the Board can (point 5) make that decision by majority, or (point 6) whether it has to achieve 2/3 support to make that decision. We know that in practice the ICANN Board would generally made a decision like this *by consensus*, so there is very unlikely to be any practical difference whichever option we choose. We also know that when the ICANN community was consulted about the idea of raising the threshold in the bylaws to 2/3, it was overwhelmingly rejected. May I add two other points I think that we know, but which are probably controversial: - the GNSO is unlikely to be able to approve the proposal with the 2/3 rule in place - the GAC is unlikely to be able to come to a consensus to reject the proposal in the absence of the 2/3 rule. I've explained why I think there is no practical difference between the two alternatives. Either way the Board will operate by consensus if at all possible on such weighty matters. That said, I do recognise the importance of the symbolism here. So let me set out my view of this. I think that governments form an integral part of the ICANN community. In a context of private sector led multistakeholder governance of the Internet DNS, they have to be at the table in an appropriate way. That's why I support GAC as an advisory body only in dealing with ICANN's main business - its various policy development processes. It is also why I support it as a decisional participant in the exercise of the limited and narrow set of accountability powers our proposals deal with. There is certainly no disrespect of sovereign states or the role of governments on my part when I say that the symbolism of 1/2 v 2/3 is simply not a battle worth fighting, especially when the rest of the ICANN community has so clearly expressed its view - and when it is so clear that it will make no practical difference whatsoever. I'll close by appealing again to what we are trying to do here. We are trying to close out a proposal, sure - and that should lead to all the chartering organisations supporting it, or at least not opposing it. I see that happening most simply through the Point 6 proposal - simple majority rule for the Board. But besides closing out this proposal, we are all trying to build a stable and constructive post-transition ICANN. Acknowledging and respecting our respective roles and responsibilities in that is important. In my view the CCWG will likely decide to proceed with Point 6. If that is right, it is a responsibility of all of us to portray that for what it is: a decision made on logical grounds, taking the feedback of the ICANN community into account. It is not an insult, or a symbolic "win" or "loss" for anyone. I appeal to everyone who's got a deeply entrenched position on this argument either way to make sure that the discussion and decisions over the next few days are done with that spirit of coming to a sound conclusion, and that whichever way it goes, the good faith of all participants isn't in doubt. That's the best thing I can think of to help us get this work done in a durable and successful way. cheers Jordan On 29 January 2016 at 09:57, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> wrote: Dear colleagues, I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say. For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway? As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse. The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community. Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place. The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118<tel:%2B64-4-495-2118> (office) | +64-21-442-649<tel:%2B64-21-442-649> (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: http://www.internetnz.nz A better world through a better Internet -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: http://www.internetnz.nz A better world through a better Internet _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
Well stated Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 5:44 PM To: Andrew Sullivan Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Dear Andrew, all: I see the situation a little bit differently. It seems to me there is fairly broad agreement about these points: - the GAC's advice is advice, and does not bind the ICANN Board - the Bylaws set out how the Board should deal with GAC advice (attempt to come to an agreement - wrong language but you get the point) - GAC today generates advice by consensus - GAC today could change the way it generates advice - the ICANN Bylaws should clearly state that the way the Board has to respond to GAC advice should only apply to consensus GAC advice - the Board has the ability to not accept GAC advice even if it works through the "attempt to come to an agreement" process. The critical difference we were discussing with our two options today is whether, in deciding not to accept GAC advice, the Board can (point 5) make that decision by majority, or (point 6) whether it has to achieve 2/3 support to make that decision. We know that in practice the ICANN Board would generally made a decision like this *by consensus*, so there is very unlikely to be any practical difference whichever option we choose. We also know that when the ICANN community was consulted about the idea of raising the threshold in the bylaws to 2/3, it was overwhelmingly rejected. May I add two other points I think that we know, but which are probably controversial: - the GNSO is unlikely to be able to approve the proposal with the 2/3 rule in place - the GAC is unlikely to be able to come to a consensus to reject the proposal in the absence of the 2/3 rule. I've explained why I think there is no practical difference between the two alternatives. Either way the Board will operate by consensus if at all possible on such weighty matters. That said, I do recognise the importance of the symbolism here. So let me set out my view of this. I think that governments form an integral part of the ICANN community. In a context of private sector led multistakeholder governance of the Internet DNS, they have to be at the table in an appropriate way. That's why I support GAC as an advisory body only in dealing with ICANN's main business - its various policy development processes. It is also why I support it as a decisional participant in the exercise of the limited and narrow set of accountability powers our proposals deal with. There is certainly no disrespect of sovereign states or the role of governments on my part when I say that the symbolism of 1/2 v 2/3 is simply not a battle worth fighting, especially when the rest of the ICANN community has so clearly expressed its view - and when it is so clear that it will make no practical difference whatsoever. I'll close by appealing again to what we are trying to do here. We are trying to close out a proposal, sure - and that should lead to all the chartering organisations supporting it, or at least not opposing it. I see that happening most simply through the Point 6 proposal - simple majority rule for the Board. But besides closing out this proposal, we are all trying to build a stable and constructive post-transition ICANN. Acknowledging and respecting our respective roles and responsibilities in that is important. In my view the CCWG will likely decide to proceed with Point 6. If that is right, it is a responsibility of all of us to portray that for what it is: a decision made on logical grounds, taking the feedback of the ICANN community into account. It is not an insult, or a symbolic "win" or "loss" for anyone. I appeal to everyone who's got a deeply entrenched position on this argument either way to make sure that the discussion and decisions over the next few days are done with that spirit of coming to a sound conclusion, and that whichever way it goes, the good faith of all participants isn't in doubt. That's the best thing I can think of to help us get this work done in a durable and successful way. cheers Jordan On 29 January 2016 at 09:57, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> wrote: Dear colleagues, I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say. For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway? As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse. The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community. Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place. The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet ________________________________ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com<http://www.avg.com> Version: 2016.0.7227 / Virus Database: 4489/11316 - Release Date: 01/03/16 Internal Virus Database is out of date.
Some further thoughts: It is disappointing that the GAC’s comments on the Third Draft Proposal did not take a position on Recommendation 11, or even provide useful details regarding the reason(s) why some GAC members supported or opposed it. That shortfall places the rest of the community in the position of having to speculate on the reasons as we attempt to resolve a matter centering on the GAC’s role in a post-transition ICANN. However, that shortfall on a matter in which the GAC has a very large stake reinforces my own experience with the GAC since I have engaged on ICANN matters -- which is that the GAC has difficulty reaching consensus, and that when it does it talks a considerable amount of time to get there. That’s perfectly understandable as the GAC is composed of representatives of sovereign nation states with widely divergent perspectives, and that GAC members cannot take a position until it is approved by the government officials they report to. In short, the GAC tends to lag considerably behind the rest of the ICANN community in the timing of providing its official view – and in many instances is unable to reach consensus as presently defined. The only way to shorten that timeline would be for the GAC to change its definition of consensus to a lower threshold of agreement – or even begin operating by majority vote—and it seems evident that the large majority of the community would not wish for such a development. Once it is finally rendered, the Board’s acceptance or rejection of GAC advice depends on less the difference between a majority versus two-thirds voting threshold than the selection of Board members who have allegiance to ICANN’s Mission, Commitments and Core Values, and to an Internet Governance narrative that welcomes governmental advice but rejects governmental control. Given that a GAC operating under the definition of consensus memorialized in Recommendation 11 will almost always have a more difficult task in reaching consensus, and will take substantially longer to do so, than other Chartering organizations, my real concern is that including the GAC within the empowered community may substantially hinder the potential application of accountability measures in situations where time is of the essence. Therefore, while shaping the (hopefully final) Supplemental Proposal we need to make sure that the escalation process will be able to proceed at requisite speed even when one of the empowered entities is subject to the internal dynamics of the GAC and will often be unable to render a yay or nay. Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal Virtualaw LLC 1155 F Street, NW Suite 1050 Washington, DC 20004 202-559-8597/Direct 202-559-8750/Fax 202-255-6172/cell Twitter: @VlawDC "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey From: accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces@icann.org] On Behalf Of Jordan Carter Sent: Thursday, January 28, 2016 5:44 PM To: Andrew Sullivan Cc: Accountability Cross Community Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Recommendation 11, 2/3 board threshold, GAC consensus, and finishing Dear Andrew, all: I see the situation a little bit differently. It seems to me there is fairly broad agreement about these points: - the GAC's advice is advice, and does not bind the ICANN Board - the Bylaws set out how the Board should deal with GAC advice (attempt to come to an agreement - wrong language but you get the point) - GAC today generates advice by consensus - GAC today could change the way it generates advice - the ICANN Bylaws should clearly state that the way the Board has to respond to GAC advice should only apply to consensus GAC advice - the Board has the ability to not accept GAC advice even if it works through the "attempt to come to an agreement" process. The critical difference we were discussing with our two options today is whether, in deciding not to accept GAC advice, the Board can (point 5) make that decision by majority, or (point 6) whether it has to achieve 2/3 support to make that decision. We know that in practice the ICANN Board would generally made a decision like this *by consensus*, so there is very unlikely to be any practical difference whichever option we choose. We also know that when the ICANN community was consulted about the idea of raising the threshold in the bylaws to 2/3, it was overwhelmingly rejected. May I add two other points I think that we know, but which are probably controversial: - the GNSO is unlikely to be able to approve the proposal with the 2/3 rule in place - the GAC is unlikely to be able to come to a consensus to reject the proposal in the absence of the 2/3 rule. I've explained why I think there is no practical difference between the two alternatives. Either way the Board will operate by consensus if at all possible on such weighty matters. That said, I do recognise the importance of the symbolism here. So let me set out my view of this. I think that governments form an integral part of the ICANN community. In a context of private sector led multistakeholder governance of the Internet DNS, they have to be at the table in an appropriate way. That's why I support GAC as an advisory body only in dealing with ICANN's main business - its various policy development processes. It is also why I support it as a decisional participant in the exercise of the limited and narrow set of accountability powers our proposals deal with. There is certainly no disrespect of sovereign states or the role of governments on my part when I say that the symbolism of 1/2 v 2/3 is simply not a battle worth fighting, especially when the rest of the ICANN community has so clearly expressed its view - and when it is so clear that it will make no practical difference whatsoever. I'll close by appealing again to what we are trying to do here. We are trying to close out a proposal, sure - and that should lead to all the chartering organisations supporting it, or at least not opposing it. I see that happening most simply through the Point 6 proposal - simple majority rule for the Board. But besides closing out this proposal, we are all trying to build a stable and constructive post-transition ICANN. Acknowledging and respecting our respective roles and responsibilities in that is important. In my view the CCWG will likely decide to proceed with Point 6. If that is right, it is a responsibility of all of us to portray that for what it is: a decision made on logical grounds, taking the feedback of the ICANN community into account. It is not an insult, or a symbolic "win" or "loss" for anyone. I appeal to everyone who's got a deeply entrenched position on this argument either way to make sure that the discussion and decisions over the next few days are done with that spirit of coming to a sound conclusion, and that whichever way it goes, the good faith of all participants isn't in doubt. That's the best thing I can think of to help us get this work done in a durable and successful way. cheers Jordan On 29 January 2016 at 09:57, Andrew Sullivan <ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com>> wrote: Dear colleagues, I was going to make a comment on the call today, but in the interests of time I took myself out of the queue. This note replaces what I wanted to say. For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise, I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal. That will conceivably scuttle the transition; and in the absence of a consensus on the accountability measures, there is no reason to suppose we'll get the additional powers that are in the current text (incuding the Empowered Community). Is it worth it to give up those additional powers to prevent the 2/3 board threshold, given that the additional powers provide a way to foil truly bad decisions anyway? As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority. And indeed, as things are, the ICANN board has a difficult time even under the current arrangements when it decides to reject GAC advice. Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions. Therefore, the consensus position of the GAC represents a grave threat to the transition. The current state of affairs is in any case not that hot; and the GAC could unilaterally make that current state of affairs worse. The compromise proposal does a few things. It is true that it increases the threshold for the board to reject GAC advice. But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold. In that way, it is actually an improvement of GAC's covenant with the ICANN community. Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place. The compromise proposal is not perfect -- I too would prefer not to have the 2/3 rule -- but one does not expect complete satisfaction from a compromise. And it should be surprising to no-one that it came rather late: each side wants something pretty big, and both appear to be dug in. This means that each will need to give something up. That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition. Best regards, A -- Andrew Sullivan ajs@anvilwalrusden.com<mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com> _______________________________________________ Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org<mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community@icann.org> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community -- Jordan Carter Chief Executive InternetNZ +64-4-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob) Email: jordan@internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz> Skype: jordancarter Web: www.internetnz.nz<http://www.internetnz.nz> A better world through a better Internet ________________________________ No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com<http://www.avg.com> Version: 2016.0.7227 / Virus Database: 4489/11316 - Release Date: 01/03/16 Internal Virus Database is out of date.
Dear Andrew, Please forgive me for writing to disagree with you forcefully. You and I are usually in either in complete agreement, or quibbling over mere details of a broader unity. And you usually make your case so beautifully there is usually nothing to add at all. On this, however, I respectfully disagree with your conclusion that we should adopt this clause, the so-called "2/3 rule". Moreover, I'm afraid I think that the evidence you offer to persuade us to your view is demonstrably untrue in almost every respect. On 28/01/2016 20:57, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
For those chartering organizations and individuals that wish to reject the compromise,
What compromise? We keep being told this is a compromise, but I see none. You say:
But in exchange for that, it enshrines the GAC's responsibility to the rest of the ICANN community as to how the GAC will reach decisions. This means that, in exchange for the increased threshold -- a threshold that I think will be easy to reach regardless of the actual numbers on the board in any case that counts -- the GAC is giving up independent control over its decision-making procedures when exercising that threshold.
This is simply not the case. The footnote makes clear that the GAC retains complete control over its decision-making procedures, even to the extent of defining what constitute a formal objection. What the community sought was to ensure that the Board would never be faced with something called "GAC advice", that purports to represent the collective view of governments, while simultaineously receiving directly opposing advice from one or more governments that did not join the GAC "consensus". Have we achieved that? No. The footnote makes clear that the GAC could still define the opposition of one or more governments as not constituting a "formal objection" for any reason, including (for example) that it was not supported by a sufficient number of other governments. If the GAC chooses to switch to a 75% supramajority system, this new bylaw does not prevent them from doing so: they simply need to define a "formal objection" as being one supported by 25%+1 of the governments present. Or the GAC could refuse to classify a dissenting opinion as a "formal objection" for any other reason: not being submitted in advance, for example. Personally, I doubt that even had we achieved that protection for the Board from an invidious position it would be worth the price we are invited to pay. But since that supposed protection disintegrates under scrutiny, the issue doesn't even arise. There is something else the rest of the community sought. We wanted to win GAC's support for the CCWG Proposal as a whole. In my view, this is a much more persuasive reason why we might have accepted this demand. But have we won the GAC's support for our proposal? No. The GAC has made clear that it is split on this issue, and unlikely to reach a resolution. It is also withholding its support on other issues too. Why should the rest of us give this clause our support when the GAC does not? Indeed, if one really wished to insist on describing this as "compromise" that was "reached" on Thanksgiving, as one of our co-Chairs said this evening, then the GAC has also reneged, by failing to support it. In truth, however, neither the GAC nor the GNSO has "reneged" on a "compromise" that was "reached", because no compromise was reached at all. All that happened was that the CCWG came up with a proposal that it hoped would form a compromise, if agreed upon by the community as whole. It is entirely within the rights of both the GAC and the GNSO to decline to endorse it. But you cannot then call it a compromise, that neither party accepts.
I have a question. If the proposed compromise position on recommendation 11 is rejected, there is a good reason to suppose that at least one important part of the community (the GAC) will reject the accountability proposal.
Firstly, the GAC has made clear that it is divided. It has given no reason to suppose that it will suddenly unite in opposition to the removal of this clause, when it was unable to unite in support of the same clause's inclusion. Secondly, there is by contrast a very clear reason to suppose that if the 2/3 rule is not removed then one important part of the community, the GNSO, will reject the accountability proposal: the GNSO has said so plainly. Why do you think the GAC support is so much more worthy of weight, while the GNSO position is not? The GNSO is the very reason that ICANN exists in anything like its current form: forming and implementing GNSO policy is the entire purpose for ICANN being more than merely IANA. Surely the GNSO community is very much the community without whose support transition is dead. If fear of rejection "by an important part of the community" is your litmus test, that clearly points to removal of the 2/3 rule from our proposal, not adoption of it.
As I understand things, we are in a trap. On the one hand, the GAC has produced a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority.
You are mistaken. Please remember that GAC communications are negotiated documents and you cannot safely make any assumptions beyond what stated. The Dublin Statement stated: "In assessing the different rationales presented so far related to Stress Test 18, the GAC considered The recommendation of the BGRI WG, as reiterated by the ATRT2, to set the threshold for the ICANN Board to reject GAC advice to a 2/3 majority voting, consistent with the threshold established for rejection of ccNSO and GNSO PDP recommendations." That is a long way from stating "a consensus position that the board must reject GAC advice by a supermajority.". I know that if you or I wrote such a thing in ordinary discussion (such as now) what you say would be a reasonable inference, but those rules simply do not apply when deciphering intergovernmentally-negotiated text. Of course, it is possible that the GAC might adopt such a position in the future. But they have given us no evidence that they will do so, and every evidence that they are unable to do so. The expectation that this will change is - for those of us not privy to the GAC's internal deliberations - a matter of the purest speculation.
Yet the GAC is currently free to rearrange its own procedures such that it could lower its own threshold for decisions.
As I have said above, it will remain free, to precisely the same extent as it is now, under the proposal you recommend to us. In fact, that GAC freedom of which you speak is *currently* contrained by the existing GAC Operating Procedures: moving to a lower threshold would have to be approved by the current, higher threshold. That is the only protection we have, now or under this new proposal.
Moreover, let us suppose that the GAC produced advice that the board decided to accept, but the rest of the community found that objectionable. In that case, the rest of the community could force the board not to take the advice _anyway_, because of the additional accountability measures that this CCWG wants to put in place.
How could the community force the Board not to take the GAC's advice? By sacking the Board, and replacing it with new directors? Unless the Board's action also breached the Bylaws (in which case an IRP challenge could be attempted), that is the only recourse available. Sacking the Board in such circumstances is purest fantasy. The GAC would obviously object;o nly one other objection would then be needed. ALAC would surely supply it; one thing that has become clear to me for the first time, during my participation in this WG, is how close the ALAC is to the Board, and how readily they adopt the Board's view. Moreover, such a question is most likely to arise over a matter of gTLD policy. It seems to me highly questionable as to whether the ccNSO or the ASO would ever consider dismissing the Board over a purely gNSO matter that did not directly concern them. So Board dismissal would likely fail for lack of support, as well as for sufficient opposition. I'm afraid your expection of community control gives far too much credit to efficacy of the CCWG proposal. There is simply no available mechanism to do what you say.
That's what deals look like. And we need a deal, and soon, because we need to move ahead with the IANA transition.
We do indeed need to move ahead with the IANA transition. Do you really hope to achieve that by pressing for a proposal the gNSO cannot support? Andrew, I truly appreciate your efforts to move us past this difficult issue so that transition can proceed. But I am afraid I believe you have alighted on precisely the wrong way of achieving this. Would you efforts not be better spent trying to reconcile the GAC to the entirely reasonable necessity of avoiding the Board having to judge between opposing government advice? Must we really pay, as a price for this modest and reasonable request, the promise that ICANN will by default do whatever governments instruct it, unless overwhelming opposition can be organised? Is that how you would really wish ICANN to be constituted in the future? Or any other I* organisation? ICANN is not supposed to be an intergovernmentally-led organisation. I believe you support that principle too, Andrew. I also believe a number of governments continue to profess it, including even some of those who are incomprehensibly advocating that the Board should be required to follow their advice except when extraordinary opposition can be mustered. I would urge those Members that do believe governments have an important role to play, but not a leading one, to support the gNSO concerns and vote to remove the 2/3 rule from our proposal. Kind Regards, Malcolm. -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd Monument Place, 24 Monument Street, London EC3R 8AJ Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA
participants (27)
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Andrew Sullivan -
Avri Doria -
Chartier, Mike S -
Chris Disspain -
CW Mail -
Dr Eberhard W Lisse -
Drazek, Keith -
Edward Morris -
Eric (Maule) Brunner-Williams -
Greg Shatan -
Jeff Neuman -
Jordan Carter -
Jorge.Cancio＠bakom.admin.ch -
Kavouss Arasteh -
Malcolm Hutty -
Marilyn Cade -
Mueller, Milton L -
Nigel Roberts -
Olga Cavalli -
Paul Rosenzweig -
Pedro Ivo Ferraz da Silva -
Perez Galindo, Rafael -
Phil Corwin -
Robin Gross -
Roelof Meijer -
Schaefer, Brett -
Seun Ojedeji